THE MORGENTHAU PLAN: Soviet Influence on American Postwar Policy

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THE MORGENTHAU PLAN
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INTRODUCTION

_Homo homini lupus_ — Man is a wolf to other men.

In an age where every government policy is dissected for the slightest hint of scandal, where every hero is scrutinized for the most minute blemish, there is a curious lack of critical interest in the period of history immediately following the Second World War. Still, as the passions surrounding the events of the Second World War inevitably subside, a reexamination of the Western postwar policies is unavoidable. New documentary evidence demands a reconsideration of the way government officials and politicians formed policy. Inconsistencies and obvious falsehoods have been accepted at face value by respected historians, whose natural inquisitiveness is strangely absent.

Sad to say, reports of mass murder and genocide in the twentieth century have not been uncommon; sadder still, the holocaust depicted in this book is unique in that there is no clear historical record of its occurrence. Millions of people perished without mention or with little more than a footnote in some of the most detailed accounts of the history of the period. This missing chapter is so large as to lead to the conclusion that the historical record has been grossly distorted. As James Bacque commented, “It is astonishing to encounter such a wholesale erasure of history.”

<1>
In an age of historical revisionism there is one absolute: World War II was a “good war.” It was a conflict in which the forces of good were pitted against the forces of evil. As General Eisenhower stated, “This war was a holy war; more than any other in history this war has been an array of the forces of evil against those of righteousness.” On July 13, 1945, he wrote to Field Marshal Montgomery, “a continent has been liberated from all that is an antipathy to the ideal of democracy which is our common heritage.”

Within two years of the end of the War, this comforting interpretation of events was rendered obsolete by the East-West conflict. As a result of this conflict Soviet policies came under increased scrutiny, leading to the conclusion that only half a continent, at best, had been liberated.

While Soviet policies came under closer inspection, Western policies have rarely been subjected to critical review. This book will deal with the Morgenthau Plan and its impact on American postwar planning. Conventional accounts of Western postwar policies occasionally mention the Morgenthau Plan, describing it as a plan developed in the Treasury Department designed to deindustrialize or “pastoralize” the German nation. These accounts are chiefly characterized by their brevity. Professor Robert Ferrell has remarked, “the proposal [the Morgenthau Plan] and its temporary and partial adoption . . . was an unfortunate but small chapter in American diplomatic history.” Conventional accounts state that the Plan was adopted by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill at the Second Quebec Conference in September 1944, and that, when President Roosevelt was informed of its impracticality, he immediately abandoned it and stated that he had initialed the plan “without much thought.”

McGeorge Bundy provides a typical explanation of the plan’s rejection:

This preposterous paper died young; Roosevelt shared it with Hull, Hull with others, and someone with the newspapers. In the resulting hullabaloo Roosevelt began to assert that he had no such plan, and when Stimson responded by reading back to him what he had initialed, he was “frankly . . . staggered and said he had no idea how he could have initialed this.”
Following the plan’s apparent rejection, more enlightened policies were supposedly adopted. Robert Dallek found these postwar policies “refreshing.”

It is refreshing to study a record of American foreign policy toward Western Europe since the Second World War. . . . Instead of an imperialistic America exploiting Europe’s weakness, these documents reveal a generous and often realistic government of the United States aiding a prostrate Europe to regain economic health, defend herself from internal and external threats, and integrate a rebuilt, democratic Germany into the mainstream of her economic and political life.6

In spite of these enlightened policies, the European economy went into a tailspin. Dallek reports that, “By Spring, 1947, however, political instability and natural disasters in the form of droughts, unprecedented cold and crop failures had brought Europe to the verge of total collapse.”7 At this point the US Secretary of State, George Marshall, stepped in with the Marshall Plan to rebuild the European economy. Western Europe miraculously recovered and Secretary of State Marshall deserved a large part of the credit for this turnaround.

The conventional account contains four misleading assertions. First, the Morgenthau Plan was not designed to “cripple” German industrial potential or to transform Germany into a “pastoral” state, as is often reported. The plan was designed to completely destroy the German economy, enslave millions of her citizens, and exterminate as many as 20 million people.8 Dr. Ernest F. Fisher, Jr., a senior historian with the United States Army Center for Military History, has stated,

The plans made at the highest levels of the US and British governments in 1944 expressed a determination to destroy Germany as a world power once and for all by reducing her to a peasant economy, although this would mean the starvation of millions of civilians.”9

In response to a question about the possible German reaction to the large amount of German territory which was to be surrendered to Poland, Victor Gollancz quotes Winston Churchill:
“We need not fear,” he continued, “that the task of holding these new lines will be too heavy for Poland, or that it will bring about another German revenge, or that it will, to use a conventional phrase, sow the seeds of future wars. We intend to take steps far more drastic and effective than those that followed the last war, because we know much more about this business, so as to render all offensive action by Germany utterly impossible for generations to come.”

Second, the Morgenthau Plan thoroughly reflected President Roosevelt’s views on postwar policy. He spent a great deal of time studying and promoting the plan, often against heated opposition. There is also reason to believe that he made significant concessions to obtain British acceptance of the plan. However, few commentators accept Warren Kimball’s conclusion that, “What appears, on the surface, to have been the impulsive acceptance by Churchill and Roosevelt of the Morgenthau Plan for the pastoralization and reform of Germany was actually the culmination of an intensive and wide-ranging debate within the American government.”

The assertion that the Morgenthau Plan was not implemented is based on the fact that the plan was not enforced as Secretary Morgenthau and his assistant Harry Dexter White had envisioned it. As Warren Kimball stated, “Unless the Morgenthau Plan existed as a whole, it did not exist at all.” But no plan of such magnitude, containing such radical proposals, has ever been implemented in its entirety as it was originally conceived. Using this standard, one could maintain that the Marshall Plan for the reconstruction of Europe was never carried out either, because it was not implemented in its original form.

Finally, the policies based on this plan were not immediately rejected. The fundamental policy based on the plan, Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive 1067, was not replaced until July 1947. To quote one German reference, “the Morgenthau Plan essentially determined American’s German policy until 1947.”

There are of course problems in questioning some of the most basic assumptions of the conventional historical outlook. Accepting the conclusions that must be drawn from what follows will be extremely
painful to a great many people. James Bacque wrote that he and his assistant found themselves in a strange state of mind while investigating the deaths of German POWs following World War II. They were “convinced by great evidence that leaders of our society had committed an appalling crime against humanity, which we did not want to believe. Every day, we had to choose between the horrible truth and the pretty myths we had been taught about our history.” What would motivate someone to pursue such an uncomfortable course? Why did not Bacque simply ignore the evidence? Columnist Walter Lippmann commented, “Once an issue has been fought over a long time, most of us are too proud and too timid to be moved out of our entrenchments by reason and evidence alone.”

The motives of revisionists are suspect, as they should be. The conclusions that can be drawn from this account obviously could be abused. They could be used to condemn all Americans for the policies of some of their leaders. They could also be used by people trying to justify the behavior of the National Socialists or by anti-Semites. It should be pointed out that the American people paid an extremely high price for their Secretary of Treasury’s interference in foreign affairs. It should also be pointed out that one of the severest critics of Western postwar policy was the Jewish publicist, Victor Gollancz.

Secretary of War Stimson objected to the Morgenthau Plan because he believed that it would somehow lessen the crimes of the Nazis in the eyes of the world. Edward Peterson wrote, “The occupation diminished the horrors of Nazism by creating some horrors of its own.” However, these crimes should be judged individually. They should not be compared. Soviet activities or Western actions in no way diminish the crimes of the Nazis.

One reason offered for the constant reminders of the Nazi Holocaust is that to remember it will prevent it from ever happening again, so that we may avoid the fate noted by George Santayana, that “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.” However, if we maintain a narrow interpretation of the Nazi Holocaust, we may miss the point. If the lesson learned is that we must be vigilant lest the Germans revert to this form of behavior or that some other nationality under a fanatical dictatorship may pursue similar policies, we blind
ourselves to a more serious danger. Self confident, knowing that the human race or at least the people of the democratic nations have progressed to a point where this type of behavior is no longer possible, we may not realize how fragile the veneer of civilization really is — how susceptible man is to evil.

This book provides a revisionist interpretation of the events preceding the end of the Second World War and the peace settlement that followed. It will become clear that the evil that was National Socialism was not unique to Germany in the first part of the twentieth century. Evil is universal and many of the characteristics condemned in the Germans (arrogance, intolerance, blind obedience, a willingness to follow immoral orders, and an ability to deny facts that should have been commonly known) can be found in any nationality. Human failings are universal, regardless of nationality, but also regardless of ideology.

It will become clear that the outlook that fostered the “Atlantic Charter” and the “Four Freedoms” also was responsible for policies that rivaled those of the National Socialists in their consequences. Alfred de Zayas asked, “if the Allies fought against the Nazi enemy because of his inhuman methods, could they then adopt some of those same methods in retribution?” The answer to this question appears to be that they could, and did.

The purpose of this account is to demonstrate that individuals commit crimes. Those individuals and no one else should be held responsible for their crimes. Modern ideologies often condemn entire races or classes. We can easily recognize this characteristic in alien ideologies. It is far more difficult to recognize it in our progressive Western ideology. However, these evil characteristics are there — as will be demonstrated. Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn has remarked, “The line dividing good and evil cuts through the heart of every human being.”

That individuals are responsible for their actions is a traditional and widely accepted viewpoint. However, it is more difficult to maintain than one might expect. Immediately after criticizing the concept of collective guilt, Alfred de Zayas states, “Only a few voices have been raised to acknowledge the injustices perpetrated by us and our allies over so many decades.” Another opponent of the concept of collective guilt, Victor Gollancz, asserted:
Instead of doing justice and showing mercy and walking humbly, we did as Hitler would have done. We annexed, we expelled, we stole: we exhibited an extreme of nationalist intolerance: we bore ourselves with offensive superiority: when the pinch came, and the choice was between a little less comfort for ourselves and starvation for the enemy, we let them starve: and the twin bases of our policy were the secular wickedness of self-interest, or what we grotesquely misunderstood as such, and *vae victis*. I am not suggesting, God forbid, that we did these things to the degree to which Hitler would have done them: if I thought that I should think the war fought in vain, which is very far from being the case. But we acted more in Hitler’s spirit than in ours; and was this the way, I ask, to wean the German people from Hitlerism or the basic ideas of which Hitlerism is merely one expression? Was it not rather to convince them that all our liberal talk had been so much hypocrisy, that the war had been merely a trial of strength in which they happened to have lost, and that a ruthless selfishness was the norm of behavior which everyone, when it came to it, adopted? Nor can we escape by claiming that the responsibility is at worst our statesmen’s and not ours. In a democratic country statesmen cannot act in defiance of public opinion, if it is sufficiently strong and adequately vocal.  

It is impossible to determine what percentage of the population of the Western democracies would have supported these “injustices.” These policies were often carried out in secret. They were classified secret precisely because they would have caused a furor in the United States and in the Allied countries. People can not be held responsible for policies carried out by their government that they would have objected to if they were not kept secret. Nikolai Tolstoy commented,

All in all, it seems just to assert that ordinary British and American people cannot fairly be charged with the stigma of supporting the agreements entered into at Moscow and Yalta. They knew nothing of the circumstances, and their governments estimated, doubtless correctly, that they would have recoiled at the measures effected by their rulers had they known the full story.  

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This book is based primarily on unclassified information that has been available to the public for decades. Although many accounts of the Morgenthau Plan accept the euphemisms, understatements and outright fabrications offered by the individuals concerned, the author intends to demonstrate that it was not impossible for a conscientious researcher to uncover a more accurate picture of the truth. However, most scholars have decided to accept at face value statements that on close inspection are obviously false.

Some of these misstatements concerning the Morgenthau Plan are understandable. One example is a statement by Fleet Admiral William Leahy, President Roosevelt’s Chief of Staff, recorded in his ironically entitled memoirs, *I Was There*. “A number of important political questions were considered at this meeting [Quebec], but I did not attend the political sessions.”22 In fact, the Admiral did attend at least one crucial and dramatic three-hour-long dinner conference in Quebec on the 13th of September.23 His account of what took place at this meeting would have shed valuable light on what occurred during the conference. It does not appear that the Admiral was attempting to cover up for Morgenthau. According to a memo describing this conference by Henry Dexter White, Morgenthau’s assistant, “Admiral Leahy seemed on the whole to be unsympathetic to the Treasury’s program and to side with Churchill.”24 It is more likely that the Admiral failed to record his attendance at this meeting because it would have raised some difficult questions, and he wisely chose to avoid the controversy. It is also understandable that, in his extensive memoirs, Secretary of State Hull failed to make any reference to his early support of the Morgenthau Plan.

It is less understandable when a respected biographer intentionally distorts the historical record. Robert E. Sherwood records, in his biography, *Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History*:

The Hopkins papers, while full of relevant material, tell nothing which has not already been revealed. There is no doubt that Hopkins, as a member of the President’s Special Cabinet Committee, joined with Hull and Stimson in opposition to the plan.25
But there is no evidence that Hopkins ever opposed Morgenthau and there are several references to his firm support of Morgenthau. Had Hopkins edited his papers to delete all reference to his support for the plan, Sherwood should still have been aware of Hopkins's position from the writings of other participants. Sherwood wrote,

The circumstances of the origination of this plan, and of its initial approval by Roosevelt and Churchill, and of the violent repercussions when news of it was leaked to the press, have been described in detail from various points of view by Cordell Hull, Henry L. Stimson, and Henry Morgenthau, Jr., himself — and Winston Churchill will undoubtedly be heard from on this subject in due course.26

These numerous accounts do not support Sherwood's contention that Hopkins ever opposed the plan.27

The problem of press censorship also restricted the public's awareness and researchers' effectiveness. The New York Times commented on this problem in its May 27, 1945 edition:

The American people are being deprived of information to which they are entitled . . . It seems almost as though now that there is no enemy to fight, high Army officers are spending a large part of their time writing directives to circumscribe the movements and activities of war correspondents.28

In addition to press censorship and the less than candid memoirs of the participants, many of the files dealing with the postwar period have been destroyed or sanitized. Nikolai Tolstoy provides one example of this. He was attempting to obtain a specific file dealing with the transfer of German troops of Russian origin to the Soviet Union following the war. He wrote the Ministry of Defense in London requesting the files. He was informed that, “All three volumes were physically destroyed in 1968 or 1969 as not being worthy of permanent preservation under the Public Records Act 1958.” When Tolstoy requested photocopies of the files still held by the Americans, he was informed that the British had advised the Americans that, “we continued to regard file 383.7-14.1 as personally sensitive and therefore subject to a 75-year clo-
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sure period, and that no privileged access had been or would be given. 29 James Bacque discovered copies of an order issued by General Eisenhower in the archives of several villages near the Rhine river, including the village of Langenlonsheim, making it a crime punishable by death to feed prisoners. This order is reproduced in his book Crimes and Mercies. Bacque spent six months attempting to locate a copy of this order in the U.S. military archives, without success. 30

In spite of the obvious distortions of the records, the unwillingness of many of the participants to recount their roles in these events accurately, and the destruction of documents, it is possible to reconstruct a more accurate picture of what took place during this period. Although efforts are still being made to maintain the official history by suppressing evidence, there are enough open sources to provide a fairly clear picture of what transpired during this period. All that is required is an ability to look at these events objectively. Victor Gollancz described this eventuality in 1946:

When men recover, if they ever do recover, their objectivity, Yalta and Potsdam will be names of infamy; and what will be remembered will be, not the photographs of Mr. Churchill and President Roosevelt and Marshal Stalin in smiling good-fellowship, but decisions which brought unutterable wretchedness to millions and will bring it to many more, and which sooner or later must divide the men, or their countries, which were jointly responsible. 31

The National Socialists were extremely popular in Germany, especially at the height of their victories. It is quite possible that an overwhelming majority of the German population supported them at one point. It should be remembered, however, that the National Socialists never received a majority of the German vote in an election. After Hitler was appointed Chancellor in January 1933, after the Reichstag fire and the banning of the German Communist Party, the National Socialists received only 44 percent of the vote in the election of March 5, 1933. There was always a sizable minority in Germany opposed to the National Socialists. Naturally, among them were a majority of the German Communists and German Jews. The German Communist
Party was the largest Communist Party outside of the Soviet Union. W. Friedmann asserted that there may have been as many as 800,000 opponents of the regime imprisoned in concentration camps.

Colonel Andrus, who was in charge of the prisoners at Nuremberg, spoke of the National Socialists who committed the most terrible crimes as “my boys.” It is ironic that they frequently received more humane treatment at the hands of the Allies than did their German opposition. Andrus related with pride that the prisoners’ health had improved under the prison regime; the defendants at Nuremberg were well fed during their captivity. When it came time for them to pay for their crimes, those condemned to death were executed in a humane fashion; many of their opponents suffered a more severe fate.

This was a consequence of the official government policy of presuming collective guilt. In his report to President Truman date November 9, 1945, Byron Price complained that:

Notwithstanding the punishment Germans now suffer and those still before them, there is no apparent realization of collective guilt for the unspeakable crimes committed by the German nation. . . . Intelligence reports indicate clearly that all of our propaganda efforts to instill a sense of collective guilt have fallen flat.

Gollancz’s comment on this philosophy seems appropriate. “This horrible vice of personalizing a race or nation and depersonalizing the individuals that make it up is of course nothing new. The Jews have suffered particularly from it.”

People are outraged by individuals who contend that the Nazi Holocaust did not take place. An enormous injustice was committed and yet there are those who would deny it. They should be equally outraged that information about the events described herein has been so successfully suppressed, for so long. Ultimately, the reader will be the judge of the accuracy of this account; and while the reader may not agree with all of the conclusions, he will find it impossible to deny that there has been a gross distortion of the historical record and that further research into this era is necessary.

The author does not suggest that the United States should not
have entered the Second World War. The United States had legitimate interests in what was taking place in Europe. As Robert Dallek has written, “Americans had always regarded the preservation of a balance of power in Europe as a vital interest of the United States.”37 The problem arises with how those interests were defended.

Proponents stressed three major advantages of the Morgenthau Plan. First, it would remove the threat of Germany dominating Europe or attempting to conquer the world. A plan to destroy Germany as a nation had a certain appeal in light of the perception that Germany had been the cause of two of the bloodiest wars in the history of the world, within the course of twenty-five years. Second, the plan would capture German markets for the British. And third, it would provide industrial plants for the victims of Nazi aggression. What was President Roosevelt willing to pay for this?

It is suggested that at the Quebec Conference itself the President agreed to a $6.5 billion credit to the British in order to gain Churchill’s acceptance of the plan. It is also possible that the President agreed to an exchange of zones of occupation with the British for the same reason. Prior to the conference, the President’s advisers had pointed out that the destruction of the German economy would lead to a general collapse of the European economy. This would require the US taxpayers to provide billions of dollars in financial aid to Europe. The resulting political unrest could possibly lead to a victory of communism in Europe. Roosevelt’s Secretary of War observed that this intentional creation of economic chaos would damage the moral standing of the Allies. However, Roosevelt was willing to accept the political fallout once the plan became public, as it inevitably would. He was also informed that it would naturally stiffen German military resistance, leading to increased Allied casualties; yet President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill were willing to agree to the plan’s implementation.

Most accounts that deal with the Morgenthau Plan in any detail assert that the policies derived from it were the result of incompetence. Gustav Stolper repeatedly referred to the naivete of the plan.38 W. Friedmann attributed the results of the plan to “muddled economic thinking,”39 and stated, “It would now be trivial to explain in full the whole folly of this policy.”40 Edward Peterson stated, “The JCS
emerged from its long top secret deliberations with a foolish policy toward Germany.”41 Stolper remarked that, “What makes the Morgenthau Plan such an amazing document is not that it is cruel to the Germans, or impracticable but that such a concept of the dynamics of economic life could have been promoted by a man who for twelve years had been Secretary of the Treasury of the United States.”42 Finally Lewis Douglas, General Clay’s financial adviser, claimed that the directive based upon the plan was “assembled by economic idiots.”43 Henry Morgenthau and his assistant Harry Dexter White, the primary architect of the Morgenthau Plan, were many things, but they were not fools or “economic idiots.” This book should resolve that seeming paradox.

Apparently comfortable with the assumption that the financial experts in the US Treasury and their supporters throughout the US government were incompetent, many critics of the Morgenthau Plan simply discard the only other plausible explanation for the destructive consequences of the plan. Ultimately, there was only one beneficiary of the plan: the Soviet Union.

In order to understand the willingness to follow a plan that was so clearly contrary to US interests, it is necessary to review the attitude held by many in the US government toward the Soviet Union during this period. Nikolai Tolstoy remarked,

From the moment that the German invasion compelled the Soviet Union to fight on the same side as the Allies, an extraordinary quasi-religious emotion swept over people of all classes. It was for the most part wholly uncritical and irrational, and frequently resulted in the press, radio and cinema representing Soviet society as actually superior to that in the democracies. In 1942 Harold Nicolson remarked, “Anyone who makes even the slightest critical remark . . . is branded as ‘an enemy of the Soviet.’” A Soviet official remarked, “The slightest effort to scrape off a little of the tinsel, to expose the squalor and moral ugliness underneath, was resented by most Americans as if their deepest religious convictions were at stake.”44

Milovan Djilas commented, “That idolatry of Stalin’s personality, as well as of more or less everything in the Soviet Union, acquired irra-
tional forms and proportions." The Polish Ambassador to the United States during the war years commented, “The fast-dwindling few who dared to challenge the truthfulness of such blasts of pro-Soviet admiration were accused of unfriendly bias and suspected of fascist leanings.” President Roosevelt informed the Polish Ambassador that the “pro-Soviet sentiment in America was superficial, as a matter of fact, it had to be artificially fed.” One of the ways this sentiment was fed was through the media. Life magazine provides an example; it stated in 1943 that the Russians “look like Americans, dress like Americans and think like Americans.”

This led the Polish Ambassador, Jan Ciechanowski, to complain about “The rising tide of ‘fellow travelers [which] was rapidly penetrating American official and political circles, ready to criticize even the American Bill of Rights if it appeared to clash with Soviet ideology.” The Ambassador complained that pro-Soviet elements had moved into important places in some of the United States’ war agencies and that anyone who criticized the Soviet government “was pilloried as a “Fascist saboteur and German spy.” Stanislaw Mikolajczyk noted that “We finally protested to the United States State Department about the tone of the OWI [Office of War Information] broadcasts to Poland. Such broadcasts, which we carefully monitored in London, might well have emanated from Moscow itself.”

All of this propaganda may have had an effect on President Roosevelt. In response to criticism of Joseph Stalin by Ambassador Bullitt, Roosevelt responded, “I just have a hunch that Stalin is not that kind of man. Harry [Hopkins] says he’s not. . . and I think that if I give him everything I possibly can and ask nothing from him in return, noblesse oblige, he won’t try to annex anything and will work with me for a world of democracy and peace.” Yet Roosevelt must have been aware, to some extent at least, of the nature of the Soviet leader. In 1943 he commented to the Polish Ambassador, “We have to admit that Uncle Joe knows how to play a wily game.”

The following is an account of the genesis, development, implementation, and eventual rejection of the Morgenthau Plan. The reader will judge the logic of the argument and the reliability of the sources. Even those who do not agree with the conclusions drawn will have to
agree that further research is needed. There are too many unexplained events, events that have not received the attention they deserve. The fact that these events are unpleasant is not an excuse for professional historians to gloss over them.
On July 6, 1944, Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau Jr., temporarily relinquished his chairmanship of the Bretton Woods Conference to go to the White House to speak with the President. Morgenthau had been the Secretary of the Treasury for nearly eleven years and was a close friend of the President as well as being his upstate New York neighbor. He requested permission to go to France to evaluate plans for US occupation currency. He was pleased with Roosevelt’s “instantaneous” positive reaction.1

Morgenthau and his staff departed for Europe on August 6, boarding a military transport at Presque Isle, Maine, for the sixteen-hour flight to Prestwick, Scotland. According to Morgenthau’s son, “Morgenthau and Harry White were experiencing a high that stimulated their hunger for a new challenge. Ostensibly their mission was to investigate financial conditions in Europe and formulate plans for the currency to be used by the Allied occupying forces.”2

Because White played such a crucial role in the formulation of the Morgenthau Plan (Morgenthau’s son claims that the “so-called Morgenthau Plan seems to have been conceived in the mind of Harry Dexter White”)3 some background on White might give the reader a clearer picture of his role in the Treasury Department. Harry Dexter
White was born in Boston in 1892 to Lithuanian parents. He received a Ph.D. from Harvard and joined the Treasury in 1934. White rose rapidly in the Treasury. According to Henry Morgenthau's son, White advanced to become “the secretary’s most influential adviser.” Morgenthau gave White responsibility for all of the Treasury’s foreign policy activities and appointed him the department’s representative to other agencies including the Office of Strategic Services, America’s wartime intelligence service. White eventually rose to the position of Assistant Secretary of the Treasury. He was considered a world-class economist, and because of his role in the founding of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, he has retained this reputation. The enormous damage White inflicted on US interests is often minimized and sometimes is completely overlooked.

In 1953, E.F. Penrose, Ambassador Winant’s adviser, wrote in his *Economic Planning for the Peace*, “The account given in this study of the origin and development of the Morgenthau Plan and the reparation plan should dispose of the insinuations, made during the hearings of certain congressional committees, that Dr. Harry White was a disguised communist following instructions from Moscow.” Warren Kimball asserted that, “Flimsy and uncorroborated statements made by a few witnesses before those groups [congressional investigative committees], inspired speculation that White had formulated the Morgenthau Plan on orders from Moscow. That is simply not true.” Edward Peterson commented in his book on American occupation policy that Harry Dexter White “was described during the McCarthy era as a Communist. This assertion proved to some more simple-minded observers that the Morgenthau Plan, as well as the early occupation policy, was part of ‘the Communist conspiracy.’” He later describes White as a “Communist” (in quotes). By placing these allegations during the McCarthy era and putting the word in quotes, Peterson implies that these charges may have been false.

At the risk of sounding simple-minded, Harry Dexter White was a Communist. He was not a party member, but he was one of the Soviet Union’s most important agents of influence within the United States Government. This should have been obvious long before these authors published their books and several years prior to the “McCarthy era.”
White worked for Soviet intelligence for several years; however, he broke off contact with the Communists in the late 1930s. Henry Morgenthau III suggested that this was a result of the Nazi-Soviet Pact. He indicated that White got rid of his two key advisers, Frank Coe and Harold Glasser, during this period. (Glasser was shipped out to become an adviser to the Ecuadorian government. Coe resigned from the Treasury and later went to China.8) Coe and Glasser were also later identified as members of the Communist underground. Morgenthau III indicated that White became active again after the United States entered the war. This would suggest that White was not a devout Communist, but was motivated by anti-Fascism. Morgenthau claimed that by the time of Pearl Harbor White was again providing intelligence to the Soviets.

Other sources place White’s break much earlier. Elizabeth Bentley reported that White ceased providing information to the Soviets when his contact, Whittaker Chambers, dropped out of the Communist underground in 1938. Chambers threatened to expose White if he did not break with the Communists; Chambers believed that he had been successful.9

White’s reactivation by the Soviets provides some interesting insights into his motives and the influence he wielded in the Roosevelt Administration. In April 1941, Iskhak Akhmerov, the senior KGB illegal officer in the US, suggested to V. Pavlov that White be reactivated. In May 1941, Pavlov, in the role of a Soviet diplomatic courier, contacted White. Pavlov was concerned that White might be unwilling to assist the Soviets because of their alliance with Nazi Germany. However, White was willing to cooperate. Pavlov related his account of his contact with White in the Moscow magazine, News of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, in 1995.10

According to Pavlov, he was the point man for “Operation Snow,” an effort to manipulate US policy toward Soviet ends. Pavlov reported that he provided White with a note containing a recommendation that the US take a firm stand in their negotiations with Japan. From this note White wrote a memo which he delivered to Secretary Morgenthau on June 6, 1941.11 Morgenthau did not act on this memo. However, White rewrote it and resubmitted it to Morgenthau, who signed it and
sent copies to President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Hull on November 17, 1941. According to John Morton Blum, “Hull made the Treasury memorandum one basis among several for fashioning his answer to Japan.” Herbert Romerstein contended that he “used most of the harsh, demanding language in his ultimatum to the Japanese on November 26, 1941.” Rear Admiral Edwin T. Layton reported that the memo was drawn up by “Morgenthau’s adroit young aide, Harry Dexter White.”

The memo was entitled “An Approach to the Problem of Eliminating Tension with Japan and Insuring the Defeat of Germany.” This is an odd title for what Secretary of State Hull called an ultimatum in his memoirs. Pavlov suggested that his actions saved Russia from a two-front war by provoking Japan into attacking the United States. This may be an exaggeration. White’s memo would have had no impact if the policy it advocated did not coincide with the policy advocated by others in the Roosevelt Administration. However, it is significant that much of an important US policy document appears to have originated in Moscow.

John Earl Hayes and Harvey Klehr have provided a clear picture of how valuable White was to his Soviet handlers:

The KGB mentioned that White offered advice concerning how far the Soviets could push the United States on abandoning the Polish government-in-exile [which was hostile to Stalin] and assured the Soviets that US policymakers, despite their public opposition, would acquiesce to the USSR’s annexation of Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania. White was also a senior adviser to the US delegation at the founding conference of the United Nations in San Francisco in May 1945. During the negotiations on the UN charter he met covertly with Soviet intelligence officers and provided them with information on the American negotiating strategy. He assured the Soviets that ‘Truman and Stettinius want to achieve the success of the conference at any price’ and advised that if Soviet diplomats held firm to their demand that the Soviet Union get a veto of UN actions, that the United States ‘will agree.’
Aside from providing the Soviets with classified information, White was in a position to place his associates in highly sensitive positions within the Treasury Department and the Department of War’s Civil Affairs Division. Henry Morgenthau III wrote that,

During his first six years at the Treasury White augmented his staff with several highly qualified men who were subsequently charged with being involved in a Communist conspiracy. He also developed a network of contacts in various branches of government service, a number of whom were later suspected of providing a conduit to Russian intelligence.\(^{17}\)

Morgenthau’s son later reported that Glasser and Coe were back in the Treasury by 1943. Ludwig Ullman and Gregory Silvermaster, also Communists, were again back on White’s team. In the fall of 1943 Coe was a key representative of the Treasury during the Lend-Lease negotiations with the British.\(^{18}\) White brought him with him to the International Monetary Fund, where he would remain until December 1952. In 1958 Coe moved to Communist China “to work for Mao Tse-tung’s government.”\(^{19}\) In 1941 White managed to induce the Chinese Nationalists to hire Chi Ch’ao-ting, a secret communist, to a senior position in their Ministry of Finance.\(^{20}\)

Harry Dexter White’s espionage activities should have been exposed early in his career. In September 1939 Whittaker Chambers, White’s contact with Soviet military intelligence, notified Adolf Berle, Assistant Secretary of State and President Roosevelt’s internal security adviser, that White had been supplying classified information to the Soviets. According to Morgenthau’s son, “Berle assured Chambers that his information would go directly to the President . . . . After their meeting Berle drew up a four-page memorandum entitled ‘Underground Espionage Agent,’ which listed Harry Dexter White and the other leading Soviet agents for whom Chambers had acted as courier.”\(^{21}\) John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr contend that Berle did not pass on Chamber’s warning.\(^{22}\) However, Herbert Romerstein and Eric Breindel have suggested that Berle gave the information to President Roosevelt, “who simply laughed.”\(^{23}\)

There is little doubt that White provided valuable classified
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information to the Soviets. In the Venona transcripts (decoded correspondence between Moscow and Soviet agents in the United States) he was given the code names “Jurist”, “Lawyer” and “Richard” by his Soviet handlers. J. Edgar Hoover testified before Congress that the bureau had sent seven warnings of espionage, containing White’s name, to the White House from November 8, 1945 to July 24, 1946. In a February 1946 special report to the President, the FBI reported that, “This information has been received from various confidential sources whose reliability has been established either by inquiry or long established observation and evaluation. In no instance is any event or transaction related where the reliability of the source of information is questionable.” This report contained a cover letter from J. Edgar Hoover, marked “Top Secret”:

In view of the . . . seriousness of the charges against White in the attachment, I have made every effort in preparing this memorandum, to cover all possible ramifications. As will be observed, information has come to the attention of this Bureau charging White as being a valuable adjunct to an underground Soviet espionage organization operating in Washington, DC.

In November 1953, Attorney General Herbert Brownell caused a sensation when he told an audience of businessmen at the Executive Club of Chicago that in 1946 Truman had named Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Harry Dexter White the executive director of the International Monetary Fund, in spite of FBI warnings sent to the White House in December 1945 and February 1946 that White was a Communist spy. Brownell declared, “Harry Dexter White was a Russian spy. He smuggled secret documents to Russian agents for transmission to Moscow. Harry Dexter White was known to be a Communist spy by the very people who appointed him to the most sensitive and most important position he ever held in government service.” Brownell pointed out that the appointment of White to be executive director of the International Monetary Fund removed him from the danger of additional investigations because officials of international organizations were immune from FBI investigation.

It may have been difficult for members of the Roosevelt
administration to recognize White’s communist inclinations because a large number of them shared many of his beliefs. Although Morgenthau was not a Communist, many of his views coincided with those of White’s. According to Morgenthau’s son:

Morgenthau himself had long harbored an admiration for the Soviets. Like many liberals in the post-World War I era, he had a rather romantic view of the Soviets as liberators of the Russian people from czarist tyranny. Furthermore, many Russian Jews had supported the revolution and held top positions in the Lenin regime, although these Jews, along with Christians, had renounced their religion in favor of the new secular faith. My father had taken the lead in negotiating the resumption of US-USSR diplomatic relations.29

The enormous harm White caused to US interests has been obscured by a number of factors. When allegations about his Communist activities became public in 1948, White voluntarily appeared before the House un-American Activity Committee and denied all ties to Communism and espionage. He died of a heart attack three days after protesting his innocence to the committee. Had he lived, it is unlikely that he would have revealed his Communist activities.

Perhaps more important than the information White supplied to the Soviets, and the Communists he was able to place in key positions, was his impact on the formulation of US foreign policy. This may have been his most damaging influence.

White was the major architect of the Morgenthau Plan and policies dealing with occupation currency that were to cost the American taxpayers billions of dollars. As an example, because of White’s influence, the Bureau of Engraving and Printing was ordered in April, 1944 to deliver to the Soviet government a duplicate set of plates for the printing of the military occupation marks. This subject will be dealt with below.

White sat next to Morgenthau during the flight to Scotland and two members of the Treasury entourage, Josiah DuBois and Fred Smith,
were seated behind them. DuBois recounted one of the many supposed births of the Morgenthau Plan to Morgenthau’s son:

“I can tell you how the Morgenthau Plan got started,” DuBois confided. “On the way over in the plane, White and your dad sat together, and though I wasn’t deliberately eavesdropping, it was obvious from the conversation that what they were talking about was the whole notion of how we should get reparations from Germany. And by the time we arrived in England, there was no question in my mind that your dad was at this point completely convinced that the approach that the State Department had suggested was the wrong approach . . . So at that point he began pushing what later became known as the so-called Morgenthau Plan for Germany, and wherever he went, whoever he talked to, he would hammer this point home.”30

White had given Morgenthau a copy of the report by the Washington Interdepartmental Foreign Economic Policy Committee on postwar policy toward Germany. Morgenthau was shocked. In his opinion it would have left Germany more powerful in five or ten years than she had been before the war.

On their arrival in Scotland, White and Morgenthau were briefed by Colonel Bernard Bernstein, who had taken Eisenhower’s special train to meet them in Scotland. Bernstein was financial adviser (G-5) at Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF). He was a former Treasury lawyer who is described by Morgenthau’s son as “My father’s principal on-the-spot agent in the European theater of operations. . . a brilliant lawyer and an intensely loyal friend of my father.”31 E.F. Penrose reported that he was “commonly referred to in London as a Treasury representative in uniform.”32

Bernstein provided Morgenthau with a draft of the SHAEF Military Handbook for Germany, which, as a member of the Civil Affairs staff, he had been working on. Bernstein disagreed with the tone of the Handbook because it emphasized building up the German economy in order to prevent the army from being “bogged down in a morass of economic wreckage.”33

It is interesting that Henry Morgenthau III described Bernstein as
Morgenthau’s “principal agent” in the European theater. He did not work for the Treasury. Bernstein was a colonel in the US Army, working for General Eisenhower. However, the Civil Affairs Division of the US Army had a special relationship with the Treasury. According to Paul Hammond:

On September 29 [1944] the President wrote the Secretary of War suggesting that in recruiting civilians for financial work in Germany he call upon the Treasury Department, a policy which had been followed, though not consistently, since 1942. Bernstein was thereby authorized to surround himself with people from the Treasury Department, and was provided with grounds for claiming that he and other Army finance officers had a special relationship with the Treasury which entitled them to maintain direct communication with that department (a claim which did not go unchallenged by his Army superiors).  

The decision to staff military finance with members of the Treasury Department had the effect of driving out officers who maintained a more moderate position on postwar planning. Dale Clark, who served in the Civil Affairs Division, described the effect of Colonel Bernstein’s appointment to Director of the Finance Division of the US Group Control Council:

The Chief of the Finance Division of G-5, SHAEF was given the additional assignment as Director of the Finance Division of the US Group Control Council and many new recruits for his office arrived from the Treasury Department. Several officers who had been in the Finance Division requested transfers in protest at the new policies being developed.

These officers were highly qualified but, like Bernstein, they possessed a somewhat skewed view of postwar planning. Clark commented on their abilities:

To put through a policy that encountered so much opposition required consummate skill in the manipulation of power. That the men who accomplished this feat were not
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mediocrities is revealed by the details of their skillful performance. The secrecy surrounding military planning was a factor which aided in the instituting of a policy which appeared to be out of harmony with American practices and interests.  

Bernstein was later penalized for providing the SHAEF Military Handbook to the Secretary of the Treasury. Henry Morgenthau III reported: “The highly irregular manner in which Bernie turned over this draft document was something which both men were sensitive to. Bernie learned later on that it cost him a much-coveted promotion to General and a Distinguished Service Medal.” There may have been other reasons why Bernstein was not promoted. On May 7, 1945 General Clay, Eisenhower’s successor, wrote to General John Hilldring, the Director of the Civil Affairs Division, “I doubt if Colonel Bernstein is big enough to handle the overall financial problem. He is very smart and energetic but is somewhat warped in his judgment of the problem as a whole.”

The following day Morgenthau and his staff met with General Eisenhower at Portsmouth, Eisenhower’s English Channel Headquarters, where he had launched the D-day invasion. Fred Smith of the Treasury recorded the conversation leading to another genesis of the Morgenthau Plan:

On August 7, 1944 at approximately 12:35 PM in a tent in southern England, the Morgenthau Plan was born. Actually, it was General Dwight D. Eisenhower who launched the project. . . . The subject first came up at lunch in General Eisenhower’s mess tent. Secretary Morgenthau, Assistant to the Secretary Harry D. White and I were there. White spoke of Germany, which was now certain to be defeated. . . White said, “What I think is that we should give the entire German economy an opportunity to settle down before we do anything about it.”

Here Eisenhower became grim, and made the statement that actually sparked the German hardship plan. [Smith notes here that “This material is taken from notes made directly after the meeting.”] He said: “I am not interested in the German economy and personally would not like to bolster it if that will
make it any easier for the German.” He said he thought the Germans had punishment coming to them: “The ringleaders and the SS troops should be given the death penalty without question, but punishment should not end there.” He felt the people [emphasis in original] were guilty of supporting the regime and that made them a party to the entire German project, and he personally would like to “see things made good and hard for them for a while.” He pointed out that talk of letting Germany off easy after taking care of the top people came from those who feared Russia and wanted to strengthen Germany as a potential bulwark against any desires Russia might some day have.

The General declared he saw no purpose in treating a “paranoid” gently, and the “whole German population is a synthetic paranoid. All their life the people have been taught to be paranoid in their actions and thoughts, and they have to be snapped out of it. The only way to do that is to be good and hard on them. I certainly see no point in bolstering their economy or taking any other steps to help them.”

White remarked: “We may want to quote you on the problem of handling the German people.” Eisenhower replied that he could be quoted. He said, “I will tell the President myself, if necessary.”

According to Steven Ambrose, Morgenthau sent General Eisenhower a copy of his book outlining his plans, *Germany is Our Problem*, in October 1945. In November Eisenhower “approved the distribution of one thousand free copies of the book to American military officials in Germany.” Eisenhower later insisted that the free distribution did not “constitute approval or disapproval of the views expressed.” Ambrose concluded that, “There can be little doubt, however, that at that time, Eisenhower definitely did approve, just as there can be little doubt that in the August 1944 conversation, Eisenhower gave Morgenthau at least some of his ideas on the treatment of Germany.”

Morgenthau remained in Europe for over a week. He lunched with Churchill on the 10th of August and on the 12th he met with US Ambassador John Winant and his advisers, Dr. Philip Mosely, E. F. Penrose, and Walter Radius. Winant was the US representative on the
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European Advisory Commission, which had been set up as a result of the Moscow Conference in October 1943. This commission was tasked with developing plans for the postwar settlement. He found the State Department hostile to his plan to destroy the German economy. Dr. Mosely argued “vehemently” that a harsh peace would force the Germans into the arms of the Soviets.

Morgenthau also met with Sir John Anderson, the British Chancellor of the Exchequer. He then met with British Foreign Secretary Eden. Eden appeared to be more sympathetic to Morgenthau’s ideas. In a meeting on the 15th, Eden read to him selected extracts of the Teheran Conference that dealt with Germany. The Teheran Conference, a meeting where Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin discussed postwar political issues, took place between November 28 and December 1, 1943. The minutes of the Teheran Conference demonstrated that Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin envisioned a stern postwar treatment of Germany to include “deindustrialization.” Warren Kimball, who denied White’s communist connections, noted that, “Intriguingly, the basic issue which would underlie the Morgenthau Plan — deindustrialization — had been raised by Stalin . . . all of nine months before the actual birth of the Morgenthau Plan itself.”

On his return to the United States Morgenthau met with Secretary of State Cordell Hull. In a meeting on the 17th of August he found Hull’s views “very much in tune with his own.” Though, according to Henry Morgenthau III, “Hull had no consistent policy in relation to Germany. His attitude shifted perhaps more in reaction to how he was treated personally than because he held any basic tenets.” Morgenthau met again with Hull on the 18th. During this meeting Morgenthau informed Hull of the contents of the Teheran Conference minutes that Eden had provided him. Hull stated, “Henry, this is the first time I have heard this. I have never been permitted to see the minutes of the Teheran Conference.”

Morgenthau met with the President on the 19th of August. He informed the President that Prime Minister Churchill, Ambassador Winant and the Army all favored a policy of rebuilding Germany after the war. Morgenthau told the President, “Nobody has been studying
how to treat Germany roughly, along the lines you wanted."  

Apparently Morgenthau had had a discussion with the President prior to his trip to Europe, in which the President had disclosed his views on postwar Germany. The President also expressed his view that Churchill would be opposed to Morgenthau’s plan. Morgenthau recorded that the President stated:

> Give me thirty minutes with Churchill and I can correct this. We have got to be tough with Germany and I mean the German people not just the Nazis. We either have to castrate the German people or you have got to treat them in such a manner so they can't go on reproducing people who want to continue the way they have in the past.

After leaving the White House Morgenthau returned to the Treasury where he formed a special committee “to draft the Treasury’s analysis of the German problem.” This committee was composed of Harry Dexter White, John Pehle and Ansel Luxford. Under the Secretary’s close supervision and with detailed instructions this committee drafted what can rightfully be called the original Morgenthau Plan.

On August 21, Secretary of War Stimson was informed by Harry Hopkins, Roosevelt’s personal adviser, that the President wanted Stimson to talk to Morgenthau on the subject of Germany. On Wednesday, August 23, Stimson had a brief meeting with the President at the White House. It was the first time he had seen the President since June. He spoke with the him about the need for a policy toward Germany. Morgenthau had lunch with Stimson and they agreed to propose to the President that he form a cabinet committee composed of Secretary of State Hull, Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau and Secretary of War Stimson.

Secretary Morgenthau had lunch with the President on the 25th of August. They had been talking about postwar control of Germany, and Morgenthau provided the President a memorandum on his ideas on postwar planning and a copy of the SHAEF Military Handbook that Colonel Bernstein had given him earlier in the month. Morgenthau even arranged to have Colonel Bernstein flown to Washington to
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support his position. At the conclusion of the meeting Morgenthau requested that the President return the memo and Handbook, but the President said, “No. If you don’t mind, I would like to keep it and read it tonight, and then I will return it to you.” According to Henry Morgenthau III, “That night the president carefully read through the Handbook and Morgenthau’s memorandum.” Note that the President did not merely read the Handbook and memorandum. He read them “carefully,” according to Morgenthau.

After lunch Roosevelt and Morgenthau visited the Secretary of War, Henry Stimson. According to James Forrestal, “The President said he had been talking with the Secretary of the Treasury on the general question of the control of Germany after the end of the war. He said that the Germans should have simply a subsistence level of food — as he put it, soup kitchens would be ample to sustain life — that otherwise they should be stripped clean and should not have a level of subsistence above the lowest level of the people they had conquered.” It was at this meeting that the President proposed a cabinet committee to study the problem along the lines he had outlined. According to James Byrnes, it came as a shock to Secretaries Hull and Stimson that the President named Morgenthau to head the committee. According to Morgenthau, Harry Hopkins was named the coordinator of this committee. In any event, the President made it clear which direction he wanted the committee to take.

That weekend Morgenthau left Washington on the same train as the President. They traveled to Hyde Park, where they stayed overnight, “all the while discussing his plan.” Morgenthau’s efforts were having an effect. The President sent a memo to Secretary of War Stimson with a copy to Secretary Hull condemning the SHAEF Handbook and demanding it be withdrawn:

This so-called Handbook is pretty bad. I should like to know how it came to be written and who approved it down the line. If it has not been sent out as approved, all copies should be withdrawn. It gives me the impression that Germany is to be restored just as much as the Netherlands or Belgium and the people of Germany brought back as quickly as possible to their prewar estate. . . . The fact that they are a defeated
nation, collectively and individually, must be so impressed upon them that they will hesitate to start any new war — the whole nation has been engaged in a lawless conspiracy against the decencies of modern civilization. Please let me see the revision of this and also let me have this original copy back.56

On September 1, 1944 the Chief of the Division of Central European Affairs, James Riddleberger, sent a memorandum to Harry Hopkins, the President’s Special Assistant. This memo outlined the State Department’s opposition to Morgenthau’s plan:

If a far-reaching program of industrial destruction or dismantlement is agreed upon, it is apparent that, if put into effect, it will bring about extensive and important changes in European economy as a whole. Germany is a deficit country in foodstuffs and it is doubtful if a plan of making Germany predominantly agricultural can be put into effect without the liquidation or emigration of x-millions of Germans. Germany is furthermore an important producer of certain raw materials, namely coal and bauxite, for Europe as a whole, not to speak of the vast amount of industrial goods which Germany normally exports. If we advocate a “wrecking program” as the best means of assuring our security, we may face considerable European opposition on account of its effect on European economy, and if we desire continuing reparations out of Germany, we shall eliminate any such program by a policy of destruction of German industry.57

The President and Morgenthau spent the weekend of September 2-3 at Hyde Park. On the second of September the President and his wife drove to Morgenthau’s estate in Fishkill, New York.58 Morgenthau provided the President with the newest draft of his plan. Roosevelt told Morgenthau of certain changes that he wanted in it (in particular, no planes, no uniforms and no parades for the Germans).59

Excerpts from the Memorandum Prepared in the Treasury Department September 1, 1944 and given to FDR September 2, 1944 at the Morgenthau home near Fishkill, NY
4. Restitution and Reparation  
   c. by the removal and distribution among devastated countries of industrial plants and equipment situated within the International Zone and the North and South German states delimited in the section on partition.  
   d. by forced German labor outside Germany.  

9. German Economy  

The sole purpose of the military in control of the German economy shall be to facilitate military operations and military occupation. The Allied Military Government shall not assume responsibility for such economic problems as price controls, rationing, unemployment, production, reconstruction, distribution, consumption, housing, or transportation, or take any measures designed to maintain or strengthen the German economy, except those which are essential to military operations and are indicated above. The responsibility for sustaining the German economy and people rests with the German people with such facilities as may be available under the circumstances.  

Morgenthau recorded his impressions of this meeting in his presidential diary: “The President listened very closely and seemed to be in complete sympathy with what I was saying.” He was pleased that the president “was keenly interested in the memorandum and read it very slowly and very carefully.”

While the President and Morgenthau discussed postwar planning for Germany in New York, the Cabinet committee was working in Washington, DC. On September 2, 1944 there was a meeting on postwar planning in Harry Hopkins’ office. John McCloy and General Hilldring represented the War Department, Harry Dexter White represented the Treasury and H. Freeman Matthews and James Riddleberger represented the State Department. At this meeting White presented his plan. During this time “the adversarial positions of the Treasury and the War Department became more sharply defined.”

That Monday (September 4th) Morgenthau held a meeting with his staff, Harry Dexter White, Harold Gaston, the Treasury public relations officer, and Robert E. McConnell. Morgenthau’s own staff saw the chaos that his plan would engender. Morgenthau would
tolerate no objections. When Harry White suggested that the coal mines of the Ruhr not be destroyed, Morgenthau told them:

Harry, you can’t sell it to me at all. . . . You just can’t sell it to me, because you have it [internationalization of the Ruhr] there only so many years and you have an Anschluss and the Germans go in and take it. The only thing you can sell me, or I will have any part of, is the complete shut-down of the Ruhr. . . . Just strip it. I don’t care what happens to the population. . . . I would take every mine, every mill and factory and wreck it. . . . Steel, coal, everything. Just close it down. . . . I am for destroying it first and we will worry about the population second. . . . [Morgenthau continued] That is the place where war can spring from, and that is the place that closed down the steel mills of Birmingham, the coal mines in England, that caused the misery and the low standards of living in England. . . It is the competition. . . . I would close down those things tight. There is nothing left.63

The first full Cabinet committee on postwar planning was held on September 5. It was attended by Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau, Secretary of State Hull, Secretary of War Stimson and the President’s special adviser, Harry Hopkins. According to Morgenthau’s records the President had made Harry Hopkins its chairman.64 However, the first meeting was held in Cordell Hull’s office. Morgenthau presented his memorandum, which was to become the full committee’s recommendation to the President.65 The “Suggested Recommendations on Treatment of Germany from the Cabinet Committee for the President” included:

*Suggested Post Surrender Program for Germany*

3. The Ruhr Area

Here lies the heart of German industrial power, the caldron of wars. This area should not only be stripped of all presently existing industries but so weakened and controlled that it cannot in the foreseeable future become an industrial area.

a. All equipment shall be removed from the mines and the mines shall be thoroughly wrecked.66
h. Prohibition on Emigration,\textsuperscript{67} [a provision of dire significance].

Secretary Stimson opposed the Committee’s proposal and recorded:

I, to my tremendous surprise, found that Hull was as bitter as Morgenthau against the Germans and was ready to jump all the principles that he had been laboring for in regard to trade for the past twelve years. He and Morgenthau wished to wreck completely the immense Ruhr-Saar area of Germany and turn it into second rate agricultural land regardless of all that that area meant not only to Germany but to the welfare of the entire European continent. I found myself a minority of one and labored vigorously but entirely ineffectively against my colleagues.\textsuperscript{68}

Stimson found that “More and more it developed that Hull did want to take very drastic steps.”\textsuperscript{69} In fact, the memorandum the committee was to present to the President had been drafted in the State Department by James Riddleberger.\textsuperscript{70} This was an indication of the strength of the Treasury’s influence on these discussions, because Riddleberger was opposed to the Treasury’s proposals. Stimson and Morgenthau were in agreement that both Hull and Hopkins had sided with the Treasury during this meeting. “Outnumbered three to one [including Hopkins] at the September 5 cabinet meeting, Stimson recognized that he had lost yet another crucial round.”\textsuperscript{71}

A thorough reading of Cordell Hull’s memoirs will give no indication that he had initially supported Morgenthau on this matter. Robert Sherwood, Harry Hopkins’ biographer, deals with this matter in a unique way: “The Hopkins papers, while full of relevant material, tell nothing which has not already been revealed. There is no doubt that Hopkins, as a member of the President’s Special Cabinet committee, joined with Hull and Stimson in opposition to the plan.”\textsuperscript{72}

Although Stimson was alone in his opposition to the Morgenthau Plan, he did not concede defeat. He prepared a memorandum to the President outlining his objections to Morgenthau’s plan.
I have considered the paper entitled “Suggested Recommendations on Treatment of Germany from the Cabinet Committee for the President”.

With the exception of the last paragraph I find myself in agreement with the principles stated therein and they are in conformity with the lines upon which we have been proceeding in the War Department in our directives to the Armed Forces.

The last paragraph, however, is as follows:

1. The primary objectives of our economic policy are (1) the standard of living of the German population shall be held down to subsistence levels; (2) German economic position of power in Europe must be eliminated; (3) German economic capacity must be converted in such manner that it will be so dependent upon imports and exports that Germany cannot by its own devices reconvert to war production.

While certain of these statements by themselves may possibly be susceptible of a construction with which I would not be at variance, the construction put upon them at the discussion this morning certainly reached positions to which I am utterly opposed. The position frankly taken by some of my colleagues was that the great industrial regions of Germany known as the Saar and the Ruhr with their very important deposits of coal and ore should be totally transformed into a nonindustrial area of agricultural land.73

Stimson could foresee that the results of this plan would be economic chaos not only in Germany but in Europe as a whole. He described this proposal as “a Carthaginian peace.”74 (This was a reference to the city-state of Carthage, which had been completely destroyed by Rome following the Third Punic War.) His memo continued:

Upon that production [the Saar and Ruhr] Germany became the largest source of supply to no less than ten European countries. . . . The production of these materials from this region could not be sealed up and obliterated . . . without manifestly causing a great dislocation to the trade upon which Europe has lived.75
The first full Cabinet Committee meeting pitted Morgenthau against Stimson. At this time Hull was still in the Morgenthau camp. Perhaps Morgenthau suspected that Hull’s support might waiver; he sent him a memo the following day thanking him for his support. Morgenthau wrote, “My Dear Cordell: I was delighted at the attitude which you expressed yesterday in regard to the treatment of the German people.” The following day Morgenthau and Stimson would present their opposing memoranda to the President.

The Committee met again on the afternoon of Wednesday, September 6 in the White House. After the two secretaries presented their views the President addressed most of his comments to Stimson, “reverting to his proposition. . . . that Germany could live happily and peacefully on soup from soup kitchens.” However, he did not appear to accept Morgenthau’s position that the Ruhr and Saar should be destroyed, believing that German raw materials would be necessary to British industry. According to Stimson, Hopkins and Hull continued their support of Morgenthau during this meeting.

Secretary of State Hull thought that the results of this meeting were inconclusive. However, Secretary Stimson felt he had made some progress. Although Hopkins remained loyal to Morgenthau, Secretary Hull seemed to be shifting his support to Stimson. Morgenthau reported to his staff that it was a “very unsatisfactory meeting.” Morgenthau requested a rehearing before the President and another meeting was scheduled for the 9th of September.

The following day the President held a private meeting with Henry Morgenthau. He understood Morgenthau’s disappointment with the results of the previous day. He told Morgenthau, “Don’t be discouraged about yesterday’s meeting. The whole question seems to be about closing down the plants, and we have got to do the thing gradually.”

The Cabinet Committee met again on the 9th of September. The three secretaries presented their revised memoranda to the President. Morgenthau’s Briefing Book, “Program to Prevent Germany from Starting World War III,” was prepared in the Treasury by Harry Dexter White, according to Morgenthau’s specifications. It included the proposal that the Ruhr “can not in the foreseeable future become an
The President read aloud from the memorandum, “It is a fallacy that Europe needs a strong industrial Germany. I agree with this idea…” Morgenthau added, parenthetically, “I evidently made a real impression on the President the time he came to my house.”

The Treasury memorandum asserted that “At the worst, these economic consequences will involve relatively minor economic disadvantages in certain sections of Europe.” One of the supposed benefits of this plan was that the British coal industry would recover from a 30-year depression. Stimson claimed that it contained “a specious appeal to the President’s expressed desire to help England by… the proposal that by sealing up the Ruhr we would give England the chance to jump into Germany’s business of supplying Europe industrially and thus curing the alleged English depression in coal mining. It asserted that England had coal enough to supply its present output for five hundred years.” While insuring the destruction of German industry it placed the responsibility for maintaining the German economy solely on the German people: “The responsibility for sustaining the German economy and people rests with the German people with such facilities as may be available under the circumstances.”

Morgenthau’s memorandum also contained a proposal for the geographic dismemberment of the German state. “Poland should get that part of East Prussia which doesn’t go the USSR and the southern portion of Silesia.” It further included the statement, “The Nazi regime is essentially the culmination of the unchanging German drive toward aggression.”

At this last cabinet committee meeting before the President departed for the Quebec Conference, he gave the impression that he was still undecided. Stimson recorded, “Without making any decisions on any of these papers, Mr. Roosevelt went to Quebec, where on September 11 the Octagon Conference with Mr. Churchill began.” However, Jim Bishop writes in his biography of Roosevelt’s last year, “When the group disbanded, he did a strange thing: He did not invite Secretary of State Hull to the Quebec Conference, or Secretary of War Stimson, but he did ask Treasury Secretary Morgenthau to join him in Canada.”
According to Morgenthau’s recollection, the President did invite Secretary Hull to Quebec at this meeting. The President stated, “I think there will be two things brought up in Quebec. One is military and the other is monetary because Churchill keeps saying he is broke. . . . If they bring up the financial situation I will want Henry to come to Quebec.”93 According to Morgenthau, Hull responded that he was “too tired” to attend.

The President left the White House at 10:00 PM that evening. He took Morgenthau’s memorandum with him. He was accompanied by Secretary Morgenthau, Admiral William Leahy, his chief of staff, Ross McIntire, his personal physician, and Grace Tully, his secretary. He arrived at Highland, New York at 7:30 AM. At this point Morgenthau left the train for his estate. At 4:37 PM, Roosevelt departed Highland for Quebec.94
The public and the State Department were informed that the primary purpose of the Second Quebec Conference (Octagon) was to discuss military matters. President Roosevelt went to great lengths to make it known that this was the purpose of the conference. During the last Cabinet Committee meeting on postwar planning on September 9 the President had apparently invited Secretary Hull to Quebec. However, he had told Hull, too, that the this was going to be primarily a military conference and therefore it would be unnecessary for Hull to attend. Hull recorded:

When the President decided to meet with Prime Minister Churchill for the Second Quebec Conference, in September 1944, he asked me whether I wished to accompany him. The conference, however, was intended to be largely military. I was not well, the Dumbarton Oaks Conference was in progress, and I told him I preferred to remain in Washington but would be available if he needed me.¹

Mrs. Roosevelt recalled that, “At first Mr. and Mrs. Hull had planned to go [to Quebec], but Secretary Hull decided that he was not well enough.”²
The President had also told other members of the State Department that Quebec was going to be a military conference. Under Secretary of State Stettinius recorded in a memo on September 6, 1944:

I then raised with the President the importance of his having political advisers with him at meetings such as the forthcoming one at Quebec, in the event that political questions would be discussed. The President agreed that this was sound and important but said the forthcoming meeting would be of a military nature. He did, however, promise to send for Mr. Hull if discussions took a political turn.³

Hull also told James Byrnes that he would not be attending the conference because of its exclusively military nature. Byrnes recalled, “Secretary Hull did not attend because, he told me, the President had said that only military matters would be discussed. There evidently was a change of plan because Secretary Morgenthau did attend.”⁴

The President had assured the State Department that if political matters did arise, someone from the State Department would be called to Quebec. Under Secretary of State Stettinius wrote a memorandum on September 14, 1944:

[Mr. Hull] said he had not heard from the President about going to Quebec and did not feel in any event that he should go. This comment was made after I had reminded him of the President’s promise to send for him or someone else in the Department if the conference went into political matters.⁵

This was also recorded by the British Foreign Office Under-secretary Alexander Cadogan. According to Cadogan, Stettinius had told President Roosevelt in Hull’s presence that:

the constant attendance of Harriman and Hopkins at international conferences had caused deep resentment in the State Department. Roosevelt, according to Stettinius’s account, warmly agreed, admitted his error and promised that it should not recur. “Quebec is to be entirely military; if any other subjects come up I shall call Cordell right away.”⁶
General Omar Bradley recalled that the purpose of the conference was to “hash out strategy for the Pacific War.” The President even informed the Soviet Ambassador, Andrei Gromyko, that discussions at Quebec would be “on military matters only.”

Cordell Hull began to suspect that more than strictly military matters were going to be discussed at Quebec on September 12 when Alexander Cadogan received a telegram from Winston Churchill inviting him to Quebec. Cadogan reported:

Telegram from P.M. [Winston Churchill] saying “Do please come and stay a night 13th or 14th” . . . Told Ed. [Stettinius] of P.M.’s message. He didn’t seem very enthusiastic. . . . Ed. went down to State Dept. and got back about 3, saying Hull thought it a “tragic mistake” for me to go to Quebec. (Of course, he doesn’t want to go himself.) His arguments were that Q. was “ostensibly” a military meeting: it would be known I was there, and that would seem to inject into it diplomatic and political questions.

Relying exclusively on what was told to the public and to the State Department, it would be natural to conclude that the Second Quebec Conference was to be an exclusively military affair. That it dealt with postwar planning for Germany is frequently chalked up to a last-minute change of plans. However, there are other sources that conflict with what the State Department was told. The President’s Log for the 1944 Quebec Conference, dated September 9-21, 1944, states, “the President and the Prime Minister convened their eleventh War Conference to discuss two great problems: postwar control of Germany and the final defeat of Japan.”

Henry Morgenthau III explained:

In order to obscure the true nature of Octagon [The Second Quebec Conference], spokesmen told the press that the discussions were exclusively concerned with military matters, particularly the war in the Pacific and Asia, and so the highest-ranking uniformed personages were put on display.
Why was it necessary to “obscure the true nature” of the Quebec Conference; to conceal its purpose from not only the public but also from President Roosevelt’s own State Department? It is quite possible that the original and real purpose of the Quebec Conference was to gain British acceptance of the Morgenthau Plan. According to the Presidential Log for the Second Quebec Conference, a September date for this conference was not chosen until late August. This was at the height of discussions on postwar planning. The need for a postwar occupation plan was becoming more and more acute as the Allied forces approached Germany. Philip Mosely recorded that, “By mid-August, when plans were being made for the second Quebec Conference, it was clear that the decision regarding the British and American zones could not be delayed any further.”

Winston Churchill may have suspected that he was invited to Quebec to discuss postwar planning; at a dinner discussion on the 13th of September he asked, in response to Morgenthau’s proposal, “Is this what you asked me to come all the way over here to discuss?” In Cordell Hull’s Memoirs, Hull phrases this question differently. He related that, “The P.M. bluntly inquired whether he had been brought over to Quebec to discuss a scheme that would mean ‘England’s being chained to a dead body.’” Churchill’s agreement to the Morgenthau Plan had to be gained without State Department interference.

President Roosevelt’s efforts to win Churchill over to the Morgenthau Plan was a repudiation of a year’s work by the United States State Department and the British Foreign Office. This work had been initiated by Roosevelt himself in response to a visit to Washington by Britain’s Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden in March 1943. Eden spoke with Roosevelt’s adviser, Harry Hopkins, on the need to reach an understanding on postwar planning. As a result of these conversations Roosevelt sent a note to Secretary of State Hull on April 3, 1943, instructing him to talk to Secretary Stimson and the British concerning a coordinated postwar plan.

In September 1943, arrangements were made to conduct a meeting of the three foreign ministers in preparation for a meeting of the three Allied heads of state. This resulted in the Moscow Conference of
October 1943, where it was decided to create a commission to study postwar planning. The European Advisory Commission (EAC) was created, with its seat in London. At the Teheran Conference, that November, the representatives for the EAC were chosen. Ambassador John Winant represented the United States. Sir William Strang represented the United Kingdom and Fedor T. Gusev represented the Soviet Union.

An inter-departmental committee was formed, composed of representatives of the State, War and Navy Departments, to advise Ambassador Winant. According to Philip Mosely, Winant’s adviser, this committee made little progress due to the fact that the Civil Affairs Division, representing the War Department, placed several obstacles in the planners’ path. In April 1944, George Kennan, Ambassador Winant’s political adviser, visited Washington to discuss with President Roosevelt the problems confronting the EAC. President Roosevelt was aware of the direction the State Department planners were taking.

In July, Secretary Hull approved a State Department proposal which (according to E. F. Penrose) provided “an enlightened approach to postwar Germany which, if adopted, would have raised the credit of the United States in the world and helped to start all Europe on the road to early economic recovery.” Also in July, General Eisenhower approved a preliminary plan for military government that directed an “enlightened approach.” These developments inspired Morgenthau to make a trip to Europe in August 1944 to correct what he saw as a wrong direction in postwar planning.

Warren Kimball asserted that “Anthony Eden and the British Foreign Office knew of the Morgenthau Plan about ten days before the Quebec Conference.” He suggested that the British Foreign Office predicted the thrust of the Quebec Conference once they had received reports of the Plan. Kimball stated that, at the instigation of Eden, the British War Cabinet sent a message to Churchill at Quebec urging him not to commit himself to the Morgenthau Plan. This message, dated September 14, 1944, contains all of the obvious objections to the Morgenthau Plan. The War Cabinet explained:
The Morgenthau Plan

This would be wholly against our interests:
(A) The task of our occupation forces would be made more difficult and we should need increased forces, control personnel and administrative services (especially transportation services);
(B) A few profiteers would gain; the true sufferers would be the workers and the middle class;
(C) Our name would be associated with avoidable and purposeless suffering, not with just retribution;
(D) All hope would vanish of getting any adequate contribution out of Germany towards the reconstruction of Europe.

A policy which condenses or favours chaos is not hard; it is simply inefficient. We do not favour a soft policy towards Germany; but the suffering which she must undergo should be the price of useful results for the United Nations, ordered and controlled by ourselves.  

President Roosevelt frequently saw his Secretary of State as an obstacle to his foreign policy objectives. The President often conducted a separate foreign policy outside of his State Department, and he frequently used his Secretary of the Treasury to conduct negotiations he did not want to entrust to his Secretary of State. William Bullitt recalled a comment made by Secretary Hull about Morgenthau’s role in foreign affairs: “We sometimes found him conducting negotiations with foreign Governments which were the function of the State Department.”

President Roosevelt had used this strategy since the beginning of his administration. Ambassador Bullitt recalled how, in the spring of 1933, Roosevelt had decided to recognize the Soviet Union. Bullitt claimed that as late as August, in a meeting with Hull, the President discussed recognition in a general way but left Hull with the impression that he was still undecided. Bullitt claimed, “Not only was Roosevelt keeping his decision from his Secretary of State, he had several months earlier — indeed soon after inauguration — requested
that Morgenthau, then his Farm Credit Administrator, ‘help conduct conversations looking toward the recognition of Russia.”’23

Roosevelt’s policy of keeping his State Department uninformed frequently left Hull in an awkward position. Hull was required to testify before Congress and to conduct negotiations with foreign representatives. It was expected that he, as Secretary of State, was knowledgeable about US foreign policy. Yet when Jan Ciechanowski, the Polish Ambassador to the United States, questioned Hull about the Teheran Conference, Ciechanowski reported that Hull “appeared embarrassed.”24 When Senator Guy Gillette asked Hull, “Did we make any political commitments at Teheran beyond those of which we have been told?” Hull, “made a long reply, circumscribed at half a dozen points by the limitation ‘so far as I know’ and responded in the negative,”25 leaving Ambassador Ciechanowski to relate that a US Senator informed him that Hull “either did not wish to discuss the [Teheran] conference, or did not know the details of the President’s discussions with Stalin.”26 Secretary Hull was kept in the dark about the recognition of the Soviet Union, the discussions at Teheran, and the negotiations at Quebec.

Once Cordell Hull realized that political discussions would be part of Quebec, he requested that Ray Atherton, the US Ambassador to Canada, represent the State Department at the discussions. Atherton did not attend.27 Henry Morgenthau, however, did attend — he called the President on September 12, requesting to attend the conference. The President’s secretary recorded: “During the 1944 Quebec Conference, I received a call at the Citadel from the Secretary of the Treasury in Washington asking me to inquire of the President whether he could come to see him. The answer being yes, Morgenthau arrived the next day.”28 The President sent Morgenthau a telegram that same day: “Please be in Quebec by Thursday, 14 Sept., Noon.”29 According to Alexander Cadogan, Hull’s response, upon hearing of Morgenthau’s invitation was, “In Christ’s name, what has happened to the man?”30

The press communiqué released on September 16 continued the fiction that the Conference was conducted to discuss military matters:
The President and the Prime Minister, and the Combined Chiefs of Staff, held a series of meetings during which they discussed all aspects of the war against Germany and Japan. In a very short space of time they reached decisions on all points both with regard to the completion of the war in Europe, now approaching its final stages, and the destruction of the barbarians of the Pacific. The most serious difficulty with which the Quebec Conference has been confronted has been to find room and opportunity for marshaling against Japan the massive forces which each and all of the nations concerned are ardent to engage against the enemy.
According to The President’s Log for the 1944 Quebec Conference (OCTAGON), September 9-21, 1944, Roosevelt arrived in Quebec at 9:00 AM on September 11. He met with Churchill several times during the first two days of the conference. After lunch on the first day, he discussed the news with Churchill. That evening they attended a “big dinner.”¹ On the morning of the 12th, the two world leaders had a photo opportunity at 11:30. They had lunch at 1:00 PM and after lunch Churchill demonstrated harbor models. Again, according to the President’s Log, at 8:00 PM they attended another “big dinner.”² The President’s Log does not contain any details of their initial discussions. However, it is certain that the subject of the Morgenthau Plan arose.

Roosevelt and Churchill naturally discussed issues that required the assistance of their political advisers. Morgenthau later wrote, “I imagine the reason he [Roosevelt] sent for me was he had tried this [the Morgenthau Plan] out on Churchill and got nowhere.”³ These advisers could have been scheduled to attend the conference at its beginning. However, this would have revealed the political nature of the conference, something the President did not want to do. Churchill sent for his Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden. Eden recorded, “On September 12th a telegram arrived from Mr. Churchill in Quebec, suggesting that I should join him there.”⁴ Alexander Cadogan,
Churchill's Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs, also received a telegram to join Churchill in Quebec. Henry Morgenthau apparently did not wait to be called. He called the President himself, to request an invitation. It is likely that he was in upstate New York already; although he was asked to be in Quebec by the 14th, he arrived on the afternoon of the 13th.

Churchill was interested in Morgenthau's attendance at the conference because he wanted to discuss financial matters with the Secretary of the Treasury. On September 12, Churchill sent the President a memo.

One of the most important things I have to discuss with you is Stage II [Lend Lease]. Would Thursday, 14th, do for that? In which case I hope you could have Morgenthau present. This matter is considered of extreme and vital importance by the British Government, for reasons which are only too painfully apparent.

Roosevelt had lunch with Churchill at 1:00 PM on the 13th and, according to the President's Log, the President brought up the Morgenthau Plan. Morgenthau and Harry Dexter White arrived in Quebec after lunch that day. Morgenthau was invited to tea with Mrs. Roosevelt and was informed by Grace Tully that “the boss” wanted to see him. According to the President's Log, “The President conferred with Secretary Morgenthau at length after his arrival.”

During his 4:00 PM hour-long meeting with the President, Morgenthau was told, “I have asked you to come up so that you could talk to 'the Prof [Lord Cherwell].”’ With “the Prof” was Friedrich A. Lindemann, “Churchill's most trusted adviser and intellectual support over many years.” Lindemann was the author of a paper on the strategic bombing of Germany (which might be called the Lindemann Plan). According to C.P. Snow,

It described, in quantitative terms, the effect on Germany of a British bombing offensive in the next 18 months (approximately March 1942–September 1943). The paper laid down a strategic policy. The bombing must be directed essentially against German working-class houses. Middle-
class houses have too much space round them, and so are bound to waste bombs; factories and “military objectives” had long since been forgotten, except in official bulletins, since they were much too difficult to find and hit. The paper claimed that — given a total concentration of effort on the production and use of bombing aircraft — it would be possible, in all the larger towns of Germany (that is, those with more than 50,000 inhabitants), to destroy 50 per cent of all houses.9

A survey of the results of this plan in the Ruhr area showed that of “1,200,000 houses, 400,000 were destroyed, 320,000 were more or less badly damaged but repairable, 260,000 were slightly damaged, and only 220,000 undamaged.”10

Roosevelt informed Morgenthau that Churchill “had been very glum,” until asked if he would “like to have the steel business of Europe for 20 or 30 years.”11 A memo prepared by Harry Dexter White on the 25th of September described what took place at this meeting:

The Secretary asked how freely he could talk with the Professor, and the President replied, ‘You can talk about anything you want.’ The Secretary inquired: ‘Anything?’ and the President said, ‘Well, let me look at that book’ [the book he referred to was the collection of memoranda on Germany prepared in the Treasury, which the Secretary had given him in Washington]. The President went over the whole section and said, ‘I wouldn’t discuss with him the question of zones to be occupied by our armies. That’s a military question.’ The President went over the whole of the first section of the book, item by item, and then said: ‘I have sent for Eden. Churchill, Eden, yourself and I will sit down to discuss the matter. (The Secretary expressed the view that the President gave him the impression that he was bringing Eden to Quebec largely because of the report he [the Secretary] gave him upon his return from England about Eden being tough on the question of a policy toward Germany. The President said ‘Don’t worry about Churchill. He is going to be tough too.’ As the Secretary was leaving, the President said to Miss Tully, ‘Put that book right next to my bed. I want to read it tonight.’12
The President’s Log records a dinner meeting that evening at 8:00 PM. It was attended by Winston Churchill, Friedrich Lindemann [Lord Cherwell], Churchill’s adviser, Lord Moran, Churchill’s physician, Lord Leathers, the British Minister of War Transport, Admiral Emory Land, the chief of the US Maritime Commission, Admiral William Leahy, Chief of Staff to President Roosevelt, Morgenthau and Admiral Ross McIntire, the President’s personal physician. Conference discussions followed dinner and lasted until 11:15 PM. The proposed topic of discussion was supposed to have been shipping. However, when the President informed Prime Minister Churchill that he had invited Secretary Morgenthau to Quebec to talk about Germany and that Morgenthau was scheduled to talk with Lord Cherwell the following day, Churchill asked, “Why don’t we talk about Germany now?”

When Morgenthau began to explain his plan to destroy German industry, Churchill growled that his plan was “unnatural, un-Christian and unnecessary.” Morgenthau recorded, “I had barely got under way before low mutters and baleful looks indicated that the Prime Minister was not the most enthusiastic member of my audience. He looked on the Treasury Plan, he said, as he would on chaining himself to a dead German.” “He was slumped in his chair, his language biting, his flow incessant, his manner merciless, I have never had such a verbal lashing in my life.” Secretary Hull recorded that Morgenthau later stated to Secretary Stimson, “He was even more angry than you, Harry.”

Churchill’s initial reaction to the Morgenthau plan was based on a belief that the destruction of the German economy would lead to suffering throughout Europe, including England. This argument was presented most forcefully by Secretary of War Stimson in two memoranda he sent to the President. On the fifteenth Stimson sent the following memorandum:

A subordinate question is whether, even if you could do this, it is good for the rest of the world either economically or spiritually. Sound thinking teaches us that prosperity in one part of the world helps to create prosperity in other parts of
The world. It also teaches that poverty in one part of the world usually induces poverty in other parts. Enforced poverty is even worse, for it destroys the spirit not only of the victim but debases the victor. It would be just such a crime as the Germans themselves hoped to perpetrate upon their victims — it would be a crime against civilization itself.  

On September 17th, Stimson sent another memo to the President:

The benefit to England by the suppression of German competition is greatly stressed in the Treasury memorandum. But this is an argument addressed to a shortsighted cupidity of the victors and the negation of all that Secretary Hull had been trying to accomplish since 1933. I am aware of England’s need, but I do not and cannot believe that she wished this kind of remedy. The sum total of the drastic political and economic steps proposed by the Treasury is an open confession of the bankruptcy of hope for a reasonable economic and political settlement of the causes of war.  

The conversation around the dinner table continued for three hours. At one point, as mentioned above, Churchill demanded, “Is this what you asked me to come all the way over here to discuss?” According to Lord Moran, “After three hours discussion there seemed to be an absolute cleavage between the American point of view and that of the P.M. The Prof, however, sided with the Americans.” Moran recorded that his “notes of the conversation at this dinner party bring out Winston’s instinctive revulsion to Morgenthau’s scheme.”

Morgenthau received little support during this meeting. Apparently the President allowed Morgenthau to present his case without interruption. Admiral Land appeared to support Morgenthau, but “only perfunctorily.” Morgenthau was also supported by Lord Cherwell. Harry Dexter White’s record of this meeting relates that “Admiral Leahy seemed on the whole to be unsympathetic to the Treasury’s program and to side with Churchill.”

Churchill opposed every one of Morgenthau’s arguments including his contention that the destruction of German industry
The meeting ended with the President stating, “Let the Prof go into our plans with Morgenthau.”26

Winston Churchill’s account of this meeting sheds little light on what transpired during that evening:

I was glad to see Morgenthau, as we were anxious to discuss financial arrangements between our two countries for the period between the conquest of Germany and the defeat of the Japanese. The President and his Secretary of Treasury were however much more concerned about the treatment of Germany after the war. They felt very strongly about that military strength rested on industrial strength. We had seen during the 1930s how easy it was for a highly industrialized Germany to arm herself and threaten her neighbors, and they asserted that there was no need for so much manufacturing in a country as large as Germany, which could to all intents and purposes feed herself. The United Kingdom had lost so much overseas investments that she could only pay her way when peace came by greatly increasing her exports, so that for economic as well as military reasons we ought to restrict German industry and encourage German agriculture. At first I was violently opposed to the idea. But the President with Mr. Morgenthau — from whom we had much to ask — were so insistent that in the end we agreed to consider it.27

Lord Moran, commenting on Churchill’s account, stated:

The whole passage appears at first sight to be a little wanting in candour. Winston disposes of the plan in less than a page. It would be possible, I suppose, to dismiss the somewhat ambiguous sentences as no more than a good example of the political art of presenting a bad case in its least damaging form.28

At 10:00 AM on the 14th of September, Secretary Morgenthau and Harry Dexter White met with Lord Cherwell. According to a memorandum prepared by White,
Cherwell commented that he didn’t understand why Churchill had taken so contrary a position on the program the evening before. He [Cherwell] was surprised at Churchill’s attitude and thought possibly that it was due to the fact that Churchill did not wholly understand what the Secretary was driving at.\textsuperscript{29}

Morgenthau also mentioned that Secretary of State Hull was in general agreement with the Treasury plan and that he suspected that Anthony Eden would also be in agreement.

At 11:00 AM, President Roosevelt met with Prime Minister Churchill and Richard Law, Minister of State from the British Foreign Office and Anthony Eden’s “first assistant.” At 11:30 they were joined by Secretary Morgenthau and Harry Dexter White.\textsuperscript{30} A memorandum of this meeting by Lord Cherwell stated:

The President said that he did not think it would be an undue hardship to require Germany to revert towards an agricultural status such as she had enjoyed up to the latter part of the last century. She had shown she could not be trusted with all these facilities for making weapons.

The Prime Minister said he was converted to the idea that we should explore this line of approach.\textsuperscript{31}

At 1:00 PM the President had lunch with Churchill, Mrs. Roosevelt, Morgenthau, White, Law and Thompson. At 4:45, he had tea with “the girls.” Anthony Eden and Alexander Cadogan arrived that afternoon.\textsuperscript{32} At 5:30 PM the President met with Prime Minister Churchill, Secretary Morgenthau and Lord Cherwell for discussions\textsuperscript{33} Another entry in \textit{Foreign Relations} suggested that he met with Morgenthau, Churchill, Eden, and Cadogan\textsuperscript{34} There is no record of what was discussed.

That evening there was another 8:00 PM dinner. It was attended by Winston Churchill, Henry Morgenthau, Richard Law, Lord Cherwell, Anthony Eden and Alexander Cadogan.\textsuperscript{35} Lord Moran states that MacKenzie King also attended.\textsuperscript{36} There are no records of the discussions. Forrest Pogue, Director of the George C. Marshall Research Foundation & Director of the Marshall Library, reported that
it was at this dinner that Eden stated his objections to the Morgenthau Plan:

At dinner in Quebec on the fourteenth Churchill lashed out at Morgenthau, saying that he didn’t want to be tied to the dead corpse of Germany. But the situation changed the next day. Morgenthau managed to win over Lord Cherwell, Churchill’s trusted adviser, who then converted the Prime Minister to the harsh line, despite Eden’s protests. Cherwell’s telling argument was that the crippling of German industry would aid British export trade.37

However, this is contrary to several other accounts that place this disagreement on the following day.

Morgenthau and White met with Cherwell on the morning of the 15th to prepare for their meeting with the President and Prime Minister. At noon Morgenthau and Cherwell met with Eden, Cadogan, Churchill and Roosevelt.38 The first matter of discussion was an agreement to provide Britain with $6.5 billion in Lend Lease assistance. This was referred to as Phase II of Lend Lease, or the aid to Britain that would follow the defeat of Germany. Receiving this assistance was Churchill’s primary goal in attending this conference. Morgenthau and Roosevelt did not make it easy for him. At one point Churchill stated, “What do you want me to do, stand up and beg like Fala (Roosevelt’s dog)?”39

After the agreement on Lend Lease was finally signed, Morgenthau recorded:

Churchill was quite emotional about this agreement, and at one time he had tears in his eyes. When the thing was finally signed, he told the President how grateful he was, thanked him most effusively, and said that this was something they were doing for both countries.

Then Churchill, turned to Lord Cherwell and myself, said, “Where are the minutes of this matter of the Ruhr?”40

Apparently there was a problem with the draft of the Morgenthau Plan. Morgenthau may not have been satisfied with Cherwell’s
proposed draft, which had been toned down in order to overcome Churchill's objections. Whatever the case, there was no memorandum prepared that Churchill could simply sign. Therefore, Churchill took the opportunity to dictate a draft of the plan in his own words:

At the conference between the President and the Prime Minister upon the best measures to prevent renewed rearmament by Germany, it was felt that an essential feature was the future disposition of the Ruhr and the Saar. The ease with which the metallurgical, chemical and electrical industries in Germany can be converted from peace to war has already been impressed upon us by bitter experience. It must also be remembered that the Germans have devastated a large portion of the industries of Russia and of other neighboring Allies, and it is only in accordance with justice that these injured countries should be entitled to remove the machinery they require in order to repair the losses they have suffered. The industries referred to in the Ruhr and in the Saar would therefore be necessarily put out of action and closed down. It was felt that the two districts should be put under somebody under the world organization which would supervise the dismantling of these industries and make sure that they were not started up again by some subterfuge. The program for eliminating the war-making industries in the Ruhr and in the Saar is looking forward to converting Germany into a country primarily agricultural and pastoral in its character.\footnote{41}

Churchill dictated this memorandum and could, in that respect, be considered the father of the Morgenthau Plan. His major contribution to it was the addition of the term “pastoral,” suggesting an idealized view of agricultural life; the term has frequently been used to describe the Morgenthau Plan. It was Churchill's intent to use this word to give a rose-tinted view of the plan's drastic implications.

Few commentators on the Morgenthau Plan have been swayed by Churchill's attempt at camouflage. One author who concluded that the Morgenthau Plan was an extension of Morgenthau's New Deal Reform impulse was Warren Kimball. He recorded that,
Although the Morgenthau Plan for Germany later received widespread condemnation as a design to starve the German people, that was not his intention. A gentleman farmer who loved the land (his early work with Roosevelt had been in agriculture), Morgenthau assumed that reestablishing contact with the land would turn Germans into good, honest, democratic yeomen farmers, the Jeffersonian ideal.42

However, it would become obvious that the reality of the Morgenthau Plan was far from pastoral.

Lord Moran was “bewildered” by Churchill’s change of heart:

Within 48 hours I was bewildered by a sharp right about-turn. Someone had said that the plan would not work. At this, Winston lost his temper. “Why shouldn’t it work?” he demanded. “I’ve no patience with people who are always raising difficulties.”

It was plain that the Prof had got hold of him. Winston had changed sides.43

When Churchill had finished, Anthony Eden seemed shocked and stated, “You can’t do this. After all, you and I publicly have said quite the opposite. Furthermore, we have a lot of things in the works in London which are quite different.”44 Eden gave this account of the conversation in his memoirs:

On the morning of September 15th I joined the Prime Minister and the President, who were by now in agreement in their approval of the plan. Cherwell had supported Morgenthau and their joint advocacy had prevailed. Large areas of the Ruhr and the Saar were to be stripped of their manufacturing industries and turned into agricultural lands. I did not like the plan, nor was I convinced that it was to our national advantage.

I said so, and also suggested that Mr. Cordell Hull’s opinion should be sought for. This was the only occasion I can remember when the Prime Minister showed impatience with my views before foreign representatives. He resented my criticism of something which he and the President had
approved, not, I am sure, on his account, but on the President’s.45

Lord Moran provided a similar account of the events that transpired after Churchill had dictated his memorandum:

Eden . . . flew into a rage when he learned of the agreement. He had a heated discussion with the P.M. He asked him if he had forgotten that the Foreign Office had been working for many months on a plan which was to come into force when Germany surrendered.

. . . in the end, according to Morgenthau, the plan was drafted entirely by Mr. Churchill.46

Top Secret telegrams were sent to the various government agencies in Britain and the United States that would be influenced by this decision. The President sent Cordell Hull the following:

After many long conversations with the Prime Minister and Lord Cherwell, the general matter of postwar plans regarding industries has been worked out as per the following memo. This seems eminently satisfactory and I think you will approve the general idea of not rehabilitating the Ruhr, Saar, etc.47

Hull recorded, “Four days after the conference began, I was astonished to receive from the President a memorandum addressed to me, dated Sept. 15, which indicated that he and Churchill had largely embraced Morgenthau’s ideas.”48

The President sent Hull an additional memorandum outlining his decision on Lend Lease. Hull suspected that the President may have agreed to this program in exchange for Churchill’s support for the Morgenthau Plan.

On the same day, Sept. 15, that the President sent me the memorandum embracing the Morgenthau plan and the decision on the zones of occupation, he sent me another memorandum which informed me that Morgenthau had presented at Quebec, in conjunction with his plan for Germany, a proposal of credits to Britain totaling six and a half
billion dollars. This might suggest to some the quid pro quo with which the Secretary of the Treasury was able to get Mr. Churchill’s adherence to his cataclysmic plan for Germany.⁴⁹

Cordell Hull’s choice of words to describe the President’s memoranda is an example of that style of writing used to obscure the record. Hull is more explicit when he writes, a few pages later, “The British at Quebec had joined in on this extreme starvation plan in order to get Morgenthau’s help in obtaining six and a half billion dollars credit proposed by the Secretary of the Treasury.”⁵⁰

The British Treasury representative in Washington in 1944, R.H. (later Lord) Brand, recorded that during the Quebec Conference he was sent by his department to Quebec “to try and stop this lunatic idea.” Lord Cherwell told Brand that Britain would be “very much more likely to get the loan if he got Winston to sign the document.” This was an attitude Brand found “irresponsible.”⁵¹

Harry White claimed, a month after the conference, that Churchill had accepted the Morgenthau Plan as a quid pro quo for American assurances of Stage II of Lend-Lease.⁵² This is also supported by a description of the briefing book prepared in the Treasury Department — “Program to Prevent Germany from Starting World War III” — dated 9 Sept. 1944. Roosevelt had this at the Cabinet Committee meeting on September 9. The description of the book includes the statement, “This was done by Henry Morgenthau, Jr., and his people. In the conversation (at Quebec) with the Prof (Lord Cherwell). We used it in discussing the financial problems, but not the recommendations on the allocations of zones in Germany. F.D.R.”⁵³

The discussion of zones of occupation took place immediately after Churchill’s dictation of his interpretation of the Morgenthau Plan. At about 5:00 PM Admiral Leahy informed Morgenthau that Roosevelt and Churchill had reached agreement on the allocation.⁵⁴ The agreement would leave the British in control of the northern zone of western Germany and the United States forces in the south. The decision reached may not have been dependent upon Churchill’s acceptance of the Morgenthau Plan, but there certainly was a
connection. According to Stimson, Roosevelt was “hell-bent” on the US occupying the northwestern zone of Germany. Secretary Morgenthau said immediately after the conference that the President had told him he had held up agreement on the zones until the last minute to make certain that the British, when they were in charge in the Ruhr and Saar, would have to implement the Morgenthau Plan. 55

General Lucius Clay, the future military governor of the US zone in Germany, believed that the allocation of zones was part of the quid pro quo. He said:

It is understood, although no record is available, that in the second Quebec Conference of September 11-16, 1944, attended by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, we gave up our previous insistence on American occupation of northwest Germany and accepted an occupation of south Germany in exchange for the United Kingdom’s acceptance in principle of our proposed policy for the treatment of Germany. This was the policy advocated by Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, Jr., who had been at Quebec, and was subsequently expressed with some modification in JCS 1067. 56

Would Churchill have received this pledge of six and a half billion dollars had he refused Morgenthau’s proposal? Secretary Stimson believed that Churchill was induced to support the plan by Morgenthau’s economic arguments: “Mr. Churchill had been converted by the argument that the elimination of the Ruhr would create new markets for Great Britain.” 57 Forrest Pogue dismissed out of hand the idea of a quid pro quo: “The Prime Minister’s switch led some observers to decide [incorrectly] that he had made a deal with Morgenthau on Lend-Lease in exchange for backing his plan for Germany.” 58

There was certainly no written agreement in which it was stated that Churchill agreed to the Morgenthau Plan in exchange for Lend-Lease. This was unnecessary; it was understood. And it will be demonstrated that Roosevelt and Morgenthau were willing to pay a much higher price to carry out the Morgenthau Plan.

That evening, Secretary Morgenthau called on the President and met with him until 7:15 PM. 59 According to Morgenthau, “I got in about six o’clock and stayed until after seven-thirty. He was
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The Second Quebec Conference closed on the afternoon of September 16th. A press conference was held at 3:45 PM and a communiqué was issued to the press. The communiqué gave no indication of what had been the primary focus of the conference. Lord Ismay, Chief of Staff to the Minister of Defense recalled:

OCTAGON ended on 16 September. It had been the shortest conference of the series; as Churchill said, it had started “in a blaze of friendship”; it ended on the same note. The principal difficulty had been to find room and opportunity for marshaling against Japan the massive forces which both nations were ardent to engage against the enemy.

Churchill departed Quebec at 5:30 PM on the 16th. Roosevelt and Morgenthau departed the next day. On the afternoon of the 17th, Roosevelt and Churchill visited Morgenthau at his estate at Fishkill, New York. It is more than likely that they had additional discussions on the Morgenthau Plan.
When Morgenthau returned to Washington, he told his staff, “the thing up at Quebec . . . was unbelievably good. . . . As far as it went personally, it was the high spot of my whole career in the Government.”

The decisions reached in Quebec had an immediate impact on discussions held by the Cabinet Committee on Postwar Planning. In their meeting on September 20th, Hull and Stimson assumed that the Treasury had won a major victory. At the same time, the Draft Interim Directive for Eisenhower’s use in the immediate post surrender period was now being written, not only with Treasury participation but in line with ideas on the postwar German economy that White had outlined.

On September 22nd, Harry Hopkins called the deputies of the members of the Cabinet Committee to meet in John McCloy’s office for an all-day session to draft the interim directive for General Eisenhower. The Treasury representatives declared that the original White memorandum had been approved by the President. According to Vladimir Petrov, “This put an end to all further opposition on the part of their colleagues from the War and State Departments.” Petrov added that “the original version of JCS 1067 [the Joint Chiefs of Staff directive to General Eisenhower] became largely a Treasury document.” In an interview with John Backer, John McCloy described the War
Department’s position: “We could not follow a soft or even an objective line . . . In this atmosphere we could not spell out a constructive program . . . we had to go along with a generally negative approach.”

The observations of one of the State Department officials working on JCS 1067 shed some light on the motives of White, Frank Coe and Harold Glasser during these negotiations. Howard Trivers reported:

During the committee discussions these Treasury representatives consistently and persistently argued for the dismemberment of Germany and the transformation of industrial Germany into a bucolic pasture. They were representing faithfully the views of Henry Morgenthau, the Secretary of the Treasury. Later, I wondered whether they also had been acting under Soviet instructions, if they really were members of a communist cells [sic]. It would have been typical Soviet policy and practice to instruct American Communists to support vocally the dismemberment and pastoralization of Germany and to seek to determine American policy along these lines. In this way, contrary to the Americans, the Soviets could present themselves to the Germans as the champions of the German national cause, the ultimate aim, of course, veiled at first, being a United Germany under Communism.

Morgenthau and his representatives clearly had the support of the President. Therefore, their proposals held sway. In those areas where their proposals deviated from the original Morgenthau Plan, it was a result of other factors such as the fact that the British were scheduled to occupy the Ruhr and Saar areas. Their goal was nothing less than economic chaos. Dale Clark commented that, “Early punitive policies tending toward economic stagnation in Germany produced a feeling of frustration in conscientious officers. Many shared the cynical conviction that a politics of planned chaos was being instituted in Germany and that the Soviet Union would be the beneficiary.”

On September 21, Drew Pearson reported — in a column sympathetic to Morgenthau — that the President had rejected the Basic Handbook. According to Vladimir Petrov, “The opponents of the Morgenthau Plan instantly realized that Pearson’s report originated in
the Treasury." Morgenthau reportedly attempted to track down the source of the leak in the Treasury without success. On the 24th of September, reports of the Cabinet Committee disagreement were published in other newspapers. These reports were largely critical of the President and of Morgenthau. On September 29th, Arthur Krock reported that the President had returned the responsibility for planning for Germany to the State Department.

It appeared that, although the President never publicly rejected the Morgenthau Plan, he was retreating from its implication. This has allowed historians to contend that the Morgenthau Plan was abandoned. It is not necessary to cite the innumerable reports of the early death of the Morgenthau Plan; one example of a contemporary historian, Doris Kearns Goodwin, should suffice: "When news of the draconian plan leaked to the press, a loud outcry arose within Roosevelt’s Cabinet, and the idea quietly died." However, the decision of postwar planning had already been made and the policy would conform to Morgenthau’s wishes. David Rees, Harry Dexter White’s biographer, commented:

The public uproar over the Morgenthau Plan and the apparent retreat from the Quebec memorandum by Roosevelt and Churchill obscured the fact that in the immediate aftermath of Octagon the post surrender “Draft Interim Directive” for Germany had been approved by the President and the Cabinet Committee before its dissolution. In some of its most important provisions, the Directive, an official secret document known as JCS 1067, followed the spirit of the Treasury proposals for Germany.

Publication of the Interim Directive [JCS 1067] was planned for September 27, 1944, when Eisenhower, the Supreme Commander, received it. September 27 came and went. JCS 1067 was not published until over a year later; the reason given for not publishing it was purportedly based on considerations of national security.

On Wednesday, the 27th, the President telephoned Henry Stimson and explained that he did not intend to make Germany a purely farming nation. Stimson recorded:
He told me that he didn’t really intend to try to make Germany a purely agricultural country but said that his underlying motive was the very confidential one that England was broke; that something must be done to give her more business to pull out of the depression after the war, and he evidently hoped that by something like the Morgenthau Plan Britain might inherit Germany’s Ruhr business.  

On the 29th, the President sent a memorandum to Secretary Hull stating, “Somebody has been talking not only out of turn to the papers or [sic] on facts which are not fundamentally true. No one wants to make Germany a wholly agricultural nation again, and yet somebody down the line has handed this out to the press.” On the same day Roosevelt dissolved the Cabinet Committee and released a letter to the press indicating that postwar economic planning for Germany remained unsettled.

Morgenthau was unhappy with these developments and he wrote in his diary, on the 29th:

[Speaking to Anna Boettiger, Roosevelt’s daughter] “I think he ought to get Hull, Stimson and me together in the room and read the law to all of us, and tell us to stop talking. . . . The first thing you know, they’re going to spread it that the President has signed an agreement with Churchill on this thing.”

By October 3rd, the President appeared to have completely disassociated himself from the Morgenthau Plan. Stimson says that during lunch that day, “he grinned and looked naughty and said ‘Henry Morgenthau pulled a boner,’ or an equivalent expression.” Secretary Stimson then read the Quebec agreement. Stimson described the President’s reaction. “He was frankly staggered by this and said he had no idea how he could have initialed this; that he had evidently done it without much thought.” Edward Stettinius reported that both “Hull and Stimson were convinced, as the result of their separate conversations with the President, that he had not realized the extent to which he had committed himself at Quebec.”
It is often recorded that Roosevelt halted all postwar planning at this point. E.F. Penrose reported that “Unfortunately, President Roosevelt, after realizing his mistake at Quebec, instead of examining the contending and irreconcilable views which had been urged on him, and deciding which of them or what combination of them, or what alternative views, should be adopted as United States policy, turned entirely from all planning for the future of Germany.” Philip Mosely provided this description of Roosevelt’s decision:

Instead of pursuing this farsighted program [the State Department plan], the United States in September 1944 dashed off after the will-o’-the-wisp of the Morgenthau ‘Plan.’ For six months it indulged in a policy of ‘no policy’ towards Germany. On October 20 Mr. Roosevelt wrote to Mr. Hull: ‘I dislike making detailed plans for a country which we do not yet occupy.’ And five days later an F.D.R. memorandum, elicited by the Civil Affairs Division, put a complete stop to postwar planning for Germany and even placed in question the US draft directives which had already been cleared in Washington and circulated to the EAC.

At this point in the Allied advances into Germany, planning could not have been stopped. What was halted was State Department planning. E. F. Penrose later recorded that “work had to go forward on the preparation of a directive to the Commander-in-Chief who was to bear responsibility for governing the United States zone and who would have to represent the United States on the Allied Control Council after hostilities ceased.” Dale Clark, a staff member in the Civil Affairs Division, recorded that Roosevelt’s apparent rejection of the Morgenthau Plan was “regarded as a hopeful sign by military government officers.” He added that “As events showed, however, it was merely an evasive statement, while policy followed the ‘Quebec Plan.’ The new plan continued to guide policy through the ‘top secret’ channels of the army.”

It is important to note that President Roosevelt’s memo halting State Department planning was “elicited by the Civil Affairs Division.” Warren Kimball provided some insight into the President’s motives:
“Roosevelt, in one of his last written responses to the debate, phrased a carefully ambiguous answer to Hull which mandated postponement of any real decision. Roosevelt knew that the EAC faithfully reflected State Department thinking and his instructions demonstrate that the President did not want that department to set policy for postwar Germany.”

Penrose recorded that the outcome of the President’s “refusal to arbitrate was the notorious ‘basic directive,’ JCS 1067, which was supposed to guide the United States occupying forces in the initial period of occupation.” Penrose was highly critical of JCS 1067 and commented that “It may well rank among the most discreditable state documents ever written.”

This October 3 meeting has become the defining moment in Roosevelt’s apparent rejection of the Morgenthau Plan. It is absurd on two accounts. The President held numerous meetings with his Cabinet, Morgenthau and the British, where objections to the Morgenthau Plan were made, often in a heated manner. Further, his subsequent statements confirm that he never abandoned the plan. Eleanor Roosevelt recorded:

At least a month before the Quebec conference, my husband had received memoranda from Secretary Hull, Secretary Stimson and Secretary Morgenthau, members of the Cabinet Committee he had set up to recommend a plan for the postwar treatment of Germany. All were carefully considered, so it is fair to surmise that Henry Morgenthau’s plan more closely met the needs of the situation as Franklin saw it.

Eleanor Roosevelt did not believe that her husband had changed his mind about the Morgenthau Plan. She wrote, “I never heard my husband say that he had changed his attitude on this plan. I think the repercussions brought about by the press stories made him feel it was wise to abandon [it] at that time. . . .”

On November 26, 1944, Roosevelt had a meeting with the British economist, Lord Keynes. Roosevelt informed him that the Morgenthau Plan would be carried out. The German economy would be reduced to a level “not quite” completely agrarian, he said. The plan went “pretty far” in deindustrializing the Ruhr and eliminating many of Germany’s
basic industries.\textsuperscript{28}

Morgenthau was with the President the night before he died in Warm Springs, Georgia on April 12, 1945. Mrs. Roosevelt gave an account of Morgenthau’s last meeting with the President:

Henry Morgenthau himself tells the story of his last interview with my husband the night before he died. He left him with the firm conviction that Franklin still was determined not to allow any sentimental considerations to modify the conditions necessary to prevent Germany and the German people from becoming aggressors again.\textsuperscript{29}

The President’s last words to Morgenthau on his policy were, “Henry, I am with you 100\%.”\textsuperscript{30}

Robert Sherwood, Roosevelt’s biographer, when describing Roosevelt’s decision to announce the policy of unconditional surrender, gives an explanation of the President’s character:

Roosevelt, for some reason, often liked to picture himself as a rather frivolous fellow who did not give sufficient attention to the consequences of chance remarks. In this explanation, indicating a spur-of-the-moment slip of the tongue, he certainly did considerably less than justice to himself. For this announcement of unconditional surrender was very deeply deliberated.\textsuperscript{31}

There is no excuse for professional historians accepting Roosevelt’s contention that he initialed the Morgenthau Plan “without much thought.” The preponderance of evidence demonstrates that he gave this decision a great deal of thought indeed. He was willing to commit six and one half billion dollars to gain British acceptance of the plan. He was willing to suffer the political costs of supporting what was to be an unpopular plan. In fact, it will become clear below that he was willing to pay a much higher price.
The publication of the decision made at Quebec to accept the Morgenthau Plan had a predictable impact on the German populace and its leaders. Secretary Hull foresaw the human costs of the plan becoming public:

If the Morgenthau plan leaked out, as it inevitably would — and shortly did — it might well mean a bitter-end German resistance that could cause the loss of thousands of American lives.¹

In the fall of 1944, President Roosevelt was involved in his last presidential campaign. He was an astute politician and must have known that there would be a political price to pay for his endorsement of Morgenthau’s plan; yet he was willing to pay that price. On the 18th of October, Gov. Thomas E. Dewey, the Republican candidate for president, accused Roosevelt of stiffening the German resistance by his policy toward Germany.² Dewey stated, “Almost over night the morale of the German people seems wholly changed. Now they are fighting with a frenzy of despair. We are paying in blood for our failure to have ready an intelligent program for dealing with invaded Germany.”³ Dewey called the Morgenthau Plan “as good as ten fresh German divisions.”⁴ Forrest Pogue, General Marshall’s biographer, suggested that Dewey’s accusations were politically motivated:
Governor Dewey, searching for an issue in his campaign against Roosevelt, attacked the Secretary of the Treasury, charging that the proposal would frighten the Germans and thus prolong the war. However, President Roosevelt’s son-in-law, Lieutenant Colonel John Boettiger, who was not running for office, estimated that the Morgenthau Plan was “worth thirty divisions to the Germans.” General Marshall complained to Morgenthau that after the Krock article on November 2, Germans resistance appeared to have stiffened. Marshall Knappen related that “Weary men returning from the field reported that the Germans fought with twice their previous determination after the announcement of the Morgenthau policy.”

General Omar N. Bradley stated that “In early September [1944], most men in the Allied high command believed that victory over Germany was imminent. The near-miraculous revitalization of the German Army in October had come as a shock, dissipating some of the optimism.” There is no way of calculating the number of American servicemen who lost their lives as a result of this policy. However, it is obvious that Dewey, Boettiger and Hull were correct in their predictions.

William Casey wrote:

Exhorting Germans to fight on lest their country be turned into “a potato patch” was hardly distorting the truth, and as is so often the case, the truth was much more effective than the biggest lie. Captured letters from front-line troops showed how well Goebbels had succeeded.

German Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels did not waste time capitalizing on the news of the Morgenthau Plan. A headline in the German newspaper, *Völkischer Beobachter*, read: “The Quebec decision will serve only to redouble German resistance.” Goebbels wrote in his diary:
In addition the Morgenthau Plan will be pursued, under which Germany is to be turned into a potato field, German youth of military age is to be compulsorily deported abroad as slave labor and reparations are to be paid...  

The German Minister of Munitions, Albert Speer, stated:

The Morgenthau Plan was made to order for Hitler and the Party, insofar as they could point to it for proof that defeat would finally seal the fate of all Germans. Many people were actually influenced by this threat.  

Hitler’s New Year’s message to the German people included a description of the Morgenthau Plan as a plot of the British, Americans, Bolsheviks, and “international Jews,” which he said would result in the “complete ripping apart of the German Reich, the uprooting of 15 or 20 million Germans and transport abroad, the enslavement of the rest of our people, the ruination of our German youth, but above all, the starvation of our masses.”  

The Morgenthau Plan and its release to the press has been described as “a textbook example of psychological warfare in reverse.”  

William Donovan, Director of the OSS (Office of Strategic Services), wrote to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on November 27, 1944:

The horrible prospects of exile to Siberia, eternal slavery, de-industrialization, break-up of Germany and even sterilization, have been carefully portrayed to the Germans by their Nazi leaders. It is considered that the German spirit of resistance has been bolstered greatly by fear of the consequences of unconditional surrender.  

Col. R.R. Henn, deputy chief for Operations Branch G-5, stated that the publicity given to the Morgenthau controversy had confirmed “to the last detail every statement of enemy propaganda for the past five years.”  

It is quite possible that Hitler used the new determination of his troops to launch an offensive in the West. John Snell reported that:
By September 25 the Morgenthau Plan was known in general outline in Germany. At the end of that month Hitler revealed to his closest generals his intention to launch a counterattack against the West and to re-take Antwerp, even if it were necessary to weaken the eastern front to carry out the western operation.17

William Casey recorded that “Nobody expected an attack in the Ardennes.” Hitler’s drive through the Ardennes “sent shock waves from the Allied high command to GIs stocking supplies in the rear areas.”18 Hitler had committed to the assault 28 divisions, including ten of armor, grouped into three armies. General Eisenhower admitted that “all of us, without exception, were astonished at the ability of the [Germans] to act offensively.”19

General Eisenhower told General Marshall,

...there is a noticeable and fanatical zeal on the part of nearly all his fighting men as well as the whole nation of 85,000,000 people, successfully united by terror from within and fear of consequences from without. The Germans are convinced they are fighting for their very existence and their battle action reflects this spirit.20

According to William Casey, the Morgenthau Plan was leaked to the press intentionally. He asserted that “Roosevelt and Churchill had leaked the plan to the Anglo-American press early that fall and given Goebbels a field day.”21 If it was Roosevelt’s policy to destroy the German nation, the publication of the Morgenthau Plan would further this objective by stiffening German resistance and eliminating all chances of a negotiated peace, with even anti-Nazi elements. Allen Dulles concluded that “Those who determined policy in Britain and America seemed to be making the military task as difficult as possible by uniting all Germans to the bitter end.”22 In speaking of the Allied unconditional surrender policy, General William Leahy wrote: “From a military viewpoint its execution might add to our difficulties in succeeding campaigns because it would mean that we would have to destroy the enemy.”23

Roosevelt’s intent may well have been to destroy the German
nation. He had announced in a meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “I am not willing at this time to say that we do not intend to destroy the German nation.” After the defeat of Germany, Stalin believed that the Allies had indeed destroyed Germany. In a meeting on May 28, 1945 Hopkins wrote, “He [Stalin] feels that if we stick to unconditional surrender the Japs will not give up and we will have to destroy them as we did Germany.”

Yet Winston Churchill still contended that the policy of unconditional surrender did not prolong the war. He told Robert Sherwood that, “It is false to suggest that it prolonged the war.”
The pattern for the postwar treatment of Germany had been set at Tehran and the architect of it was Joseph Stalin.
— Sir John Wheeler-Bennett

The foundation of the United States Army’s occupation policy was established on the 22nd of September, prior to Roosevelt’s apparent rejection of the Morgenthau Plan and his dissolution of the Cabinet Committee on Postwar Planning. The initial directive approved by the Cabinet Committee was revised several times. In January, 1945 Colonel Bernstein returned to Washington, and during discussions with White and other Treasury officials, the financial provisions of the revised Interim Directive were stiffened. Although William Clayton, the Undersecretary for Economic Affairs for the State Department, had been appointed the chairman of the committee, most of the meetings where held in Morgenthau’s office. Morgenthau, as the senior member of the committee, was the de facto chairman. On April 26 the second major revision of the directive was approved by the committee and sent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for clearance. Colonel David Marcus, Chief of the Planning Branch of Civil Affairs Division in the War Department, dictated the final version of the basic directive, “which was very close to Morgenthau’s position.” John Snell noted that this revision “met with the warm approval of the Treasury officials.”

On April 28, 1945, a draft Directive to Commander-In-Chief of United States Forces of Occupation Regarding Military Government of
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Germany (JCS 1067) was sent by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to General Eisenhower. General Clay recorded that it had been received on the 26th. President Truman signed this revised version of JCS 1067 on May 10, 1945. Morgenthau considered this “a big day for the Treasury.” He also hoped “somebody doesn’t recognize it as the Morgenthau Plan.” The approved directive was issued on May 14. It was distributed to key personnel on May 21, classified top secret. It would retain that designation until October 17, 1945, when it was released by the State Department with the following introductory statement.

The directive was issued originally in April 1945, and was intended to serve two purposes. It was to guide General Eisenhower in the military government of that portion of Germany occupied by United States forces. At the same time he was directed to urge the Control Council to adopt these policies for enforcement throughout Germany.

One of the most important goals of the Treasury dealt with the standard of living to be maintained in occupied Germany. This was contained in section 21 of the directive: “German Standards of Living”:

21. You will estimate requirements of supplies necessary to prevent starvation or widespread disease or such civil unrest as would endanger the occupying forces. Such estimates will be based upon a program whereby the Germans are made responsible for providing for themselves, out of their own work and resources. You will take all practicable economic and police measures to assure that German resources are fully utilized and consumption held to a minimum in order that imports may be strictly limited and that surpluses may be made available for the occupying forces and displaced persons and United Nations prisoners of war, and for reparations.

This section contained a passage from the original Basic Handbook and the original “Combined Directive For Military Government in Germany Prior to Defeat Or Surrender” issued on April 28, 1944. Appendix D (Economic and Relief Guide For Germany) of this directive, issued on May 31, 1944, states, “German food and other
supplies will be utilized for the German population to the minimum extent required to prevent disease and unrest.” This sentence was modified to include “as would endanger the occupying forces.” The officials who revised the original draft of JCS 1067 were lawyers and the inclusion of this addition was not accidental or superfluous. It was meant to be interpreted as allowing starvation or widespread disease as long as it did not endanger the occupying forces.

The intent of this addition is revealed in a passage by John Backer:

Faced with two impossible alternatives, namely, the administering of mass starvation under the aegis of the American flag or the open violation of military orders, they [Clay] were obliged to move in a third direction traditionally unfamiliar to the military mind, namely a painstaking legal analysis of their orders.12

Mass starvation “under the aegis of the American flag” was the policy of the directive and the only way that this situation could be avoided was either “open violation of military orders” or “painstaking legal analysis.”

Although President Truman disagreed with Morgenthau’s philosophy on postwar planning, he signed JCS 1067 as Roosevelt’s policy, and sent it to Eisenhower 14 May.13 Morgenthau told Truman that he wanted to attend the Potsdam Conference of 17 July-August 2, 1945. The President informed him that he was needed in Washington. Morgenthau threatened to resign if he was not permitted to attend the conference. Truman accepted his resignation. However, the policy Truman followed at Potsdam was based upon JCS 1067.14 According to Hajo Holborn, “All the general objectives contained in the American post-defeat Directives on the Military Government of Germany [JCS 1067] reappear in the Potsdam Declaration, often enough couched in the same language.”15

The Report on the Tripartite Conference of Potsdam, August 2, 1945 contained the following passage dealing with reparations From Germany:
4. In addition to the reparations to be taken by the USSR from its own zone of occupation, the USSR shall receive additionally from the western zones:

(a) Fifteen percent of such usable and complete industrial capital equipment, in the first place from the metallurgical, chemical and machine manufacturing industries, as is unnecessary for the German peace economy should be removed from the western zones of Germany, in exchange for an equivalent value of food, coal, potash, zinc, timber, clay products, petroleum products and such other commodities as may be agreed upon.

(b) Ten per cent of such industrial capital equipment as is unnecessary for the German peace economy and should be removed from the western zones, to be transferred to the Soviet Government on reparations account without payment or exchange of any kind in return.16

Was JCS 1067 the Morgenthau Plan? Conventional historians can honestly contend that it was not. JCS 1067 did not cover all of Germany, as the Morgenthau Plan did. There were significant proposals in the Morgenthau Plan that were not included in JCS 1067. However, it cannot be honestly maintained that the Morgenthau Plan did not form the foundation of JCS 1067. People involved in the negotiations saw this and commented on it at the time. Walter Dorn wrote, “what is so striking about JCS 1067 is not that it was a punitive document — it could not have been otherwise — but that it was an exclusively punitive document.”17 He added that JCS 1067 was “largely a Treasury document.”18

E.F. Penrose recorded:

Naturally the Treasury exerted a particularly strong influence on this section [the financial section of 1067] of the directive, and as the financial administration would be headed by officers who were really Treasury officials transferred temporarily to the army and in frequent communication with Mr. Morgenthau, financial policy was predestined to be, in its earlier stages at least, an instrument of revenge and not of reconstruction. American and British taxpayers are still paying for the consequences of this early and major error of the peace.19
Stimson reread the document two years later and found it “a painfully negative document.”\textsuperscript{20} James W. Riddleberger, the chief of the Division of Central European Affairs, described the document as “substantially . . . the same as drafted by the Treasury Department some months ago.”\textsuperscript{21} General Clay, the future military governor, stated, “there was no doubt that JCS 1067 contemplated the Carthaginian peace which dominated our operations in Germany during the early months of occupation.”\textsuperscript{22} Finally, there are Morgenthau’s comments on the redrafted version of JCS 1067: “I feel all these documents are so far better than I had any hope for that I am perfectly willing to sit tight. . . . They are . . . completely satisfactory to me.”\textsuperscript{23}

Morgenthau’s son conceded that the Morgenthau Plan was “implanted” in JCS 1067 and that it lived on, briefly:

In the summer of 1945, after Morgenthau’s resignation, the Morgenthau Plan enjoyed a short afterlife implanted in the regulations for administering the military German occupation, JCS 1067. This was in part the handiwork of Morgenthau’s former assistant, Colonel Bernard Bernstein, and other Treasury hands planted in Eisenhower’s staff. However, without Morgenthau and his privileged Roosevelt connection, the elements of JCS 1067 calling for enforcement of a tough peace were ultimately ignored.\textsuperscript{24}

Henry Morgenthau III may contend that without his father’s guidance the directive was ignored, but, due to the large number of ex-Treasury officials working as Civil Affairs officers during the early stages of the occupation, it was frequently carried out to the letter.\textsuperscript{25}

JCS 1067 was not replaced by a new directive until July 11, 1947 (more than a year later than had been expected).\textsuperscript{26} This new directive, JCS 1779, directed the commanding general to consider it his fundamental task to help lay the economic and educational basis for a sound German democracy. JCS 1779 also directed, “Military Government should provide the general policy guidance and assist in the development of a balanced trade.” The US military governor was directed to support the removal of existing trade barriers, to encourage
the return of foreign trade to normal channels, and to prepare the reorganization of German finances on a sound basis.\textsuperscript{27}

There were several reasons for the eventual abandonment of JCS 1067. Most of these were foreseen by the early critics of the Morgenthau Plan, especially its impact on the average German citizen. With the increasing tension between the Western allies and the Soviet Union, Germany was now seen as a valuable prize in the East-West struggle. In July 1946, the foreign minister of the Soviet Union, Vyacheslav Molotov, declared at the Foreign Ministers Conference in Paris that it would be a mistake to plan for Germany's agrarianization and destruction of its main industrial centers. Molotov claimed that the Soviet Union's purpose was not to destroy Germany but to transform it into a democratic and peace-loving state which, in addition to its agriculture, would have its own industry and foreign trade.\textsuperscript{28} The Soviets were appealing to the civilian population of the Western zones.

One explanation that has been offered for the destructive results of the Morgenthau Plan and the directive based upon it was that it was not a well-designed plan. Upon seeing the draft directive, on April 16, Lewis Douglas (General Clay's financial adviser) commented that “This thing was assembled by economic idiots.” Douglas' comments reflected the thinking of many critics of Morgenthau's design. William Draper, Clay's economic adviser, concluded much the same. Douglas went on to say, “It makes no sense to forbid the most skilled workers in Europe from producing as much as they can for a continent which is desperately short of everything.”\textsuperscript{29} Morgenthau's advisers, however, were not economic idiots. The Morgenthau Plan made a great deal of sense.

Sir John Wheeler-Bennett and Anthony Nicholls recorded, in their work on the post war settlement, that,

The thought of Mr. Douglas and those who shared his views was that the Morgenthau thesis — and therefore JCS 1067 — was unpractical for reasons of geography and also undesirable, since a vast pool of unemployed Germans would — and did — create a fertile field for Communist propaganda in the heart of Europe.\textsuperscript{30}
There was only one beneficiary of the Morgenthau Plan and its consequence. That beneficiary was the Soviet Union.

It should be pointed out that Douglas and his colleagues were not motivated by humanitarian impulses. They were practical men who did not approve of the waste of human resources. As Wheeler-Bennett pointed out,

What they aimed to do was to make the Germans work — in some sense as helots — for the relief and recovery of those countries which had been victims of their aggression and ultimately for their own salvation.31
THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE MORGENTHAU PLAN

A fool among men is he who sacks cities, brings desolation on the temples, the groves, the hallowed places of the dead, and thus has brought destruction too upon himself.

— Euripides

According to Cordell Hull, President Roosevelt believed that the future of Britain was linked inversely to the future of Germany. Hull stated that Roosevelt believed “Britain needed to get back her export trade after the war, but he felt that she could not do so if Germany were permitted to develop an extensive export trade in competition.” This was the reason he “embraced” the Morgenthau Plan. Morgenthau’s plan would “guarantee English prosperity for twenty years after the war by eliminating German competition for coal and steel markets around the world.” Hull believed that the President somehow “forgot, despite Churchill’s initialing of the agreement, that the British Government was the last to desire the conversion of Germany into a pastoral country, because Britain’s livelihood would be impaired if Europe’s economy collapsed because of a wrecked Germany.”

The destructive economic consequences of the Morgenthau Plan were obvious to all of its opponents long before the plan was implemented. Is it plausible that the men in the Treasury, trained in economics, were unaware of those possible consequences? Warren Kimball asserted that “Morgenthau and those who supported his plan for the pastoralization of Germany could not have predicted the political and economic ramifications of what they proposed.” Kimball’s assertion is based on his belief that White was not a
The Morgenthau Plan

Secretary of War Stimson pointed out the economic consequences of the Morgenthau Plan on the first of September 1944 in his memo to the President:

Germany is furthermore an important producer of certain raw materials, namely coal and bauxite, for Europe as a whole, not to speak of the vast amount of industrial goods which Germany normally exports. If we advocate a “wrecking program” as the best means of assuring our security, we may face considerable European opposition on account of its effect on European economy, and if we desire continuing reparations out of Germany, we shall eliminate any such program by a policy of destruction of German industry.\(^5\)

Churchill, in spite of his initial approval of the Morgenthau Plan, expressed at Yalta his objections to a policy of destroying the German economy:

Secondly, (Mr. Churchill continued,) there arises in my mind the specter of an absolutely starving Germany. If our treatment of Germany’s internal economy is such as to leave eighty million people virtually starving, are we to sit still and say, “It serves you right,” or will we be required to keep them alive? If so, who is going to pay for that? . . . If you have a horse and you want him to pull the wagon you have to provide him with a certain amount of corn — or at least hay.\(^6\)

Even Morgenthau’s chief assistant Harry Dexter White suggested at one point permitting the Ruhr to produce coal so as to alleviate what he termed the “terrific coal shortage” that Western Europe and Great Britain would face after the end of hostilities.\(^7\)

General Lucius Clay, Eisenhower’s successor as Military Governor, believed that JCS 1067 prohibited him from taking measures to maintain the German economy. He wrote in his memoirs:

It had not taken a financial or an economic expert on May 7,
1945 to realize that the German economic structure had collapsed. While under our initial directive, JCS 1067, we could not take remedial measures, since such a collapse was deemed necessary to bring home to the German people what had been inflicted upon them by Nazi leadership, the provisions of the Potsdam Protocol did permit something to be done.  

In spite of the provisions in the Potsdam Protocol, according to the Military Governor, the intent of JCS 1067 was to oversee the collapse of the German economy. The directive was explicit on this point. “Except as may be necessary to carry out these objectives, you will take no steps (a) looking toward the economic rehabilitation of Germany, or (b) designed to maintain or strengthen the German economy.”

General Patton claimed that one of the missions of the occupation was to “deindustrialize Germany and make the nation incapable of war.” Nicholas Balabkins contended that “During the first three years of Allied occupation the policy of industrial disarmament of Germany was vigorously pursued by the British and American military governments. . . . In the American zone the JCS 1067 directive, with its negative White-Morgenthau approach, provided the basic framework of occupation. JCS 1067 aimed at the creation of a new, peacefully oriented Germany without heavy industry but with a well-developed agriculture.” The US Senate’s Judiciary Committee came to essentially the same conclusion, asserting, “During the first two years of the Allied occupation the Treasury program of industrial dismantlement was vigorously pursued by American officials.” Vladimir Petrov, an expert on the financial aspects of the occupation, wrote:

By forbidding the American Army to maintain price, wage, and market controls, it literally decreed, as a State Department official put it, economic chaos. In this way the Treasury’s view that the extreme disruption of German economy was not in conflict with Allied interests became official American policy.
The Morgenthau Plan

In Earl Ziemke’s study of the postwar economic situation he points out that, “Of the whole industrial establishment in the US zone about 15 percent was in working condition in August [1945] and was running at about 5 percent of capacity.”\(^{14}\) This reduced production was not entirely the result of wartime damage. James Bacque points out that “The most heavily damaged area of Germany was the Ruhr, where less than 30 per cent of the plant equipment and machinery was destroyed by the war. In Germany as a whole, 80-85 per cent of the machinery and plant survived intact, but in 1946 in the US zone, exports were forced down to only 3 per cent of prewar levels.”\(^{15}\)

William Clayton, the State Department’s representative on the Reparations Committee at Potsdam wrote to James F. Byrnes on July 29, 1945:

[W]e are committed to the substantial de-industrialization of the Ruhr, and it is doubtful if other claimant nations for reparations will be able to use all the equipment which will be removed from that area. In other words, to give a reasonable percentage of such equipment to the Russians will cost nothing.\(^{16}\)

The folly of removing valuable machinery for transport to a foreign location was pointed out by Gustav Stolper:

A machine must fit into the technical environment of the foreign country. Spare parts of the same shapes and measurements must be available. The machines must be adaptable to working on the same materials as had been used for other machinery, and must not depend in their operations on the special, untransplantable skill of their operators. Viewed from this angle, dismantling of surplus capacity is under normal circumstances deplorable waste. But circumstances are not normal.\(^{17}\)

Stolper went on to point out that “Valuable and complicated machines were torn, broken, blasted from their foundations and put on railroad cars which never reached Russia. They were left or forgotten

\(^{86}\)
on sidings and the machinery became rusted scrap."\textsuperscript{18} Marguerite Higgins of the \textit{New York Herald Tribune} estimated that, "Probably not more than one-tenth of the equipment they dismantled and removed was later usable."\textsuperscript{19}

Another aspect of the contradictory policies followed by the Allies was illustrated by Stolper in recounting the case of an Austrian tire factory, "They [the Russians] removed the machines from the one major Austrian tire factory, then immediately ordered the Austrian government to deliver a certain number of tires."\textsuperscript{20}

A table of industrial production in the combined British and American zones of Germany indicates the severity of the policy and reveals when this policy began to change:

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
\hline
Year and Quarter & Production Index \\
\hline
1936 & 100 \\
1945 & not available \\
1946 & \\
1 & 28 \\
2 & 32 \\
3 & 37 \\
4 & 36 \\
1947 & \\
1 & 30 \\
2 & 39 \\
3 & 42 \\
4 & 43 \\
1948 & \\
1 & 46 \\
2 & 48 \\
3 & 65 \\
4 & 76 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Industrial production index in the Bizone of Germany \hspace{1cm} All goods (1936 = 100)}
\end{table}

\textit{From Research Analysis Corp., McLean, Va., Technical Paper RAC-TP-352 April 1969, p. 60.}\textsuperscript{21}
Predictably, the economic policies followed in postwar Germany led to the collapse not only of the German economy but the entire European economy. General Clay quickly saw the impact of German economic ruin on the rest of Europe. “It was an early appreciation that until Germany was able to produce again it not only would require assistance from the occupying powers but also would be a drag on recovery in Europe.” Nicholas Balabkins recorded that “The fallacies of Morgenthauism, or perhaps more correctly Whiteism, in all its variations, were an important contributor to the postwar collapse of Western European economies.” Edward Peterson recorded that, by early 1947, “economic recovery throughout western Europe suddenly stalled and went into a tailspin, coinciding with the necessity for facing up to the problems of Germany at the Moscow Conference.” Petrov concluded that “The victorious Allies . . . delayed by several years the economic reconstruction of the war-torn continent, a reconstruction which subsequently cost the US billions of dollars.”

The cost of these chaotic economic policies should be added to the foreseeable economic costs that Roosevelt was willing to pay in order to achieve his objectives. In 1947, Herbert Hoover recorded in his report, “The President’s Economic Mission to Germany and Austria,” that,

At the present time the taxpayers of the United States and Britain are contributing nearly $600,000,000 a year to prevent starvation of the Germans in the American and British zones alone. The drain is likely to be even greater after peace unless the policies now in action are changed. Therefore, entirely aside from any humanitarian and political aspects, policies which will restore productivity in Germany and exports with which to buy their food and relieve this drain upon us are of primary importance.

John Backer estimated that “The grand total of all GARIOA [Government and Relief in Occupied Areas] financed expenditures in Germany was $1.52 billion.” W. Friedmann commented in 1947 that “Britain must reduce the burden of continuous imports to Germany at a
cost which, coupled with the vast administrative apparatus of the Control Commission, amounts to over 100,000,000 pounds a year.”

David M. Nichol of the Chicago Daily News estimated that “For three years, until East-West trade broke down completely, the Americans poured some $700,000,000 a year into one end of the country while the Russians took $500,000,000 out of the other.”

Western economic policies in occupied Germany naturally had a political impact. On September 5, 1946, the New York Herald Tribune reported: “The best way for the German people to be driven into the arms of the Soviet Union was for the United States to stand forth as the champion of indiscriminate and harsh misery in Germany.” Secretary of State James Byrnes recorded a comment by General Charles de Gaulle, that “The very fact that Germany was now weak makes that country all the more susceptible of becoming the political instrument of other powers.”

The French General Alphonse Juan told General Patton, “It is indeed unfortunate, my General, that the English and the Americans have destroyed in Europe the only sound country — and I do not mean France — therefore the road is now open for the advent of Russian Communism.”

Averell Harriman commented on the impact of the economic situation on the rest of Europe:

I don’t think there is any doubt that, with the strong Communist Parties both in Italy and in France, he [Stalin] would have extended his domination to the Atlantic, if we had not acted to frustrate it. In all probability, the Communist leaders in those countries had reported to Moscow that they could take over, and I think they would have succeeded if we had not helped Western Europe to recover.

Field Marshal Montgomery foresaw the benefits to the Soviets of western economic policies, and stated, “a dismembered and discontented Germany would help the spread of Communism.” Edward P. Morgen wrote an article entitled “Patton is Called on Carpet” in the Des Moines Tribune on September 26, 1945. In it he claimed that “The United States Army is now building a record which will by itself open to charges of having created such chaos as to make it
appear that some of our representatives and officials deliberately desired to throw the American zone into ultimate Russian control.”

Morgen was not aware at the time of how correct his analysis was.

It was during this period that Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov delivered his speech to the Council of Foreign Ministers in Paris, on July 10, 1946:

> It would be incorrect to adopt the course of Germany’s annihilation as a state or that of its agrarianization, including the annihilation of its main industrial centers. Our purpose is not to destroy Germany, but to transform Germany into a democratic and peace-loving state which, besides its agriculture, will have its own industry and foreign trade. . . . The policy of Germany’s annihilation as a state or that of her agrarianization and annihilation of her principal industrial centers will result in making Germany a center where dangerous sentiments of revenge will be nourished and will play into the hands of German reactionaries and will deprive Europe of tranquility and peace.36

Secretary of State Byrnes recorded that, “I realized at once the strength of this appeal. It was clearly calculated to play on the widespread German fear of the so-called ‘Morgenthau Plan,’ which had been widely discussed in the American press.”

This is a curious statement by the Secretary of State. Molotov made this speech over one year after the defeat of Germany. Molotov was commenting on current Western policy. He was appealing to German fear of the policy being pursued and not their fear of something being discussed in the American press.

Nicholas Balabkins contended that it was this realization — that the Soviet Union was making progress with its appeal — that made the Western powers reverse their economic policies. “It was this . . . and nothing else, that made Washington change its former negative and repressive policy.”

E.F. Penrose came to a similar conclusion. He asserted, “it was probably the indirect influence of the Soviet Union which did most to prod Washington to change its ways.”

Another policy originating in the Treasury that had a devastating impact on the German economy was Western monetary policy in
David Rees reports that, “the State Department and the Treasury agreed on a ten-cent rate for the AM mark [occupation currency], the figure originally suggested by White. This was an overvaluation of the dollar, based on the nominal rate of 40 cents, or 300 percent.” In addition to this the Treasury insured that the occupation Marks would be nearly worthless by providing the Russians with a duplicate set of plates to produce occupation currency. Edwin Hartrich, in his book on postwar Germany, opined, “For some as yet unexplained reason, Henry Morgenthau, Jr., the US Secretary of the Treasury, gave the Soviet authorities a full set of the new printing plates for the occupation currency, as the Russians said they wanted to print their own marks.” Hartrich was apparently unfamiliar with the motivations of Harry Dexter White.

In 1944 White provided the NKVD (Soviet secret police), through Gregory Silvermaster, samples of the occupation currency printed by the Treasury for use in Germany. When the Russians asked for the plates, ink, and paper samples in order to print notes of their own, the director of the Bureau of Printing and Engraving naturally objected that “to permit the Russian government to print a currency identical to that being printed in this country would make accountability impossible.” White protested that the Russians would interpret this as showing lack of confidence in their integrity; they “must be trusted to the same degree and to the same extent as the other allies.” A week later the Soviets received the plates.

Vladimir Petrov related that the three Western allies put into circulation a total of about 10.5 billion AM Marks. The Soviets issued on “a very conservative estimate” 78 billion. These occupation marks were eventually redeemed by the American and British taxpayers. Robert Haeger of the United Press estimated that “This oblique raid on the Treasury amounted to more than $300,000,000 before the Army called a halt.” Hartrich calculated that “the Americans had been fleeced out of $500 million and the British out of $300 million by the Communist financiers.”

Hartrich’s account of the economic situation in postwar Germany is worth quoting at length:
The Russian soldiers were in the black market for anything of value that could be carried away with them to the Soviet Union. The “Ivans” would pay fantastic prices for consumer goods, especially items from the US Army’s PX stores. For example, a cheap PX wristwatch, costing $15 or $20, would sell for as high as 5,000 Russian-printed occupation marks, which in turn could be redeemed by the American seller for a $500 postal money order. In addition, the G.I.s found that they could unload $1.00 cartons of American cigarettes in the Berlin Market for 1,200 to 1,500 marks each, or $120 to $150 when cashed in at the Army finance or postal offices.

By the end of July 1945, it began to dawn on the US Treasury that they were subsidizing a large part of the Soviet military occupation cost by redeeming billions of the Russian-printed marks at the rate of ten cents each. Fortunately, these Soviet marks were distinguishable from the occupation currency of the American and British zones by a small dash in front of the serial number. Hence, without any advance warning, at the end of July 1945, it was announced that the Russian marks were invalid in western Germany and could not be redeemed at any American or British finance or postal office for dollars or pounds sterling.

W. Friedmann related that “the salary of a medium senior official is about R.M. 600 a month. This would, on the black market, buy 1 lb. of coffee or 80-100 cigarettes.”

These economic conditions created an atmosphere that was conducive to massive corruption. Robert Haeger of the United Press reported that “The conqueror’s climate of 1945 was favorable to the acquisition of jewels, cameras, furs, watches, antiques, and just about everything else that was portable, from hungry Germans who were in no position to protest.” People who should have known better or should have been ethically opposed to taking advantage of this situation were often seduced by the opportunity for personal gain. Edward Peterson reported that the chief US Prosecutor and Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson demanded that the military property officer acquire two grand pianos for him. Peterson remarked that no record was kept of where these pianos were obtained.

As early as the beginning of 1946, it was becoming obvious that
Western monetary policy in Germany was a failure. An American committee of financial experts recommended the introduction of a new currency (the Colm-Dodge-Goldsmith Report). However, the issuance of a new currency was postponed due to the expected opposition of the Soviets. The new currency was not issued until June 18, 1948. The Soviet responded by imposing a blockade on the city of Berlin the next day, and issued their own reformed currency.

The financial policies followed by the Western powers were coupled with a policy of industrial dismantlement, nominally for the purpose of reparations. This policy reached its peak in 1949, well past the time when the destructive consequences of the early US financial policy had become obvious. It was clearly in conflict with the policies of the Economic Cooperation Administration (the agency for the Marshall Plan). The American taxpayers were financing the rebuilding of the European economy while simultaneously paying to have it torn down. A total of 667 plants with an estimated 1938 value of R.M. 708.5 million were removed from the Western zones of Germany. The policy of industrial dismantlement did not end until April 1951.

General Clay favored an increase in Marshall Plan funding for Germany. At the same time, he supported the dismantling program. During the Berlin blockade, the Ruhr Minister-President asked about the workers’ concern for their jobs in the dismantled plants. Clay responded: “It’s none of their business. If one wants any more help from America, one should stop talking about the dismantling.”

The fuel industry presented a striking example of the impracticality of the Morgenthau Plan. Europe was dependent on the fuel produced in the Ruhr. Harry Dexter White did not have to be an economic genius to foresee a “terrific coal shortage” following the war. Even before the conclusion of hostilities, voices were raised to call attention to the impending fuel deficit. F.S.V. Donnison recorded that, “On 21st April 1945 the Combined Production and Resources Board in America drew the attention of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the critical coal position in north-west Europe and to the urgent necessity for reviving coal production in Germany ‘by every step however drastic.’” In May 1945, a group of US and British economics experts, the Potter-Hyndley Mission, released a study of European coal...
The Morgenthau Plan

requirements and concluded, “Unless drastic steps are taken, there will occur in Northwest Europe and the Mediterranean next winter a coal famine of such severity as to destroy all semblance of law and order, and thus delay any chance of reasonable stability.” Yet the recommendations of the Potter-Hyndley Mission were not acted upon for months. Donnison points out that “Basic Allied policy, until August 1945, was that nothing should be done to help rehabilitate German industry. But the need for coal was so great that it was early realized that some import of mining machinery and supplies might well become necessary.”

On August 2, 1945, a new directive was issued to the British Commander-in-Chief in Germany. He was directed “to make available for export, out of the production of coal mines in western Germany, a minimum of ten million tons of coal during 1945 and a further fifteen million tons by the end of April, 1946.” However, according to Donnison, the directive also included instructions that “no coal whatever was to be released for industry, public utilities, domestic use, or any other purpose within Germany, except, first, for the production and movement of coal for export, and secondly, for releases which, under the provision quoted above, could be justified as ‘civil...requirements necessary to ensure the safety, security, health, maintenance and operation of the occupying forces and to ensure the speedy redeployment of Allied forces from Germany.’”

On December 12, 1945, a “Statement on American Economic Policy Toward Germany” was released to the press. It contained four “immediate aims.” The first of these was:

to increase to the greatest extent the export of coal from Germany to liberated areas. The rate of economic recovery in Europe depends upon the coal supplies available over this winter; and it is our intention to maintain the policy of hastening the recovery of liberated areas, even at the cost of delaying recovery in Germany.

In July 1945, the American Ambassador to France, Jefferson Caffery, wrote to James Forrestal that he had told the President that unless France got some coal from the United States for the coming
winter, “there would inevitably be Communism and possibly anarchy.” Yet the realization that there was going to be a severe coal shortage did not lead Western policy makers to follow sound economic policies that would have prevented a shortage. The policies followed were intended to extract the greatest amount of coal at an unrealistically low price. They were frequently contrary to Churchill’s observation that one must feed a horse or it cannot work.

The price of German coal was set by the Allied Control Council. They set the price at R.M. 15 per ton, which was about the same level as during the war. Because of the coal shortage, low output, the rising costs of mining materials and higher wages, the cost of production rose to R.M. 30 per ton. Nicholas Balabkins reported that “From May, 1945, to September, 1947, the Western Allies exported German coal at $10.50 a ton, while the world price was $25 to $30 a ton.” This policy cost the bizonal area approximately $50 million in foreign credits annually, a cost ultimately born by the American and British taxpayers.

This pricing policy obviously would have an effect on long term production. In addition, Balabkins points out that “ninety-seven firms producing coal mining equipment — most of whom had supplied little or nothing to Hitler’s armies — remained on the dismantling list.”

Added to this was a shortage of locomotives and railroad cars. The situation was aggravated by the refusal of the liberated countries, especially France, to return cars that went to them with coal exports.

The Potter-Hyndley Mission estimated a 25 million ton coal shortage for Europe — excluding Germany — from June 1945 through June 1946. Before the war, Germany had exported thirty million tons of coal annually. In a free market, Germany would have been capable of exporting an additional 5 million tons of coal after its domestic needs were met. However, the Ruhr coal industry was not going to be allowed to operate under free market conditions.

At the time of the Potter-Hyndley study, coal production had been reduced to 30,000 tons per day, 24,000 of which were required to run the mines. The mission recommended this policy “without any regard for the consequences to Germany.” Their report suggested that, should the coal shortage lead to civil unrest, and “Should it become necessary to preserve order by shooting, it would surely be
better for this to occur in Germany than elsewhere.”69 Even though the Potter-Hyndley Report recognized that “this may delay industrial resumption [in Germany], cause unemployment, unrest, and dissatisfaction among Germans of a magnitude which may necessitate firm and rigorous action,”70 President Truman, through the JCS, ordered General Eisenhower to advocate at the Allied Control Council the export of 25 million tons of coal for the period ending April 1946. General Clay also recognized that this policy would ultimately reduce the amount of coal available for export. “Of course any increase would deprive the German economy of the ability to meet many of its chief needs and would retard any lasting increase in coal production.”71

These shortsighted occupation policies naturally had an impact on coal production. As mentioned, coal production had been reduced to 30,000 tons per day by May 1945. Special attention was given to hard coal production and it reached 180,000 tons per day. Production never exceeded 200,000 tons per day (52% of the prewar level) and it actually fell to less than 160,000 tons per day in 1946 as the food shortage began to take its toll.

One of the obstacles to increased output was the individual miner’s productivity. Nicholas Balabkins pointed out that “the average daily output per miner in 1938 was 1.5 tons, but in 1946 and 1947 the average output was .86 tons and .88 tons per day, respectively.”72 General Clay attributed some of the decline in production to the food situation. He recorded that, “Even in 1945 special provision had been made for food for the miner but with the food shortage which developed in early 1946 production of hard coal . . . fell.”73 Miners were allocated a daily food ration of 3600 calories. According to John Backer, this ration “was usually met.”74 However, it was periodically reduced.

The increase in coal production continued till January 1946 when weekly output reached twelve per cent of the 1943 figures. This level was held until lack of wheat forced serious cuts in the ration scale during March, the daily calorie content of the normal consumer’s ration dropping from 1,555 to 1,050, and that of the miners from 3,400 to 2,864. Production then dropped back to ten per cent.75
Nicholas Balabkins attributed the low productivity to these reduced rations: “The low food allotments were the principal reason for an almost precipitous decline in labor productivity. Some estimates put the 1947 industrial output per man at 50 percent of the prewar level; other official estimates put it as low as 40 percent.”\(^\text{76}\) Although miners were issued additional rations, they did not necessarily consume them. Victor Gollancz pointed out that “it is quite obvious that married men do take home what they can spare to give to their wives.”\(^\text{77}\) Field Marshal Montgomery realized the connection between food and production. He commented that “If we wanted more coal, we would have to feed the miners properly.”\(^\text{78}\)

The deficit in German coal production necessitated an increase in imports. General Clay pointed out that “western Europe was importing coal from the United States at a very high transportation cost.”\(^\text{79}\) Much of the cost of these expensive imports was covered by the American taxpayer.\(^\text{80}\)

This should be added to the foreseeable costs of the philosophy represented by the Morgenthau Plan. The self-defeating economic policies followed by the western Allies were commented on by F.S. V. Donnison:

In short, the complete denial of coal to Germany would operate against the revival of coal production, would prevent the creation of any export surplus, and might involve an increase in the British forces which it would be necessary to keep and employ in Germany, and ultimately for the U.K. Government to assume a far greater responsibility for relief than would otherwise have been necessary, in order to avert anarchy and preserve the safety of these forces.\(^\text{81}\)

Herbert Hoover explained the economic consequences of US policies that impeded German production,

It must not be overlooked that Germany was the market for every nation in Europe and such a reduction of her economy will tend to demoralize the industries and employment in those countries. For instance, Germany was the market for over half the exports of Turkey and over one-third those of
Greece. In consequence, their loss of this market contributes to increase the relief they seek from us now.82

F.S.V. Donnison pointed out that:

The Germans were to be deprived of everything that could give them the power to make war and were to be made to save themselves by their own efforts from the predicament into which they had fallen or been brought. Unfortunately the resources for making modern war included most of the resources required for the survival of Germany in peace, and the results of economic collapse could not be confined to Germany, but would bring down also many of Germany’s neighbours.83

Hoover concluded that “We can keep Germany in these economic chains but it will also keep Europe in rags.”84 General Patton wrote to his wife on September 2, 1945, that “What we are doing is to utterly destroy the only semi-modern state in Europe so that Russia can swallow the whole.”85

Sir John Wheeler-Bennett recounted a meeting between the President and Secretary of State Hull in which Hull stated that “Morgenthau’s plan was out of all reason. Its net results . . . would be that nothing would be left to Germany but land and only 60 per cent of the German people could live on the land. This meant that the other 40 per cent would die.”86 In Herbert Hoover’s report to the President in March 1947 Hoover reported that, “There is the illusion that the New Germany left after the annexation can be reduced to a ‘pastoral state.’ It cannot be done unless we exterminate or move 25,000,000 people out of it. This would approximately reduce Germany to the density of the population of France.”87 This was also the conclusion of the United States Congress, which warned that the continuation of the present policies

. . . can mean only one of two things, (a) That a considerable part of the German population must be “liquidated” through diseases, malnutrition, and slow starvation for a period of years to come, with resultant dangers to the rest of Europe
from pestilence and the spread of plagues that know no boundaries; or (b) the continuation both of large occupying forces to hold down “unrest” and the affording of relief mainly drawn from the United States to prevent actual starvation.88
FOOD RATIONING

Hunger is a gray thing and it kills drearily, masking its killing in a hundred ways. Famine must go on for months before this visible horror of starvation comes; there is a swelling tide of illness and death among people who do not get enough to eat.

— Victor Gollancz

Famine as a political weapon had been used very successfully by the Soviets in the 1920s and the 1930s. There is little argument that the Soviets pursued policies that led to widespread famine. However, to this day there is no way to accurately estimate the number of deaths that occurred as a result. That is one advantage of this particular weapon, from the government’s viewpoint: it is difficult to determine the number of deaths resulting from government policies and it is easy to deny responsibility for famine. Poor crop production can be blamed on climatic conditions or other factors beyond government control.

Would it be possible for a Western democracy, with its free press, to pursue similar policies? The obvious and commonsense answer is no. However, a close examination of postwar conditions raises some serious questions about US and British policies.

Steven Ambrose attributed the critical food situation in postwar Germany to a worldwide food shortage. Robert Dallek attributed the fact that Europe was on the verge of total collapse in 1947 to “droughts, unprecedented cold and crop failures.” Undoubtedly the world food situation and the chaotic economic situation in postwar Europe contributed to the deplorable shortage of food. However, these problems were not the entire reason. American and British occupation
policies also had a considerable impact on the famine conditions that existed in Europe following the Second World War.

Gustav Stolper, who may have been unaware of the true motive of the policy makers, commented that “It was one of the naive assumptions of the American planners for the postwar treatment of Germany that the agriculture of a country can be kept in a sort of separate compartment from the rest of the economy.” Field Marshal Montgomery was aware of the agricultural capabilities of his zone of responsibility. He stated that, “The British Zone could not at any time produce even half the food needed for its twenty million inhabitants.” He estimated that in order to issue an 1800 calorie ration it would be necessary to import two million tons of wheat during the next twelve months. He also pointed out that this was logistically impossible.

The original “Handbook for Military Government in Germany” planned to prevent disease and unrest in occupied areas by maintaining a 2,000 calorie ration, by importing foodstuffs if necessary. Also Appendix D (Economic and Relief Guide For Germany) of the April 28, 1944 “Combined Directive For Military Government in Germany Prior to Defeat or Surrender” stated, “German food and other supplies will be utilized for the German population to the minimum extent required to prevent disease and unrest.” The final directive delivered on April 28, 1945, “Directive to Commander-In-Chief of United States Forces of Occupation Regarding Military Government in Germany,” Part II in the economic section on the German Standards of Living, reads, “21. You will estimate requirements of supplies necessary to prevent starvation or widespread disease or such civil unrest as would endanger the occupying forces.” The addition of “. . . as would endanger the occupying forces . . .” was not insignificant. It was a carefully thought out position by men familiar with the law and legal terminology, and it authorized starvation and widespread disease as long as these conditions did not endanger the occupying forces. General Clay had a somewhat ambiguous interpretation of this directive. He stated, “The German economy was to be controlled only to the extent necessary to meet the needs of the occupation forces or to produce the goods which would prevent disease and unrest, which might endanger the occupying forces.” According to Clay’s interpretation, disease and
unrest could be viewed as natural dangers for the occupying forces. Combined with the economic policies followed by the Western powers it becomes clear that the directive of April 28, 1945 formed the basis of Western policy in the immediate postwar years.

Early in the occupation it became obvious to many that the plans devised in Washington were not practical under the circumstances found in Germany. General Clay apparently had mixed feelings about the policies that he was assigned to carry out. On April 26, 1945, he told John J. McCloy, the Assistant Secretary of War, “I hope you won’t think . . . I am getting soft. I realize the necessity for stern and Spartan treatment. However, retribution now is far greater than realized at home.”

On July 2, 1945, Calvin Hoover of the Economic Intelligence Branch, Economic Division, US Group Control Council, reported that in some urban areas the consumer rations were as low as 700 calories per day, a ration “decidedly below the minimum necessary to health and muscular activity essential to productive labor.”

General Clay appraised the situation during the early period of the occupation and concluded:

In July 1945 we had determined what supplies were available and found that the ration for the normal consumer had to be set at levels varying from 950 to 1150 calories per day. This allowance was only about half the caloric content deemed essential by nutritional experts to support a working population. . . . Actually only about 950 calories per day were distributed.

Field Marshal Montgomery, the Commander of the British Zone, concluded that the loss of life in the winter 1945-46 was going to be “very heavy.” The daily ration for an average adult then was 1,042 calories, which Montgomery said meant, “we are going to let them starve; gradually.”

In August 1945, General Clay fixed the official ration at 1550 calories for the normal consumer. This “official ration” should not be interpreted as the actual ration distributed. It was more of a ceiling which was frequently not met. Victor Gollancz described the 1,550 calories a day amount as a “bogus figure.” Even this level was
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recognized as insufficient. A statement on American Economic Policy Toward Germany, released to the press on December 12, stated, “One thousand, five hundred and fifty calories is not sufficient to sustain in health a population over a long period of time, but as a basic level for the normal consumer it should prevent mass starvation in Germany this winter.”15 Victor Gollancz quoted a report of the Emergency Economic Committee for Europe, issued on February 6, 1946, which stated:

A diet containing an average of about 2,650 calories a day . . . has been recommended by the UNRRA [United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration] Food Committee as the amount of food sufficient to maintain full health and efficiency in a population with a normal distribution according to sex, age and occupation. . . . An average diet of around 2,000 calories has been generally recognized . . . as a minimum level below which there would be marked effects on ability to work and danger of . . . disease . . . . These effects become progressively more serious as the diet is reduced down to and below 1,500 calories and the period of low diet is prolonged.16

General Clay estimated that 4,000,000 tons of imports per year would be needed to support the 2000-calorie allowance that he claimed was the goal. Clay noted, “However, we could not meet the lesser ration, and our weighing teams operating throughout the zone were finding increasing evidence of malnutrition.”17 General Hilldring of the Civil Affairs Division was not concerned about achieving the 2000 calorie goal; he was more concerned about the British policy on rationing. In September 1945 he told the State Department that “in direct violation of Combined Chiefs of Staff’s instructions, the British are lavish in the use of supplies, particularly food, in their zone.”18 Hilldring stated, “I am completely satisfied that only the US Military Government authorities in Germany have any genuine desire to hold rations [for Germans] down to a reasonable level.”19

President Truman sent Byron Price to Germany on a personal inspection tour to study the economic situation in Germany. Price
showed his preliminary report to General Clay in mid-October and submitted it to the President on November 9, 1945. John Gimble said,

The report was filled with gloom about the future of Germany. Price thought the American experience in postwar Germany and the conditions he saw there revealed certain basic problems that needed immediate solution. The primary problem was to develop exports that would make it possible for Germany to pay for indispensable food imports. The United States . . . had to decide whether it would permit starvation, epidemics, and disorder or whether it would ship in the food to prevent them. It should do something to increase the 1550-calorie food ration to at least 2,000 calories. . . .

General Montgomery was concerned about the food situation in the British zone and in October 1945 he telegraphed London: “I wanted to make sure the Control Office has all the facts about the future repercussions of the food situation. I think it is my duty to do this. I hold no brief for the Germans except humane treatment and they will have to tighten their belts. But I do not think we should provide a ration less than Belsen [concentration camp].” General Clay realized that something had to be done and in December 1945 he told the German zonal assembly, “We shall approve with the beginning of January 1 ration period a 1550-calorie ration. Hunger and starvation have never been United States objectives. My government has authorized me to say to you that it will support a 1550-calorie ration, the cost of which will be paid by Germany when it is able to pay.”

According to General Clay, improved distribution and the new harvest made it possible for the official ration of 1550 calories to be met for a few months in the winter of 1945-46. However, Clay reported that “in February 1946 it resumed its downward trend and reached its low point in our zone in May-June 1946, about 1180 calories per day for the normal consumer.” Conditions were worse in the British Zone. Under normal circumstances the area in the British Zone would pay for its food imports with profits from its manufactured exports. The area in the US Zone ordinarily produced more food than it consumed. At the end of February 1946, Field Marshal Montgomery sent a cable to the British Foreign Office
demanding an increase in imports. He warned the Foreign Office that “If we do not we shall produce death and misery to an extent which will disgrace our administration in history and completely stultify every effort which we are making to produce a democratic Germany.”

The occupation rationing policies began to attract the attention of the US Senate and in March 1946, Senator William Langer declared:

[We] are caught in what has now unfolded as a savage and fanatical plot to destroy the German people by visiting on them a punishment in kind for the atrocities of their leaders. Not only have the leaders of this plot permitted the whole world situation to get . . . out of hand . . . but their determination to destroy the German people and the German nation, no matter what the consequences to our own moral principles, to our leadership in world affairs, to our Christian faith, to our allies, or to the whole future peace of the world, have become a world scandal . . .

Senator Kenneth Wherry commented:

The American people should know once and for all that as a result of this government’s official policy they are being made the unwilling accomplices in the crime of mass starvation. . . . Germany is the only nation where UNRRA is not permitted to feed its nationals. Germany is the only nation subjected to a deliberate starvation policy of 1,500 calories per day.

In March 1946, Senate interest in the occupation policy led to the approval of a resolution which read, in part:

Whereas . . . reports reaching the United States indicate that . . . the policies of the victor powers are subjecting millions to mass starvation, and whereas the United States has been a party to the commitments and agreements reached among the victor powers which have led to these conditions; and whereas the Congress has been bypassed and the American people have been ignored in the formulation and implementation of these policies, and whereas it is essential
that the Congress of the United States should obtain the necessary information to enact legislation and to request the President to take executive action designed to eliminate the starvation conditions resulting from the policies for which this Government is directly responsible.27

In spite of this criticism of the 1550 calorie per day ration, the food situation only worsened. The Hoover Report stated, in February 1946, that “The target ration of 1,550 calories was wholly inadequate to sustain a healthy human being, and yet this ration was rarely being attained.”28 On April 1, 1946, General Clay reduced the ration in the US Zone to 1,275 calories. This was about a third more than the indigenous supplies could sustain.29 To maintain this ration it would be necessary to ship 50,000 tons of grain to the American zone in each of the months of April, May, and June.30 In the fourth week of May, he had to reduce the ration again to 1,180 calories.31

General Clay informed Herbert Hoover in April 1947 that unless supplies could be imported at once, he might be compelled to reduce the ration to 1,000 calories. He told Hoover that the British had already done this in their zone and said that conditions in the French Zone were even worse where the French were providing only about 900 calories per day.32 Earl Ziemke reported that the daily ration for the normal consumer in the British Zone had dropped to 1,042 calories a day in March and in the French zone to 980 calories.33 Gustav Stolper reported that the ration in both the British and American zones for “a long time in 1946 and 1947 dropped to between 700 and 1,200 calories per day.” 1,150 calories per day was the ration that General Clay said would kill millions of people in the Soviet zone.34

In June, General Clay raised the ration to 1,330 calories per day.35 However, the reductions had already taken their toll. In August, the USFET [US Forces, European Theater] Chief Surgeon Maj. Gen. Morrison C. Stayer reported that nutritional survey teams had found that 60 percent of the Germans were living on a diet that would inevitably lead to diseases caused by malnutrition. Surveys, he said, already showed vitamin deficiencies and weight loss in both adults and children. Because the issued ration, which varied downward from 1,150 calories per day, was not enough to sustain life, Stayer recommended
raising the ration to 2,000 calories per day.\textsuperscript{36} Health checks, such as the one in Mannheim, revealed that 60 percent of the infants showed signs of rickets, and showed increasing evidence of malnutrition among the city populations.\textsuperscript{37}

Victor Gollancz reported that “A diet of 1,200 calories,” according to the fourth report from the Select Committee on Estimates, House of Commons, November 5, 1946, “may be characterized as slow starvation . . . 1,550 calories is probably no better than even slow starvation.” Moreover, the Germans had been living for many months on no more than 1,000 calories, and some of them, from time to time, on considerably less.\textsuperscript{38} Gollancz reported that

The normal consumer’s ration is supposed to be one of 1,550 calories a day — about half ours in England. But this week four of the items that account for most of this bogus figure — bread, cereals, skim milk, and even vegetables — were either non-existent or in horribly short supply; and the same has been the case, in varying degree, ever since I’ve been here.\textsuperscript{39}

Conditions in Germany reached their lowest point in 1947. Nicholas Balabkins recorded that “living conditions were considered worse in 1947 than in 1946 or 1945.”\textsuperscript{40} General Clay reported that “The authorized allowance in the bizonal area dropped to 1040 calories a day in April 1947. Weighing teams reported malnutrition at what proved to be the worst stage in postwar Germany.”\textsuperscript{41} Herbert Hoover asserted that this ration was “hardly more than the ration which caused thousands in the Nazi concentration camps to die from starvation.”\textsuperscript{42}

There are numerous references comparing the issued ration to that received by occupants of Nazi concentration camps. Edward Peterson quotes Harold Zink as saying “The amount available for German use hardly equaled the food supplied by the Nazis at such notorious concentration camps as Dachau where thousands died from starvation.” Peterson reported that “During the long, cold winter 1946-47, the calorie distribution went as low as 650 a day, while the average distribution in the US zone was 1,040.”\textsuperscript{43} Victor Gollancz reported that a large portion of the population of Dusseldorf “have been living these last days on anything from 400 to 1,000 calories. Four hundred — and I
have been in many homes where this has been the daily ration — is half the Belsen figure.”^44 Gollancz quoted Gerald Barry, the editor of The News Chronicle, as saying, “the actual daily ration is now as low as the prisoners of Belsen received in the worst days.”^45 Gollancz quotes Field Marshal Montgomery as saying, “We will keep them at 1,000 calories. They gave the inmates of Belsen only 800.”^46

According to theologian Prince zu Loewenstein, the official ration in the French Zone in January 1947 was 450 calories per day, half the ration of the Belsen concentration camp.^47 Balabkins reported that, “In April, May and June 1947, the normal consumer in the Ruhr actually received no more than 800 calories. In early May the daily calories actually issued came to 800 in Hamburg, 770 in Hanover and 740 in Essen.”^48 This was echoed by a group of German doctors who reported in 1947 that the actual rations issued for three months in the Ruhr section of the British Zone for average people amounted to only 800 calories per day.^49 Earl Ziemke reported that, “The SHAEF maximum daily ration for normal consumers was 1,550 calories, but the amount actually being issued ranged from 804 calories in Hesse and Hesse-Nassau to 1,150 calories in parts of the Rhineland.”^50 Secretary of War Patterson informed Secretary of State George Marshall in June 1947 that the “average ration for the last six weeks has been 1,200 calories, and in many places it is as low as 900 calories . . . this is slow famine.”^51 Senator Kenneth Wherry reported that “Terrifying reports are filtering through the British, French and American occupied zones, and even more gruesome reports from the Russian occupied zone, revealing a horrifying picture of deliberate and wholesale starvation.”^52

What were the consequences of the occupation rationing policy? Merle Fainsod, the Director of the Civil Affairs Training School, commented that “While starvation was very real, death from it was kept within limits.”^53 What were those limits?

Official records provided by both the Military Governor and the German government give a death rate of 12.1 per year per thousand for 1947, the severest year of the postwar rationing. This figure is only slightly higher than the prewar level of 11.9 per year per thousand. On the other hand, James Bacque gives a figure of 5,700,00 deaths as a result of Allied rationing policies. If the official record is correct, then,
as Steven Ambrose claims, James Bacque has made an absurd charge. However, if the actual figure approaches Bacque’s estimate, then the defenders of the official estimate are guilty of concealing a crime. At first, Bacque’s estimate may appear ridiculous. How could so many people perish without it being noticed, during a period when the Western powers were shipping hundreds of millions of dollars worth of food to Europe?

Part of the answer is provided by General Clay in his 1945 comments on conditions in the Soviet Zone:

This low food ration is already having its effect. The death rate in many places has increased several-fold and infant mortality is approaching 65 per cent in many places. By the spring of 1946, German observers expect that epidemics and malnutrition will claim 2.5 to 3 million victims between the Oder and the Elbe.

Bacque pointed out that Clay failed to mention that the food situation was just as bad in the British and American Zones during this period. Robert Murphy, Clay’s political adviser, reported in 1947 that he expected the German population to decline by 2 million people between 1947 and 1950. Bacque claims this figure was too low because it was based on 1946 figures and did not take into account the disastrous situation in 1947.

Naturally, the first to succumb to the ravages of the reduced ration were the aged and the very young. Herbert Hoover reported during his 1947 mission that “Famine edema is showing in thousands of cases, stated to be 10,000 in Hamburg alone. The increased death roll among the aged is appalling.” Edward Peterson reported that “The death rate of children and old people in Berlin rose to fantastic heights; more than half the babies born in Berlin in August [1945] died. In the US zone 30 percent of the children in their first year died.” This claim was repeated by Eugene Davidson who reported that, “At a meeting of the ministers president of the American Zone in April [1946] it was reported that 300 of 1000 children had died in their first year.” Earl Ziemke gives an infant mortality rate for Berlin of 660 per thousand in July 1945. This number is repeated by Eugene Davidson who wrote,
“More than half the babies born in Berlin in August died, mainly of malnutrition a US government report showed some months later. There were 1,448 deaths out of 2,866 births.” Bacque reported that, “In the summer of 1945 in Berlin, nearly every baby was born dead or died within a few days.” General Mark Clark, US Military Commissioner in the US Zone of Austria, reported in April 1946 that the death rate in Vienna was varying between 27 and 35 per thousand per year. Clark’s report stated that “This relatively high death rate prevailed during a period when the ration scale was 1,550cpd. With a drop in the ration it is probable that these rates will increase.” These reports call into question the official figures. In fact, Bacque records that General Clay’s Medical Officer reported, in secret, a death rate of over 21.5 as of May 1946.

The increased mortality rate prevailed throughout the period of the Morgenthau Plan. Gustav Stolper reported on the situation in the beginning of 1947:

It is not surprising to learn that in the United States sector of Berlin in the first quarter of 1947 the death rate (28.5) was almost three times as high as the birth rate, 10.7 per 1000 population per annum, and that infant mortality soared from 70.9 in the third quarter of 1946 to 116.2 in the first quarter of 1947 [it had already been 135.4 in the second quarter of 1946].

Was the reduced ration the result of a worldwide food shortage or the result of deliberate government policies? Were the occupying powers’ policies geared to providing the maximum amount of food available under very difficult circumstances? It appears that there was a definite policy of refusing assistance from outside sources. To a request by the American Society of Friends to provide assistance, General Eisenhower wrote to General Marshall:

It appears unwise to complicate the organization for German welfare by placing certain responsibilities in the hands of American Civilian Agencies, which will require to be supported by the army. . . . While it is realized that such organizations as the American Friends Service Committee have demonstrated in the past their ability to handle such
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matters of public welfare and that they have trained staff of relief personnel . . . it is believed that German Public Welfare Agencies should be charged with this duty.\textsuperscript{69}

So Eisenhower forbade the North American Quakers to come to Germany. He also recommended to the War Department that this policy be kept secret.\textsuperscript{70}

Also, while he stipulated that German relief was to be provided by the Germans themselves, as Bacque points out, “German Agencies” did not exist because they had been forbidden or drastically curtailed by Eisenhower. He quotes a Red Cross representative speaking at a convention in Geneva in January 1946: “Strictly speaking, there is no German Red Cross.”\textsuperscript{71} The Swiss Relief Fund started a private charity to feed a meager meal once a day to a thousand Bavarian children for a couple of months. As soon as the US Zone occupation authorities discovered what was going on, they “decided that the aid . . . should not at once be accepted.” The army informed the ICRC that “public opinion in the US would not allow” private charity to go to Germany.\textsuperscript{72} As late as February 1946, the ICRC — along with other relief agencies — was still prevented by the US from “bringing help to German children and sick persons in the US zone.”\textsuperscript{73}

In view of the horrendous infant mortality rate, it is unconscionable that relief shipments were prohibited until December 1945, “on the grounds that they might tend to negate the policy of restricting the German standard of living to the average of the surrounding European nations. CARE package shipments to individuals remained prohibited until 5 June 1946.”\textsuperscript{74} Asked to permit two large shipments of Red Cross food destined for German civilians to enter the country, in late November, 1945, Clay refused, with the words “Let the Germans suffer.”\textsuperscript{75}

Bacque related the story of two freight trains loaded with food sent to Mannheim and Augsburg by the International Red Cross from Switzerland, where they had over 100,000 tons of relief supplies in storage. When the trains reached their destinations, the personnel were informed by US Army officers that the warehouses were full and the trains would have to return.\textsuperscript{76} Steven Ambrose found that General Eisenhower had declared that Red Cross food parcels would be used to
feed displaced persons (of whom there were over two million in Germany) and claimed that they “got those food parcels.” However, Max Huber, the head of the International Committee of the Red Cross, reported that the Red Cross had to return over 30,000 tons of stock to its original owners.

Bacque commented on army warehouses in Europe containing 13,500,000 high protein Red Cross food parcels taken over from the ICRC in May, but never distributed. He stated that in November 1945, the Army was still wondering what to do with them. He stated that so much food was confiscated that Max Huber complained about it in August 1945 in a letter to the US State Department. Senator Kenneth Wherry complained that “The truth is that there are thousands upon thousands of tons of military rations in our surplus stock piles that have been spoiling right in the midst of starving populations.”

Ambrose quoted James Tent, of the University of Alabama, who claimed that this food was stockpiled in warehouses because of fear of famine in the winter of 1945-46. He claimed that, “Even with the reserve, they barely got through the winter.”

All of the occupation policies can be rationalized to one extent or another. However, there is one policy that cannot be justified under any circumstance. General Clay alluded to it, saying, “Hunger was to be seen everywhere and even the refuse pails from our messes, from which everything of value had been removed, were gone over time and time again in a search for the last scrap of nourishment.” The question is, who removed “everything of value” from the refuse pails? Was it removed by the starving or was it removed by military personnel in order to keep it out of the hands of those starving individuals?

Although it is unlikely that there is a written policy still in existence, there are several references to a policy of intentionally destroying food. Edward Peterson commented that “Surely things happened locally which did not enter the documents — oral instructions are less dangerous than those in writing.” Why would written instructions be “dangerous?”

According to Karl Vogel, who was the German camp commander appointed by the Americans in Camp 8 at Garmisch-Partenkirchen, “Eisenhower himself ordered that the food [provided to prisoners by
women in the area surrounding the camp] be destroyed.” Bacque reported that “many prisoners and German civilians saw the American guards burn the food brought by civilian women.” Bacque reported that Professor Peter Hoffmann of McGill University, who lived near a US camp near Ulm in 1945, saw the US Army deliberately burning surplus food from their mess tables just outside a prisoner cage.

Edward Peterson reported that “Germans noted Americans threw food away and were bitter that leftovers from army kitchens were frequently forbidden to hungry children, and sometimes even burned in front of them.” Eugene Davidson reported that “They [American wives] were told never to allow leftovers to get into the hands of their maids — the food was to be destroyed or made inedible.”

The deplorable rationing situation was the result of several occupation policies. Germany could not import food because it was incapable of paying for it. Occupation policy was aimed at increased agricultural production, not imports. As General Clay pointed out:

It [JCS 1067] specifically prohibited us from taking any steps to rehabilitate or maintain the German economy except to maximize agricultural production. It seemed obvious to us even then that Germany would starve unless it could produce for export and that immediate steps would have to be taken to revise industrial production. Since there was no German government to initiate these steps, Military Government perforce would be responsible. Nevertheless, we were not only prohibited from taking such steps but were also required to stop production in many fields until agreement could be obtained in the Control Council.

In October 1945, General Clay refused to permit a barter deal for Czech sugar, because the Allied Control Council required all sales in currency. When he did this, he considered it unwise to bring up the food question until reports of German privations had convinced the American people that additional food should be given to Germans. There was also an Office of Military Government rule that all exports from Germany must be paid for in dollars. Peterson related the case of the Dutch, who were short of dollars, and who in 1947 were driven to the expedient of destroying the vegetables they were long accustomed
to sell to the Ruhr and Rhineland.\textsuperscript{92} As late as February 1948, Swedish fishermen were either destroying their catch or working only two days a week, because the Military Government would not allow them to barter with their German customers.\textsuperscript{93}

In order to insure the equitable distribution of food, the Military Government created Control Council Law No. 50 of March 20, 1947. This law threatened those involved in the unlawful use of foodstuffs and rationed goods with hard labor for life. W. Friedmann declared that this law would be “flouted daily, as long as the struggle for survival drives people into the black market.”\textsuperscript{94} Friedmann commented, “The situation has deteriorated so much that the struggle for sheer survival is stronger than the fear of punishment.”\textsuperscript{95}

Peterson estimated the cost of these often contradictory occupation policies to be $1.5 billion for food relief alone for the first three years.\textsuperscript{96} John Backer concluded that the grand total of all GARIOA [Government and Relief in Occupied Areas] expenditures in Germany was $1.52 billion.\textsuperscript{97} Herbert Hoover estimated that the United States and Britain were contributing nearly $600,000,000 a year to prevent starvation of the Germans in the American and British zones alone.\textsuperscript{98} John Gimble reported that

Food imports totaling 1.5 million tons, using 170 “victory ships” and 100,000 railway cars, and costing the United States and British taxpayers 163 million dollars [from January through April of 1947], seemed inadequate to meet the needs of the situation.\textsuperscript{99}

The food crisis did not end until December 1949. In June 1948, Clay reported that he was able to raise the ration to 1990 calories a day, a figure he stated was “recommended as a minimum by nutritional experts in 1945.”\textsuperscript{100} It is interesting to compare this with the figures given by Brian Freemantle for the rations provided to prisoners in the Soviet Gulag:

The recognized minimum calorie intake for someone working a hard, eight-hour day is between 3,100 and 3,900. Even by 1977 the calorie allowance in strict regime camps was only
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2,600. Punishment diet was 2,100 and prisoners on strict punishment conditions received 1,300 a day.\textsuperscript{101}

Peterson reported that “As of December 1949, food rationing for all practical purposes was discontinued — the German food problem was over.”\textsuperscript{102}

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The results of Morgenthau’s proposed occupation policies were foreseen long before the policies were put into practice. An early State Department memo (September 1, 1944) concluded, “Germany is a deficit country in foodstuffs, and it is doubtful if a plan of making Germany predominantly agricultural can be put into effect without the liquidation or emigration of x millions of Germans.”103 Three years later, Herbert Hoover reported, “There is the illusion that the New Germany left after the annexations can be reduced to a ‘pastoral state.’ It cannot be done unless we exterminate or move 25,000,000 people out of it.”104

Occupation forces did make some provisions for the impending

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disaster. Victor Gollancz quoted Norman Clark of the News Chronicle, writing on September 10th:

Allied public health authorities are ordering burgomasters to take measures ensuring the easy burial of the dead in the winter. Graves are to be dug now which men debilitated by weeks of under-nourishment will not have the strength to dig in a few months’ time. . . Coffins will have to be dispensed with, what wood is available being needed for fuel.\textsuperscript{105}

“We must decide whether we are going to feed the Germans, or let them starve,” Field Marshal Montgomery stated in a Memo to the Prime Minister on May 2, 1946. Describing the dilemma facing the occupation authorities, he said he believed that “we must not let them starve.” However, he pointed out that “It does not look at present as if we can increase the ration beyond the present rate of 1042 calories; this means we are going to let them starve: gradually.”\textsuperscript{106} W. Friedmann commented on the consequences of the Western rationing policies:

Extermination need not proceed dramatically, through gas chambers and mass executions; it can be no less effective through the gradual sapping of vitality. This, then, is one method of settling the German problem for all times. It would be degrading to prove that this is not and cannot be allied policy. Yet, the Germans are increasingly convinced that it is.\textsuperscript{107}
ENFORCED/SLAVE LABOR

The German people are not going to be enslaved — because the United Nations do not traffic in human slavery.
— President Roosevelt
Address to the Foreign Policy Association
New York, October 1944.

It should have been unnecessary for the President of the United States to proclaim the American policy toward slavery. This policy had been established in the middle of the 19th century after a long and bloody civil war. It was an integral part of the United States Constitution, the thirteenth Amendment to which states, “Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”

The leaders of the United States Government were animated by the rule of law. General Eisenhower stated at a press conference in Paris, “If the Germans were reasoning like normal human beings they would realize the whole history of the United States and Great Britain is to be generous toward a defeated enemy. We observe all the laws of the Geneva Convention.” The US policy toward slavery was not only a basic law of the United States but was also viewed as a fundamental principal of international law. Fritz Saukel, the chief organizer of conscripted labor for Nazi Germany, paid with his life for his role in organizing the Nazi slave labor program.

Perhaps it would be best to conclude any discussion of the use of “forced labor” at this point. However, on close inspection, events
following the conclusion of hostilities do not appear to have conformed to the stated US policy. This subject is extremely difficult for defenders of President Roosevelt’s postwar policies to explain.

The most effective defense is to omit any reference to slave labor. When the subject does arise, the euphemism “forced labor” is used for what was clearly slave labor. Secretary of State Byrnes, while admitting that slave labor was abhorrent, attempted to minimize its impact by suggesting that the number of persons enslaved numbered only in the thousands.

The prospect of using prisoners of war as slave labor was a topic of discussion in the Roosevelt administration for some time. Contrary to what might be inferred from the President’s statement, the proposal to use prisoners of war as slave labor was looked upon with favor by many key members of his administration. According to Secretary of State Hull, the President stated during a conference with the Secretary on October 5, 1943, that “He thought that reparations should be exacted in manpower and equipment.”3 The use of slave labor was also a topic of discussion at the Teheran Conference in November, 1943, where Stalin demanded “at least four million Germans” to be used as forced labor.4

Since the use of “forced labor” was under discussion at least as early as 1943, it is not surprising that it would also be included in the Morgenthau Plan. In Morgenthau’s memorandum, given to the President on September 2, 1944, it is suggested under item 4: “Restitution and Reparations: (d) by forced German labor outside Germany.”5 This provision was also included in the final version of Morgenthau’s plan, where Section Five states that: “Restitution and reparations shall be effected by the transfer of existing German resources and territory, e.g. (d) by forced German labor outside of Germany.”6

The United States Government, represented by President Roosevelt at the Yalta Conference in February 1945, sanctioned the use of slave labor. The agreement concerning “forced labor” is contained in the Yalta Protocol: “2. Reparations in kind is to be extracted from Germany in three following forms: . . . (c) Use of German labor.”7

Undersecretary of State Edward Stettinius recorded that the
subject was brought up at Yalta by President Roosevelt. Stettinius stated, “The President next raised the question of German reparations. He pointed out that the United States did not desire reparations in the form of labour, and he was sure that Great Britain held the same view.” Attempts to conceal the truth about the origins of this barbaric proposal began almost immediately. If we are to believe Secretary of State Byrnes, this section of the Yalta Agreement was included as a result of a “misunderstanding” of the remark made by President Roosevelt. According to Secretary of State Byrnes:

The [Yalta] protocol, which on the last day of the conference was submitted to the heads of government for final approval, also contained the statement that the Reparations commission could consider “the use of labor” as a possible source of reparations. There was no discussion of this proposal at the conference table except a passing reference by the President in which he said the United States “cannot take manpower as the Soviet Republics can.” Later I learned the language was added by Mr. Maisky, the Soviet representative, and subsequently agreed to by the other delegations. At any rate, I did not know of it at the time I left Yalta. Had I known it, I would have urged the President to oppose the inclusion in the protocol of any provision for the use of large groups of human beings as enforced or slave laborers.9

The details of the proposal were worked out by Stettinius in his discussions with the Soviets. He recorded that on February 9, 1944, “We then turned to the subject of German reparations. I said I would like to present some counter-proposals to the document prepared by Mr. Vishinsky and Mr. Maisky. I had discussed these proposals that morning with President Roosevelt.” Stettinius suggested that the discussion of the use of German labor by way of reparations be postponed and dealt with by the Reparations Commission.10 The British representative, Anthony Eden, also felt that the question of the use of labor should be discussed at a later date by the Reparations Commission.11

Those discussions were later “dropped” by the Truman Administration at the Potsdam Conference. Apparently Truman did
not want to put his signature on a document authorizing the use of slave labor. Secretary of State Byrnes recorded that “Another aspect of the reparations agreement made at Potsdam has not received the attention it deserves. The recommendation made at Yalta that the ‘use of German labor’ should be considered by the Reparations Commission as a possible source of reparations was dropped by the Big Three at Potsdam and the protocol signed there contained no provision for, or reference to, the use of labor as reparations.” However, the policy had been set, and like many policies of the Roosevelt Administration, the Truman administration followed through with it.

The US representative to the Reparations Commission that would meet in Moscow was Ed Pauley and his associate representative was Isidor Lubin, who had been a close adviser to President Roosevelt. Although, according to Secretary of State Byrnes, this Commission contained no provision for the use of labor, it is interesting to note Lubin’s attitude toward the use of slave labor. He was not satisfied with the enslavement of prisoners of war but wanted to include children in the category to be enslaved. William Casey recalled a dinner meeting attended by Lubin,

I remember vividly having dinner one evening at Claridge’s with General Donovan, Justice Jackson, Ed Pauley, who had just been appointed Reparations Commissioner, and Isidor Lubin, Chief of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, who had signed on as Pauley’s deputy. Lubin spoke at great length and with considerable vehemence about why it was important to convict the Hitler Jugend and other organizations en masse so that Russian demands for reparations could be satisfied by German slave labor.13

Although provisions for the use of “forced labor” were not included in the Potsdam Agreement or apparently discussed in the Reparations Commission, the record reveals that understandings were reached concerning this issue. Again Secretary of State Byrnes attempted to put this issue in the best possible light. In 1947 Byrnes recorded that although this policy had been dropped, “I regret to say that Germans and Japanese still are being held in Allied hands for the
use of labor.” \(^{14}\) Later he recalled that “it is a deplorable fact that thousands of Germans and Japanese are still being held as enforced laborers in violation of solemn international pledges.” \(^{15}\)

That is a classic example of understatement. At the time Byrnes made this statement the number of prisoners engaged in slave labor amounted to several million. According to Eugene Davidson, the number was 4 million in March 1947. \(^{16}\)

Prisoners of a totalitarian regime are obviously in a precarious position. Literally tens of millions have perished in slave labor camps during the 20th century. Remarkably, the prisoners of war held by the Western democracies were to find themselves living and dying under similar conditions.

The very nature of slavery had changed since the writing of the Thirteenth Amendment. The modern slave became the property of the state. Slave holders of previous centuries owned their slaves; they had a vested interest in the physical well-being of what they considered their property. The modern form of state slavery frequently treats the subject as an expendable economic asset and as an enemy of the state. Thus, modern slavery places the traditional slave in an enviable position. It appears that the modern state would have the slave work while simultaneously liquidating him.

American representatives not only condoned the use of slave labor by their allies but also provided them with a large number of prisoners for that purpose. The reason for this transfer of prisoners of war was provided by Stephen E. Ambrose. “What happened is simple enough: the Allies could not afford to feed the millions of German prisoners at the same level at which they were able to feed German civilians, not to mention the civilians of the liberated countries of Western Europe.” \(^{17}\) Secretary of State Byrnes gave a similar explanation. “In the closing days of the war against Germany we took so many prisoners it was difficult to care for them behind the lines, and guarding them required so many troops that General Eisenhower decided to transfer many of them to the custody of the liberated nations. But these prisoners surrendered to the United States Army and we therefore retained responsibility.” \(^{18}\) These transfers could therefore be viewed as a
humanitarian gesture.

One of these “liberated nations” was the Soviet Union. General Eisenhower was well aware that the Soviet Union was not a signatory of the Geneva Convention. Yet, according to Edward Peterson, he turned over “some hundreds of thousands [of prisoners] who had fled to the Americans to avoid being taken prisoner by the Russians . . . in May [1945] to the Red Army in a gesture of friendship.” According to Peterson, General Eisenhower did not transfer these prisoners out of necessity but out of a desire to please the Soviets. Had Eisenhower been a German general who handed over hundreds of thousands of Allied prisoners to a non-signatory of the Geneva Convention, he would likely have found himself seated next to the other defendants at the Nuremberg trials.

The contention that prisoners were transferred to other powers because the US Army could not care for them does not explain the transfers that occurred long after the end of hostilities. Secretary of State Byrnes recognized the fact that prisoners should be returned soon after the end of hostilities when he stated, “The Geneva Prisoners of War Convention, in letter and spirit, contemplates the repatriation of prisoners as soon as possible after the end of actual fighting.” Perhaps Secretary Byrnes was not aware of the fact that the Geneva Convention did not apply to German prisoners. This was the result of a clever semantic maneuver.

James Bacque pointed out that Eisenhower sent a message to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on March 10, 1945, proposing the creation of a new class of prisoners who would not be protected by the Geneva Convention. He felt this was necessary because he believed that it would be difficult to feed the large mass of prisoners at the level required by the Geneva Convention. On April 26, the Combined Chief of Staff replied, creating the status of “Disarmed Enemy Forces.” This status was approved for “prisoners of war in American hands only.”

Steven Ambrose claimed that Bacque credited Eisenhower with the decision to deny the prisoners the protection of the Geneva Convention by changing their status. According to Ambrose, Bacque believed that Eisenhower made this decision “personally, secretly, and with sinister intent.” However, Ambrose believed this decision was
made by the European Advisory Commission because the United States and other Allied nations had signed the Geneva Convention and did not wish to violate it.22

Bacque claimed that the British members of the CCS refused to adopt the American plan for their own prisoners. However, the British apparently followed an identical policy. Field Marshal Montgomery wrote a memo to General Zhukov on November 30, 1945, stating, “Ex-Wehrmacht personnel were not described as Prisoners of War because we did not wish to apply the Geneva Convention to them.”23

Conditions under which prisoners were held varied greatly. The British held their prisoners under relatively benign conditions, perhaps with the view that these experienced troops might be needed one day. In spite of earlier thoughts that the British would not require laborers, they apparently had a change of heart. According to Field Marshal Montgomery, “the British Government required 225,000 Germans as reparations labour for the United Kingdom.”24 And according to Earl Ziemke, US forces were using over half a million prisoners in Military Labor Service Units.25

There are no definitive figures for the numbers of individuals captured and held prisoner by the Soviets. In the chaos of the Eastern Front, there was no firm accounting. It was not unusual for prisoners to be shot immediately after capture; and historians often have an agenda that inclines them to either exaggerate or minimize the numbers captured by the Soviets, depending on the point they are trying to make. Eugene Davidson reported that “How many prisoners the Russians were holding was a matter of long and inconclusive controversy. Hoover’s figure was more than 3 million.”26 Edward Peterson gave a range of figures: “The estimated numbers range from 890,000, the Russian figure in March 1947, to 3.5 million assumed by Germans on the basis of 4 million estimated captured.”27 Peterson also mentioned that the Russians claimed to have captured over 3 million.28 Secretary Byrnes reported that Stalin told Harry Hopkins in June, 1945, that they were holding “about two million prisoners of whom 1,700,000 were Germans.”29 James Bacque reported that “the Soviets captured 2,389,560 German soldiers between 22 June 1941 and 9 September 1945.”30 In addition to prisoners of war, the Soviets abducted a large
number of civilians. Alfred de Zayas reported that “According to German Red Cross documents, it is estimated that 874,000 German civilians were abducted to the Soviet Union.” 31 Mortality rates among those captured are a subject of great controversy and these are related to the numbers captured by each victor. The West German government estimated that there were 1,407,000 persons missing as of March 31, 1945. 32 If they did not die in Russian captivity, then other nations were responsible. James Bacque gave several mortality figures: “From all fronts, more than 700,000 prisoners of war and paramilitary civilians died in Soviet captivity. . . .” 33 Later he reported that “Among the one million German prisoners on hand [in the Soviet Union] in summer 1945, until the last prisoner went home in 1955, about 94,000 died [9.4 per cent].” 34 He also stated that of the 2,289,560 the Soviets captured between June 22, 1941 and September 9, 1945, 450,000 German soldiers died. 35 Peterson gave a 75 percent mortality rate for captives of the Soviets: “Deaths during captivity presumably accounted for 75 percent of the prisoners; out of 60,000 Italians known captured only 12,500 returned. . . . they had probably taken a large number of civilians, including women; of one such group of 1,300 German women, 800 died in two years [Manchester Guardian, 31 July 1947].” 36 According to Alfred de Zayas of the 874,000 German civilians abducted to the Soviet Union, 45% perished. 37

Bacque quoted a former POW named G. Kurtz, who reported: “I survived Stalingrad, the exhausting marches, I even survived the death camp of Beketovka, where in a couple of weeks, of my 55,000 comrades, 42,000 died from hunger and disease.” 38 This resulted in a mortality rate of 76 percent in a matter of weeks. Germany’s allies did not fare any better. Nikolai Tolstoy reported that “About 320,000 Romanian soldiers had been taken prisoner (about 130,000 of whom were captured after hostilities ceased). In addition to these were 100,000 more who had been recruited into the Hungarian Army. Of this total of 420,000, less than half (190,000) ever returned home.” 39

The French government requested 1,700,000 prisoners of war to be used as “enforced laborers.” 40 In July, 1945 SHAEF agreed to provide 1.3 million prisoners for labor in France. 41 There are conflicting reports on how many prisoners were actually delivered. Bacque stated that
(primarily between July-September 1945), “The Americans granted them [the French] around 800,000 [POWs], the British some 55,000.”

In 1947 the War Department informed Senator Knowland that the United States Army had transferred a total of 600,000 prisoners to the French. Eugene Davidson gave a figure of 440,000.

The fate of these prisoners was foreseen by General Patton, who wrote in his diary, “I am also opposed to sending PW’s to work as slaves in foreign lands (in particular, to France] where many will be starved to death.” General Patton commented that, “It is amusing to recall that we fought the Revolution in defense of the rights of man and the Civil War to abolish slavery and have now gone back on both principles.”

Almost immediately after the cessation of hostilities, the health of these prisoners of war caused a stir. Dr. Ernest F. Fisher Jr., a senior historian with the United States Army Center for Military History, claimed that, “Starting in April 1945, the United States Army and the French army casually annihilated about one million men, most of them in American camps.” Conditions in the camps threatened to become a public scandal and French officials began to blame the Americans for these conditions while American officials began to blame the French. The literature contains several references to the harsh conditions in French camps. Eugene Davidson wrote, “The French were getting thousands of Germans from American POW camps, and these men were treated in such a fashion that American officers compared them with the emaciated inmates the Allies had liberated from Dachau.”

Bacque quoted a letter to the American Red Cross Headquarters in Washington, by Henry W. Dunning of the prisoners of war department of the American Red Cross:

The situation of the German prisoners of war in France has become desperate and shortly will become an open scandal. During the past week several Frenchmen, who were formerly prisoners of the Germans, have called on me to protest the treatment being given German prisoners of war by the French Government. General Thrasher, commanding the Oise Intermediary sector, asked one of our field workers to come to Paris to see me about the same matter. Mrs. Dunning,
returning from Bourges, reports that dozens of German prisoners are dying there weekly. I saw Pradervand [Jean-Pierre Pradervand, Chief delegate of ICRC in France] who told me that the situation of German prisoners in France is worse than in the former German concentration camps. He showed me photographs of human skeletons and letters from French camp commanders who have asked to be relieved because they can get no help from the French government and cannot stand to see the prisoners dying from lack of food. Pradervand has appealed to everyone in the French government but to no avail.49

Bacque related the situation in the Labouheyre work camp, where “25 percent of the men died in January, of starvation, dysentery or disease. The dysentery was so bad that the French came down with it.”50 He also mentioned two camps that were notorious to the Red Cross, “La Chauvinerie and Montreuil-Bellay, where in September 1945, there were thousands of women and children who had been originally imprisoned by the Americans. The ICRC complained to the French that these old men, women and children were dying of typhus that would soon spread to the surrounding French civilians.”51

The condition of these prisoners was becoming impossible to conceal from the press. In September 1945, Serge Bromberger wrote in Le Figaro:

The most serious source confirmed that the physical state of the prisoners was worse than deplorable. People were talking about a horrifying death rate, not from sickness but starvation, and of men who weighed an average 35-45 kilos (80-100 lbs). At first we doubted the truth of all this, but appeals came to us from many sources and we could not disregard the testimony of Father le Meur, Assistant General Chaplain to the prisoners.52

Bromberger interviewed French General Louis Buisson, in charge of the French camps, who admitted that the prisoners got only 900 to 1,000 calories per day. Bacque stated, “Circumspectly, he [Buisson] referred to the Americans only as the source of prisoners transferred to French custody, leaving the cause of the condition implied.”53
While the French press was suggesting that the condition of the POWs was the Americans’ responsibility, the American press was suggesting that it was the result of French treatment. Drew Middleton of the New York Times reported that the French had stolen food from the prisoners and that the US Army had turned over “large stocks of army rations” to the prisoners, “because General Eisenhower and his senior staff officers feel strongly that the United States Army is obligated to watch over the welfare of the prisoners that it captured.” The Times reported that one source compared the photographs of prisoners in French camps to photographs taken at Dachau.\(^{54}\) Dorothy Thompson wrote,

> That country [France], with our consent and connivance, and in defiance of the Geneva Convention, has been employing [prisoners] as slave labor under the same definition of slave labor as that used against Herr Sauckel in Nuremberg. Few care to recall that President Roosevelt gave a specific pledge to the German people in September 1944: “The Allies do not traffic in human slavery.” Do only a handful of people see that if, having defeated Germany, we accept for ourselves Hitler’s standards and Hitler’s methods, Hitler has conquered?\(^{55}\)

Eugene Davidson also commented on reports of mistreatment and that the American Red Cross found the prisoners improperly treated. “The New York Herald Tribune reported 12 October that the French were starving their PWs; Americans compared their emaciation to that of those liberated from Dachau.”\(^{56}\)

All this negative publicity led to the apparent termination of POW deliveries to the French. In March 1946 Senator William Langer reported to the Senate: “On 12 October 1945, the United States Army officials stopped turning over German prisoners to the French after the International Red Cross charged the French with failing to provide sufficient food for German prisoners in French camps . . . General Louis Buisson, Director of the War Prisons, said that food rations were ‘just enough to allow men to lie down, not move, and not die too quickly.’” Senator Langer concluded, “In spite of the certain fate awaiting German prisoners of war in French hands, this government continues to be a
party to sentencing German prisoners of war to starvation in continued violation of the articles of the Geneva Convention.” Edward N. Peterson commented that “About one-third [of the million prisoners promised to the French] had been delivered when Clay in September [1945] discovered the French were not complying with the Geneva Convention. General W.B. Smith showed Eisenhower photographs of emaciated PWs, who were being used as slave labor; the United States turned over none after 1 October.”

Eugene Davidson reported that, “The Americans, appalled at the state of a portion of the 440,000 men they had turned over to the French, negotiated for their return.” However, the termination of these transfers was more apparent than real. As Bacque states, “The army had pretended to stop delivering German slaves to the French, but in fact they continued. More than a hundred thousand were delivered after the ban was announced. Some Germans who had already been discharged by General Mark Clark in Austria were seized again and sent to France.”

Almost immediately after the publicly announced termination of these transfers, a new agreement was worked out for their resumption. According to Eugene Davidson, “In October [1945] an arrangement was announced by which 350,000 more German prisoners of war were to be turned over to the French at the rate of 50,000 a month to help the French reconstruction. 90,000 prisoners were to be returned by the French to the American authorities because of the poor physical condition.” Davidson added that “it would not be long before many of the healthy prisoners of war going to France would be in the state of the 90,000.” Earl F. Ziemke reported that, “During January [1946], USFET discharged almost a hundred thousand prisoners of war but, at the end of the month, having secured assurances the prisoners would be adequately cared for, resumed prisoner of war transfers to the French.” There will in all likelihood never be an accurate accounting of the number of prisoners who perished in these camps. Bacque concludes that “not more than 314,241 and no fewer than 167,000 men died in French captivity between 1945 and 1948.”

Could US military authorities have been unaware of the fate of
these prisoners from the very beginning? Certainly General Patton foresaw their predicament even before the transfers took place. Why did General Clay “discover” that the French were not adhering to the Geneva Convention when he should have known that the Geneva Convention did not apply to “Disarmed Enemy Forces?” These transfers were in themselves a violation of the Geneva Convention. Did prisoners of war fare much better in US-run camps? Is there any basis for Colonel Ernest Fisher’s charge that most of the missing prisoners of war perished in US camps?

General Eisenhower had clearly demonstrated that he was willing to violate the Geneva Convention by turning over prisoners to the Soviets as a “gesture of friendship,” and by his agreement to reclassify prisoners as “Disarmed Enemy Forces” not subject to the Geneva Convention. Could General Eisenhower have agree to and even encouraged other violations of the Convention?

James Bacque makes a strong case that he did. There is evidence that the US Army was following policies similar to those of the French. There were complaints from the French that up to 25 percent of the prisoners they received were déchets, or garbage. Of course any violation of the Geneva Convention had to be kept secret. As Bacque pointed out, General Everett S. Hughes, Eisenhower’s Special Assistant, advised Eisenhower “not to issue any orders about feeding POWs and issue of liquor.” Hughes passed the message about the need for secrecy down the line to a subordinate officer in Europe on Friday, November 24. “You shouldn’t put yours or your staff’s views about POW rations on paper.”

Bacque pointed out that “As soon as Germany surrendered on 8 May 1945, the American Military Governor, General Eisenhower, sent out an ‘urgent courier’ throughout the huge area that he commanded, making it a crime punishable by death for German civilians to feed prisoners.” Bacque reproduced a copy of this announcement, dated May 9, 1945, and quoted one US Army officer as saying that it was “the intention of Army command regarding the German POW camps in the US Zone from May 1945 through the end of 1947 to exterminate as many POWs as the traffic would bear without international scrutiny.” Bacque reported that “an official US Army ration book,
smuggled out by an ex-prisoner, for the huge camp at Bretzenheim, shows that these captives who nominally had prisoner-of-war status — supposedly the best-treated of all — got only 600-850 calories per day. This resulted in an appalling death rate. According to Bacque, “as early as May 1 the prisoners of war, who apparently were the best treated, were already exposed to conditions that killed them at the rate of over 30 percent per year.”

The fear that the civilian population would somehow supply the prisoners with food from their own meager rations was perhaps based on the knowledge that this source of food could be very important. General Patton commented on the fact that Allied prisoners often depended upon outside sources of food. “During the last month the prisoners at Moosberg were wholly supported by American Red Cross packages, as the Germans made practically no attempt to supply food which they themselves did not possess.” Patton added, “To their credit be it stated that they did not tamper with the packages.” Lt. Col. Henry W. Allard, of the Corps of Military Police in charge of the US camps in France in 1945, stated: “The standards of PW [prisoner of war] camps in the ComZ [the US Army’s rear zone] in Europe compare as only slightly better or even with the living conditions of the Japanese PW camps our men tell us about, and unfavorably with the Germans.” Bacque pointed out that “After the German surrender on 8 May 1945, the American camps grew steadily worse.” Policies followed by the Japanese resulted in a 27 percent mortality rate. Paul Johnson pointed out that “The Japanese POW record, in fact, was much worse than the Nazis’: of 235,000 Anglo-American POWs held by Germany and Italy only 4 percent died, whereas of the 132,000 in Japanese custody 27 percent died.” Nazi POW camps, unlike Western POW camps, have been the subject of comedy.

In response to Bacque’s charges, Steven Ambrose quoted Albert Cowdrey of the Department of the Army’s Center of Military History, who reported, “the overall death rate among German prisoners was 1 percent.” Cowdrey could have picked a more realistic figure. Under the best of circumstances the mortality rate of these troops would have been higher than 1 percent. The civilian mortality rate in Britain was 1.2 percent per year at the time. Although they were primarily healthy
young men at the time of induction, at the time of capture many were severely wounded. There are many eyewitness accounts of conditions in the camps. Bacque quoted Martin Brech, a retired professor of philosophy at Mercy College in New York, who was a guard at Andernach in 1945. Brech has said that he was told by an officer that “it is our policy that these men not be fed.” Bacque related that the 50,000 to 60,000 men in Andernach were starving, living with no shelter in holes in the ground, trying to nourish themselves on grass. When Brech smuggled bread to them through the wire, he was ordered by an officer to stop. Later, Brech sneaked more food to them, was caught, and was told by the same officer, “If you do that again, you’ll be shot.”75 John dos Passos related the story of a Jewish intelligence officer who stated, “I’ve been interrogating German officers for the War Crimes Commission, and when I find them half-starved to death right in our own P.W. cages and being treated like you wouldn’t treat a dog, I ask myself some questions. Sometimes I have to get them fed up and hospitalized before I can get a coherent story out of them.”76

There were examples of camps run according to the Geneva Convention and certainly dedicated researchers can uncover their locations. However, their practices apparently were not in line with official policy. General Hughes recorded that he “Stopped at PWE [prisoner of war enclosure] near Stenay. Find Germans eating full B rations.” To this he added, “I wonder if I can kick that problem.”77 It may also be noted that there were numerous civilians kept in these camps. Bacque noted that “In many US camps, sections were devoted to women, many of them accompanied by young children. At Attichy, the so-called ‘baby cage’ held at one time 10,000 children who had been sent there under tough conditions by truck and train.”78

Eventually the survivors of these camps were released. Secretary of State Byrnes reported that the “last of the German and Italian prisoners in this country were returned home in the fall of 1946.” Secretary Byrnes reported that the British announced a program on September 12, 1946 to return their last prisoners by October, 1948.79 In September, Byrnes suggested informally to the French a program to return the 600,000 prisoners in their hands which had been transferred to them by General Eisenhower. Byrnes explained:
The French asked me to withhold any formal action for a short time, which I did. But on December 2, 1946, I asked all three governments holding prisoners for us — France, Belgium and Luxembourg — to agree to complete repatriation by October 1, 1947. My message pointed out that eighteen months had elapsed since the end of hostilities and that, since the idea of forced labor was repugnant to the American people, we believed those prisoners not charged with war crimes should be returned. The French answered that while they realized the prisoners must be returned, they were so short of labor that they needed a longer period to complete the repatriation.80

Byrnes went on to explain that “On March 13, 1947, our government announced that an agreement had been reached with the French under which approximately 450,000 prisoners, including those captured by French forces as well as our own, would be released at the rate of 20,000 per month. This means that the last of the German prisoners will not be returned home until about four years after the end of the war.”81 Secretary Byrnes made no mention of the discrepancy of his original figure of 600,000 prisoners transferred to the French by General Eisenhower and the 450,000 they agreed to return. The French also captured approximately 200,000 prisoners on their own. This would leave approximately 350,000 prisoners unaccounted for, exceeding Bacque’s upper figure of 314,241 who died in French captivity. This discrepancy may be accounted for by the large number of prisoners who joined the French Foreign Legion.

Byrnes recorded that, “In March 1947, the Soviet Government claimed to have returned over one million Germans and to have 890,000 left. Forced labor camps are a symbol of Hitler’s regime that we should eliminate as rapidly as possible.”82 In 1947, Eugene Davidson reported that “More than 4 million German prisoners of war were still in Allied hands in March 1947. Many returning from France and Russia looked like walking skeletons.”83 A Military Government report in 1948 stated: “Those who are returned by Russia from time to time are the most pitiable objects of starvation and suffering one could imagine.”84

In a rebuttal to James Bacque’s charges that prisoners were, in
effect exterminated, Steven Ambrose wrote, “Was the undoubted suffering in the camps, especially the transit camps along the Rhine, the result of Eisenhower’s policy or the result of the chaotic conditions that prevailed in Europe in the spring and summer of 1945?” Ambrose contended that this suffering was beyond Eisenhower’s control. He did admit that “Men did die needlessly and inexcusably.” But how many men? It would be significant to know whether it were two men or one million.

Ambrose admitted that the policy of Eisenhower’s superiors “was to impress upon the Germans the fact of their defeat, the fact that they had brought it on themselves and in other ways to ‘treat ’em rough.” John Dos Passos’ intelligence officer’s comment on this policy seems appropriate: “All these directives about don’t coddle the Germans have thrown open the gates for every criminal tendency we’ve got in us.”

Ambroses most devastating critique of Bacque rests on his credentials as an historian. Ambrose charged that Bacque “has no reputation as a historian to lose.” He continued, “Mr. Bacque has all the paraphernalia of scholarship; it looks impressive enough to bamboozle even scholars.” In other words, the facts Bacque present are irrelevant. Because he is not a respected scholar, what he says is meaningless. It would seem that Mr. Ambrose should show more concern for his own reputation as a respected historian.
THE ETHNIC “CLEANSING” OF EASTERN EUROPE

The President of the United States and the Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill — desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned.

— The Atlantic Charter, August 14, 1941

One of the most dramatic events of the 20th century was the mass expulsion of ethnic Germans from the territory east of the Oder-Neisse Rivers. As many as 18.1 million people were driven from their homes because of their ethnic background. Somewhere between 2.1 million and 6 million of these people, mostly women and children, perished in what was supposed to have been an “orderly and humane” transition.

Section Two of the Morgenthau Plan, dealing with the ‘New Boundaries of Germany,’ stated that: “(a) Poland should get that part of East Prussia which doesn’t go to the USSR. and the southern portion of Silesia.” However, even Morgenthau had not envisioned the drastic territorial changes finalized at the Potsdam Conference, where it was agreed that all German land east of the Oder-Neisse Rivers that was not under Soviet administration “shall be under the administration of the Polish state.”

The decision to move the German frontier to the west of the Oder-Neisse Rivers and to expel the inhabitants may have been made during the Yalta Conference. General Clay recorded:

Although it does not appear in the agreement, I am of the opinion that it was also here [Yalta] that we accepted the principle later formally agreed at Potsdam of the expulsion of
persons of German origin from the areas outside post surrender Germany and their resettlement of Germany.³

Winston Churchill described an incident that took place during his discussions with Joseph Stalin on moving Poland's borders to the West:

Eden said that what Poland lost in the East she might gain in the West... I then demonstrated with the help of three matches my idea of Poland moving westward. This pleased Stalin, and on this note our group parted for the moment.⁴

This illustration, so easily demonstrated and so pleasing in its simplicity, would represent the deaths of millions of people in a most cruel and unusual fashion. At the conclusion of the Potsdam Conference (17 July-2 August, 1945), a Protocol was announced, Article XIII of which authorized the transfer of the Eastern Germans to what was left of Germany.⁵ This simple procedure would compensate Poland for the loss of territory surrendered to the Soviets as a result of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939.

Article XIII (Orderly Transfer of German Populations) of the Potsdam agreement also provided that:

The Three Governments, having considered the question in all its aspects, recognize that the transfer to Germany of German populations, or elements thereof, remaining in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, will have to be undertaken. They agree that any transfers that take place should be effected in an orderly and humane manner.⁶

At Potsdam, Prime Minister Churchill began to have misgivings about the extent of the proposed territorial transfer. By July 1945, it was becoming obvious that this transfer would result in chaotic conditions in the areas occupied by the Western powers. It was Stalin who suggested expanding the area of Polish control to the Oder and Neisse Rivers. During the fifth session of the Potsdam Conference, Churchill registered his opposition to the Soviet-Polish plan and argued that the population transfers should be held within limits:
If there were three or four million Poles east of the Curson Line then room should be made in the west. So considerable a movement of population would shock the people of Great Britain, but a move of eight and a quarter millions [Germans] would be more than I could defend. Compensation should bear some relation to loss. It would do Poland no good to acquire so much extra territory. If the Germans had run away from it they should be allowed to go back. The Poles had no right to risk a catastrophe in feeding Germany. We did not want to be left with a vast German population who were cut off from their sources of food. The Ruhr was in our zone, and if enough food could not be found for the inhabitants we should have conditions like the German concentration camps.7

In the sixth session of the Potsdam Conference, on Sunday July 22, 1945, Churchill stated, “The British have grave moral scruples about the vast movements of population.” Perhaps the Prime Minister was beginning to realize the economic consequences of this massive migration. As anticipated, the exodus put a tremendous strain on the already meager resources remaining in the Western zones of Germany. General Clay reported, “The situation in the British and American zones had worsened with the receipt of over 7,000,000 expellees from Poland, the Polish-administered territory in Germany, Czechoslovakia and Hungary.”8

On October 18, (1945), General Eisenhower telegraphed Washington:

In Silesia, Polish administration and methods are causing a mass exodus westward of German inhabitants. Germans are being ordered out of their homes and to evacuate New Poland. Many unable to move are placed in camps on meager rations and under poor sanitary conditions. Death and disease rate in camps extremely high. . . . Methods used by Poles definitely do not conform to Potsdam agreement. . . . Breslau death rate increased tenfold and death rate reported to be 75% of all births. Typhoid, typhus, dysentery, and diphtheria are spreading.
Total number potentially involved in westward movement to Russian zone of Germany from Poland and Czechoslovakia in range of 10 million. . . . No coordinated measures yet taken to direct stream of refugees into specific regions or provide food and shelter.

. . . [There exists] serious danger of epidemic of such great proportion as to menace all Europe, including our troops, and a probability of mass starvation [on an] unprecedented scale.9

Earl Ziemke wrote:

An average of 45,000 of these expelled Germans came each week in May and June totaling 920,000 by the end of June [1945]. Only 12 percent could be classified as fully employable; 65 percent needed relief. Contrary to agreements made before the movement to keep families together, the countries expelling Germans were holding back the young, able-bodied men. Of the arrivals 54 percent were women, 21 percent were children under fourteen years, and only 25 percent men, many of them old or incapacitated.10

The subsequent transfer of from 16.5 to 18.1 million people was unprecedented in the history of the world. There will never be an accurate accounting of the numbers of people who perished during this process. The generally accepted estimate is that 2.1 million men, women and children perished during this “orderly and humane” transfer.11 USFET [US Forces European Theater] estimated a death rate among these refugees of nearly three million. Edward Peterson recorded that “The weak, the old and the very young died by the hundreds of thousands.”12

It is estimated that about 12 million refugees arrived alive in shrunken Germany. This left an additional 2.5 million people who were assumed to have remained in the annexed territory. Bacque commented that “It now appears that if many of these evaded expulsion, it was only by dying.”13 Others placed the death toll much higher. The members of the Committee Against Mass Expulsions in New York estimated that 4.8 million had died by the end of 1947.14 Conrad Adenauer, Germany’s postwar Prime Minister, wrote in March
1949: “Six million Germans have vanished from the Earth. They are dead, gone. Most of the 7.3 million who stayed alive are women, children and old people.” Bertrand Russell wrote, in the *London Times* on October 19, 1945:

In eastern Europe now mass deportations are being carried out by our allies on an unprecedented scale, and an apparently deliberate attempt is being made to exterminate many millions of Germans, not by gas, but by depriving them of their homes and of food, leaving them to die by slow and agonizing starvation. This is not done as an act of war, but as a part of a deliberate policy of “peace.”

The enormous casualties among the civilian population were a result of Soviet policy. As Field Marshal Montgomery reported, “The Russians were creating a desert in their zone; anything in it of value was being sent to Russia, and conditions were already appalling in the area. Our reconnaissance parties in search of routes and camps for Poles returning to Poland reported that the Germans in the area were living like beasts on whatever they could get, and that starvation was already evident.” Stanislaw Mikolajczyk concluded that the behavior of the Soviet troops was directed from Moscow. He stated, “The Red Army’s lack of discipline during the robbery and looting of 1945 and 1946 was actually ordered as a means of sapping the morale of the people. In 1947 the troops became more disciplined.”

Atrocities committed by Soviet troops were somehow justified in the minds of many because of German atrocities committed within the Soviet Union. There is a great deal of evidence, however, that the behavior of the Red Army was encouraged by the Soviet leadership as a matter of policy, a policy that was not restricted to Germany. Molovan Djilas, head of the Yugoslav Military Mission in Moscow, wrote in his book *Conversations with Stalin* that he complained to Stalin about atrocities committed by Red Army troops in Yugoslavia. Stalin allegedly replied: “Can’t he understand it if a soldier who has crossed thousands of kilometers through blood and fire has fun with a woman or takes a trifle?” Djilas reported that in the small section of Yugoslavia liberated by the Red Army there were, “121 cases of rape, of
which 111 involved rape with murder, and 1,204 cases of looting with assault.” He added that these figures were “hardly insignificant if it is borne in mind that the Red Army crossed only the northeastern corner of Yugoslavia.” He added that these figures were “hardly insignificant if it is borne in mind that the Red Army crossed only the northeastern corner of Yugoslavia.”

The Bulgarians also felt the brunt of the Soviet Army’s thirst for revenge. “After a few disastrous incidents, the farmers learned it was best to let the soldiers take what they wanted.”

Discipline distinguishes an effective professional military from a disorganized rabble. There were Soviet commanders who realized that allowing their troops to behave in a disorganized manner damaged their effectiveness. Marshal Rokossovsky issued the order, “For looting, rape, robbery and murder of civilians, court-marshal; when necessary, execution on the spot.” Rokossovsky’s order was frequently ignored. This led to some embarrassing situations. De Zayas pointed out that “Even Polish and Ukrainian labourers who had stayed in Allenstein to await the arrival of the Red Army were not always spared. Drunken soldiers mistook them for Germans and so raped them or shot them.” This even resulted in the deaths of Western POWs.

On July 5, 1946, before an American tribunal in Neu Ulm, the former Chief of Staff of the German Fourth Army in East Prussia, Major General Erich Dethleffsen, stated:

When in October, 1944, Russian units . . . broke through German defenses and advanced as far as Nemmersdorf, they tortured civilians in many villages south of Gumbinnen, nailed some on barn doors and shot many others. A large number of women were raped. The Russian soldiers also shot some fifty French prisoners of war. The affected villages were reoccupied by German forces within forty-eight hours.

Edward R. Stettinius reported that Stalin remarked that most Germans in the areas to be annexed had already run away in the face of the advance of the Red Army. Field Marshal Montgomery, commenting on the character of the Russian fighting man, stated:

Finally, there was the impact of the Russians on the Western forces. From their behavior it soon became clear that the Russians, though a fine fighting race, were in fact barbarous
Asiatics who had never enjoyed civilization comparable to that of the rest of Europe. Their approach to every problem was utterly different from ours and their behavior, especially in their treatment of women, was abhorrent to us. In certain sectors of the Russian Zone there were practically no Germans left; they had all fled before the onward march of the barbarians, with the result that in the Western zones the crowd of refugees was so great that the problems of food and housing seemed almost insoluble.25

Montgomery’s account was not entirely accurate. Many of the inhabitants of eastern Germany had no opportunity to flee. Ambassador George Kennan wrote in his memoirs:

The disaster that befell this area with the entry of the Soviet forces has no parallel in modern European experience. There were considerable sections of it where, to judge by all existing evidence, scarcely a man, woman or child of the indigenous population was left alive after the initial passage of Soviet forces; and one cannot believe that they all succeeded in fleeing to the West. . . . The Russians . . . swept the native populations clean in a manner that had no parallel since the days of the Asiatic hordes.26

Milovan Djilas commented that “while crossing East Prussia, Soviet soldiers, especially the tank units, pounded and regularly killed all German civilian refugees — women and children.” He reported that when Stalin was informed of this and asked what should be done, he replied: “We lecture our soldiers too much; let them have some initiative!”27 When, during a discussion about Soviet policies toward civilians, Lev Kopelev asked his superior officer, “Does that mean killing women and children?” His superior officer replied, “Don’t be silly. Why bring in children? Who’s going to start killing children? You? Me? But if you want to know the truth, if there are any who will do it, let them kill the little Fritzes in the heat of the moment, until they get sick of it themselves.”28

To the casualties suffered during the expulsion must be added those who perished as a result of being imprisoned by the occupying
powers. On May 30, 1945, Rhona Churchill wrote an article for the London Daily Mail, dealing with conditions in the newly emerged Czechoslovak State:

Concentration camps for Germans are now opening up all over the territory and the Germans are being thrown indiscriminately into them while awaiting visas for Germany. Even German Jews and anti-Nazis recently released from Gestapo concentration camps are not immune.29

Alfred de Zayas relates a confidential report filed with the Foreign Office by R.W. F. Bashford. Bashford reported that the concentration camps in Eastern Europe were not dismantled, but rather taken over by the new owners. “Mostly they are run by Polish militia. In Swientochlowice [Upper Silesia], prisoners who are not starved or whipped to death are made to stand, night after night, in cold water up to their necks, until they perish. In Breslau there are cellars from which, day and night, the screams of victims can be heard.”30

One of the worst camps in postwar Czechoslovakia was the old Nazi concentration camp of Theresienstadt. Conditions under the new Czech administration are described by H.G. Adler, a former Jewish inmate, as follows:

Many amongst them [the new inmates] had undoubtedly become guilty during the years of occupation, but in the majority they were children and juveniles, who had only been locked up because they were Germans. Only because they were Germans . . . ? This sentence sounds frighteningly familiar; only the word “Jews” had been changed to “Germans.” The rags the Germans had been clothed with were smeared with swastikas. The people were abominably fed and maltreated, and they were no better off than one was used to from German concentration camps. . . 31

It is ironic that the men responsible for the Second World War received better treatment than the average citizen. As mentioned above, Francis Biddle described how warmly Colonel Andrus spoke of his charges, the criminals detained at Nuremberg, and how pleased he
was that the prisoners’ health had improved during their captivity.\textsuperscript{32} John dos Passos recorded that Andrus stated at a press conference that “In spite of everything I could do, one of my prisoners [Kaltenbrunner] got sick.” Dos Passos noted that the colonel looked heartbroken.\textsuperscript{33}

The Potsdam Agreement was obviously contrary to the provisions of the Atlantic Charter, the provisions of which did not apply to Germany — a position that was not made clear at its inception. It was not until March 1944 that the Earl of Mansfield stated before the British House of Lords:

> The Atlantic Charter will not apply to Germany, and therefore there is no reason whatever why we should not contemplate, if not with equanimity, at least without undue consternation, any unavoidable sufferings that may be inflicted on German minorities in the course of their transference.\textsuperscript{34}

Winston Churchill was eventually distressed by the results of this agreement. He wrote:

> My heart is saddened by the tales of the masses of German women and children flying along the roads everywhere in 40-mile long columns to the West before the advancing [Russian] armies. I am clearly convinced they deserve it; but that does not remove it from one’s gaze. The misery of the whole world appalls me.\textsuperscript{35}

There was only one beneficiary of this Western policy in postwar Europe. It was the Soviet Union. By decreeing economic chaos in Western Europe, Western leaders made Soviet policies appear almost benign. The economic hardships were a great benefit to the Communist parties throughout Europe. In October 1946, Anne O’Hare McCormick, special correspondent to the \textit{New York Times}, reported, “The scale of this resettlement and the conditions in which it takes place are without precedent in history. No one seeing its horrors first-hand can doubt that it is a crime against humanity for which history will exact a terrible retribution.”\textsuperscript{36}

Victor Gollancz qualified this conclusion in his book \textit{Our \textsuperscript{145}}
Threatened Values: “If the conscience of men ever again becomes sensitive, these expulsions will be remembered to the undying shame of all who committed or connived at them . . . The Germans were expelled, not just with an absence of over-nice consideration, but with the very maximum of brutality.”37 Perhaps the conscience of men has not yet become sensitive to such matters.
CONCLUSION

What is Europe now? It is a rubble-heap, a charnel house, a breeding ground of pestilence and hate.
— Winston Churchill, May 1947

For two years the Western Powers followed contradictory policies. On the one hand the Western leaders prided themselves on their just treatment of the Germans. The American prosecutor and Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson commented in his opening statement at the Nuremberg Trials that the wrongs condemned at the trial were so devastating that

. . . civilization cannot tolerate their being ignored, because it cannot survive their being repeated. That four great nations, flushed with victory and stung with injury, stay the hand of vengeance and voluntarily submit their captive enemies to the judgment of the law is one of the most significant tributes that Power has ever paid to Reason.

Francis Biddle said that the fundamental principles of international law ‘were stated unanimously in the judgment.’

On the other hand, Western policies often reflected a more sinister aspect, as revealed by John dos Passos, quoting an intelligence officer: “Once war has broken the fabric of human society, a chain reaction seems to set in which keeps on after the fighting has stopped
tearing down the decencies and the inhibitions that hold together the framework of civilization.” Fr Fifty years later, Irving Kristol was to write:

My fellow soldiers were too easily inclined to loot, to rape, and to shoot prisoners of war. Only army vigilance kept them in check. At the same time, observing German women and young girls, living among the rubble and selling their bodies for a few packs of cigarettes — the currency of the day — rid me of any anti-German feeling which, as a Jew, might otherwise have been present in me. Even the subsequent revelation of the Holocaust could not make me feel differently about ordinary Germans. They, too, had suffered — more than most Americans realize. And I was not so convinced that the American soldiers I knew were a different breed of humanity from their German counterparts.

W. Friedmann commented in 1947 that the preservation of a state of belligerency “enables the occupation authorities to disregard principles of law to a large extent.”

In a letter to his commanders, General Patton pointed out a fundamental principle of military leadership. He discussed the necessity for discipline, stating, “If you, their commanders, cannot enforce discipline in peace, you are useless in war.” Yet General Eisenhower held a contrary view on this subject. In August 1945, he remarked at a press conference, “In many ways I feel our soldiers are very good ambassadors in teaching the German about our way of living, for example, their lack of discipline shows another people not used to that sort of thing how we act and react. We would ask you not to quote ‘lack of discipline’ — I mean our attitude toward discipline as opposed to a subservient race.”

Edward Peterson quotes a 1946 orientation pamphlet:

You are a soldier fighting a new war. . . . we’ve got to watch every German 24 hours a day. . . . Making us feel sorry for them is one of the few weapons the “little” Germans have left. The children who shuffle from one foot to the other in the cold
outside the mess hall. . . old men and old women pulling carts. . . the ragged German trudging along the street with a load of firewood may not look vicious, but he has a lot in common with a trapped rat.9

These policies led to the creation of a Third World colony in the center of Europe. Francis Biddle described the atmosphere in Germany during his attendance at the Nuremberg Trails:

Nuremberg was colonial, we had taken the country after this wretched war, and were living in it, [and we] had to be there for a while. We weren’t sure how the natives would act, whether they would lie down and lick our boots, or slit our throats on too dark a night, yet we were determined to dine out on occasion and have as much fun as we could. It was like Kipling’s Simla, pointed to a different setting in a very different time.10

This naturally created a power vacuum where once Germany stood. Were these policies in the best interests of the nations that pursued them?

The Morgenthau Plan would have made perfect sense if the premises upon which it was based were correct. Supporters of the Morgenthau Plan believed that Germany was the sole cause of conflict on the European continent. They believed that when the war was concluded the Western Powers would work cooperatively with the Soviet Union. Those who had doubts about Soviet conduct were told that the Soviet Union had changed and become more democratic.

However, there are several reasons to believe that the Western leaders were aware that these premises were not correct. Ordinary Americans could be told that Russians “look like Americans, dress like Americans and think like Americans.”11 Their leaders should have known otherwise.

The Western leaders could not avoid having detailed knowledge of certain factors and surely considered them to bear directly on the policy that was to be formulated. One of these factors was the large number of Soviet citizens serving in the German military. Nikolai Tolstoy commented that,
By the spring of 1944 it was clear that the long-deferred Second Front was about to be opened. The daring and dangerous venture required meticulous planning, and among the factors to be taken into account was the question of the Russian troops in German service. Western intelligence was therefore anxious to appraise their fighting capacity.12

Western interest in the capabilities of Soviet POWs dated back to the Russo-Finnish War of 1939. Tolstoy tells of two Russian-speaking British Intelligence officers, Major Gatehouse and Captain Tamplin, who traveled to Finland in February 1940 to interrogate Russians captured by the Finns. Gatehouse and Tamplin concluded that “The military value of the prisoners of war is nil. It is most unlikely that any reliable military force, or even formation, could be raised from among these men. Any possibility of using them as a military force can be ruled out.”13

This report by Gatehouse and Tamplin accentuates the outrageousness of the fact that approximately one million Soviet citizens joined the German military.14 Tolstoy pointed out that, “Despite the most appalling brutalities inflicted on the Russians, Hitler had succeeded in raising nearly a million anti-Communist legionaries from amongst the prisoners in German hands.”15 Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn described this as “a phenomenon totally unheard of in all world history; that several hundred thousand young men, aged twenty to thirty, took up arms against their Fatherland as allies of its most evil enemy.”16

General Eisenhower was aware of this situation, and sent a message stating, “Our experience shows that about five per cent of prisoners captured from the Germans are Russian citizens.”17 Earl Ziemke reported that “In late 1944, the Army had discovered some 5,000 Soviet nationals among German prisoners of war in the camps in the US.”18 These soldiers represented a wide cross section of Soviet nationalities. In addition to Russians and Ukrainians, there were Cossacks, Crimean Tartars, and peoples from Central Asia who contributed to a large Muslim representation. If we are to believe Patrick Dean, a British Foreign Office legal expert, there were also a
number of Poles, who “formed a unit which was operating under German command.”

What possessed these men to take up arms to fight for an alien philosophy that described them as subhuman? Lev Kopelev commented,

Why, I would often be asked maliciously by the Germans and Poles I met in my subsequent years in jails and prison camps — why was it that not one of the bourgeois countries conquered by Germany could furnish Hitler with more than, say, a battalion of troops while in the Soviet Union hundreds of thousands — almost a million — soldiers and officers enlisted with the Germans in Vlasovite and Cossack units; in the various “legions” of the Tatar-Chuvash, Caucasian and Turkestan minorities; in two divisions associated with the SS; and, as hiwi, in the Wehrmacht itself?

The Western military leadership should have been extremely interested in the motives of these men. Interviews would have provided valuable insight into the true nature of Soviet practices and intentions.

However, even without the testimony of Russians serving in the German military, there was sufficient evidence to reveal the true nature of the Soviet State. Nikolai Tolstoy related that the head of the Soviet Military Mission in Britain, General Ratov, actually declined an offer of British mine-detectors, explaining that “in the Soviet Union we use people.” This was one of the prime functions of the penal battalions. The men in these units were driven forward in waves under the threat of machine-gun fire until the area of potential danger was cleared. Tolstoy relates how a Soviet general horrified General Eisenhower by explaining that captured soldiers were useless soldiers, and should be abandoned. There is reason to believe that prisoners returned from Finland after the Russo-Finnish war had been liquidated. Tolstoy relates that Lord Moyne was informed by the Soviet repatriation representative, General Sudakov, that many of the Soviet prisoners returned by the West “are due for liquidation on their return.”

The Soviet attitude toward their troops who were captured by the
enemy was well known to the leadership in the West. Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn recorded that:

\[
\ldots \text{the USSR did not recognize as binding Russia’s signature to the Hague Convention on war prisoners. That meant that the USSR accepted no obligation at all in the treatment of war prisoners and took no steps for the protection of its own soldiers who had been captured. The USSR did not recognize the International Red Cross. The USSR did not recognize its own soldiers of the day before; it did not intend to give them any help as POWs.}^{26}
\]

At the beginning of the conflict between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany, even Hitler had requested Red Cross inspections of prisoner of war camps. However, the appeal to Stalin for a prisoners’ postal service was met with the reply, “There are no Russian prisoners of war. The Russian soldier fights on till death. If he chooses to become a prisoner, he is automatically excluded from the Russian community. We are not interested in a postal service only for Germans.”\(^{27}\) Nikolai Tolstoy reported that, “By refusing to accede to the Geneva Convention on Prisoners-of-War or to collaborate with the International Red Cross, the Soviet Government [as it well knew] effectively sentenced its citizens to death.”\(^{28}\)

Western actions regarding the Soviet citizens enlisted by the Nazis are revealing. Many of these men naturally demanded to be treated as German prisoners of war. This was their right under the Geneva Convention. However, the Soviets, according the Secretary Stimson, “indicated a keen interest” in the “repatriation” of these men. Stimson asserted that “the Americans were faced with the unpleasant alternative of offending a great ally or abandoning the great principle of political asylum.”\(^{29}\) The Western leadership was faced not merely the abandonment of a great principle but, by returning these men to the Soviets, they were violating an international treaty ratified by the United States Senate.

A decision was made to retain custody of these troops until the end of hostilities. Anthony Eden suggested, “In order not to discourage surrender on the part of others impressed by the Germans to fight
against us, we should ask that no steps should be taken to deal with these Russians until the end of hostilities.” This would also eliminate the fear of reprisals against Western troops by the Germans, as pointed out by General John Deane, Head of US Military Mission in Moscow. This was done with the full knowledge of what would await these men on their return to the Soviet Union. On June 24, 1944, Patrick Dean, the Assistant Legal Adviser at the Foreign Office, asserted, “we are not concerned with the fact that they may be shot.”

Soviet treatment of their own troops as well as civilians may explain in part the horrendous casualties they suffered during the Second World War — the figure of 20 million casualties is frequently cited. It is assumed that these deaths were the result of Nazi aggression. However, there is evidence that a large number of these deaths can be attributed to the Soviet government. Tolstoy comments on the large section of the population that fled with the German Army as it withdrew from the Caucasus. This flood of refugees was often strafed by low-flying Red Air Force planes.

Another factor that revealed the true nature of the Soviet State was the events surrounding the “Katyn Forest Massacre.” During the Soviet invasion of Poland in 1939, the Red Army took prisoner several thousand Polish officers. These prisoners were kept in three prison camps, Starobielsk, Kozielsk, and Ostashkov. In the spring of 1940 these prisoners were transferred to an unknown location and all correspondence with them ceased. The Polish Government in Exile never abandoned hope of discovering their location and made repeated attempts to determine the prisoners’ fate. With the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, the Poles became allies of the Soviets. On October 6, 1941 the Polish Ambassador to Moscow held a meeting with Stalin and Molotov in which he specifically inquired about the prisoners in the Starobielsk, Kozielsk, and Ostashkov camps. Again in November, 1941 Ambassador Kot in a meeting with Stalin inquired about the prisoners in these three camps. In December 1941, Generals Sikorski and Anders held a meeting with Stalin and Molotov in which they made further inquiries about the missing prisoners. They mentioned that “all correspondence with their families in Poland ceased abruptly in April and May 1940 when they were transferred
from their three former prison camps to an unknown destination. On August 5, 1942 the Polish Ambassador to the United States met with President Roosevelt and requested that he intervene on their behalf. Roosevelt responded that the US ambassador in Moscow had been “put off” by the Soviets when he made inquiries about the missing men.

On April 5, 1943, the mystery of what had happened to these prisoners was solved by a German announcement that they had discovered the bodies of 10,000 Polish officers buried in a wood at Katyn, not far from Smolensk. The Polish Government in Exile demanded a Red Cross inquiry. The Soviet authorities used this demand for an independent inquiry as a pretext to break relations with the Polish Government in Exile on April 25, 1943. The prisoners had been in Soviet custody since 1939. Their whereabouts were known until the spring of 1940, at which time they were “transferred” and all communication with them ceased. The German military did not arrive in the area for well over a year. It would appear obvious who was responsible for this act. However, Soviet denials were accepted throughout the West. Winston Churchill commented that “The less said about that the better,” while President Roosevelt declared that the whole incident was a German propaganda plot.

Sir Owen O’Malley conducted an exhaustive investigation of the Katyn massacre for the British Government and issued a report in February 1945. This report proved beyond a doubt that the atrocity had been committed by the Soviets. O’Malley showed this report to the Polish Ambassador to Britain and informed him that after the British Cabinet had read the report, it was ordered suppressed and another was written which wouldn’t offend the Soviet Union. When George H. Earle, a former US Minister to Bulgaria and to Austria, met with President Roosevelt to inform him of information he had received indicating Soviet responsibility for the massacre, the President responded, “I have noted with concern your plan to publish your unfavourable opinion of one of our allies. . . . I not only do not wish it, but I specifically forbid you to publish any information or opinion about an ally that you might have acquired while in office or in the service of the US Navy.” Louis FitzGibbon added that “Earle was promptly transferred to Samoa.”
It was obvious that the Soviets were responsible for the Katyn forest massacre. It is also obvious that the Western leadership was aware of the fact. However, they chose to suppress it. The Soviets attempted to place responsibility for the massacre on the Germans at the Nuremberg Trials. This was too much even for Soviet supporters in the West, and the charges against the Germans were quietly dropped. Soviet guilt in this matter was not admitted until after the fall of the Soviet Union.

The Western leadership’s callousness is illustrated by an incident that took place in the White House on June 7, 1944. In a meeting with the Polish Prime Minister, Mikolajczyk, President Roosevelt attempted to lighten up the conversation by relating an amusing incident. He told Mikolajczyk about a conversation that took place during the Teheran conference when Stalin proposed a toast to the death of at least 50,000 German officers. Apparently, Churchill failed to grasp the jocular tone of Stalin’s toast and stated, “Great Britain could never admit the killing of war prisoners.” To ease the friction between Churchill and Stalin, Roosevelt “laughed heartily, saying that he saved the situation by suggesting ‘an amendment to Stalin’s toast,’ and proposed a revised one ‘to the death in battle of forty-nine and a half thousand German officers.’” Sir John Wheeler-Bennett commented that “There is no particular reason to suppose that Stalin was joking.” In any event, the execution of 50,000 men does not appear to be a proper subject for amusement, especially to a man concerned about the fate of 10,000 of his own countrymen.

The massacre of these members of the Polish officer corps was not the only indication of Soviet criminality. Between 1939 and 1941, approximately 1,500,000 Polish citizens had been carried off into slavery in the Soviet Union. Nikolai Tolstoy estimated that within two years approximately 270,000 of these Poles were dead from murder, malnutrition, disease and starvation. Others put the mortality rate much higher. Prime Minister Mikolajczyk obviously kept Washington informed about the condition of these Poles. He wrote, “Our officers in London had been swamped by heartbreaking communications from Polish civilians who had been released from slave camps. We had been supplied with photographic evidence of
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starvelings from which the eye recoiled and with statistics of death rates that shocked the mind."47

With the “liberation” of Poland, Soviet behavior did not appear to have improved. The Polish Government in Exile complained that “Thousands of Home Army men were being arrested and shipped into Russia. Villages were being burned by the Red Army. Citizens were being murdered and the land stripped of its industry.”48 40,000 members of the Polish Home Army had been seized and deported to Russia.49 Initially, the Red Army welcomed the support of the members of the Polish Home Army. However, apparently on orders from Moscow, the commanders of the Home Army were “put under arrest, some of them were shot, some hanged, and others deported.”50 The Soviets also induced the Western powers to stop giving aid to the Polish underground.51

A realistic view of Soviet intentions would have affected the decision to surrender much of Central Europe to the Soviets, a decision frequently attributed to General Eisenhower. Steven Ambrose suggests that there was one “real reason, above all others, that Eisenhower left Berlin and Prague to the Russians. For all his constant insistence on ‘military’ rather than ‘political’ factors, he avoided the two capitals for the most obvious of political reasons — to please the Russians.”52 General Eisenhower did not believe that geographical locations were significant. He referred to the Ruhr as “merely a geographical objective”53 and to Berlin as “nothing but a geographical location,” adding that “I have never been interested in these.”54

This lack of appreciation for geography had its limits, however. A decision was made not to allow the Soviet Union to gain control of the Baltic by seizing Denmark. General Omar Bradley commented that, “Had we not primed Ridgway in advance and then rushed him to help Monty, the Russians would surely have reached the Danish border first and perhaps gone on to Copenhagen with possibly damaging consequences in the postwar world.”55 In the end, it would seem that Eisenhower was willing to sacrifice the lives of his soldiers to achieve political objectives.

Although Eisenhower naturally gave his input, the decision to allow the Soviets to liberate the great capitals of Central Europe was
made at a higher level in the US government. The British encouraged Eisenhower to liberate Prague. On April 13, Mr. Eden sent a message to Ambassador Winant urging the Americans to liberate Prague before the Soviets did so. By May 4, American armored units were within sixty miles of Prague, while the Soviets were still a hundred miles to the east. According to General Omar Bradley, “Ike passed this question on to Marshall.” General Marshall responded that he would be “loath to hazard American lives for purely political purposes.” On May 5, the Soviet Chief of Staff, General A. I. Antonov, asked General Eisenhower to halt his forces along a line running through Pilsen and Karlsbad — well to the west of Prague. Field Marshal Montgomery believed that the Western forces could have liberated Prague, Vienna and Berlin before the Soviets.

Josef Stalin knew the importance of geography. Milovan Djilas related a conversation with Stalin in which the Soviet leader stated, “whoever occupies a territory also imposes on it his own social system. Everyone imposes his own system as far as his army can reach. It cannot be otherwise.” Edward Stettinius recorded that at the Potsdam Conference Stalin wanted the United States to recognize the governments in Eastern Europe before the elections provided for in the Yalta agreement were held. Stalin said: “A freely elected government in any of these countries would be anti-Soviet, and that we cannot allow.” What appeared obvious to the Russians apparently was a mystery to the leaders of the West. Perhaps this is why General Bradley quoted from Field Marshal Alan Brooke’s diary, “There is no doubt, that Ike is a most attractive personality and, at the same time, a very, very limited brain from a strategic point of view. This comes out the whole time in all conversation with him.”

General Eisenhower had other priorities. He told Field Marshal Montgomery that “our real objective was to kill Germans and it did not matter where we did it.” In March 1945, he sent Montgomery a message which ended, “My purpose is to destroy the enemy's forces and his power to resist.”

This outlook fitted perfectly with the Morgenthau Plan and had some regrettable fallout. Patton recorded that “There were also some unfortunate incidents in the shooting of prisoners.” He added
parenthetically, “I hope we can conceal this.” Bradley mentions the case of two men from the 45th Division, a captain and a sergeant, who had “lined up and murdered in cold blood a total of seventy-nine German POW’s. Both men pleaded in their defense that the atrocities had been committed because Patton had encouraged them to wantonly kill POWs.” The murder of prisoners of war was not an uncommon event.

The attitude toward prisoners of war was fostered by the Western military leadership. In a meeting with the British Ambassador to Washington, Lord Halifax, General Eisenhower commented that he would like to “liquidate” the German General Staff as well as leaders of the Nazi party “from mayor on up and all members of the Gestapo.” They agreed that “that extermination could be left to nature if the Russians had a free hand.” This would also indicate that they were aware of Soviet methods.

The primary objective of a professional military is not to destroy its enemy’s military. It is to achieve objectives that will lead to the enemy’s submission to the victor’s terms, at a minimum cost. These objectives may be achieved by destroying the enemy’s military. However, this is not an efficient method. If an opponent believes that he has no alternative to death in battle he naturally will fight with added determination. The fear of being murdered coupled with the knowledge of the Morgenthau Plan resulted in a bitter struggle to the end. It is not plausible that the Western leaders were unaware of that.

Toward the close of the Second World War, Heinrich Himmler contacted Field Marshal Montgomery and requested an interview. Montgomery described this meeting in his memoirs:

His purpose in seeking an interview with me was to stress that sooner or later there would be another war to stop the march of the Asiatic hordes into Western Europe, led by Russia. Now that Germany was beaten, Britain was left alone to face the Asiatic onslaught. It was essential to save the fighting man-power of Germany from falling into Russian hands, since it would be needed to fight with the British against the Russians in the near future — such a war, in his view, being inevitable.
Montgomery would not have bothered to record this conversation if he did not believe it had some merit. The British were much more sensitive than the Americans to the postwar geopolitical balance in Europe. Gollancz asserted, after the war, that “it is in Germany above all that the Soviet Union and the West are counterpoised and . . . the fate of Germany will decide, or very largely decide, the fate of Europe and perhaps the world.”

By 1949, it was clear that the Western postwar policies had wrought a disaster. Germany’s importance to the defense of the West became obvious to even the most obtuse. Field Marshal Montgomery held discussions with Ernest Bevin in January of that year. Montgomery explained that “Our plans were based on conventional weapons and we would need strong forces if we were to match those which could be deployed against us by Russia. Without Germany, we could not hope to produce those forces.” As Sir John Wheeler-Bennett explained, Germany “was virtually begged to rearm by the Western Powers at their expense.”
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