



POSITORY,

SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY UNITED STATES SENATE

EIGHTY-FOURTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES

JUNE 12 AND 14, 1956

PART 27

(With Sketch of the Career of J. Peters)

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SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES

TUESDAY, JUNE 12, 1956

UNITED STATES SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to recess, at 2 p. m., in room P-63, United States Capitol Building, Senator Arthur V. Watkins presiding.

Present: Senator Watkins.

Also present: Robert Morris, chief counsel; William A. Rusher, administrative counsel; and Benjamin Mandel, research director.

Senator Watkins. The committee will be in session.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Munsell, would you come forward please? Senator WATKINS. Raise your right hand and be sworn.

Do you solemnly swear the testimony you give in the matter now pending before this committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Munsell, I do.

Senator Watkins. Proceed. Mr. Morris. Will you be seated?

Mr. Donner, will you identify yourself for the record, please? Mr. Donner. Yes. I am Mr. Munsell's counsel. My name is Frank J. Donner, and my address is 342 Madison Avenue, New York City.

TESTIMONY OF ALEXANDER E. O. MUNSELL, NEW YORK, N. Y., ACCOMPANIED BY FRANK J. DONNER, HIS ATTORNEY

Mr. Morris. Mr. Munsell, will you give your name and address to the reporter?

Mr. Munsell. Certainly. Alexander E. O. Munsell, 324 West 20th Street, New York City 11, N. Y.

Mr. Morris. And what is your business or occupation, Mr. Munsell?

Mr. Munsell. I am a retired businessman, sir. Mr. Morris. You are a retired businessman?

Mr. Munsell. Correct.

Mr. Morris. Now, did you attend a meeting of the Religious Freedom Committee on April 11, 1956, in New York City?

Mr. Munsell. April 11-

Mr. Morris. It was held at the gallery, National Arts Club, 15 Gramercy Park South, New York City.

Mr. MUNSELL. To the best of my knowledge, I was at that meeting.

Mr. Morris. You were at that meeting?

Mr. Munsell. As far as I know.

Mr. Morris. Were you there as an individual or were you there representing someone else?

Mr. Munsell. I was there as an individual.

Mr. Morris. As an individual. Now, you are the treasurer for the

Reverend Dr. Melish, are you not?

Mr. Munsell. This question that you are asking seems to me to come under the first amendment on the question of free exercise of religion, and therefore I decline to answer on the grounds that this comes under the first amendment also.

Mr. Donner. Mr. Morris, may the question be repeated?

Mr. Morris. You are the treasurer, are you not, for the Reverend r. Melish? That is a committee of Dr. Melish's. You act as the

treasurer to collect money for him, do you not?

Mr. Munsell. My understanding of the Constitution, the first amendment, refers to the field of religion, the free exercise of religion, as one of the things guaranteed under the first amendment. And on that ground I decline to answer this question.

Senator Watkins. The Chair takes a contrary view, and you are

directed to answer the question.

Mr. Munsell. Mr. Chairman, I can only repeat that I feel this is an invasion of my right of religious freedom, and I can only decline.

Senator Watkins. Do you realize that, in declining, you possibly may be in the situation of a proceeding for contempt of the Congress?

Mr. Munsell. Mr. Chairman-

Senator Watkins. It is my duty to warn you.

Mr. Munsell. I understand. If it is a matter of my conscience, I feel that I have no choice but to take this stand, sir.

Senator Watkins. With what I have just said in mind, I again

direct you to answer the question.

Mr. Munsell. And I again make the same reply, sir, that under the free exercise of religion clause of the first amendment, I am not willing to answer the question.1

Senator Watkins. I shall not argue the matter with you. I have merely for the record made this record, and I will let it stand at that.

You may proceed.

Mr. Morris. You are a member of the Communist Party, are you

not, Mr. Munsell?

Mr. Munsell. I decline to answer that question on the grounds that under the fifth amendment no one may compel me to be a witness against myself.

Senator Watkins. You are claiming the protection of the fifth

amendment?

Mr. Munsell. I do, sir.

Mr. Morris. Now, were you present at this meeting of April 11 at which the plans were set forth whereby the Religious Freedom Com-

¹ Subsequently, the subcommittee received from Mr. Munsell the following affidavit, dated at New York and sworn to on June 16, 1956, before Ethel Supnick, a notary public of Kings County, N. Y.:

"Alexander O. Munsell, being duly sworn, deposes and says:

"1. On Tuesday, June 12, 1956, I appeared under a subpena before the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee.

"2. I was asked the following question: 'Are you treasurer of the "Melish Committee'?' In response to this question, I invoked the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States. On advice of counsel, I now waive my previous reply, and answer that I am treasurer of the Parishoners Committee for Holy Trinity."

mittee, in association with the Methodist Federation for Social Action, would take action to prevent the publishing of a handbook of this

Senate Internal Security Subcommittee?

Mr. Munsell. If my memory serves me right, I arrived at that meeting somewhat late, and I am not too sure just what took place at that meeting. I am trying to recall as best I can what was being said

when I came in, but I am unable to remember.

Mr. Morris. Don't you remember that Dr. Harry F. Ward said, before all these people present, that steps, drastic steps, would have to be taken to prevent the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee from publishing its handbook called Handbook for Americans, explaining the role and function of the Communist Party?

Mr. Munsell. I do not recall whether I heard Dr. Ward speak at

that meeting or not, as I did get there quite late.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Munsell, what was your business before you retired?

Mr. Munsell. It was the publishing of color charts.

Mr. Morris. Was it your own business or did you work for someone? Mr. Munsell. Well, it is a business—it is called the Munsell Color

Mr. Morris. Did you ever live in Baltimore?

Mr. Munsell. I did.

Mr. Morris. Did you ever run for office in Baltimore?

Mr. Munsell. I did not catch that.

Mr. Morris. Did you ever run for office in Baltimore?

Mr. Munsell. No; not that I recall.

Mr. Morris. There was an Alex Munsell who was a candidate for the city council in Baltimore in 1939. Was that you?

Mr. Munsell. I refuse to answer that question on the grounds that under the fifth amendment I may not be compelled to be a witness

against myself.

Mr. Morris. The Daily Worker of New York, of Friday, January 27, 1939, lists you as a candidate on the Communist Party ticket, or lists Alex Munsell, spelled the same way as you spell your name, as candidate for the city council, fourth councilmanic district, together with a man named Bernard J. Weinkrantz. Do you know a man named ${
m Weinkrantz}$?

Mr. Munsell. I rely on my answer previously given.

Mr. DONNER. May the record show that that is the fifth amendment?

Mr. Morris. Yes.

Now, can you recall that the Reverend Lee H. Ball spoke at this

meeting of April the 11th?

Mr. Munsell. I really can't remember who spoke at the meeting, sir. I came in late and things were going on at that time, and I know nothing more than that I was at the meeting, but I have very little recollection of what was said or anything else. I think it was within half an hour or 20 minutes of the end of the meeting that I got there.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, subject to the approval of the chairman and the full committee, I have here a report as to what happened at that meeting, and I was wondering how we can have some of these facts to get into the record. This witness today says he cannot recall

what happened at that meeting.

Senator Warkins. What is the record or this statement that you

have?

Mr. Morris. Senator, it is an outline of a plan that the Religious Freedom Committee, working in concert with the Methodist Council for Social Action, would take in an effort to prevent the Senate committee from publishing its handbook. One of the things they mention here in April is that they had hoped to get a judge to sign an injunction, and that they had taken it up with their counsel, who was named in here, who would make an effort to get an injunction.

Senator Watkins. What is the background of this statement?

How did you get it? Who vouches for it?

Mr. Morris. Senator, I would rather not go into that in public session.

Senator Watkins. I see.

Mr. Morris. With respect to Miss Roberts, Senator Watkins has to go over to the Judiciary Committee now. I was wondering if we could have a conference after he leaves about when we could take her testimony.

Mr. Donner. Very well.

Senator Watkins. I am sorry I cannot stay to continue the hearing. But the Judiciary Committee set a meeting for 2 o'clock this afternoon, and I have one of the major measures to be considered, and they cannot proceed very well without me.

So this meeting will be recessed subject to the call of the chairman. (Whereupon, at 2:10 p. m., the subcommittee adjourned, subject

to the call of the Chair.)

SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES

THURSDAY, JUNE 14, 1956

United States Senate, Subcommittee
To Investigate the Administration of the
Internal Security Act and Other Internal
Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:45 a.m., in room 318, Senate Office Building, Senator William E. Jenner presiding.

Present: Senator Jenner.

Also present: Senator McCarthy; Robert Morris, chief counsel; Benjamin Mandel, research director; William A. Rusher, administrative counsel; and Robert C. McManus, investigations analyst.

Senator Jenner. The committee will come to order.

The witness will be sworn.

Mr. Morris. Dr. Dodd, will you stand, please?

Senator Jenner. Do you swear that the testimony you give in this hearing will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Dr. Dopp. I do.

Senator Jenner. Proceed, Mr. Morris.

TESTIMONY OF BELLA V. DODD, NEW YORK, N. Y.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, the subject of today's hearing will be the Communist penetration of political parties and Communist activities within the industrial scene.

This meeting has been preceded by an executive session at which

sworn testimony was taken from the present witness.

Dr. Dodd, I wonder if you would tell us for the record roughly what position you occupied in the Communist Party, the top posi-

tion that you had.

Dr. Dopp. I was a member of the national committee. I was a member of the [New York] State committee, and I was legislative representative and functioned for it on the State secretariat. I was a member of various committees of the party, like the women's committee, labor Committee, and education committee, and numerous others.

Mr. Morris. And you were expelled from the Communist Party in 1949, were you not?

Dr. Dodd. I was.

Mr. Morris. And you were, prior to that time, a member of the national committee?

Dr. Dodd. I was.

Mr. Morris. And you also were in charge of political affairs for the Communist Party in New York City; were you not?

Dr. Dod. I was for a period.

Mr. Morris. What was the period, Dr. Dodd?

Dr. Dopp. Roughly in 1944–45–46.

Mr. Morris. I see.

Would you generally describe for the committee what your role was

at that time?

Dr. Dodd. On the political scene, it was my obligation to study and analyze the State of New York from the point of view of getting as much Communist advance in public office as possible. This meant analyzing the possibilities of capturing congressional seats, senatorial, State senator, State assembly, and citywide and statewide offices.

Mr. Morris. I see.

Now, in that position, Dr. Dodd, you had to know the identities and the nature of the activities of certain persons who were Communists and subordinate to you; is that right, Dr. Dodd?

Dr. Dodd. Yes.

Mr. Morris. I notice that you mentioned in your book, Dr. Dodd, on

Now the die was cast and we followed the election decisions made previously. With O'Dwyer's election the Communists placed one of their ablest men in city hall as confidential secretary to the new mayor.

Now, I wonder if you would tell us here for the record the circumstances which supported the statement in your book: School of Darkness?

Dr. Dodd. Bill O'Dwyer appointed Paul Ross, who was an attorney and former member of the Communist Party, known to me as a member of the Communist Party, as confidential secretary.

Mr. Morris. Were you a party to that behind the scenes? Dr. Dodd. I had known Paul Ross for a good number of years.

Mr. Morris. You had known him as a Communist?

Dr. Dod. And by this time, we knew that Mayor O'Dwyer, who had received the support of the Communist Party in the election campaign-

Mr. Morris. Now, what election campaign was that, Dr. Dodd? Dr. Dodd. 1945. We knew that he would make certain appoint-

ments. Now, ordinarily the appointments are not necessarily of Communist Party members or known Communist Party members, but those who were friendly or those who were close to the party. But in the case of Paul Ross, it was a question of having someone who was a key person at city hall, through whom party requests and party problems could be channeled.

Mr. Morris. And did you thereafter work with Paul Ross in connection with your official capacity as the head of the Communist Party

election activity in New York State?

Dr. Dodd. I worked with Paul Ross and so did many other people in the party work with Paul Ross.

Mr. Morris. I wonder if you would tell us some general examples,

Dr. Dodd, as to how you carried on this activity.

Dr. Dodd. Well, we generally prepared for elections at least a year or 2 years in advance, setting down the line and the strategy of the election campaign. For instance, for the 1946 election, we worked

beginning with the end of the 1945 election and on through the election campaign of 1946. We would cover the various districts and decide which districts could be taken over from the conservatives, from the people who were auticarty, who were opposed to the program of the

party, and decide where the key effort should be placed.

For instance, in 1944, back to 1944, the decision was made in the State committee of the Communist Party that the 29th Congressional District was to be taken away from the man who then held it and was to be captured by a liberal, progressive candidate. That was Hamilton Fish's district. By 1946, we were making decisions as to what the statewide ticket should be like as a whole. And in that respect, we would be working with-since the Communist Party controlled the American Labor Party, and since the Communist Party controlled a section of the labor movement itself, which was important in political action, since the Communist Party had some very strong support within certain of the mass organizations of the minority groups, it was very important for the political program of the party to cover all of these groups—and therefore we worked with someone who was within the Democratic Party, someone who was within the Republican Party, someone who was in the Labor Party, and worked with people in the trade unions and the mass organizations and mapped out our strategy.

But the final strategy as to who should run from which districts and who should receive the Labor Party support, the Communist Party support, and the support of all those groups that the Communist Party controlled, the decision was finally made, of course, by the State

committee of the Communist Party.

Mr. Morris. Now, was Clifford T. McAvoy active at this time?

Dr. Dod. Clifford McAvoy had been appointed during the La-Guardia administration as his welfare commissioner. Clifford Mc-Avoy had come from City College where he had taught French, and he had been chairman of an organization that achieved a great deal of popularity, called the Anti-Fascist Organization. Clifford had become a party member, and when the mayor selected him for the welfare position, he was a party member, and thereafter, of course, Clifford was an important person used by the party in various positions.

McAvoy was a pleasant person, an able person, and made a very

good candidate. He was used for different offices.

Mr. Morris. The New York City Welfare Commissioner at this

time was an important position; was it not?

Dr. Dod. Extremely important, because of the political problems which surrounded the giving of relief. Now, unfortunately, that question had not been resolved. At present, I do think we have eliminated the question of political considerations on the granting of relief. But at that time the granting of relief was still instinct with politics.

Mr. Morris. Now, Dr. Dodd, was there, let us say, within the Republican Party, a certain group—did you have a certain group working within the Republican Party?

Dr. Dodd. I worked with a certain number of people. weren't the most important people; they were rather tangential people, but I worked with certain Republican people, and there were those who were my superiors who worked with others who were superior to me.

and the state of t

Mr. Morris. I wonder if you would tell us something about an operation that you had within the Republican Party. Let us begin with that particular party.

Dr. Dopp. Well, we had a member—we had a member of the Young Republican Party within our committee, who reported back to us what

was going on.

Mr. Morris. The Young Republican Club, you mean?

Dr. Dodd. Yes.

Mr. Morris. That is the New York Young Republican Club. You had a Communist Party member in the New York Young Republican Club-

Dr. Dodd. Yes.

Mr. Morris (continuing). Who reported back to you on what happened?

Dr. Dodd. Yes.

Mr. Morris. Did you know a man named Jules Justin?

Dr. Dod. Yes, I did.

Mr. Morris. Who was Jules Justin?

Dr. Dopp. He was a person in the Republican Party who was also a member of the Communist Party, and he ran for various political offices in the Republican Party.

Mr. Morris. He was the man who ran for Congress, was he not, on

the West Side in New York City?

Dr. Dopp. I don't remember the offices he ran for, but he did run for

Congress, I suppose, if you say so. I don't remember that.

Mr. Morris. Dr. Dodd, can you tell us the identity of the Communist person who was in the New York Young Republican Club who

reported back to you?

Dr. Dopp. To tell you the truth, at this point I have been trying to search my mind for his name and I can't remember his name. I remember his features, but I don't remember his name. You know, in the party we made a great fetish of not remembering names, trying to maintain anonymity and trying to call people by their first names. can't even remember his first name, though.

Mr. Morris. Now, is there anything more you can tell us?

Mr. Chairman, as you know, because you were there, there is a certain section of this testimony of Dr. Dodd that we have taken only in executive session until we can get some further corroboration to look into it further.

Senator Jenner. That is correct.

Mr. Morris. I was wondering if there is anything outside of that limitation which we asked you to observe—is there anything else you can tell us about a particular operation within the Republican Party?

Dr. Dodd. Well, the Communist Party doesn't care where it operates, whether it operates in the Democratic or Republican Party or the Labor Party or the Liberal Party, as long as they can make some headway.

Now, you take for instance the Marcantonio district, which was the district in which Marc would run in the Democratic, Republican, and Labor Party primaries from time to time. There the line between Democrat and Republican had been completely obliterated and the label of the Republican or Labor or Democratic just didn't mean anything. It was a question of the personality who was running.

For that reason, it was possible to gain control of the party apparatus and party machinery in that area. The Communist Party had very close relationship with some of the people who were in the Republican Party in that area through Marcantonio's own contact with

national politics.

This happens more and more in those districts where political education—where we have had, for instance, a shifting population, a new type of population coming in, and where the economic difficulties are so great that it is the individual that makes the party rather than the principles that make the party.

Mr. Morris. Did you know a man named Hyman Forstenzer?

Dr. Dodd. I did.

Mr. Morris. Who was Hyman Forstenzer, Dr. Dodd?

Dr. Dodd. Mr. Forstenzer was a member of the teachers union and also the brother of one of the Republican leaders on the West Side of New York, the Washington Heights area of New York.

Mr. Morris. Is he now the deputy health commissioner of New

York State; do you know?
Dr. Dodd. I heard that he was deputy commissioner of mental hygiene in the State of New York.

Mr. Morris. Now, was he known to you to be a Communist Party

member?

Dr. Dodd. He was.

Mr. Morris. Was he associated with you in activities within the

Communist Party?

Dr. Dodd. Mr. Forstenzer was an assistant to myself in the work of the legislative committee of the teachers union. As a matter of fact, he substituted for me when I was away in Albany or in Washington in my work as legislative representative.

Mr. Morris. He was your subordinate, then?

Dr. Dodd. Yes.

Mr. Morris. Was he also your subordinate in the Communist Party?

Dr. Dod. Well, no; because there wasn't that kind of relationship. Mr. Forstenzer had been a member of the Communist Party, of the branches in the Bronx, and I was on a city and statewide level. I worked with Mr. Forstenzer within the teachers union and knew that he was a Communist within the teachers union.

Mr. Morris. We have had some testimony recently from a gentleman named Barney Conal. Apparently, Mr. Barney Conal has been doing surveys, study surveys and statistical surveys for apparently the three political parties. In 1952 he was working for the Republicans; in 1946 he was working for the Democrats; in 1948 he worked for Henry Wallace.

I wonder if you encountered Barney Conal at any time during the course of your experience in the Communist Party.

Dr. Dodd. Yes.

Mr. Morris. It is spelled C-o-n-a-l.

Dr. Dodd. Yes, I knew Mr. Conal for many years. I knew him because his wife was a secretary in the furriers' union and the secretary to Ben Gold of the furriers' union.

Mr. Morris. Was that Greta Spiro?

Dr. Dodd. Yes.

And I knew him also because he was very busy in the CIO-PAC organization and then NC-PAC, which developed in the period of 1944.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Conal testified that he was head of war activities for the CIO political action committee during the war.

Dr. Dodd. He was very active in the 1944 election campaign and

continued active in the development of community groups.

The purpose of the NC-PAC was to develop a new type political organization within the communities, substituting for the old type of district clubs and district groups, and the community groups were to

be based upon representation from various organizations.

For instance, if I were organizing a community group for Elmhurst, that is, if Mr. Conal or anybody else was, during this period of 1944, 1945, and 1946, if they were organizing a community group, they would have a representative there of the teachers' organizations, a representative of the parents' organizations, a representative of the students' organizations, a representative of whatever unions were within that community.

In other words, this was an attempt to organize political action based upon group representation of unions and social and other types of organizations, and these were supposed to assist the trade

unions in conducting the National and State elections.

This is a new type of political organization, unlike the old district clubs which are made up of individuals who are residents of a community. It is local organization on a group basis, with the decisions already made by these groups in their own National and State or-

ganizations.

For instance, in a community organization which is being thus organized in Elmhurst—I am using Elmhurst as a fictitious community—but in a community organization like Elmhurst, you would have a representative of the Parent-Teachers Association. Well, their decisions on where they stand on various questions have already been made through the National Congress of Parents and Teachers or the State Congress of Parents and Teachers.

The representatives of the teachers' union, well, their decisions have

already been made in their own organizations.

In other words, there was a meeting together of already organized groups which already had programs, already had made decisions, and it was not really representative, perhaps, of the feeling of the individual citizens in the community, but rather representative of the organized forces within the community.

Mr. Morris. Now, Mr. Conal's organization was called Community Inventory. Can you tell us anything about—I do not mean that particular organization—but can you tell us anything about how a research organization like that operates, drawing on your knowledge and

the experience you have had, Dr. Dodd?

Dr. Dodd. I don't know Mr. Conal's organization, but I know there are numerous political analyses organizations busy at this time, this presidential year. What they do, of course, is prepare questionnaires, have interviews with various people at home on the question of which candidates they would support, and by preparing a loaded questionnaire they very often fix, within the minds of the people whom they circularize, what they really want them to believe in.

It is part of a propaganda—there is a great deal of propaganda work done in these supposedly scientific analyses which are being

made.

I am not saving that this is true of Mr. Conal's organization, because I have no knowledge of it.

Mr. Morris. I see.

Now, associated with him was a man named Palmer Weber, who also worked as his assistant, and whom he testified he brought into his organization, and who also did research and also worked for many of the Senators and Congressmen here on Capitol Hill. Did you ever encounter Palmer Weber?

Dr. Dodd. Yes, I knew Mr. Weber.

Mr. Morris. Was Palmer Weber a Communist?

Dr. Dodd. Yes, he was.

Mr. Morris. Did you know anything about his work in these re-

search organizations that he did for the political parties?

Dr. Dodd. Well, I have known Mr. Weber for many years, and he was very active here on Capitol Hill, holding various positions in various Senators' offices, on questions relating to the work of the Senators.

Mr. Weber was particularly interested in the Southern Conference for Human Rights, and I did know, of course, that Mr. Weber held some very important posts with some Republican organizations in Connecticut, where they made an analysis of what the best political theme should be for a Republican campaign.

In other words, Mr. Weber was advising some important Republican

organization up in Connecticut in the period of 1948-49.

Mr. Morris. And at that time he was a member of the Communist Party?

Dr. Dodd. Well, I knew Mr. Weber was a member of the Communist

Party up through 1947. I can't say beyond that.

Mr. Morris. Now, Dr. Dodd, generally with respect to all these individuals that we have been talking about, and those that we have gone into only in executive session, do you find that the political strength of the Communist Party is abating or do you think it is in-

creasing, from your own observations?

Dr. Dodd. Well, I would say that because of the facile change in lines being presented by the Communist International, the life of the Communists in this country is becoming a lot easier, and I notice that there is a great deal more arrogance, a great deal more agressiveness, in coming forth and in accepting positions of importance with the assurance that they will not be challenged.

I would say, Mr. Chairman, that the danger in this country of a Communist penetration is much greater today when the line is being peddled which says communism is never a threat to the country.

Senator Jenner. Communism is what?

Dr. Dopp. Communism is never a threat to this country. line that is being peddled. It is an insignificant, unimportant thing. It would never threaten this country.

And that is a line which is being peddled all over the country, both

on the political front and on the academic front.

Mr. Morris. Now, Dr. Dodd, you experienced, did you not, the reorganization of the Communist Party-I notice you have mentioned it in your book—that took place in the late 1940's?

Dr. Dodd. Yes.

Mr. Morris. Would you tell us what you know about that reorgani-

Dr. Dodd. You mean, 1945, 1946, and 1947?

Mr. Morris. I believe that is when it was, Dr. Dodd.

Dr. Dopp. As you remember, in 1945, after the Yalta Conference, immediately, almost, shortly after the Yalta Conference—the Yalta Conference was in February, but by May of 1945 the Communist Party of America was thrown into a turmoil because of the publication of the so-called Jacques Duclos letter, and Jacques Duclos, as you know, was a member of the Third International and was a person who was giving directions to the American Communist Party. He was also, of course, the leader of the Communist Party in France.

Jacques Duclos wrote a letter which was published in a magazine called Cahiers du Communisme, and that letter criticized the American Communist Party for being too soft, too democratic, for believing in cooperation with other democratic forces. And the Communist Party had, during the period of 10 years previous to that, cooperated with practically every force that was willing to work with it in

America.

Now suddenly the line was that the party should get back to its revolutionary tenet, and that we ought to reestablish the classic as a method of teaching our Communist Party members, that we ought to begin to define the hard core of the Communists, and the direction was given that, after all, the time had come when we Communists, we who were members of the Communist Party in America, must get ready for the final takeover, and that in the final takeover, you must establish a degree of sturdiness and firmness on the part of the membership of the party so that they would be firm in doing two things:

One, if the time came when we had to betray the United States, we would be ready to do so without any question; then the question was also raised during that purge period that if the labor movement in America attempted to come to the defense of this country, the American Communist must be ready to defeat and to betray the American

labor movement, also.

That was one of the great features of the 1945 Duclos letter which has been muted in all of our reports, and very little has been done

with it.

The Communist was sworn and was pledged and was instructed that he not only must be ready to betray his country, his nationalism, but he must also, even if he were a class-conscious person, he must be ready to betray his own labor movement, his own labor class in this

country for the purpose of taking over power.

Of course, as you know, after the 1945 purge, the party did get frightened by the attacks which were made upon it and an attempt was made by the party to go underground. It did go underground in 1947. I was present at the national committee meeting in June of 1947 at which Bill Foster, who had been in Europe and come back, after seeing Dmitrov and the various other leaders of the Communist Party movement in Europe—Bill Foster made an analysis of how the party should go underground. He actually drew the pictures on the blackboard, and the techniques.

Just how it was done, I do not know, because I myself stopped going to meetings at this period and made the break at this time, so that I don't know just what happened or how it was done except by reading

your own reports.

Mr. Morris. Now, Dr. Dodd, I think you mention in your book Congressman Hugh De Lacy. I think he was a Democratic Congressman from the west coast.

Dr. Dodd. Yes.

Mr. Morris. Did you ever encounter Hugh De Lacy at all?

Dr. Dodd. Yes, I knew Hugh De Lacy. I knew Hugh De Lacy as a member of the Teachers' Union, as a member of the National Executive Committee of the Federation of Teachers, and as a member of the Communist fraction within the Federation of Teachers.

Mr. Morris. Now, this was a Congressman, a man who was a Con-

gressman from Washington?

Dr. Dopp. Hugh De Lacy had also been a member of the State

legislature out there.

Mr. Morris. Now, Dr. Dodd, we have asked you about how you worked within the Republican Party. I wonder if you would tell us about some of your activities with the Democratic Party.

Dr. Dod. Of course, the Communist Party was obviously in industrial and in large city areas working with the Democratic Party, to a much larger degree than it would in the Republican Party.

The work within the Democratic Party proceeded largely—the unity was established largely on an opportunistic basis. The Communists knew what they wanted. They wanted to get men who would support them. And very often they would support a man who was a weak person, for election to office, because they could get him to do what they wanted him to do.

For instance, I have seen them support a candidate, a man who had been in Congress as a Democrat, who had been absent from Congress a good deal, who had not attended to his business very often, but because they felt they could control him, they would proceed to do

that.

Now, in addition to that, once they had pushed a man, then there was a question—in a district which was largely becoming radicalized, what they would do was to push the man who was in office by getting more and more concessions from him until they had practically pushed him to the point where he could make no more concessions and then they would drop him overboard and stop supporting him, in other words, a process of eliminating certain people from public office-

Then there were certain districts, for instance, in the rural areas and in States other than New York, where they decided they would like to take a particular district, since very little money would have to be spent to take a district, and they would send the money into

that particular area to defeat that particular candidate.

As far as the Democratic Party is concerned, in a city like New York, those who operated within the Labor Party and those who operated within the Communist Party, of course, were neighbors and friends and relatives of those who were in the Democratic Party, and

the contacts were continuous.

I would say that during the LaGuardia campaign, LaGuardia knew how to utilize the Communists, and he did utilize them. I have seen the day when Mr. LaGuardia would meet with representatives of the Communist Party and get their promise to withdraw their candidate for the office he was running for, and then he would go to the Liberal Party or to the people uptown who represented the Social Democrats, and he would fulminate against the Communists, even though he had already accepted support from them. But he was a master strategist in his own right.

But with successive mayors, there has been, of course, some dealing

on the part of the Communists with the Democratic Party.

Mr. Morris. Now, do you know of any instance you could tell us—I know this is in the area of the executive session, Dr. Dodd—with respect to Paul Ross, who was confidential assistant, or I think you described him as an executive assistant, to Mayor O'Dwyer, with Communists working with you. I wonder if you would tell us in open session, where we have not barred it from the areas staked out in executive session.

Dr. Dodd. I will tell you, Mr. Morris, I am very reluctant to go into much of this thing, not because I want to cover up anyone, but because this whole question of practical politics is such an avenue where, let us say, the people operated on an opportunistic basis. Men wanted to get into office. If the Communists controlled a certain number of votes, they were willing to make deals with the Communists, and because the word "Communist" had such connotations, I am very reluctant to extend that kind of malice.

Mr. Morris. Dr. Dodd, you mention in your book individuals, and you even name them, who worked with the Communist Party, even though to your knowledge they were not necessarily Communist Party members. Have you been following the activities of these people of late, Dr. Dodd? Do you observe their activities on the political scene

 $\operatorname{now} ?$

Dr. Dodd. Well, I see them—

Mr. Morris. Without going into their names? Dr. Dopp. I have been interested in them, in part.

Mr. Morris. Do you find that these people are on the ascendancy

generally?

Dr. Dopp. I would say that by and large those who were being supported and assisted during the period of the thirties, the early forties, and the middle forties are going ahead at great speed and are achieving positions of great importance in policymaking divisions of our Government.

Mr. Morris. Dr. Dodd, I wonder if you would tell us about the Communist penetration of the industrial levels. What can you tell

us about that, Dr. Dodd?

Dr. Dodd. Since this was not my specialty in the party, I can only

give you very tangential material.

I became aware of the fact, during the war, that the party had certain business ventures from which it derived profit, that it had, for instance, associated with its New York County Committee and with its New York Waterfront Committee, certain fund-raising groups whose total activity was given to raising funds.

Now, they were raising funds not only for the actual work of the party, because the work of the party was financed largely by dues and by contributions from its membership, but I discovered that these funds were then used for the purpose of going into business and maintaining businesses from which other profits were derived.

There is no question in my mind that the nightclubs which are run by the party, which were run by corporations who were financed by the party—I refer to the Cafe Society, both uptown and downtown, and to a number of other nightclubs which the party had an interest in.

In addition to that, because the party, during the war, did maintain, through some of its operators, certain machine shops—as I understood, they had contracts even with the Government making parts for the Government war apparatus. I remember one particular incident. The plants were located in various sections of New York, and how the profits were distributed I do not know, but the fact that the party put confidential and long-trusted Communists in charge of them makes me believe that the funds were given to the party.

Now, I do know that, in the New York County apparatus, which Bill Laurence was in charge of for a while, and people like Sam Brown and others of this group, that the New York County [apparatus] had a particular group of associated businessmen for the purpose of helping to extend finance to various types of business and that the

party got a cut in the business that was so established.

Included in that group, to my knowledge, were certain manufacturers of paints and varnishes and things of that kind. There were certain real-estate operators who were in that group. There were several manufacturers of different items as varied as manufacture of dolls, the manufacture of shoulder pads.

Later on, when the Young People's Records were established, the party was interested in helping to finance that particular group.

Now, I cannot name you chapter and verse. All of these organizations were organized under corporate charters, and therefore it would

be very difficult to put your finger on them.

Now, I did know, for instance, that there were a number of pools established, through which finances—through which the personal fortunes of wealthier members of the party were pooled for investment purposes. That came to my knowledge because I was involved in a business transaction. What happened was, we took the wealthy people like Louise Bransten and a couple of other people, and then you had a group of accountants who handled their investments, and the party got its funds from that particular type of group, that they invested in things such as building machines and building apparatuses and a variety of things. It became apparent to me.

But as I say, since I was not actually involved in supervising anything of that kind, I can't pin it down for you. But I did become aware of the fact that in 1946-47, the party's operation on the business

front was a tremendous one.

There is one other thing which I think I ought to put in the record and that was that during the period in the early forties there was on the Hill, in the Senate, a committee investigating the small-business men, or trying to develop a legislative program for small-business men. I was told that there were a number of party people who were active in that senatorial committee, and that much of the material which was developed was made available to the party people, particularly in their analysis of the business structure, and that it was used by the party people both to go into businesses and to penetrate those businesses that were having difficulties.

You will remember that the National Association of Small-Business Men—I have forgotten what the exact title was—but it was established and played a great part in the election campaigns in both 1944 and

and the second of the second of the second

then later in 1948.

Mr. Morris. Dr. Dodd, I wonder if you will notice that Henry Collins, who was one of the witnesses before this committee who has been identified as a Communist and was not able to deny it, but instead invoked his privilege under the fifth amendment, that he had an important position on the staff of that particular Small Business Committee.

Dr. Dodd. I don't know him.

Mr. Morris. Dr. Dodd, you mentioned——

Senator Jenner. She was in the middle of an answer.

Mr. Morris. I am sorry. Continue, please.

Dr. Dod. This association of small-business men was an extremely important tool in the election campaigns of 1944 and 1948. It was used as a method of organizing and penetrating the middle class, both from the point of view of getting money and also penetrating it from the point of view of political organization.

Some very important businesses, including the linen business, and, as I said, the paint and varnish business, the garage business, perfume

manufacturing—the variety is infinite.

Mr. Morris. Dr. Dodd, there is a special subcommittee of the Internal Security Subcommittee of which Senator Olin Johnston is the chairman and Senator Jenner at present is a member, and it is generally looking into the general area of moneys coming into the United States and to what extent it is Communist moneys.

Now, can you relate any of this testimony that you are giving now

to that general procedure?

Dr. Dodd. I think this is probably one of the most important, serious investigations the Senate could do, because the whole question of who controls the finances for investment purposes in this country is something we should be aware of as we look toward an answer to, [the question of] will there be another depression, because the people who control the finances that are being thrown into the market and withdrawn from the market will be able to have a very important influence upon either a continued equilibrium in business or a possible fall in business.

I do believe that that investigation will develop material which the American people will stress soberly, and it is extremely important

for their very survival.

Mr. Morris. And, Dr. Dodd, you did notice in the closing days of your Communist Party activity that here was a great emphasis on the part of the party to enter into financial and fiscal arrangements?

Dr. Dodd. As a matter of fact, the party seems to be going that way much more than it was in any other line. That was the thing which they were most interested in, to explore new avenues for investment purposes and for moneymaking purposes.

It was one of the things that finally made me realize that this party,

It was one of the things that finally made me realize that this party, which I had thought was an idealistic party, for the interest of the workers, was really interested in other things besides the workers, and

they were just using the workers for their own end.

Mr. Morris. Dr. Dodd, you mentioned the name of Louise Bransten in connection with your testimony. Did you know that Louise Bransten

sten was a Communist?

Dr. Dodd. I never saw her party card. All I can say is that it was reported to me by those who knew her and those who used her money for some of these ventures, that she was a party member.

Mr. Morris. And she is a woman of some means?

Dr. Dodd. A woman of considerable means.

Mr. Morris. Now, you mentioned a person named Bill Laurence,

Dr. Dodd. Who was Bill Laurence?

Dr. Dono. Bill Laurence was secretary of the Communist Party of New York State before 1945. He was one of the Lincoln Brigade leaders, and he was also in charge of this New York County businessmens' apparatus for the purpose of analyzing which businesses to go into, which ones to finance, which ones to lend money to, and which ones to take a cut from.

Mr. Morris. He is a well-known Communist Party functionary? Dr. Dopp. He is a well-known Communist Party functionary.

Senator Jenner. Dr. Dodd, in view of the Supreme Court's decision against the State sedition laws, would you say that the Communist Party activities are directed against the State governments from time

to time?

Dr. Dodd. The Communist Party has no interest in maintaining the sovereignty of the States of the United States. The Communist Party is interested in breaking down as much as possible of the established legal apparatus which might maintain sovereignty. However, the Communist Party will use every legality either for or against its propositions, depending upon how they can promote them. If it served their convenience, they would rely upon States' rights, but, in general, their whole attitude is to break down the sovereignty of the States and, of course, the sovereignty of the United States.

Senator Jenner. All right.

Mr. Morris. Dr. Dodd, did you ever in your experience in the Communist Party encounter Harry Bridges?

Dr. Dodd. Yes; on two occasions.

Mr. Morris. Was Harry Bridges known to you to be a Communist? Dr. Dodd. That is a question which I had not expected, and it is a question which I certainly have no knowledge of. I have never seen his card. I have never seen that he is a party member. I have never attended a Communist Party meeting at which he was a member.

But I can only tell you this, that in 1945, when there was a longshore strike in New York City, and the party had assigned a number of people, including people like Bob Thompson and the then secretary of the Communist Party—I have forgotten his name—to work on the waterfront, to control, to get control over the longshore people, they were holding a great many nightly meetings for the purpose of making strategy decisions and meeting with some of the waterfront characters and, on one occasion, the party asked whether they could not use my office for the purpose of holding a night meeting.

And to that night meeting, people like Robert Thompson, Hal Simon, who was then the labor secretary for the party on a statewide basis, and Harry Bridges came. But that is all I can say to you about

that.

Mr. Morris. Now, we had a witness here recently named Saul Mills. Did you ever encounter Saul Mills?

Dr. Dodd. Yes; I did.

Mr. Morris. Was Saul Mills a Communist?

Dr. Dodd. As far as I know, he was a member of the Communist Party, because he sat in the meetings. He sat in meetings which were for the purpose of discussing Communist Party strategy on the political front. Mr. Morris. Now, he was the head of the Greater New York Industrial Union Council, was he not?

Dr. Dodd. He was.

Mr. Morris. That is the CIO?

Dr. Dodd. Yes.

Mr. Morris. And that organization roughly controlled membership of approximately 500,000 organized CIO workers at the time, did they not, Dr. Dodd?

Dr. Dodo. Yes, they did.

Mr. Morris. And as such, he was a powerful personality on the

political scene in New York?

Dr. Dodd. He was a key person. Whenever the party wanted to do anything through the CIO—you see, the party operated through these mass organizations, the CIO, one or two of the A. F. of L. people whom he had in various unions, and through a number of organizations. Whenever the people of the center decided they were going to accomplish something, they made 5 telephone calls, and they called the CIO, their contact on the Greater New York Council; they would call their contact at the State labor party headquarters; they would call their contact with the teachers' union; they would call their contact with some of the foreign-born organizations, and after they made 4 or 5 or 6 telephone calls, they had mobilized support on a citywide or a statewide level for the things they wanted to do.

Mr. Morris. By making 4 or 5 telephone calls?

Dr. Dopp. That is right.

Mr. Morris. They could draw into play a whole powerful organization?

Dr. Dopp. That is right.

Mr. Morris. And in the Saul Mills case, it was a labor organization made up of 500,000 union members who would, at least in their political activity, be supporting the Communist Party?

Dr. Dod. That is right.

The person who was at the receiving end of those telephone calls sometimes could not deliver everything the party wanted them to deliver, because he had his own organization to worry about, as to how far he could go with his own organization, but he was under the obligation to deliver as much as he possibly could.

Mr. Morris. Now, Dr. Dodd, is there anything more about the penetration of American industry that you can tell the committee about at this time! Again, Dr. Dodd, since we have explored this particular aspect of it in executive session, without mentioning the

names of the individuals involved.

Dr. Dodd. I do not think I would like to extend it. I wasn't too prepared when you asked me that question. I am just giving it to you as I remember, and I don't think I had better extend it any further.

Mr. Morris. And there is just one other person I would like to ask you about. Si Gerson was an important person for the penetration

of political parties, was he not, in the Communist Party?

Dr. Dodd. Si Gerson was a legislative representative of the Communist Party before he went into the Army. I took his position when he went into the Army. After he came out of the Army, he was sent to the Daily Worker as a reporter, and since he was not very happy there, and I was not very happy in staying in the Com-

munist Party, he took my position when I vacated the position of legislative representative. So he would be doing the same thing which I had been doing in the period of 1943, 1944, 1945, and 1946. He was doing the work of making the analyses on the strength that the party would like to have in an election campaign, which candidates to support in the Labor Party and the Democratic Party and the Republican Party, what deals to make, what associations to make.

Of course, Si Gerson's most obvious association was with a member of the Republican Party of the city of New York as confidential clerk or confidential secretary to Stanley Isaacs of the city of New York. Si Gerson gained a great deal of prestige and a great deal of importance because as confidential clerk to a borough president you have your fingers on a great many organizations and a good deal of the life of the city itself.

Senator Jenner. Dr. Dodd, in view of your intimate knowledge of the workings of the Communist apparatus in this country, their objectives and their aims, I would like to bring this testimony down

to date.

What is your honest opinion as to whether or not the Communist Party is gaining, standing still, or losing ground in America? We

know where it is in the world. But in America.

Dr. Dodd. I think the Communist Party is gaining at an alarming rate. I think the Communist Party is not gaining that under the label of Communist, but by having its operators operate under many different labels, under many different titles. But the people who were known to me as either party members or associates of the party are mounting to important positions in policymaking, both on the industrial level, on the communications level, and on the governmental level.

It is the most terrifying thing to watch, and perhaps if I have never suffered anything else, just watching this thing growing and knowing the significance is something by which perhaps I am being castigated

for the evil that I have done myself.

I think that every American needs to understand this thing, needs to understand that it is not just communism, it is not just the word "communism," because that has become very obnoxious. We have made it unpopular. But they are selling us the whole program in little bits. Someone has very well said:

"If I send you a machinegun and tell you it is a baby carriage, and I send it to you wheel by wheel and nut by nut and you do not know until you have assembled the thing that it is a machinegun and not a baby carriage," that is exactly what has happened to this country. We are being sold machineguns without knowing it is machineguns.

Mr. Morris. Senator, in connection with the testimony of Dr. Dodd which we have taken in executive session, and in a limited way because Dr. Dodd's plane came in late this morning, Senator, I find it at the staff level very difficult to deal with many of the personalities that she knows about.

Her testimony concerns itself with people who work closely with and who seem to her to be closely associated with the Communists.

Now, she could not say authoritatively that they actually were members of the Communist Party, but she did know they worked wholeheartedly with the Communist Party. So our difficulty is that if we deal with these personalities, we are at a great disadvantage. For that reason, Senator, much of this testimony that she can give, much of the important information she can give us, has to be in executive session, because the line of demarcation is not very clear.

Senator Jenner. We understand that situation, and we, too, as a

committee, are in a precarious position.

However, Dr. Dodd, again I want to thank you publicly on behalf of this committee for your forthrightness in coming forth and alerting this committee and the people of this Nation to the precarious position that we are placed in at this juncture of our history. We know what a tremendous price you have paid for this kind of testimony, but we thank God that you are willing to pay that price.

If there is nothing more, the committee will stand adjourned. Senator McCarthy. Mr. Chairman, could I impose on the hospitality of the chairman? I want to say that I very greatly appreciate the opportunity of sitting in on this hearing, and I would like to make the comment that this committee is doing, I think, a greater service to American than any other committee on the Hill, either House or Senate, and I think the chief counsel, Judge Morris, should be complimented for the painstaking work he has done, and then if I may impose on you further, I would like to say that I would like to compliment Dr. Dodd for the courage which she has in coming forward. She would not have to do that. She is going to subject herself to a great deal of abuse, and I think it is a wonderful thing that this committee can get witnesses who will subject themselves to the type of abuse they are subjected to when they come forward and testify.

Senator Jenner. We certainly thank you, Senator McCarthy.

Mr. Morris. Thank you.

Senator Jenner. I have only one regret about it. I am only sorry that it is impossible for every Member of the United States Senate to have been here and to have heard the testimony of Dr. Dodd.

(Whereupon, at 11:35 a.m., the subcommittee adjourned.)

APPENDIX I

(The following material was compiled by the research staff of the Senate Internal Security subcommittee on the basis of sworn testimony and other records in the subcommittee files:)

The Career of J. Peters

(Also known as Shandor Goldberger, Alexander Goldberger, J. Peter, J. V. Peters, Roberts, Steve Lapin, Pete Stevens, Steve Miller, Isador Boorstein, Blake, Steve Lapur, Alexander Stevens)

BOSS OF THE COMMUNIST UNDERGROUND IN THE UNITED STATES

Recalling a conversation with a man he knew in the Communist Party, U. S. A., as J. V. Peters, Roberts, Steve and other aliases, Mr. Louis Francis Budenz, former managing editor of the (Communist) Daily Worker, gave the latter's description of the Communist underground apparatus of which Peters was the head, as follows: "He told me that the Communist Party is like a submerged submarine; the part that you see above water is the periscope, but the part underneath is the real Communist organization; that is, the conspiratorial apparatus."

The career of this influential individual is as mysterious as the apparatus of which he was a potent part. His name and exploits were not publicized in the Communist press. The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee has pieced together from varied sources and testimony biographical details which will give an informative picture of the background of this individual who undoubtedly played an important but little known part in shaping American history. At the same time the life story of J. Peters will give an illuminating outline of the

operations of the Communist conspiratorial apparatus.

According to Witness, the autobiographical work of Whittaker Chambers, confessedly the "secret contact man between a succession of Soviet apparatuses and the Communist Party," those included in the net under the supervision of J. Peters included individuals in various departments of the Government, some of them in policymaking positions. The list of individuals with the positions they have held, follows:

John Abt, attorney in the Department of Agriculture, Works Progress Administration, Justice Department and chief counsel of the Senate Committee on Labor

and Education (LaFollette committee).

Solomon Adler, Treasury Department representative in China; American repre-

sentative on the American-British-Chinese Stabilization Fund.

Virginius Frank Coe, Assistant Director, and later Director, Division of Mone-Viginitis Frank Coe, Assistant Director, and later Director, Division of Monetary Research, Treasury Department; financial adviser or consultant to the Federal Security Administrator; Executive Secretary of the Joint War Production Committee of the United States and Canada and assistant to the Executive Director of the Board of Economic Warfare; Assistant Administrator, Foreign Economic Administration; Secretary, National Advisory Council on International and Monetary Problems; Technical Secretary-General, Bretton Woods Monetary Conference; special assistant to United States Ambassador in London.

Henry H. Collins, Jr., National Recovery Administration; Department of Agriculture; executive secretary, Senate Subcommittee of the Military Affairs Committee on Technological Mobilization.

Lauchlin Currie, Administrative Assistant to the President; Deputy Administrator, Foreign Economics Administration.

Laurence Duggan, chief, Latin American Division, State Department.

Harold Glasser, Treasury Department; adviser, loaned to Government of Ecuador; adviser, loaned to War Production Board; adviser on North African Affairs in Algiers, North Africa; adviser to Secretary of State at Moscow Conference in March 1946; member of the United States delegation to the first and second UNRRA council meetings.

Alger Hiss, attorney, Department of Agriculture; Senate Special Committee Investigating the Munitions Industry; Justice Department; State Department, Director, Office of Special Political Affairs; Secretary General, United Nations.

Donald Hiss, attorney, Labor Department; State Department.

Irving Kaplan, Associate Director, National Research Project, Works Progress Administration: Special Assistant to the Attorney General, Department of Justice; principal research economist, Office of the Administrator, Federal Works Agency; head economic analyst, Statistics Division, Industrial and Commodity Research Branch, War Production Board; head program progress analyst, Executive Office of the Chairman, Office of Progress Reports, War Production Board; Director, Programs and Reports Staff, Office of the Administrator, Foreign Economic Administration; economic adviser, Foreign Funds Control Section, United States Control Council, American Military Government in Germany.

Charles Kramer, National Labor Relations Board; Office of Price Administration; Senate Committee on War Mobilization; Senate Committee on Wartime

Health and Education; Senate Committee on Education and Labor.

Eleanor Nelson, Labor Department; treasurer, United Federal Workers, a

union of Government employees.

Victor Perlo, head of branch in Research Section, Office of Price Administration; War Production Board; Monetary Research, Treasury Department.

Lee Pressman, attorney, Department of Agriculture; Works Progress Admin-

istration.

Philip Reno, analyst, economist, Social Security Board; Farm Credit Administration; Office of Emergency Management.

Vincent Reno, Aberdeen Proving Grounds; mathematical assistant to Colonel

Zornig.

Abraham George Silverman, Director, Bureau of Research and Information Services, Railroad Retirement Board; Economic Adviser and Chief of Analysis and Plans, Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Materiel and Services, Air Force,

Julian Wadleigh, Economist, State Department.

Harry Dexter White, Assistant Secretary, Treasury Department; Executive Director, International Monetary Fund; Treasury representative with the Interdepartmental Lend-Lease Committee, Canadian-American Joint Economic Committee, Executive Committee on Commercial Policy, Executive Committee and Board of Trustees of the Export-Import Bank, Interdepartmental Committee on Inter-American Affairs, National Resources Committee, Price Administration Committee, Committee on Foreign Commerce Regulations, Interdepartmental Committee on Postwar Economic Problems, Committee on Trade Agreements, National Munitions Control Board, Committee on International Relief, Board of Economic Warfare, Executive Committee on Economic Foreign Policy, Liberated Areas Committee, Office of Strategic Services Advisory Committee, United States Commercial Corporation, Interdepartmental Committee on Planning for Coordinating the Economic Activities of United States Civilian Agencies in Liberated Areas.

Nathan Witt, attorney, Department of Agriculture; secretary, National Labor

Relations Board.

In his comment on the operation of this group in the 1930's Mr. Chambers

declares in Witness:

"* * the Ware Group had developed into a tightly organized underground, managed by a directorate of seven men. In time it included a number of secret subcells whose total membership I can only estimate—probably about 75 Communists. Sometimes they were visited officially by J. Peters who lectured to them on Communist organization and Leninist theory and advised them on general policy and specific problems. For several of them were so placed in the New Deal agencies (notably Alger Hiss, Nathan Witt, John Abt and Lee Pressman) that they were in a position to influence policy at several levels." (p. 335).

We will begin with the testimony of John Lautner before the Senate Internal

Security Subcommittee on June 21, 1956:

TESTIMONY OF JOHN LAUTNER

Mr. Mandel, Have you ever been a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. Lautner. Yes.

Mr. Mandel. What important positions have you held in the party?

Mr. Lautner. Well, in 1930, I was sent to a National Training School of the Communist Party organized by the Hungarian National Bureau of the Communist Party. After graduation, I was sent to Detroit, Mich., where I was district secretary of the Hungarian bureau in addition to being the secretary-treasurer of the control commission of the Communist Party, district 7.

In 1931, I was sent to Canada. I was the national secretary of the Hungarian National Bureau in Canada, editor of a weekly Communist paper. In 1932 I was district secretary of the Hungarian National Bureau in Cleveland, Ohio, In 1933, for a while I was on the district language department of the Communist Party, district 2, New York. In the fall of 1933, I became a section organizer of the Communist Party, New York City. I functioned in that capacity up to April of 1936.

In 1936, April, I was reassigned as district organizer of the Communist Party in the State of West Virginia. I functioned in that capacity from 1936, April, to the end of 1940. At the beginning of 1941, I was sent to the national training school. After graduation, I was assigned to the nationality groups com-

mission of the Communist Party.

In addition to that, I became secretary of the Hungarian National Bureau of the Communist Party, USA. I functioned in those two capacities up until November 1942. In addition to these functions, for about 6 months, I was also national secretary of the Hungarian section of the international workers order.

In 1942, November, I was inducted into the Army. I served 31 months in the United States Army, 25 months overseas. I am a graduate of the War Department Military Intelligence Training School, Cambridge, Md., and overseas I was assigned to Psychological Warfare Branch of the Allied Force Headquarters.

Upon returning from the Army, I was again assigned in 1945, June, to the nationality groups commission of the Communist Party, national secretary of the Hungarian National Bureau and one of the editors of the Hungarian Communist Party in New York. I functioned in those capacities until the end of 1945. I was sick for awhile in the beginning of 1946. Later on, I was called into the party headquarters and was assigned to organize the Communist Party members in the New York Metropolitan area for the building trades into an industrial organization.

I functioned in that capacity until about February of 1947, and then I was assigned to the New York waterfront as section organizer of the Chelsea organization of the Communist Party to develop a regional organization, concentrating

on transport.

I functioned in the preliminary work of this organization up to May of 1947. At that time, I was appointed head of the New York State Review Commission of the Communist Party. I functioned in that capacity up until the time I left the Communist Party on the 17th of January 1950. In addition to that, in 1948, September, I was also appointed to the national review commission as one of its members and functioned also in that capacity until the time I left the Communist Party.

In addition to these functions, I attended national committee meetings or central committee plenums of the Communist Party in the years of 1936, 1937, 1938, 1939, 1940, and 1941. I attended the following conventions as delegate or head of a delegation or member of the presiding committee of the convention: the 1936 convention, 1938, two conventions in 1940, the 1942 convention, the 1945,

and the 1948 convention.

ALIASES

Mr. Mandel. In the course of our investigations, we have run across the activities of an individual who has been variously known as J. Peters, J. Peter, J. V. Peters, Alexander Goldberger, Roberts, Steve Lapin, Pete Stevens, Steve Miller, Isidor Boorstein, Steven Lapur, Alexander Stevens, and I would like to ask you if you know an individual with one or more of these names?

Mr. Lautner. Yes.

Mr. Mandel. Tell what names you knew him under and how you came to first

Mr. Lautner. Well, I knew J. Peters since 1929 and from time to time I was associated with his work or associated in the Communist Party work under him up until about 1949. I knew him under the name of Joe Peter, and I knew him under the name of J. Peters. I knew his real name, which was Sandor Goldberger. Also, as Alex Goldberger. I knew him as Steve Miller; I knew him as Steve. I knew at least three persons under the name of Blake.

Mr. Mandel. Well, was Blake the same person?

Mr. LAUTNER. The name Blake was used at least by three persons, one was J. Peters, and the other was Max Kitzes, and the third person was William Weiner, but all three of them used the name of Blake.

I know at least two persons who used the name of Lapin. Steve Miller, or

J. Peters, and Charlie Dirba.

Mr. MANDEL. Why did Peters, we will call him Peters, why did Peters use so

many different names?

Mr. LAUTNER. Well, I have no answer to that, but being in a sense that he worked in the party, a lot of party leaders used other names besides their right names in order to cover up their activities.

(Mr. Louis Budenz, former managing editor of the Daily Worker, testified before a congressional committee on August 24, 1948, with reference to the

activities of J. Peters, as follows:)

"Mr. Stripling. Now, early in your testimony you mentioned that you knew J. Peters as the head of the underground movement. Could you elaborate for the committee your knowledge of that activity of J. Peters as a Communist Party functionary?

"Mr. Budenz. Yes, sir. You will note in my book, 'This is My Story' that Mr. Peters appears there, and that I refer to him as the man of many names.

"In fact, I also speak, I think, about his reminding me of the Cheshire cat, or something, because he always had an artificial smile. But what I particularly noted there was his many other names, Steve Miller, Jack Roberts, and many other names within a short period of time.

"Mr. Nixon. Will you name as many of those names as you can remember. "Mr. Budenz. Yes, sir. The thing is, of course, I learned some later, but the names that I recall immediately there in 1936 and 1937 were brought to my attention by the fact that Mr. Peters himself very bureaucratically told me about them; that is, I had to see him frequently on the ninth floor. He was then, I think, supposedly the organization secretary of the party, although nobody knew him to any great degree. When I say 'nobody' most of the rank and file members did not know him.

"I would have to go up there on business, and I would say, 'Comrade Peter'—and he said, 'Now, my name is Steve,' and he would be very abrupt about it, 'Steve Miller.' Then, later on, he told me his name was Jack Roberts. I came home and told my wife, 'I am getting dizzy trying to keep Peters' names before me.' But either then or on other occasions, I learned his name to be Alexander

Stevens, I think Alexander Goldberg, and-

"Mr. Stripling. Did you know him under the name Isidore Boorstein?

"Mr. Budenz. I knew that was his organization name. I learned that from some source in the party, or other. Those are all of the names I can think of for the moment. But there were a number of names during the course of time.

(Manning Johnson, a former official of the Communist Party, U. S. A., in New York City, testified before a congressional committee on July 8, 1953, with regard

to the activities of J. Peters:)

"Mr. Kunzig. Did you know J. Peters under any other name?

"Mr. Johnson. Yes; I knew him under the name of Blake and also under the name of Stevens, Alexander Stevens" (p. 2176, Communist Activities in the New York City area, pt. 7, HUAC).

(Continuing with the testimony of Mr. Lautner:)

Mr. Mannel. Will you describe the appearance of J. Peters?

Mr. LAUTNER. J. Peters was a short man, about 5 feet, 4 inches tall. He had dark bushy hair. A round fat face, and for his height a fat little body. He also had a pair of nice little fat hands. He loved good food. Did take a drink occasionally and did not smoke. He also loved mystery and detective stories. He said it was a relaxing habit.

EARLY LIFE IN HUNGARY

Mr. Mandel. Did you know anything about the early life of Peters?

Mr. Lautner. He comes from Hungary. His father was a railway official, and they lived in Czop in the northern part of Hungary, and later on in Debrencen. And he took some law courses in Budapest and during the war he was a lieutenant in the Austro-Hungarian Army. And prior to his coming to the United States, for a number of years he was the regional secretary of the Communist Party in Czechoslovakia. The region under his jurisdiction was what is known as Pod Karpatska Russ, which was at one time part of Hungary, and later on became part of Czechoslovakia.

Mr. MANDEL. At this point I wish to place in the record the testimony of David Whittaker Chambers, on August 3, 1948, before a congressional committee:

"Peters told me at one time that he had been a petty officer in the Austrian Army during World War I. After the Belakun revolution in Hungary he was a member of the Soviet Government of Hungary, I think, in the Agricultural Commissariat."

Mr. Chambers testified again on August 30, 1948, before a congressional committee as follows:

"Mr. Nixon. Did Mr. Peters ever tell you of any of his experiences-I am attempting to establish by this question-

"Mr. Chambers. Yes; occasionally he reminisced and I remember he told me of his experiences in the First World War when he was probably a noncommissioned officer on the Serbian front and later on the Russian front and then on the Italian front.

"I remember one incident especially of the Italian campaign. At zero hour they were supposed to advance against very strong Italian lines in the mountains, and the lines were considered so strong that it was feared that the soldiers, the Austrian soldiers, wouldn't advance.

"However, they did, and as they came into the Italian line they found line after line of men dead, the reason being that the Germans who had come up in support of the Austrians had shelled the Italians from beyond the hills, and due to some structure of the terrain the Austrians had not heard the barrage.

"He also told me that he was believed by the soldiers to bear a charmed life, so that during a heavy fire they would cluster around him, endangering themselves

and him.

"I remember him telling me that toward the end of the war, when the Austrian armies were crumbling, the first soldiers of the Soviets were appearing, he was called up for some kind of insubordination, I believe, and took his medals and either handed them or tossed them at his superior officer."

AFFIDAVIT CONCERNING ASSOCIATION WITH ALEXANDER GOLDBERGER, ALIAS JOSEPH PETERS

"I, Louis Rethy Reed, being duly sworn, depose and say the following facts submitted to the Internal Security Subcommittee are true and correct:

"Alexander Goldberger was born at Munkacs in north Hungary in the year of 1897. He attended grammar school there. He finished high school at the Calvinist high school in the town of Sarospatak and entered the Calvinist College in the city of Debrecen, where he studied law. After less than a year of college he was drafted to the army, but by the time he came out of officers school with the rank of ensign, the war was over.

"He had no part whatsoever in the 1919 Communist uprising. He only began to give vague hints about his activities in Hungary after the actual participants like myself were gone. In fact Szanto and Lustig related to me some very tall stories he told to the gullible American Communists and wanted me to call his bluff, but by then even such bait was not sweet enough for me to have any more

contact with Earl Browder and his central committee.

"Peters arrived in the United States in 1925 and almost at once appeared at the meeting of the Yorkville branch of the Hungarian Workers Federation, where he was admitted to membership. He claimed membership in the Czech-slovak Communist Party. This was never checked, but most likely it was true. He learned fast. And since there was a shortage of intellectuals, he rose fast. It was on my own recommendation that he was employed as a journalist at the Uj Elore Hungarian Communist daily. Nevertheless he never made any mark as a writer.

"Scheming was his specialty even in those early days. It was he and James Lustig who convinced me that I have to accept the general secretaryship of the Hungarian Federation in 1926. He knew quite well that with my affliction (TB) I would not last very long. And when in 1927 I broke down and was advised to take a rest in Arizona, he was elected to be my deputy and act with full powers of my office in my absence.

"And act he did. The general secretary was also in charge of a dummy corporation which controlled the assets of the Uj Elore. With his signature and the signature of a dummy president (who was always controlled by the secre-

tary) all the assets of the paper could be sold.

"Early in 1928 I had a long-distance conversation with Peters. He told me that the Daily Worker went bankrupt in Chicago and unless we take them in

and print them for cost they will be unable to publish. I protested, knowing well that we were unable to pay our own printers for weeks at a time and owed them large sums of money. My suggestion was that the Jewish Freiheit take them in, they were on a more solvent basis than we were. True, the Jewish paper had no English type, but I also suggested that we lend the two

linotypes for the purpose.

"Peters twisted my suggestion around and reported to the Hungarian Bureau that I favor the merger of the Freiheit and the Elore printing shops. Since it was supposed to be my suggestion it was adopted and before I got wind of the scheme, the Elore building was sold at a loss and the building on Union Square was purchased with a fantastic mortgage the weak Hungarian paper could never pay off. All the assets of the Hungarian paper were signed over in my absence by my worthy deputy to a new dummy corporation controlled by the central committee of the Communist Party. Lovestone, who was secretary of the central Committee, washed his hands and told me it was a voluntary action by the "generous" Hungarian comrades. And he also reminded me that Peters had full authority to act in my absence. And Lovestone, the innocent, began to pay off. When in the fall of 1928 I returned to New York—hopping mad—there was little I could do to undo the damage. I resigned the secretaryship and at the suggestion of Lovestone, Peters was elected in my place. Soon Peters also managed the merged printshop and even with his very poor English began to get important American assignments.

"Then came the open letter of Stalin early in 1929. With the rest of the Lovestonites I also left the party and went west to nurse my TB. Peters, the opportunist, doublecrossed his mentor Lovestone and stayed on with the Foster

group. And Earl Browder was also grateful and began to pay off.

"In 1932 I took my last look at Moscow. The idea came from Browder, who thought that with a little bait he can get me back into the party. My idea was quite different. I was sure it will cure me for good. I had to report to Clarence Hathaway, who at that time was the American representative at the Comintern. To my great surprise it was my high-riding former deputy Joe Peters who acted as representative in Hathaway's absence, who was called back to the States for some hurried conference.

"He was very generous with me. He told me that the reason he did not hit back when I slapped him for the printshop swindle was because he always loved me. He lived in the Hotel Lux on Twerskaya; in the same room I occupied when Russia got me out of the Hungarian prison in 1922. His roommate was Manya, an ugly talkative female I used to know in Los Angeles. Both of them attended the Marx-Lenin Institute, but Manya told me it was only a cover for

the espionage school they were really attending.

"Both of them worked on me to become a good boy again. But, after my return, I resigned the editorship of the Uj Elore. I organized an illegal convention of the Hungarians in Cleveland, Ohio, and exposed the theft of the assets of the Hungarian paper. Szanto, Dr. Gyetvai, Lustig, Weinstock, and others stood with me and were disciplined by Browder but later were lured back and given union assignments where they did their most damage to the tolerant country to which I have been loyal ever since.

"Had no other contact with Peters-Goldberger after the 1932 Moscow meeting.

"LOUIS RETHY REED.

"Subscribed and sworn to before me this 18th day of July 1956.

"Herman C. Wolfe, "Notary Public, Los Angeles County, Calif."

MARRIED LIFE

Mr. Mandel. Now, was Peters married and will you tell us about his married life insofar as it is of interest in connection with his Communist Party activities.

Mr. Lautner. At the time I got acquainted with him, his wife was a person by the name—known to me in the party as Lilly Zirtes. She was in the same unit to which I was assigned when I joined the Communist Party and so was Peters. By the time I came back in 1934, Lilly Zirtes left J. Peters and became the wife of Rudy Baker. Rudy Baker, in 1932, was a district organizer of the Communist Party in Detroit, Mich., and Zirtes worked with Baker in the Michigan district of the Communist Party and Lilly Zirtes also went with Rudy Baker to Canada, when Rudy Baker was the C. I. representative in Canada.

By 1935 or 1936, the wife of J. Peters was a person known to me as Ann Rollins, and also known to me as Ann Silver. Ann Silver was a party functionary, later on became a section organizer of a very important section of the Communist Party in the New York party organization.

Mr. Mandel, Was she also active in the United Electrical Radio and Machine

Workers?

Mr. LAUTNER. No. Ann Rollins, or Ann Silver, was the sectional organizer of the party membership in UOPWA, Union Office and Public, or United Office and Professional Workers of America.

POSTS IN THE COMMUNIST PARTY, USA

Mr. Mandel. Now, what was the first position that Peters held when you first

came to know him?

Mr. Lautner. Well, when I came to New York in 1927 and I began to patronize a Hungarian restaurant in New York, Yorkville, located at 350 East 81st Street, I knew Joseph Peters at that time as the national secretary of the Hungarian Bureau of the Communist Party, Central Committee.

Then, when I joined the Communist Party in 1929, I was assigned to a unit at the same address, in which Joe Peters was a member. He belonged to that

same unit where I joined.

In 1930 when I went to the national training school organized by the Hungarian

National Bureau——

Mr. Mandel. Now, Mr. Lautner, will you go on the next posts that J. Peters held in the party?

Mr. LAUTNER. Well, in 1930 when I was sent to the National Training School of the Hungarian National Bureau of the Communist Party, J. Peters—

Mr. Mandel. Where was it located?

Mr. LAUTNER. Which was held at the party building at Union Square.

Mr. Mandel. 32 Union Square?

Mr. Lautner. Where the Daily Worker is and Freiheit, and also the Hungarian Communist daily paper, and J. Peters at that time was plant manager of the Daily Worker, or production worker, manager of the Daily Worker, and he taught us in this national training school. His subject matter then was political economy.

Mr. Mandel. The records available to the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee show that J. Peters was an instructor at the Krumbein Training School of the Communist Party organized in 1936 in honor of Charles Krumbein, a

Communist leader now deceased (Daily Worker June 8, 1936, p. 5).

(Testifying before a congressional committee on July 8, 1953, Manning Johnson, a former official of the Communist Party, related his experience with

J. Peters as an instructor of the party's national training school:)

"Mr. Johnson. * * * I was in the national training school of the Communist Party, one of my instructors was J. Peters, who was head of the Communist Party underground and the Communist Party espionage apparatus, and he informed us that all publications of all Communist-front organizations are sent to the Soviet Union for study and evaluation; two, that contacts made by the Communist Party, whether directly or through front organizations are to be used to supply information of value to the Communist Party. This information given by these individual workers from these plants is sent in turn to the Soviet Union. The individual locally is contacted. He is eventually recruited into the Communist Party or in the Soviet espionage apparatus. * * *"

Mr. Lautner. I was assigned to Detroit and later on to Canada, but at this time, 1931 and parts of 1932. J. Peters was assigned, reassigned to the New York district organization of the Communist Party where he functioned as the organizational secretary under Rudy Baker and Clarence Hathaway, organi-

zational secretary under these two district organizers.

Mr. Mandel. Mr. Lautner, are you acquainted with a publication called the Party Organizer?

Mr. Lautner. Yes.

Mr. Mandel. What was the Party Organizer?

Mr. Lautner. The Party Organizer was an intraparty magazine which was published by the Communist Party itself and it dealt with organizational and political problems that the Communist Party functionaries faced throughout the country, and this Party Organizer reflected, in the way of articles and problems posed in this magazine, all these problems to the party membership.

Mr. Mandel. Now, according to the committee records, J. Peters contributed articles to the Party Organizer in its issues of June 1931, page 1; July 1934, page 28; February 1937, page 7; and September of 1933.

Was the Communist an important publication of the Communist Party?

Mr. Lautner. It was. It was the official theoretical organ of the Communist

Party published once a month.

Mr. Mandel. According to committee records, J. Peters contributed to the Communist in its issues of September 1932, page 948; and October 1935, page 1005.

What is the next position that you recall held by J. Peters?

Mr. LAUTNER. At the time I became a section organizer in 1933, J. Peters—toward the end of 1933 or beginning of 1934—J. Peters was already an organizational specialist for the Central Committee of the Communist Party. He functioned out of 35 East 12th Street from the 9th floor, which was the national headquarters of the Communist Party. At that time I knew that J. Peters was away for a short while, or a year or so, and he was in the Soviet Union.

Mr. Mandel. Now, going back a bit, what was Peters' role at conventions

of the party?

Mr. LAUTNER. Peters' role at conventions was—at all times that I recall, he was in charge of security, not only at conventions but also at all the plenums, he selected the locations where the plenums should be held, and he selected the personnel who would help him in setting up security apparatus around the central committee plenums of the Communist Party and national conventions.

(Whittaker Chambers amplified J. Peters' (Stevens') record in his testimony

before a congressional committee on August 30, 1948:)

"Mr. Nixon. When did you first meet him?

"Mr. Chambers. I believe during the year 1928; possibly a little before that.

"Mr. Nixon. What was your occupation at that time?

"Mr. Chambers. I was at that time working on the Daily Worker, New York City.

"Mr. Nixon. Were you a member of the Communist Party at that time?

"Mr. CHAMBERS. I was.

"Mr. Nixon. What was Mr. Peters' occupation at that time?

"Mr. Chambers. Mr. Peters was connected with a Hungarian Communist newspaper, the Uj Elore.

'Mr. Nixon. To your knowledge was Mr. Peters a member of the Communist

Party at that time?

"Mr. Chambers. He was."

IN THE SOVIET UNION

Mr. Mandel. From a book entitled "I Was a Soviet Worker" I place in the record a credential in English and in Russian. It reads:

"MARCH 7, 1932.

"Dear Comrades: Comrade Andrew Smith has been a member of the CPUSA since 1931 and was transferred to the Soviet Union with a very high recommendation from the party. Comrade Smith before receiving his transfer gave all his savings to the party. Comrade Smith is an expert machinist and we recommend that he should be given all possible assistance so that he could give all his abilities to Socialist construction.

Comradely yours,

"J. Peters,
Acting Representative, CPUSA, ECCI."

(The letter and its Russian translation is as follows:)

March 7th, 1932.

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Courses Andrew maith has been a sember of the CP that since 1982 and the same very high recommendation from the Party. Courses Suith before a receiving his in rafer gave all his savings to the Party.

Omeric Smith is an expert acchinist and we recommend that we should be given all possible assistance so that he could live all his abilities to Socialist Construction.

doerstoly years,

J.Print. Acting Appresent tive DP 184, E.G.d.I.

Andrew Smith's Letter of Introduction

Перевод с авглятского.

Делогие товарили!

Делогие

Делогие товарили!

Mr. MANDEL. Now, Mr. Lautner, what does that mean to you?

Mr. LAUTNER. ECCI is an abbreviation for the Executive Committee of the Communist International. That is what it means.

Mr. Mandel. It says here that he was transferred to the Soviet Union. Will

you explain that?

Mr. Lautner. Well, in those days, in the early 1930's, there were quite a number of members of the American Communist Party who went to the Soviet Union. In order to maintain the continuity of their membership they were transferred from the CPUSA to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and evidently this person had such a transfer, from one party to the other.

Mr. Mandel. Now, I wish to place into the record from the same book, I Was a Soviet Worker, by Andrew Smith, another credential dated March 17, 1932,

which reads as follows:

"ANDREW SMITH.

"Dear Combade: This is to inform you that you have been granted a transfer by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the United States of America to the CPSU. Your transfer has been referred to the Central Committee of the CPSU.

"Fraternally,

"J. Peters, Acting Representative, CPUSA, ECCI."

(The letter with the Russian translation follows:)

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Fraterwally.

1. Peter

Andrew Smith's Certificate of Transfer

17 Papra 1772r.

TON. A. CHAT

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Mr. Mandel. Will you explain that?

Mr. LAUTNER. Well, the explanation is that the transfer of this person was granted from the CPUSA and it was up for approval to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union for acceptance of this party member from the United States into the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Mr. Mandel. Does this disclose the organic connection between the Communist

Party of the United States and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union?

Mr. LAUTNER. In a sense it does. But the organic connection was much firmer. Mr. MANDEL. When he signed this as "J. Peters, acting representative, CPUSA, ECCI," what does that mean?

Mr. LAUTNER. That means the executive committee of the Communist Inter-

national.

Mr. Mandel. What was Peters doing at that time?

Mr. Lautner. Peters was the active representative of the American Party to the Communist International.

Mr. Mandel. In Moscow?

Mr. LAUTNER, Yes. We had quite a number of them from time to time and at one time he was it.

Mr. Mandel. At this point I would like to place into the record the testimony of Andrew Smith given on October 25, 1939, before a congressional committee.

(The testimony referred to is as follows:)

"Mr. Whitley. Now, Mr. Smith, who was the American representative of the Communist Party of the United States on the Comintern to whom you turned over your American credentials?

"Mr. Smith. At that time it was John Peter.

"Mr. WHITLEY. John Peter?

"Mr. SMITH. The men's representative, and Caroline Drew, the women's.

"Mr. WHITLEY. I show you a document dated March 7, 1932, signed 'J. Peters, acting representative, Communist Party, U. S. A., ECCI'-meaning the executive committee, Communist International. Is that your eredential?

"Mr. SMITH. Yes.

"Mr. WHITLEY. Which Peters gave to you?

"Mr. SMITH. That is a credential he gave to me after I returned my credentials. "Mr. Whitley. And attached to that is a document under the same date written in Russian; is that the same?

"Mr. SMITH. That is the same.

"Mr. WHITLEY. They gave you the one document in Russian and also in English?

Mr. Smith. Yes.

"Mr. Whitley. The English document, Mr. Chairman, is dated March 7, 1932, and reads as follows:

"'Dear Comrade: Comrade Andrew Smith has been a member of the Communist Party of the United States of America since 1922 and was transferred to the Soviet Union with a very high recommendation from the party. Comrade Smith, before receiving his transfer, gave all his savings to the party.

"'Comrade Smith is an expert machinist and we recommend that he should be given all possible assistance so that he could give all his abilities to Socialist

construction.

"Comradely yours."

"That is signed 'J. Peters, acting representative, CPUSA, ECCI.' * * *

"I show you another document, Mr. Smith, dated March 17, 1932, 10 days after the preceding."

(Mr. Peters' subservience to the Communist International is disclosed by statements which appeared in the Daily Worker of May 27, 1929, pp. 1 and 5, as

follows:)

"Unreserved acceptance of the decisions contained in the Comintern letter is pledged in the resolution adopted by the Hungarian Bureau of the Communist Party at its meeting, Thursday, May 23, and sent to the central committee of the party through J. Peter, secretary.

"The Daily Worker of May 21, 1929, page 1, carried the following statement

of J. Peter:

"'From Hungarian Bureau Secretary.

"'I fully and unreservedly endorse and accept the Comintern letter and the Polcom's unanimous decisions. I pledge my full support to the Central Committee fighting against all factionalism, for building the mass Communist Party in the United States. I will do all in my power to mobilize members to support the Comintern letter and the unanimous decisions of the Central Committee. "'J. Peter, Hungarian Bureau, Communist Party."

ORGANIZATIONAL SPECIALIST IN THE U. S. A.

Mr. Mandel. Approximately when did Peters return to the United States from Moscow?

Mr. LAUTNER. Well, when I became a section organizer, my recollection is that shortly after that, possibly toward the end of 1933, or beginning of 1934, he was back in the United States and functioning as an organizer for the Central Committee of the Communist Party working under leadership of Jack Stachel.

Mr. MANDEL. What was he concentrating on?

Mr. Lautner. At that time, from my point of view, where I was functioning, he was a high functionary of the Central Committee. He specialized in organizational problems. He came to my section from time to time to teach with others, new-member classes, and the composition of my section membership was mostly professional people, like schoolteachers, lawyers, doctors, and so forth, and he was mingling with these people to make connections with them, and teaching new-member classes.

In this period of time he also wrote a Manual on Party Organization for the

Communist Party.

Mr. MANDEL. Was this an important book?

Mr. LAUTNER. This was an extremely important book at that particular time. In 1934, 1935, there was a terrific influx into the ranks of the Communist Party and there was a great need for lower functionaries such as the unit organizers and unit functionaries and section functionaries in the Communist Party, and this manual served as a guide for capable party members to become functionaries in the lower organizations of the Communist Party.

The importance of this manual was pinpointed by the executive secretary of the Communist Party, Jack Stachel, who wrote the foreword. He was second in

command.

Mr. Mandel. Do you think that, according to party procedure, this book was

approved by the Central Committee of the Communist Party?

Mr. Lautner. Of course it was. Not only was it approved, but it was highly recommended for every party member to have that book, to study it, and to strive in order to become a party functionary, either in a unit or in a section of the Communist Party in New York.

Mr. MANDEL. Was that the only book of its kind?

Mr. LAUTNER. It was the only book of its kind at that time dealing with organizational problems and basic principles of the Communist Party.

Mr. Mandel. Do you think that it is extremely likely that that book was

approved in Moscow?

Mr. LAUTNER. At that time, the Communist Party of the United States was a section of the Communist International. There was no occasion at any time that there was any criticism or adverse comment on that particular book by the Communist International. In fact, it was highly recommended in the leadership meetings of the Communist Party which I attended at that time.

Mr. MANDEL. Well, it couldn't have been written without approval by the

Communist Party or approval by the Communist International?

Mr. LAUTNER. At that time, the Communist Party, United States of America, was part of the Communist International and it must have had the approval of the Communist International.

Mr. Mandel. Would you call Peters a professional revolutionist?

Mr. LAUTNER. Yes; I would call him so, and I heard others call him so, also, a professional revolutionist of the highest type.

Mr. Mandel. I want to place in the record at this point a section from the Manual on Organization by J. Peters, entitled: "Who Are the Professional Revo-

lutionists," and this is a quote from the manual:

"The party has full claim to the life of a Communist Party member: A professional revolutionist is a highly trained comrade, trained in revolutionary theory and practice, tested in struggles, who gives his whole life to the fight for the revolution and the interest of his own class. A professional revolutionist is ready to go whenever and wherever the party sends him. Today he may be working in a mine, organizing the party, the trade unions, leading struggles; tomorrow, if the party so decides, he may be in a steel mill; the day after tomorrow, he may be a leader and organizer of the unemployed. Naturally, these professional revolutionists are supported by the party organization if their assignment doesn't send them to work in shops or in mines. From these comrades the party demands everything. They accept party assignments—the matter of family associations and other personal problems are considered, but are not decisive. If the class struggle demands it, he will leave his family for months, even years. The professional revolutionist cannot be demoralized; he is steeled, stable. Nothing can shake him. Our task is to make every party member a professional revolutionist in this sense.

PENETRATING THE BASIC INDUSTRIES

Mr. Mandel. Did you know of Peters' activities in connection with the establishment of the CIO and the preliminary activities to the building of the CIO?

Mr. LAUTNER. Well, the only thing that I can recollect is that Peters, at all times in this period and, later on, was always concerned with developing, in the Communist Party, groups of young party members who could uproot themselves and, at the service of the party, be assigned into basic industries where they could become workers and build a party inside of these big industrial plants, such as in steel, in mining, in auto, in electrical appliance, factories, in transport, and he always undertook to indoctrinate young party members in how to function in these factories, how to carry on party activities. He was one of the most effective colonizers of the Communist Party.

Mr. Mandel. Is it true that later, when the CIO came into being, the Communists, who had been colonized into industries, constituted an active and

leading force?

Mr. LAUTNER. Within the organization?

Mr. Mandel. Yes.

Mr. LAUTNER. Yes, up until the time the CIO leadership began to clean the Communists and Communist influence and infiltration out of the CIO, but that came about in 1947, or thereabouts, 1946 or 1947.

ARCH CONSPIRATOR

Mr. Mandel. Now, what was your next post in the party, Mr. Lautner? Mr. Lautner. My next post was that of a district organizer of the Communist Party in the State of West Virginia. I was appointed to that post in April of 1936

Mr. Mandel. Now, in connection with that post, what experience did you have

with Mr. Peters?

Mr. Lautner. Well, along with other leading functionaries I was also instructed to have a meeting with J. Peters. J. Peters gave me instructions in the use of codes, and also gave me a number of addresses as I recollect now, in the Bronx and in Brooklyn, where I should send my reports, instead of directly to the party headquarters.

(Testimony given before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee discussed the activities of Irving Charles Velson in connection with the waterfront. Testifying on May 6, 1953, before a congressional committee, Robert Gladnick had

this to say in regard to the activities of Peters and Velson:)

"Mr. Kunzig. Would it be correct to say that Shavey Velson, or Shavey, was in charge of the entire military apparatus for the Young Communist League?

"Mr. GLADNICK. For the Young Communist League, I would say to the best of my knowledge, he was in charge under Peters.

'Mr, Kunzig. Is that J. Peters?

"Mr. GLADNICK. J. Peters.

"Mr. Kunzig. Would you tell the committee what you know of J. Peters?

"Mr. GLADNICK. Well, after the fleet left in June of 1934 (U. S. Navy), I, this young sailor, this second-class fireman, who took his furlough and was in civilian clothes, and another chap by the name of Gene Morse took a special course on work within the Armed Forces. We attended this course during the daytime at 50 East 13th Street in the Workers' School, and the course was taught to the three of us by Mendel, or Mindel—Professor Mindel—Professor Markoff anyway, they called him professor, and also J. Peters personally took over teaching us how to do ciper work and communications.

'Mr. Doyle. How to do what?

"Mr. GLADNICK, Cipher work—how to write letters without anybody knowing what you were writing.

"Mr. Doyle. How were you going to use that knowledge?

"Mr. Gladnick. Well, that was in case one of us was sent to San Pedro or Norfolk, or any Army base, and we wanted to send reports back. We were to send the reports back in cipher, rather than in the same language."

(Paul Crouch, a former district organizer of the Communist Party, testified before a congressional committee on May 6, 1949, in regard to the activities of

J. Peters as follows:)

"Mr. Crouch. As district organizer in the Carolinas from 1934 to 1937, and later in Tennessee, Peters gave me specific instructions regarding communications; the use of the codes under which confidential messages were to be sent; private addresses; details as to receipts; instructions as to the selection of parallel underground apparatus, ready at all times to take over; alternate party organizers; the selection of a place in the country where the district organizer could hide out until contact was established with him, if he was not picked up; instructions as to the storing of both large mimeographs and a small collapsible affair which could be carried in a briefcase; instructions as to how to make gelatin duplicating devices in case of emergency; and similar measures; also plans for the division of the party into groups of five, the groups being prepared to act as branches if the party was outlawed."

(Mr. Budenz relates Peters' detailed instructions on the ways and means of

Communist conspiracy:)

"There is indeed one rule which the trained rank-and-file Communist must learn, as I once heard J. V. Peters tell a group of comrades. That is to keep a lock on one's lips, to never ask questions of one's party superior, and to say

'Yes' to order no matter how unrelated to any plan they may seem.

"There is an American game, isn't there, called follow the leader?" asked Peters. 'Well, this is follow the leader, too. But it is not a game. It is in dead earnest. Each comrade anywhere in the party apparatus is wholly responsible to the comrade immediately superior to him. That is the first commandment of Communist discipline'" (p. 133, Men Without Faces, by Louis Budenz).

FALSE PASSPORTS

(Whittaker Chambers testified before a congressional committee on August 3, 1949, as to the activities of J. Peters as follows:)

"Mr. Chambers. He was known to me for years simply as Peters.

"Mr. Stripling. His name, Mr. Rankin, is well known in Communist Party circles. He has gone under the name of J. Peters, also under the name of Alexander Stevens, and has traveled on false passports under the name of Isidore Boorstein.

"Mr. Chambers. Peters told me at one time that he had been a petty officer in the Austrian Army during World War I. After the Bela Kun revolution in Hungary, he was a member of the Soviet Government of Hungary, I think, in

the Agricultural Commissariat.

"Mr. Stripling. We have in our possession a passport issued October 7, 1931, which was used by Peters to travel to the Soviet Union. The name on the pass-

port is that of Isidore Boorstein."

"Mr. Mundt. I wish you would go into that in some detail because there have been many instances, and it has become a veritable racket where these Commu-

nists get passports to visit Soviet Russia.

"Mr. Chambers. He told me with great amusement because of the simplicity of the scheme. He had sent up to the genealogical division of the New York Public Library a group of young Communists, I presume, who collated the birth and death records; that is, they found that a child had been born, let us say, in 1900 and died a month or so later or several months later.

"The party, through some members, then wrote to the proper authorities in New York for issuing birth certificates and asked for a birth certificate in the name of that dead child. The certificate was forthcoming, and a passport was then applied for under the name by someone using that birth certificate."

(An interesting sidelight on Peters' activities in securing false identification papers is found in the autobiographical work of David Whittaker Chambers

entitled "Witness":)

"For my use in the English operation, Peters procured a birth certificate for one David Breen whose birth coincided roughly with mine. It was not until the second Hiss trial that I learned that David Breen was not the name of a dead child, but that of a living man from whom permission to use his birth certificate had been bought in another of Peters' operations. The birth certificate and the passport I procured on it, I turned over to the FBI before the first Hiss trial (p. 356).

"For my wife, Peters procured still another birth certificate, which was never used. But a certificate for my daughter was also necessary. It was a much more difficult problem to solve, since it must also be in the name of Breen. Peters had a little arrangement for just such contingencies. In the city hall at Atlantic City, he had a contact. For a fee, the amount of which I have forgotten, that useful man agreed to enter the name of Ursula Breen (my daughter) in the official register of births, and to issue a birth certificate in that name. One day Peters proudly handed me the birth certificate, now also in the custody of the FBI (pp. 356 and 357).

"As usual, the birth certificate was the simplest part of the problem. J. Peters quickly provided one in the name of Charles F. Chase. On this paper Don procured a passport (p. 365).

"* * * Again, I procured him a birth certificate from Peters, and Don secured a second passport in his new name. Then he left for Russia. He was to proceed to London where the Soviet Embassy was alerted to give him a special visa for the Soviet Union. It would not show on his passport because, unlike the visas of other governments, it was not stamped there. It was stamped on a separate piece of paper (p. 388).

"Bill had not been gone long when Peters brought me word that Richard wanted to see me. Richard was the head of a Soviet passport apparatus with which Peters did a prosperous business. Peters brought Richard and me together at the Rockefeller Plaza, just below what would later be my office at Time magazine" (p. 398).

COMMUNIST BIOGRAPHIES

Mr. Mandel. Now, did Peters ever ask you for a biographical information sheet?

Mr. LAUTNER. Yes. From 1936—no; as a matter of fact, from 1934 up until the time I left the Communist I'arty, I, myself, filled out five biographies about myself based on extensive questionnaires that were given to me from time to time by J. Peters.

Usually, at national plenums or conventions—the last one in 1947, when I became head of the New York State Review Commission, and succeeded him in that position—he told me to collect all of the outstanding questionnaires with biographies and gave me a list to do so. He handled, to my knowledge, at least from 1934 to 1946, the evaluation of the leading cadres of the Communist Party based on these biographies.

Mr. Mandel. Now, Mr. Lautner, you have an opinion as to the usefulness of these biographies to the party and also what was done with them. Now, what

was your opinion about that?

Mr. Lautner. My opinion was, first of all, it gave an opportunity for the party here to get an intimate knowledge of the leading cadres of the Communist Party as to their background, as to their formal education, as to their loyalty to the party, as to their party schooling, as to what activities they carried out in the course of the years. These biographies served the purpose to acquaint the party leadership in placing cadres in the position that the party deemed they would be the most useful for the purposes of the Communist Party.

As I said before, Peters was in charge of these biographies from year to year. In the final analysis, what happened to these biographies I don't know. Beyond

Peters, I don't know.

(With reference to Communist Party records, Whittaker Chambers testified as follows before a congressional committee on August 7, 1948:)

"Mr. Chambers. I was told by Peters that party registration was kept in

Moscow and in some secret file in the United States."

(Louis F. Budenz, former managing editor of the Daily Worker, has described Peters' precautionary measures in the preparation of plenary session of the national committee of the Communist Party, U. S. A., in his book, Men Without Faces, p. 102;)

"Each man and woman attending the plenums [plenums of the national committee of the CPUSA] received a card of admission which had to be checked at the entrance. * * * A committee of chosen comrades, always under the supervision of J. V. Peters, examined each entrance card and identified each comrade as the person whose named appeared on it."

HIDEOUTS

Mr. Mandel. Now, did Peters finally get into trouble with the Immigration and

Naturalization Service?

Mr. Lautner. Yes. In 1947, during the summer, he asked me if I could make my apartment available to him because he was harassed by authorities at that time. I had a summer cottage out on Long Island with my family, so I turned the key over to Peters and his wife and they stayed in my apartment for a month or so. Early in September or the latter part of August, I was back in town. I heard that J. Peters was picked up near Poughkeepsie or near Peekskill, upstate New York, while he was driving his car, by the immigration authorities.

Mr. Mandel. Did Peters make a mistake at that time in his conspiratorial

precautions?

Mr. Lautner. Yes. I talked to him at that time and he said he made a blunder. On that particular day, he went out to Brooklyn to pick up his car and he and his wife, Ann Rollins, or Silver, went upstate and the mistake he made was by traveling in his own car. And he made a remark that "this should be an object lesson not to be careless."

Mr. Mandel. Will you tell us about Peters' underground way of life?

Mr. LAUTNER. Well, I stated before that in 1947 when he asked me for my apartment, whether he could stay there during the summer months, he was complaining that he was being harassed by the authorities. Later on, he was arrested by the INS [Immigration and Naturalization Service] and shortly after that he went underground.

In 1948, around April, John Williamson told me to hide out-

Mr. MANDEL. John Williamson?

Mr. LAUTNER. John Williamson, the member of the national board of the Communist Party and labor secretary of the Communist Party, told me to hide out J. Peters. The first place I took him to was a place owned by Kalman Marki. Kalman Marki lived at either 70th Street or 69th Street between Broadway and Amsterdam Avenue on the north side of the street. J. Peters spent in that apartment almost 2 months. He sent word to me that I should shift him to some other place because he was getting very uncomfortable in that place.

The next place I took him to was out in the Bronx, in East Bronx, to an apartment owned by a person named Paula Hirsch. He was there up until the national convention of the Communist Party in 1948. The convention began somewhere around the last day of July and the beginning of August. In the convention, John

Williamson told me to move Peters again.

At that time I assigned the bodyguard of Henry Winston, who was a fellow by the name of Harold, to take him out to Brooklyn and Harold kept J. Peters for

about a number of weeks out in Brooklyn.

One day, Ann Rollins, Peters' wife, came to me and said that she had gotten word Peters would like to go some other place. At that time, I told Harold to produce Peters and I met Peters in Newark, N. J., right under the Pennsylvania Railroad Station viaduct, where we took a bus, Peters and myself, and took Peters out to Riegelsville, Pa., on a farm south of Easton, Pa., a farm belonging to one Joe Herman. I kept Peters there for a while.

Mr. Mandel. What was Peters' reaction when the testimony of Whittaker

Chambers was made public?

Mr. Lautner. When the testimony of Whittaker Chambers was made public I was out on the farm with him one afternoon and he told me that "this is one of the most serious things that could happen to the party, this testimony." He also stated that "we are really in trouble at this time." He was very much alarmed and very much concerned with the testimony of Whittaker Chambers. However, at this time, the "pumpkin papers" were not produced yet.

Nevertheless, shortly after that meeting out there with him, I was again

instructed by the party to bring J. Peters in.

Mr. MANDEL. Do you remember who instructed you?

Mr. Lautner. John Williamson, again. I went out to get J. Peters to bring him into New York with the instructions that he should report the next morning to the offices of Nathan Witt, on East 40th Street. I did go out and I brought J. Peters in. I heard that J. Peters was called in by the Immigration and Naturalization Service and was under bond and they asked for his production.

Shortly after that he was served a subpena and he had to go into the grand jury hearings—the same grand jury that heard the testimony of Whittaker

Chambers.

(The following are excerpts from the book Men Without Faces by Louis F. Budenz, former managing editor of the Daily Worker, with reference to J. Peters'

clandestine operations:)

"The order to carry Stalin's message to the party had come directly from the Comintern and its representatives here. From his hiding place, the overactive J. V. Peters, then disguised as Alexander Stevens, sent repeated and heated instructions to the 'legal comrades' to push the History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), by Stalin, even more vigorously (p. 25).

"However, up to the recent past, the most thorough search of the so-called capitalist press will fail to turn up any photograph of Stachel, Eisler, Bittelman, Peters, Golos, or of any of the inner circles—the real rulers of the party. No newspaperman was ever permitted inside a party convention, except the representatives of the Red press; (p. 38).

"Under the direction of the Soviet espionage agent, J. V. Peters (who sent in voluminous notes from the underground through the intellectual V. J. Jerome), it was decided to run two articles on the matter [the provisions of the Voorhis Act]

in the November 1940, and January 1941, issues of the Communist.

"'The path Lenin and of Stalin leads to victory' was the theme of the first article on the 'increasing turning (of the people) with yearning and hope toward the Soviet Union.' It was intended to inflame the comrades with an even greater loyalty to the Kremlin's master, with a deeper sense of his invincibility, so that they might then inflame others with the same spirit" (pp. 45, 46).

HOLLYWOOD FINANCES

(The records of a congressional committee submitted October 30, 1947, shows that J. Peters was active in Hollywood in raising money for the defense of Earl Browder:)

"On May 3, 1942, Alexander Stevens, also known as J. Peters, and whose real name is Goldberger, visited Los Angeles, Calif. When he arrived in Los Angeles he was met by Herbert Biberman at the Union Station. During that day, a meeting was held by Alexander Stevens, Waldo Salt, and Herbert Biberman.

"* * * Also on that same date a third meeting was held by Alexander Stevens, J. Peters, R. Goldberger, as he is [variously] known, Morton Grant, John Howard

Lawson, and Vera Harris, the wife of Lou Harris, a screen writer.

"During the evening of May 2, 1942, another meeting was held in Herbert Biberman's home between Stevens or Peters, John Howard Lawson, Lester Cole, Madeline Ruthven, and Herta Uerkvitz. Lester Cole is a screen writer while Ruthven, Uerkvitz are Communist Party functionaries in Los Angeles, Calif. Ruthven, Lawson, Stevens, and Salt also held a meeting on the same date, late at night, in the home of Waldo Salt. During this visit, among other things, Stevens was working on the Communist inspired movement to secure the release of Earl Browder, Communist Party president at that time, from a Federal penitentiary, where he had been incarcerated on a charge of using a false passport to travel to the Soviet Union.

"Stevens also had a very successful financial trip, since he collected \$1,500 or furnished this sum to Communist Party functionaries in California, which he had received from Louise Bransten. He also received the sum of \$2,200 from a

Ruth Wilson, whom I can identify in executive session * * *.

"However, it is known that Bransten or that Stevens, or Peters, as he is known, visited a bank with Herbert Biberman and that Biberman entered a safety deposit box in the bank."

SUBVERSION IN THE ARMED FORCES

Mr. Mandel. Now, do you recall a secret meeting of New York section organizers in June of 1935, at Camp Unity, which was addressed by Peters on the question of activity in the American Armed Forces?

Mr. Lautner. Yes.

Mr. MANDEL. Will you tell us about that?

Mr. Lautner. Well, at that time, Max Steinberg, the executive secretary, informed a number of section organizers that they should be available for the weekend because we were going of town. Max Steinberg informed me to get a car. We were invited to a meeting out to Camp Unity and, to the best of my recollection, the following people were there: First, there was J. Peters, there

was Edwards, later known to be as Gerhardt Eisler, from the district leadership, there was Rose Wortis, and about 6 or 7 section organizers.

At this meeting, the report was given by J. Peters himself, and the gist of the report was that we must make a sharp turn in extending our activities and to begin to pay attention to party at work, party activities in the Armed Forces. In his report, he stated there was a survey made of how many young Communist League members and how many party members the party has in the National Guard in New York City; how many armories there are in New York City and where these members drill and train as members of the National Guard, Also, that these members of the National Guard, party members, will be organized into groups and we will have to pay attention to them to assist them with an outside organization, with party members organized outside of the armories, who would, on drill nights, fraternize with the National Guard members and distribute literature to them and associate with them, become acquainted with them and bring them closer to the party.

He also said that this work will be very closely checked and it will be followed up. It was done so. The person who was in charge of this meeting, of this phase of the party activity in New York, was known to me as Jim Forrest, who later became the district organizer of the Communist Party in St. Louis.

At this meeting, Gerhardt Eisler, in order to impress the necessity and the need for this type of activity, pointed out one of the grave errors the German party committed when in the early Weimar Party days; the Communist Party completely neglected activities in the German and military organization known at that time as the Stahlheimers, which was controlled by Hugenberger, one of the industrialists. Because of the neglect of this work on the part of the party, this military formation was the main strength later on the Hitler organization. military organization.

Mr. MANDEL. In other words, the remarks of Peters were endorsed and supported by Gerhardt Eisler, the representative of the Communist International?

Mr. Lautner. Yes, that is correct.

UNDERGROUND WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT

Mr. Mandel, Now, to your knowledge, did Peters have anything to do with the underground organization of the Communist Party?

Mr. Lautner. All I knew at this particular time, while I was in West Virginia, and also in 1941, 1942, was that J. Peters was still functioning out of the ninth floor of 35 East 12th Street, at the national headquarters of the Communist Party, and that he was in charge of the party organization in Washington that was in Government. Beyond that, I don't know anything else.

Mr. Mandel. How did you know he was in charge of a party organization in

Government?

Mr. Lautner. He made frequent trips to Washington and these things just get around among leading party functionaries, that J. Peters was in charge of that segment of the Washington organization which is in the Government. There were two organizations in Washington, one was the open party which was headed by one Martin Chancey, but he was head of the open organization, and J. Peters, out of New York, functioning out of New York, gave direction and guidance of the other party organization that was in Government.

Mr. Mandel. Now, going back a moment, when the Chambers story broke, was there any occasion that the Communist Party was trying to use any physical

pressure against him?

Mr. Lautner. Yes. I was told by Peters, a day or two before the pumpkin story broke, to see Nathan Witt. I went up to Nathan Witt's office and was introduced to Lee Pressman, another lawyer there, and then I and Nathan Witt went downstairs. Near the building was a bar and there he told me-

Mr. Mandel. Who told you?

Mr. Lautner. Nathan Witt. That we must find some means by which we could intimidate Whittaker Chambers. He expressed his views that Whittaker Cham-

bers is easily intimidated.

He suggested finding where he worked at Radio City in the Time offices and if he would only send him a bouquet of flowers or lilies, like that, he would know the party is keeping an eye on him and he may stop talking. When I left Nathan Witt I got \$100 from him and I assigned a party organizer in transit from Brooklyn to follow up this suggestion of Nathan Witt. The party organizer came back to me the next day saying that Whittaker Chambers was not around the Time offices. He was somewhere down in Maryland.

The next day the pumpkin story broke. Nathan Witt called me up at my residence and told me to drop everything, not to do anything in relation to the project that we were discussing. The next Saturday morning, I think it was a day later, he came down and I gave him back the money. I met him on 22d Street on 7th Avenue and gave the money back to Nathan.

(In his testimony before a congressional committee on August 3, 1948, Mr. Chambers gave the following testimony regarding the operations of J. Peters

within the Communist underground organization in Washington:)

"Mr. CHAMBERS. The actual head of the group-well, the elected head of the group, was either Witt at one time or Abt, and the organizer of the group had been Harold Ware. The head of the whole business was J. Peters.'

"One of them clearly was Alger Hiss, and it was believed that Henry Collins also might go further. Another was Lee Pressman. So it was decided by Peters, or by Peters in conference with people whom I don't know, that we would take these people out of that apparatus and separate them from it physically—that is, they would have no further intercourse with the people there—but they would be connected still with that apparatus and with Peters through me.

"It was also decided to add to this group certain other people who had not

originally been in that apparatus. One of these people was Harry White."

(Again, on August 7, 1948, Mr. Chambers testified as follows:)

"Mr. Chambers. Mr. Hiss was a member of the Communist Party.

"Mr. Nixon. How do you know that?

"Mr. Chambers. I was told by Mr. Peters. "Mr. Nixon. You were told that by Mr. Peters?

"Mr. CHAMBERS. Yes.

"Mr. Nixon. On what facts did Mr. Peters give you?

"Mr. Chambers. Mr. Peters was the head of the entire underground, as far as I know.

"Mr. Nixon. Did you obtain his party dues from him?

"Mr. CHAMBERS. Yes, I did.

"Mr. Nixon. Over what period of time?

"Mr. Chambers. Two or 3 years, as long as I knew him.

"Mr. Nixon. Party dues from him and his wife?

"Mr. Chambers. I assume his wife's dues were there; I understood it to be.

"Mr. Nixon. You understood it to be?

"Mr. Chambers. Mr. Hiss would simply give me an envelope containing party dues which I transferred to Peters. I didn't handle the money.

"Mr. Nixon. In other words, people who are in the Communist underground are in fact instructed to deny the fact that they are members of the Communist Party?

"Mr. MANDEL. What did he do with the old car?

"Mr. Chambers. The Communist Party had in Washington a service station that is, the man in charge or owner of this station was a Communist—or it may have been a car lot.

"Mr. Nixon. But the owner was a Communist?
"Mr. Chambers. The owner was a Communist. I never knew who this was or where it was. It was against all the rules of underground organization for Hiss to do anything with his old car but trade it in, and I think this investigation has proved how right the Communists are in such matters, but Hiss insisted that he wanted that car turned over to the open party so it could be of use to some poor organizer in the West or somewhere.

"Much against my better judgment and much against Peters' better judgment, he finally got us to permit him to do this thing. Peters knew where this lot was and he either took Hiss there, or he gave Hiss the address and Hiss went there, and to the best of my recollection of his description of that happening, he left the car there and simply went away and the man in charge of the station took care of the rest of it for him. I should think the records of that transfer would be traceable."

(Further testimony by Mr. Whittaker Chambers occurred on August 25, 1948,

as follows:) "Mr. Stripling. Would you now give to the committee a chronological résumé of your meeting with Mr. Hiss, and how long you knew Mr. Hiss and the circumstances under which you met him?

"Mr. Changers. I believe that I was first introduced to Mr. Hiss by Harold Ware and J. Peters, who was the head of the underground of the American Communist Party.

"The meeting took place in Washington, and I believe in a restaurant. then continued to know Mr. Hiss until I broke with the Communist Party in

early 1938, and I saw him once again toward the end of 1938.

"Mr. Harold Ware, who is the son of Ella Reeve Bloor, a well-known Communist, had gone down to Washington, to the best of my knowledge, about 1933. He was chiefly interested in farm activities of some kind, but he discovered, after he got there, that he could recruit a large number of people in the Government for the Communist Party. It is possible that some of the people were Communists already, and he simply came in touch with them; others, I am sure, he recruited himself.

"He set up, perhaps with the help of J. Peters, an apparatus consisting of a number of organizations, a number of cells, each cell being led by a man who formed part of a committee and an underground committee which met regularly

at the home of Henry Collins in St. Matthews Court.

"Mr. Stripling. Mr. Chairman, I have here a picture which was taken off a passport of the person we think to be J. Peters, who traveled for the Soviet Union on and under the name of Isidore Boorstein.

"I show you this picture, Mr. Chambers, and ask you if you can identify it as

being J. Peters [showing photograph to Mr. Chambers]."

(Mr. Whittaker Chambers resumed testifying on August 30, 1948, as follows:) "Mr. Nixon. Mr. Chambers, do you know the man, Alexander Stevens, who was just on the witness stand?

"Mr. Chambers. Yes; I do.
"Mr. Chambers. While I was editing New Masses, I received a telephone call from Mr. Max Bedacht, who was, at that time, I believe, a member of the central committee of the Communist Party. Mr. Bedacht was also head of the IWO, the International Workers Order.

"Mr. Nixon. Mr. Bedacht, will you spell that name?

"Mr. Chambers. B-e-d-a-c-h-t.

"Mr. Nixon. I see. Then you later met Mr. Peters or Alexander Stevens?

"Mr. CHAMBERS. That is true.

"Mr. Nixon. In what conection did you meet him?

"Mr. Chambers. Mr. Bedacht went away on a vacation or a trip or used this as a pretext to turn me over to Mr. Peters and my superior in the underground.

"Mr. Nixon. Where did this meeting with Mr. Peters take place?

"Mr. Chambers. I believe it took place in an automat. Where, I am not

"Mr. Nixon. You didn't meet him in Communist Party headquarters?

"Mr. CHAMBERS. No; I did not.

"Mr. NIXON. Did you ever meet Peters in Communist Party headquarters while he was in the underground?

"Mr. CHAMBERS. I never did; at no time.

"Mr. NIXON. What was the reason for that?

"Mr. CHAMBERS. The reason is that Mr. Peters was supposed to avoid the open Communist Party and so was I.

"Mr. Nixon. You both were to avoid it. Now, when you met Mr. Peters, what

capacity would you say he occupied in the underground?

"Mr. Chambers. It was my understanding that Mr. Peters was the head of the whole underground of the American Communist Party whose activities included the entire country.

"Mr. Nixon. And you know, of your own knowledge, at least that he was your

immediate superior?

"Mr. CHAMBERS. He was.

"Mr. NIXON. Do you know of your own knowledge whether he had other people at the same level that you were in the underground?

"Mr. Chambers. It is my belief that he had many such people. I could name

one in fact, Harold Ware.

"Mr. Nixon. Harold Ware?

"Mr. CHAMBERS. Yes.

"Mr. NIXON. In the same capacity that you were? "Mr. Chambers. In the same general capacity.

"Mr. Nixon. I see. Did you ever have any dealings with Mr. Peters in Washington, D. C.?

"Mr. CHAMBERS. Yes; I did.

"Mr. Nixon. Will you describe to the committee chronologically, as well as you can recollect, what those dealings were?

"Mr. Chambers. Some time in 1934, I believe, Mr. Peters introduced me to

Mr. Harold Ware. Do you want me to identify Ware again?

"Mr. Nixon. If you will, please.
"Mr. Chambers, Harold Ware was one of the sons of Ella Reeve Bloor, who is a member of the Communist Party and still active, I believe, and his interest was primarily in the field of agriculture. He had gone to Washington, I believe, for the purpose of seeing what kind of Communist penetration he could carry on in the agricultural field.

"When he got there he discovered that the possibilities for organizing the Communist underground transcends the agricultural field, and either he or he and Peters then organized an apparatus, at last one apparatus of which I have knowledge, possibly others, which I can describe more in detail, if you wish.

"Mr. Nixon. Well, now, you have already described that for the record, but will you tell the committee whether Mr. Peters actively worked with you, with the Washington representatives of this underground movement? I mean, was he ever in Washington at the same time that you were?

"Mr. Chambers. Yes; Mr. Peters was in Washington when I was, on many

occasions.

"Mr. Nixon. Did Mr. Peters introduce you to any of the members of this underground?

"Mr. Chambers. Mr. Peters, eventually, I think, introduced me to all the

members of the committee, either individually or as a group.

"Mr. Nixon. Individually and as a group both. Is that your testimony? Do

you know whether or not Mr. Peters knew Mr. Alger Hiss?

"Mr. Chambers. Mr. Peters not only knew Mr. Alger Hiss but to the best of—I hate to use this phrase, to the best of my recollection, he introduced me, himself, to Mr. Hiss, I think in the presence of Harold Ware.

"Mr. Nixon. Have you ever seen Mr. Peters in the presence of Mr. Hiss?

you say that?

"Mr. Chambers. Yes: definitely.

"Mr. Nixon. You can say that without qualifying to the best of your recollection?

"Mr. CHAMBERS. Without any qualification.

"Mr. Nixon. Now by what name was Peters known in Washington to this group?

"Mr. CHAMBERS. Peter.

"Mr. Nixon. The name 'Peter'?

"Mr. Chambers. Yes. I suppose it's sometimes Peters.

"Mr. Nixon. And did I understand you to say in previous testimony that it was Peters who arranged the transfer of a 1929 Ford automobile which Mr. Hiss owned?

"Mr. Chambers. That is true.

"Mr. Nixon. You know that by reason of what fact?

"Mr. CHAMBERS. I know that from Peters. "Mr. NIXON. From Peters and from who else?

"Mr. Chambers. Perhaps Mr. Hiss. I am reasonably sure that Mr. Hiss told I don't want to say absolutely, but I am reasonably sure.

"Mr. Nixon. Now how long did you know Mr. Peters during this period?

"Mr. Chambers. From about 1932 or 1933 until 1938.

"Mr. Nixon. Did you travel to and from New York and Washington with him on any occasion?

"Mr. Chambers. Yes; I did. Both by train and by car.

"Mr. NIXON. With Mr. Peters?

"Mr. CHAMBERS. Yes, sir. The car might make an interesting aside.

"Mr. Nixon. The what?

"Mr. Chambers. The car might make an interesting aside.

"Mr. NIXON. Yes?

"Mr. Chambers. There was, at that time, working in the Bureau of Indian Affairs, a Hungarian girl Communist who was living either as the wife or otherwise of Roy Hudson, a member of the Politburo, I believe, a maritime organizer of some kind, and it was in her car that we traveled down there together. What year that would be I am not quite certain, but I should think it might be 1936 or something like that.

"CONTACTS WITH SOVIET AGENTS

"Mr. NIXON. Was it just you and Mr. Peters alone in the car?

"Mr. Chambers. No. The girl was driving. I don't remember her name.

"Mr. NIXON. Mr. Chambers, you have testified that Mr. Peters was your immediate superior in the underground and, to the best of your knowledge, was the head of the entire underground movement in the United States. Can you tell the committee whether or not Mr. Peters was, during the time that you knew him, in contact with any agents of the Russian Government or the Russian Communist Party?

"Mr. Chambers. It is my impression that he was, in a number of cases in which

I do not know the details, and I can specify certain others.

"Mr. Nixon. This impression was gathered from what Peters told you? "Mr. Chambers. In part, and in part from introductions which he made.

"Mr. Nixon. In part from introductions?

"Mr. CHAMBERS. In other words, he introduced me to some of these people

whom I will now describe, if you wish.

"Mr. Nixon. I see. Well, now, can you tell the committee any specific example of Mr. Peters' contact with agents of the Russian Government or the Russian Communist Party?

"Mr. Chambers, Yes. Mr. Peters, around 1937, I believe, introduced me to a man under the name of Ewald, which I presume is E-v-o-r or E-w-a-l-d. It is a fairly common European name. Mister, or just Ewald, seemed to be a Russian, but I understood from Peters that he was a Lett, from Latvia. This Ewald later became internationally famous as the result of his disappearance.

"Mr. Nixon. Well, the line that you were proceeding on.

"Mr. Chambers. All right. About 1937, I believe, two Americans traveling to Europe under the name of Robinson dropped out of sight in Italy. They were then, I believe, traced on their way to Russia, traveling under another set of passports in the name of Rubins.

"Mrs. Rubins said that she was happy in prison and did not wish to return to the United States, did not wish to have any help from Americans. Mr. Robinson-

Rubins was Ewald.

"Mr. Nixon. He was Ewald. Now, do you know from any of your conversations with Peters whether he had any connection with this Robinson-Rubins-Ewald

case that you have spoken about?

"Mr. Chambers. Yes. I understood not only that he had connection with that case but I gather that, prior to that, Peters and this man Ewald had been working together securing false passports for birth certificates or naturalization papers on which American passports could be secured.

"Mr. Nixon. How were the passports on the Robinson-Rubins case obtained?

"Mr. Chambers. They were obtained in a rather unusual way. Instead of going through the usual channels, the Robinson-Rubins or their representatives went to one of the New York councilmen and the passports were issued through his office. Later, I believe it was established that clerks in his office were Communists or suspected Communists, and I understood from Mr. Peters that he had arranged the passport deal for Ewald-Robinson-Rubins.

"Mr. NINON, Mr. Peters arranged the passport deal. That is what he told you?

"Mr. CHAMBERS. Yes.

"Mr. NIXON. Now, during the time that Peters was head of the underground, would you say that, during that time, he was working in the interests of the Government of the Soviet Union rather than in the interests of the United States?

"Mr. Chambers. He was certainly not working in the interests of the United States. He was working against the interests of the United States. How directly he was working for the Government of the Soviet Union I don't think I can say absolutely, but it is implied that every Communist, by the fact of being a Communist, is working for the Government of the Soviet Union.

(Whittaker Chambers wrote a book entitled "Witness" dealing with his experiences in the Communist Party. In this volume he deals extensively with the

career of J. Peters. The book is quoted in part:)
"The Soviet espionage apparatus in Washington also maintained constant contact with the national underground of the American Communist Party in the person of its chief. He was a Hungarian Communist who had been a minor official in the Hungarian Soviet Government of Bela Kun. He was in the United States illegally and was known variously as J. Peters, Alexander Stevens, Isidore Boorstein, Mr. Silver, etc. His real name was Alexander Goldberger and he had studied law at the University of Debrecen in Hungary * * * " (pp. 32 and 33).

"The first time I met Peters in Washington we walked from the Union Station to a downtown restaurant. In New York Peters' manner had always been that of a minor commissar—a little more human that the breed, for he had a sense of humor—but reserved, innately distrustful, secretive. In Washington he was like a king returned to his kingdom—suddenly gay and expansive. He enlarged on the party's organizational and human resources in Washington, mentioning, among others, the man whose name he always pronounced 'Awl-jur'—with a kind of drawling pleasure; for he took an almost parental pride in Alger Hiss. Then, with a little inclusive wave of his pudgy hand, he summed up. 'Even in Germany under the Weimar Republic,' said Peters, 'the party did not have what we have here' (p. 32 and 33).

"The party moved at once to find out what had become of me. The day after my disappearance Colonel Bykov, the head of the Soviet apparatus, and J. Peters, the head of the underground Communist Party, U. S. A., paid a somewhat awesome visit to 'Paul.' The mood of both chiefs was glum and that of Bykov rather desperate. This information, and what follows, was given me by Paul himself

on a later occasion.

"'Paul' was the pseudonym of a secret Communist who had been turned over to the Soviet apparatus by the American Communist Party for the specific purpose of using his business to provide legal 'cover' for a Soviet underground apparatus to be set up in England. For various reasons, that apparatus was never set up. Instead, Paul provided legal 'cover' for a Soviet apparatus op-

erating in Japan.

"The world knew Paul better as Maxim Lieber, an authors' agent, who handled, among others, the profitable marketing problems of Erskine Caldwell, author of Tobacco Road, God's Little Acre and other best-selling fiction. Paul also handled Tobacco Road when it was made into a play which, lacing social consciousness with a dash of pornography, ran so long on Broadway that it closed at last chiefly because there was scarcely a literate American of playgoing age who had not seen it. This enabled Paul to buy a farm in Bucks County, Pa., which also played its small part in the underground. In 1938 Paul's office was on Fifth Avenue in New York City.

"Paul knew J. Peters from earlier days in the American Communist

Party * * *" (p. 44).

"* * * Still later, J. Peters was to introduce me to a Soviet agent, who under the pseudonyms of Robinson and Rubens, was the center of a celebrated international mystery. (He was also the subject of one of the little memos in Alger Hiss' acknowledged handwriting which figured in the Hill trials) (p. 245).

"Deals were freely made to win away key figures to the new regime. Some years later, J. Peters was to boast to me that, for a price, he had brought over the Hungarian section of the Communist Party to the Stalinists. The price, he explained complacently, had been his appointment as chief of the whole underground section of the American Communist Party" (p. 250 and 251).

"* * * I wrote through one night and by morning had completed a rather long story. It was about a farmers' rising in the West and the part played in it by an intelligent Communist * * *. In Washington, one day, J. Peters surprised me by mentioning that he had been in Moscow when the stories appeared. He had fought fiercely to keep the State Publishing House from translating and publishing them. I asked him why. 'They are against the party,' he said, and we both dropped the touchy subject. At the time, I thought that Comrade Peters' views were somewhat narrow.

"I think now that anyone who has the patience to read those four stories will agree that I was wrong, and that Comrade Peters was right. For, in retrospect, it is easy to see that the stories are scarcely about communism at all. Communism is the context in which they are told. What they are really about is the spirit of man in four basic commitments—in suffering, under discipline, in defeat, in death. In each it is not the political situation, but the spirit of man which is triumphant. The success of the stories was due to the fact that, for the first time, that spirit spoke to American Communists in a context and a language which it was permissible for them to hear. For the same reason, Peters feared the stories. For he rightly sensed that communism may never make truce with

the spirit of man. If it does, sooner or later it is the spirit of man that will always triumph, for it draws its strength from a deeper fountain" (pp. 261, 263, and 264).

"Vacations for party members were not well thought of among Communists. But Max Bedacht announced one day that he felt need of a rest and change of scene. He would introduce me to a substitute who would act as contact with the apparatus during Max's vacation. His replacement turned out to be my old acquaintance of Daily Worker days, J. Peters. Comrade Peters was no longer with the Hungarian Communist weekly. He had become head of the entire underground section of the American Communist Party. As such, he was one of the two or three most powerful men in the party. He was also a lurking figure of fate in the lives of millions of Americans who did not dream that he existed.

"Peters, of course, never sat down and disclosed to me the exact dimensions or the complex detail of his invisible empire. But I could gain some idea of its scope from the practical questions that from time to time he raised with me. They ranged from personnel problems, involving men who were highly placed in the State and Treasury Departments, to a problem of spontaneous sabotage by the Communist secret cell in the airplane-propeller-casting room of an aluminum company.\(^1\) He was in touch with Communists in the Narragansett Torpedo Base, in the Electric Boat Co. (submarines for the U. S. Navy), in the Department of Justice, and in Hollywood, whose thriving underground made him eestatic. He was also in direct touch with a number of separate Soviet underground apparatuses. For he operated a special apparatus of his own for the wholesale procurement of birth certificates and naturalization papers and for tampering with official records—all a part of the important business of securing fraudulent passports.

"Unlike Bedacht, Peters was eager to cooperate with Ulrich's underground. For a time, I continued to deal separately with both men. Tactically, this was advantageous, for it tended to develop a 'Socialist competition' between them. Organizationally, it was undesirable because it doubled the risks of meeting, and all other risks. At last I gave Ulrich my opinion of Bedacht and Peters and asked him which I should retain as the contact. 'There is a Turish proverb,' said Ulrich. 'It says: If you must choose between two wolves, a wolf that has eaten and a wolf that is hungry, choose the wolf that has eaten.' Bedacht was the wolf that had eaten. But he had eaten too well. In the end, I retained Peters. Bedacht was never officially dropped. I simply ceased to see him. Peters became the exclusive contact with the Soviet underground (pp. 309 and

310).

"* * * Somewhat breathlessly, Harold Ware reported to J. Peters, the head of the underground section of the American Communist Party, with whom Hall was in close touch, that the possibilities for Communist organization in Washington went far beyond farming.

"I do not know how many of those young men and women were already Communists when Ware met them and how many joined the Communist Party because of him. His Influence over them was personal and powerful. But about the time that Ulrich and Charlie were initiating me into the Gallery and invisible ink, Harold Ware and J. Peters were organizing the Washington prospects into the

secret Communist group now known by Ware's name—the Ware group.

"Under oath, before the House Commmittee on Un-American Activities, Lee Pressman, in 1951, testified that he, Witt, Abt, and Kramer had been Communists and members of this group. He also gave an account of its organization which may well bear a sketchy resemblance to its first formative stage. But, by 1934, the Ware group had developed into a tightly organized underground, managed by a directory of seven men. In time it included a number of secret subcells whose total membership I can only estimate—probably about 75 Communists. Sometimes they were visited officially by J. Peters who lectured them on Com-

^{1&}quot;According to Peters, the aluminum company had been plagued by microscopic flaws in its propellers, the cause of which a careful check failed to reveal. The flaws were caused by members of the cell making tiny spitballs from the cellophane wrapping of their cigarette packs, and spitting them into the molten flux. Peters' problem was whether to order this pointless sabotage to be stopped, and thereby risk dulling the revolutionary temper of the comrades, on whether to wink at it and thereby risk eventual detection. I have forgotten what he decided" (p. 310).

munist organization and Leninist theory and advised them on general policy and specific problems. For several of them were so placed in the New Deal agencies (notably Alger Hiss, Nathan Witt, John Abt, and Lee Pressman) that they were

in a position to influence policy at several levels.

"They were so well-placed that the thought had occurred to Comrade Peters, and no doubt to others, that such human material could be used more effectively, and moreover, that it was poor organization to leave so many promising Communists in one large group where everybody knew everybody else. Peters proposed to separate the most likely ones (an almost invariable underground practice) and place them in another distinct underground—a parallel apparatus—much more rigorously segregated and subdivided. When advisable, other Communists would be added to this special apparatus from other undergrounds in Washington. For the Ware group was not the only Communist underground in the capital. This task Peters assigned to me (p. 335).

"I knew of Miss Smedley as the author of Daughter of Earth, a novel about her Western girlhood, and as a persistent spokesman for the Chinese Communists. I asked Peters to arrange a meeting for me with her so that I could introduce a friend (Don) to her. I said that it would be unnecessary for Peters to go along (I did not want him to see Don) since I would easily recognize Miss Smedley from her pictures. I met her in an Automat on 72d Street in New York. Peters had not told her whom she was going to meet and she was extremely surprised and distrustful at meeting a stranger (p. 366).

"J. Peters, whom I was seeing regularly, gave the Washington activity a sudden new turn. I have already mentioned his plans for financing the American Communist underground with the help of the Russians. One day, by way of broaching this idea, he observed that, until the first 5-year plan began in the Soviet Union (circa 1929), the Communist International had subsidized the American Communist Party. During the rigors of the 5-year plan, that subsidy had been stopped, and the American Communist Party had been ordered to sup-'The beggars of the Machavaya,' as Comrade Stalin sometimes graciously called the representatives of the foreign Communist Parties (after the Moscow address of the Communist International), would now have to beg elsewhere. This, said Peters, had worked great hardships. Therefore, he had contrived a plan whereby the Russian Communists might continue to finance the American Communist Party—for services rendered. Through the Ware group and others, Peters had access to Government documents. He proposed to connect me with the right people who would turn such documents over to me. Peters would provide me with a Leica camera. I would copy the documents, return them to whomever gave them to me and turn the copies over to Bill. If he were interested, Bill would pay for them. Peters appealed to me, as an American Communist, to cooperate (pp. 369 and 370).

PROBLEMS OF THE UNDERGROUND

"I had reference to an episode that occurred while Alger was living at P Street. His position with the munitions investigation had become so strong that he himself proposed to me that he could use the authority of the Senate committee to secure confidential documents from the State Department, which I could then

photograph and turn over to the Communist Party.

"I discussed the problem with Peters. He was again excited by the possibility of selling material to Bill. I told Alger to go ahead. In the name of the Senate Munitions Investigating Committee, he requested certain documents from the State Department. The State Department was reluctant, but, in view of the popular excitement about the committee's investigation, no doubt thought it advisable to release a few documents. These Alger brought home. I photographed them in his P Street house (p. 375).

"* * Peters came down especially from New York for an election meeting of the leading committee of the group. There was a long discussion in the living room of Henry Collins' apartment. I was in the apartment at the time, but I took no part in the discussion. I sat alone in the dining room, reading.

"At last Peters joined me. He was worried. A crisis, he said, had developed in the group. Victor Perlo believed that he should succeed Ware as group leader.

He was being stubborn and surly about it. All the other members of the leadership believed that Nathan Witt was Ware's natural heir. A deadlock had resulted, for, though the rest might easily have outvoted Perlo, they did not wish to risk trouble in the group by alienating him. Peters was also for Witt. So was I. But Peters did not wish to use his authority to act against any member of the group in favor of another member. Peters asked me if I would come in and, since my personal authority was high with the group, give my reasons why I was for Witt (p. 379).

"In 1937, Colonel Boris Bykov decided that we should again make an attempt to recruit Duggan. From Peters 1 had learned that Frederick Vanderbilt Field (recently in and out of court and jail in New York in connection with bail for some of the convicted Communist leaders) was also a great friend of Luggan. For

of the convicted Communist leaders) was also a great friend of Duggan. For the express purpose of recruiting Duggan, J. Peters introduced me to Fred Field in New York. The great-grandson of Commodore Vanderbilt took me to lunch, appropriately at the Vanderbilt Hotel, and I watched with some amusement the casual way in which my millionaire comrade signed the chit (p. 382).

asual way in which my immonante comfade signed the circ (p. 502).

"I met Richard once or twice afterwards, simply because Peters had business with him and I was seeing a good deal of Peters. Richard, Peters explained to me, was not a happy man. The chief of his international apparatus was known as 'Starik' (Russian for old man). Starik was also a Lett and Richard's protector. Starik had just been removed and Richard was afraid that he had been liquidated (the purge was on). I did not know that Starik was really General Berzin, and that he was not only Richard's international chief, but mine. Nor did I guess that Starik's removal might have had something to do with the strange, delayed history of the English apparatus. Least of all did I realize that Starik's removal was a stride in Stalin's consolidation of power and that it meant that the GPU had moved in on the military intelligence, most of whose chiefs were about to be secretly shot, together with much of its personnel, including Richard (p. 398).

were false. Starik had not been removed. Richard had received a friendly message from him, pointing out that Richard had been away from 'home' a long time, that he deserved a rest and inviting him back for the celebration (Russians are epicures of a grim irony) of the October Revolution. The letter was genine, for Richard had recognized Starik's signature. With Peters' help, Richard began to prepare to return to Moscow.

"* * * Richard applied for both passports through the county clerk's office where three contacts of J. Peters' underground apparatus were employed. After Richard received the passport in the Robinson name, he had the Robinson pictures replaced by pictures of himself and his wife. But the application filed

in the State Department still bore the Robinson pictures * * * (p. 399).

"It came at the end of a weeping autumn day. J. Peters had walked me up Fifth Avenue. It was early evening. The rush-hour traffic was jamming Fifth Avenue and the rush-hour crowds were jamming the intersections. At 49th Street we were held up by the traffic and the crowd. Peters peered across in front of St. Patrick's Cathedral and said: "There's our man.' Neither of us then knew any name for him. Peters, who had already been connected with him in ways I never asked about, was there to connect me with him (p. 405, 406).

"That was the beginning of my acquaintance with Col. Boris Bykov, whose behavior baffled me beyond anything I had met with, even in a Russian. It was only very slowly, as we continued to rush down streets and on and off conveyances,

that I realized that Bykov was frightened.

"At that time, I did not know that his real name was Boris Bykov or that he was a pathological coward—that under certain unexpected pressures, or in special situations, like his arrival in a strange country whose language he could not speak, his nerves came apart in rage, fear, and suspicion. Those facts, and Bykovs name, I was to learn 2 years later from Gen. Walter Krivitsky. Bykov had once been sent to assist Krivitsky in a Soviet espionage group in Fascist Italy. After a fortnight of the same kind of panic that I witnessed in New York, Bykov had to be sent back to Moscow because his flagrant terror endangered the whole apparatus (p. 407).

"I went to J. Peters, who was in Washington constantly in 1937, and whom I also saw regularly in New York. I explained the problem to him and asked for a Communist in the Treasury Department who could 'control' White. suggested Dr. Harold Glasser, who certainly seemed an ideal man for the purpose, since he was White's assistant, one of several Communists whom White himself had guided into the Treasury Department.

"Peters released Dr. Glasser from the American Communist underground and lent him to the Soviet underground * * * (pp. 429, 430).

"A few days later I introduced Lee Pressman to Dr. Rosenbliett. The meeting took the form of a late breakfast at Sacher's restaurant on Madison Avenue near 42d Street in New York. I soon left Pressman and the doctor together. I met Lee at least once afterward. He told me that Dr. Rosenbliett had connected him with a Russian named 'Mark.' Later on, J. Peters told me that Pressman and Mark in the course of an airplane flight to Mexico City, in connection with arms purchases for Republican Spain, had been forced down near Brownsville, Tex. Mark had been worried that newsmen or security agents might pry into the passenger list" (p. 435).

(On August 24, 1948, Mr. Louis F. Budenz, former managing editor of the

Daily Worker, amplified this testimony:)

"Mr. Stripling. As head of the underground, would it be the duties of Peters to come to Washington and contact persons who were employed in the Government?

"Mr. Budenz. In 1936 and 1937, to be specific, Peters was one of the busiest men on the ninth floor of the party. There were all sorts of mysterious people there to see him. When I say 'mysterious,' they were not accounted for, they waited for him, and he had a certain air of secrecy about him. seem strange, to put it that way, but the thing is, for example, there were many precautions to get to see him, and, in addition to that, you always had to indicate what name, even below, within the apparatus, what name you knew him by. That is why he was so abrupt with me when I addressed him personally by the

wrong name, because I was supposed to ask on the telephone for the new name. "Now, the thing is, it was Peters—to give the background of it just a moment, and it may seem to little wide of the question, but it was Peters who advised me that the conspiratorial apparatus of the party was the most important apparatus. He asked me when I came up there one day, did I know the Communist Party well, and I said that I did, I thought. Then, he told me that I did not know it at all, that the part I saw was only a very small part of the party. The most important part was the conspiratorial apparatus. That was preparatory to my being introduced to the NKVD, the Soviet secret police here in the United States, by Golos.

"But Peters was known within the official apparatus and advised me himself that he was engaged in conspiratorial work. He had to advise me so that I would understand how to approach him, how to deal with him, and how not to

approach him when it was necessary in his work.

"* * * For example, I know that J. Peters was in charge of conspiratorial work for the party. I know that Mr. Golos was not only chairman of the control commission of the party, secretly, and directing the disciplining of the party members, but that he was engaged in this secret work.

"I know, likewise, that Washington was a matter of great interest to the Communist Party, and I do know that Mr. Peters was deeply interested in Washing-I could not follow all his contacts here, but I know that a great part of his conspiratorial work had to do with Washington, because of observations he made to me, safeguards that he threw on our conversations, and the like."

(Louis F. Budenz testified further on January 15, 1952, with regard to the activities of J. Peters as follows:)

"Mr. TAVENNER. Who was J. Peters?
"Mr. Budenz. J. Peters, as I testified in his deportation proceedings, confronting him as a witness, was the liaison officer between the Communist International apparatus in this country and the Soviet secret police operating here. He stated that to me himself, and I knew enough of his activities to know that that was correct.

"Mr. TAVENNER. Was he deported as a result of the hearings before the Immi-

gration and Naturalization Service?

"Mr. Budenz. He agreed to leave the country, although the deportation was clearly to be ordered.

"Mr. Bupenz (continuing) * * * in the fall of 1935, immediately after I joined the Communist Party, I had to make many reports to J. Peters in regard to the Trotzkyite organization. At his request, I had established contacts within that organization, and they were reporting to me, giving to me the proceedings of the national committee of the Trotzkyites, their various important meetings, and like.

"These I relayed to Peters, but had to deliver them personally" (p. 2209, Com-

munist Press in the Communist Conspiracy, 1952, HUAC, Jan. 15, 1952).

PETERS (STEVENS) TESTIFIES

(Alexander Stevens (J. Peters) testified before a congressional committee on August 30, 1948, as follows:)

"Mr. Stripling. Will you please state your full name and your present address

for the record.

"Mr. Stevens, Alexander Stevens, 8346 118th Street, Kew Gardens, Long

"Mr. Stripling. Where were you born, Mr. Stevens?
"Mr. Stevens. Cop, formerly Hungary.
"Mr. Stripling. When did you first enter the United States?

"Mr. STEVENS. 1924.

"Mr. Stripling. At what port of entry? "Mr. Stevens. New York.

"Mr. Stripling. New York. Are you a citizen of the United States?

"Mr. STEVENS. No.

"Mr. Stripling. Have you ever applied for citizenship?

"Mr. Stevens. I did.

"Mr. STRIPLING. When?

"Mr. Stevens. I don't remember the exact date. Five, 6 years or so after I arrived here.

"Mr. Stripling. What is the status of your papers at the present time?

"Mr. Stevens. I never get a satisfactory answer for my application, I think I applied once or twice after that.

"Mr. Stripling. Mr. Stevens, are you a member of the Communist Party?

"Mr. Stevens. I decline to answer that question under the first and fifth amendment to the Constitution, on the ground that my answer might tend to incriminate or degrade me.

"Mr. Stripling. Have you ever held any positions in the Communist Party of

the United States?

"Mr. Stevens. I decline to answer that question under the first and fifth amendment to the Constitution, on the ground that my answer might tend to incriminate or degrade me.

"Mr. Stripling. Have you ever been known under the name of J. Peters?

"Mr. Stevens. I decline to answer that question under the first amendment and fifth amendment of the Constitution, on the ground that my answer might tend to incriminate me.

"Mr. Stripling. Did you ever serve in the United States as the representa-

tive of the Communist International of the Communist Party?

"Mr. Stevens. I decline to answer that question under the fifth amendment and first amendment to the Constitution, on the ground that my answer might tend to incriminate me.

"Mr. Stripling. You refuse to answer whether or not you ever acted as a

representative of the Communist International?

'Mr. Stevens. I decline to answer that question on the ground that it will incriminate me, under the fifth amendment to the Constitution.

"Mr. Stripling. Is your signature, the name J. Peters, Mr. Stevens?

"Mr. Stevens. I decline to answer that question under the fifth amendment of the Constitution, on the ground that it might tend to incriminate me or degrade

"Mr. Stripling. Did you ever travel on a passport to the Soviet Union under

the name of Isidore Boorstein?

"Mr. Stevens. I decline to answer that question under the fifth amendment of the Constitution. It might tend to incriminate me.
"Mr. Stripling. Have you ever been known by any other name other than

Alexander Stevens?

"Mr. Stevens. I decline to answer that question under the fifth amendment of the Constitution, because it might tend to incriminate me.

"Mr. Stripling. Mr. Stevens, the charge has been made before the committee by Whittaker Chambers that you directed an underground apparatus which operated in the Federal Government beginning in 1934. Did you ever participate or direct the operation of any apparatus which was under the control of the Communist Party for the purpose of infiltrating the Federal Government?

"Mr. Stevens. I decline to answer that question under the first and fifth amendments to the Constitution, on the ground that my answer might tend to

incriminate or degrade me.

"Mr. Stripling. Do you know Whittaker Chambers?

"Mr. Stevens. I decline to that question under the fifth amendment of the Constitution, on the ground that my answer might degrade and incriminate me.

"Mr. Stripling. Will you stand up, please?

"Mr. Stevens, this individual is Whittaker Chambers. Have you ever seen this individual before in your life?

'Mr. Stevens. I decline to answer.

"Mr. STRIPLING. Did you know him under the name of Whittaker Chambers in 1934?

"Mr. Stevens. I decline to answer that question, on the ground that it would incriminate me under the fifth amendment of the Constitution.

"Mr. Stripling. Did you know him in 1935?

"Mr. Stevens. I decline to answer that question under the fifth amendment of the Constitution, as it may incriminate me.

"Mr. Stripling. Mr. Stevens, do you know an individual by the name of Alger

Hiss?

"Mr. STEVENS. I decline to answer that question under the fifth amendment to the Constitution, on the ground that my answer might tend to incriminate me.

"Mr. Stripling. Mr. Chairman, in order to expedite the hearing, if it is agreeable with counsel, I am going to ask this witness if he knows of 20 or 30 individuals, and if the same answer is agreeable with counsel, will it be agreeable with the committee, to avoid the repetition?

"Mr. McDowell. That we assume that his refusal to answer is on the grounds

that it may tend to incriminate him?

"Mr. Stripling. Under the fifth amendment. Is that correct?

"Mr. McDowell. Is that agreeable to counsel?

"Miss King. It is agreeable.

"Mr. Stripling. If special reasons arise, you may add them, but if not, you are claiming only this particular ground and so state.

"Mr. McDowell. Proceed. I want you to pay particular attention to the names he mentions to be sure you know what your answer is going to be. Proceed.

"Mr. Stripling. Donald Hiss. "Mr. Stevens. Same answer.

"Mr. Stripling. Henry Collins. "Mr. Stevens. Same answer.

"Mr. Stripling. John Abt.

"Mr. Stevens. Same answer. "Mr. STRIPLING. Lee Pressman.

"Mr. Stevens. Same answer. "Mr. STRIPLING. Victor Perlo.

"Mr. Stevens. Same answer. "Mr. Stripling. Abraham George Silverman.

"Mr. Stevens. Same answer. "Mr. Stripling. Mrs. Alger Hiss.

"Mr. Stevens. Same answer.

"Mr. Stripling. Did you ever know an individual by the name of Harold Ware?

"Mr. Stevens. Same answer.

"Mr. Stripling. Mr. Chairman, I am going to ask Mr. Russell to read the list.

"Mr. Russell. Nathan Gregory Silvermaster.

"Mr. Stevens. Same answer.

"Mr. Russell. Solomon Adler. "Mr. Stevens. Same answer.

"Mr. Russell. Norman Bursler. "Mr. Stevens. Same answer.

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"Mr. RUSSELL. Bela Gold.

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- "Mr. Russell. Sonia Gold.
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- "Mr. Stripling. Nathan Witt.
- "Mr. Stevens. Same answer."

(The above-named individuals were named as members of an underground ring of the Communist Party operating within the Government by Elizabeth Bentley and Whittaker Chambers.)

IMMIGRATION STATUS OF ALEXANDER STEVENS OR ALEXANDER GOLDBERGER OR J. PETERS OR ISIDORE BOORSTEIN OR BOORSTEIN, OR STEVE MILLER

J. Peters first entered the United States on February 10, 1924, at New York, for permanent residence. His last reentry into the United States was on September 5, 1928, with a reentry permit. However, although this last reentry is verified from official records, it is known that he departed and reentered the United States a number of times subsequent to 1928, since it has been established that he was present at the Lenin School in Moscow during the years 1931 and 1932. J. Peters was a Comintern agent from Moscow, although his official positions within the Communist Party apparatus were known to be district organizer of the New York district of the Communist Party and organizational

secretary for the same district. It is also known and it has been established that J. Peters was head of the Communist espionage apparatus in the United States.

He was arrested for deportation proceedings on October 8, 1947, and released on that date on \$5,000 bond. Warrant hearings were held during August and

September 1948.

A warrant for Peters' deportation was issued on April 12, 1949. On May 3, 1949, an order was entered granting the subject voluntary departure from the United States under the outstanding warrant of deportation. On May 6, 1949, he departed from the United States by plane from New York on KLM plane to Hungary via Holland.

Mr. MANDEL. Is Peters now in this country?

Mr. LAUTNER. No.

Mr. Mandel. Well, how did it happen that he is no longer in this country? Mr. Lauther. Well, he was under bail to the Immigration and Naturalization Service and in 1949 there came a time where there was some understanding made between the Service and the attorneys of J. Peters that the bail would be lifted if he would voluntarily depart from the United States. This happened some time in the early summer of 1949. My recollection is that on Friday, on this very same day, when his bail was lifted, by the Immigrational and Naturalization Service, we had a very intimate little dinner somewhere around Fourth Street and Second Avenue in a little restaurant, and the people that I recall being there were Gus Hall, John Williamson, myself, May Miller, possibly Jack Stachel, but I am not certain, Stretch Johnson, and Ann Rollins, and others—altogether about 12 to 15 people. John Williamson spoke—Henry Winston was also there—where John Williamson praised the activities of J. Peters. And John Williamson, in substance, said that if he had to search and seek in his mind any single individual who made a more significant contribution to the growth and development of the Communist Party in the United States he could not find such other person in his mind. That was a terrific recognition for Peters' services for the Communist Party in the United States.

The next morning, Saturday morning, he went out to Idlewild Airport, took a KLM plane and left the United States. The day before, Ann Rollins, his wife, I spoke to her, and he had told me she was going downtown to the Hungarian Consulate to pick up a Hungarian passport for him, J. Peters. So, J. Peters

became a Hungarian citizen before he left the United States.

Mr. Mandel. Now, have you heard anything about the career of Peters since

he left this country?

Mr. Lautner. Yes; I got a letter from him at one time in which he asked me to clip all the newspapers relating to the Whittaker Chambers' testimony and the trial of Hiss, in 1949.

I did that and these clippings were mailed to him by Zoltan Deak, editor of

the Hungarian Communist paper in New York.

At that time, in his letter, when Peters asked for these clippings he also said that his assignment in Hungary by the party was to be in charge of all publications that go to Hungarian Communist Party members and sympathizers throughout the world. So, Peters was building again a worldwide network of contacts through these publications, through the publication project for the Hungarian Communist Party.

Mr. Mandel. Thank you, Mr. Lautner.

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SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY UNITED STATES SENATE

OF THE

EIGHTY-FOURTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES

JUNE 6 AND 7, 1956

PART 28

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Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws

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SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 6, 1956

UNITED STATES SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS, OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,

Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 11:25 a.m., in room 155, Senate Office Building, Senator Olin D. Johnston presiding.

Present: Senator Johnston.

Also present: Robert Morris, chief counsel; William A. Rusher, administrative counsel; Benjamin Mandel, research director; and Robert McManus, research analyst.

Senator Johnston. The subcommittee will come to order. Mr. Morris. Will Mr. Levine come forward, please?

Senator Johnston. Do you solemnly swear the testimony you will give in this hearing will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. LEVINE. Î do.

Senator Johnston. Have a seat.

Mr. Morris. Senator, there are three items on the agenda this morning. One is, we would like to put some information into the record on the inquiry that we are engaged in in the Judith Coplon case. can put some information into the record on the Burgess-MacLean case. Mr. Levine has some background testimony in connection with a matter that will be of importance to the hearing.

Then, we have a witness who is going to testify today, who came from Chicago last night, on the meaning in connection with internal security, of the recent rapprochement between Tito and the leaders in

Moscow.

Naturally, we don't know the full consequences of that, but what we have to do is make a survey as to what is at stake if there should be a full-scale alliance between Tito and the Soviet Union. We have some information on Yugoslav nationals affiliated with the Embassy, delegates to the United Nations, how many Yugoslav newspapers there are in the country, and other such considerations.

Mr. Levine will be the first witness.

Mr. Levine, will you give your full name and address to the repoter?

TESTIMONY OF ISAAC DON LEVINE, WALDORF, MD.

Mr. LEVINE. Isaac Don Levine, Waldorf, Md.

Mr. Morris. What is your business or profession, Mr. Levine?

Mr. LEVINE. I am a writer and editor.

Mr. Morris. And you have had considerable experience in the field of intelligence; have you not?

Mr. Levine. Well, I have had considerable experience in the field

of Soviet former intelligence agents.

Mr. Morris. It was you, was it not, Mr. Levine, who first brought Mr. Chambers to Adolf Berle in 1939?

Mr. Levine. Yes, sir.

Mr. Morris. And it was your testimony of the notes of the conversation between Adolf Berle and Mr. Chambers that appeared in the hearing at that time?

Mr. Levine. Yes, sir.

Mr. Morris. You also knew Walter Krivitsky?

Mr. Levine. Very well. Mr. Morris. I wonder if you would tell the committee a little bit in the way of background and historicity as to your personal experiences with Krivitsky, so we can have those in connection with Burgess-

Mr. Levine. General Walter Krivitsky, who was found shot at the Bellevue Hotel in Washington on February 10, 1941, told me, during my collaboration with him on a series of articles published in the Saturday Evening Post in 1939, that while he was in the Soviet service abroad, as chief of the Soviet intelligence in Western Europe, he had knowledge of 2 Soviet agents who had been introduced into the British service, I into the code room of the Imperial Council, the other into that of the Foreign Office.

Krivitsky told me that in the greatest confidence, and he also had informed me that at least \$200,000 had been expended over a period of 2 or 3 years by Stalin's intelligence agents abroad to bring about the infiltration of these 2 men in key positions in Great Britain. He knew the name of one of these men. His name was King, K-i-n-g.

Mr. Morris. Was there a first name that he knew?

Mr. LEVINE. He did not know the first name. He did not know

He knew something about the second man, his characteristics, but he did not know his name nor his alias. The characteristics were that of a young Scotsman who had been imbued with communism in the early thirties, and who subsequently was induced to enter the service of the British diplomacy, the service of the British Government.

After my seeing Mr. Berle and Marvin McIntyre at the White House, in connection with the Chambers revelations, I felt, upon the outbreak of the war, that two such agents working for Stalin in London would of necessity convey all important information to Hitler because at that time Stalin and Hitler were partners and had signed a pact in August 1939 which had ushered in World War II.

Whereupon, I told Mr. Berle about it, although it was a violation of a confidence conveyed to me by Krivitsky several months before the outbreak of the war, but I felt the presence of force majeure. Thereupon, Mr. Berle thought that I should bring the matter to the attention of the British Ambassador here, who at that time was Lord Lothian, L-o-t-h-i-a-n, formerly Kerr, formerly secretary to Lloyd George.

I did not know Lord Lothian. I was a resident of Connecticut at the time. Arrangements were made for me to meet Lord Lothian.

Lord Lothian listened to my story, and there was a very obvious smile on his face, a smile of incredulity. However, since I did give him the name, he thought, in view of the introduction from the State Department, that the matter should be looked into.

Two to three weeks later, sometime in October 1939, I received a telephone call from the British Embassy, and I was asked when I would

be back in Washington.

When I returned to Washington in a few days, Lord Lothian had with him in his office Mr. Victor Mallett, who later became British Ambassador to Sweden, Italy, Spain, and other countries and who, at that time, held a rank next to that of the British Ambassador in the

Mr. Morris. Will you spell Mr. Mallett's name for us?

Mr. Levine. M-a-l-l-e-t-t; Victor; a 6-foot-6 individual, a very out-

standing and unforgettable human being.

It appeared there was no longer any smile on Lord Lothian's face. They found that King was in the code room of the Foreign Office, and apparently they had put him under surveillance; the information was confirmed. The man was arrested, and now they wanted to know about the second man, the Scotsman whom I described even to the point of his clothes—at least, he used to affect a cape, according to Krivitsky's description of the man to me.

Mr. Morris. Before going on to that part, Mr. Levine, will you tell

us what ultimately happened to King?

Mr. Levine. What happened to King was that 2 months later, he was reported as having been executed in the Tower of London. information did not come to me until several months after the event.

Mr. Morris. Was that publicized at the time? Mr. Levine. Never.

The only time it was mentioned, Judge Morris, was in a syndicated article by Randolph Churchill, published in the press, a somewhat garbled account of the whole affair, around 1946 or early 1947. That should be easily available in the Library of Congress, or from the British Information Office or from the British Embassy.

Mr. Morris. Did you say that it was a garbled account, that you told

us about just now?

Mr. Levine. Yes. He apparently had no access to the documents to the case, but he had picked up enough information, because of his father's connections, to know the bones were there; the exact facts were not available to him.

Senator Johnston. What position were you holding at the time you

were finding out this information?

Mr. Levine. Senator, I was a private American citizen, a taxpayer, exactly the way I am now, and I never got, sir, even a nickel for a telephone call for all my efforts.

Senator Johnston. How did you make these connections with these

Commies?

Mr. Levine. Well, the connections came when, as a writer, General Krivitsky, upon his arrival in the United States, had sought me out because he wanted to present his story in a leading American magazine. After he told me the story I went down to Philadelphia and sold it to the Saturday Evening Post.

That, sir, led, in turn, to the connection with Chambers and to many other connections with people who either had stories to sell or who thought they had stories to sell.

Senator Johnston. Do you know how he found out about you and

how he managed to get in touch with you?

Mr. Levine. Oh, very easily.

Senator Johnston. I think that ought to go into the record.

Mr. Levine. Well, he had been brought to the United States with the help of Ambassador Bullitt and of Colonel Office in Ambassador Bullitt's office in Paris; of 2 or 3 other people. For example, Alexander Barmine knew him in Paris. A good many of these people knew about me.

So, on his arrival in the United States, with the only baggage he had, his story, he had me down as one of the persons to contact. I had

known Mr. Bullitt since 1918, sir.

Senator Johnston. When the Communists started their work at

that time, we hadn't become so aware of it, either. Is that so?

Mr. Levine. It is quite so, sir, but I am not sure we are fully aware

of it now.

Senator Johnston. I think you are right.

So it made it easier for you to get information then than even now?

Mr. Levine. Yes, sir.

Mr. Morris. I would like to say for the record at this point in May of 1951 we took the executive session testimony of Mr. Barmine. Subsequently he testified publicly.

One of the things he testified about publicly was the conversations with the said General Krivitsky prior to the time Barmine came to the United States. At that time Krivitsky warned Barmine of Commu-

nist agents in the United States.

We have put some of those names in the record. But the other names I haven't put into the public record because they weren't relative to the inquiry we were conducting at that time. They may at any time you think appropriate go into the record.

Mr. Levine, would you resume and tell us about that? This is now

your second visit to the British Embassy, or your third?

Mr. Levine. Second.

Mr. Morris. Will you tell us what happened at the time of the second visit to the British Embassy? This was October——

Mr. Levine. October 1939.

The gentlemen present with the Ambassador asked me how they could bring Krivitsky to Great Britain and whether it was a question of money. I told them that it was primarily a question of prestige and any monetary considerations would militate against bringing Krivitsky over there because he wanted to be of service. I suggested to them that the best way to go about it was not through me, because I had violated my word to him, but through his attorney, Mr. Louis Waldman, a well-known labor lawyer in New York and a former candidate on the Socialist ticket for the governorship of New York State, three times, I believe.

Mr. Waldman was thereupon called in by the British Embassy and arrangements were made for General Krivitsky to go, via Canada, under special precautions to Great Britain. Krivitsky, however, wanted to have certain guaranties that the Labor Government representatives in the British Cabinet would protect him. Mr. Waldman

was a friend of Herbert Morrison. Mr. Morrison was at that time the Home Secretary. In fact, I had met Herbert Morrison at Mr. Waldman's home several years before.

Mr. Waldman had communicated then with Herbert Morrison, in whose department this whole inquiry rested, and arrangements were completed to the satisfaction of Krivitsky to go to Great Britain.

He spent several months over there. I had reason to believe in the spring of 1940, when a very odd little dispatch appeared in the press from Moscow, that Krivitsky's presence in Great Britain was suspected by Moscow, because of the elimination, shall we say, the liquidation, of one of the top agents. They could not fail to know in Moscow that something disastrous had happened to them when Mr. King was suddenly yanked out of his office and arrested and within weeks had disappeared in the Tower of London.

As I established afterward, General Krivitsky was not able to put his fingers, beyond the information he had given me, or to identify

from any pictures, the second man.

When the MacLean story broke upon us—the Burgess-MacLean story, several years ago—I naturally took a great interest in it. First and primarily, because I knew that the British Government had been warned by me and Krivitsky in the fall of 1939 that in addition to King another young ex-Communist was operating in London in a key position for Stalin's secret service.

Mr. Morris. You say ex-Communist. What do you mean by that? Mr. Levine. Well, I mean MacLean was a young Communist when he was recruited into the secret service. As you probably know, and maybe it will stand repetition here, he had decided in 1933 to go to Russia. He had, in a book which he left behind, A History of Russia, by the famous Russian historian Pokrovski, P-o-k-r-o-v-s-k-i, with an introduction by Lenin, MacLean had underlined on Christmas Day of 1933 a passage, which I can quote in part:

"A small number of most sincere and devoted revolutionaries of the intelligentsia" could bring about the Communist revolution by making

great sacrifices.

In 1933, he had determined to go to Russia. Suddenly, and for no reason that has yet been given, his decision was revoked, and, in 1935, MacLean took examinations and entered the service of the Diplomatic Corps, the Foreign Office.

Mr. Morris. That is, after he had been to Cambridge. Had he

been to Cambridge?

Mr. Levine. Oh, yes; he had graduated from Cambridge before.

Later, he showed up in Paris. From here on, it is all deductive on my part. I have no even secondhand testimony, but I do know that Krivitsky was in touch with all kinds of underground Soviet operatives in France. Hence it was not surprising to me that from them he had learned of the 2 men, 1 of whom was identified and eliminated.

Senator Johnston. How did you learn about his connections with

the men in France?

Mr. Levine. Well, in the course of his story, he had any number of other incidents, you know, which involved other Soviet operatives. For instance, the story of the murder of Ignace Reiss, R-e-i-s-s, in Switzerland came to him via information obtained from operatives in Paris. This whole clique of Soviet agents had considerable mutual relations, partly because they had come from the same headquarters in Moscow; they knew each other, although officially they were not supposed to identify themselves to their comrades.

Mr. Morris. What were the individual notes, now, that Krivitsky

told you about, secondhand? I wonder if you could cite them all.

Mr. Levine. Well, all that I could cite is, first, that he was a Scotsman, and Donald MacLean belongs to a Scottish family. Second, that he played around in the artistic world. He met his wife, Melinda, on the Left Bank and in a cafe. I am talking about MacLean.

Mr. Morris. Krivitsky said that he played in the artistic world?

Mr. Levine. Yes, sir.
Mr. Morris. That was a description by Krivitsky?
Mr. Levine. That was his description, without knowing his name, all the time.

Mr. Morris. Any other characteristics?

Mr. Levine. That he had been a young intellectual Communist; that \$200,000 had been spent over a period of 2 or more years, to make "contacts"—that is the word they used, sir—contacts from one to the other, until they were able to guide and infiltrate these men into their underground service. Another significant fact was that MacLean had decided late in 1933 to go to Russia, and then, as I learned subsequently, gave up his decision, and 2 years later appeared in the Foreign Service. Naturally, it made me think that a lot of manipulation went on during those 2 years to convince him that his duty as a revolutionist was not to go to Russia, where there are plenty of Communists, but to serve the revolution in London, in a strategic spot.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like the record to show at this point that we have received an affidavit from Vladimir Petrov, in Australia, in which Petrov swore that he knew, from official MVD intelligence information, that Burgess and MacLean had been Soviet spies from their Cambridge days, and that at the present time, now, both of them are advising the Soviet Foreign Ministry of Anglo-

American affairs today.

I would like that fact to be in the record in connection with the testimony of Mr. Levine, and the other things we are going to put into the record today.

Senator Johnston. It is so placed in the record.

(The affidavit was numbered "Exhibit No. 285" and reads as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 285

ENCLOSURE NO. 2 TO DESPATCH NO. 418, APRIL 26, 1956, FROM AMERICAN EMBASSY, CANBERRA, AUSTRALIA

LS. 1352

I, Richard Rowland Quarmby, External Affairs Officer in the City of Sydney in the State of New South Wales of Australia, do hereby certify that the signature "K. J. Young" appearing on the attached Statutory Declaration by Vladimir Mikhailovich Petrov dated the twenty-ninth day of March one thousand nine hundred and fifty-six is the true signature of Kenneth James Young, a Justice of the Peace in the State of New South Wales of Australia.

Dated this nineteenth day of April one thousand nine hundred and fifty-six.

(Signed) R. R. QUABMBY.

I, Alfred Herbert Body, Assistant Legal Adviser of the Department of External Affairs, Canberra, Australia, having been duly authorised by the Secretary of the said Department, do hereby certify that the signature "R. R. Quarmby" appearing above is the true signature of Richard Rowland Quarmby, External Affairs Officer in the City of Sydney in the State of New South Wales of Australia.

Given under my hand and the Seal of the Department of External Affairs this twenty-fourth day of April one thousand nine hundred and fifty-six.

> (Signed) (For Secretary, Department of External Affairs).

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA. AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY. CITY OF CANBERRA,

Embassy of the United States of America, ss:

I, Herbert F. Propps, Second Secretary of Embassy of the United States of America at Canberra, Australia, duly commissioned and qualified, do hereby certify that Alfred Herbert Body, whose true signature is subscribed to the foregoing certificate, was, on the twenty-fourth day of April, 1956, Assistant Legal Adviser, Department of External Affairs, Commonwealth of Australia, to whose official acts faith and credit are due. I further certify that the seal affixed to the foregoing certificate is the official seal of the Department of External Affairs of the Commonwealth of Australia.

In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the Embassy of the United States of America at Canberra, Australia, this twenty-

fourth day of April, 1956.

(Signed) HERBERT F. PROPPS, Second Secretary of Embassy.

Tariff No. 38, Service No. 19; No Fee.

STATUTORY DECLARATION

I, Vladimir Mikhailovich Petrov, of Sydney in the State of New South Wales. do hereby solemnly and sincerely declare as follows:

1. Prior to the third day of April, One thousand nine hundred and fifty-four. I was a member of the Diplomatic Staff attached to the Soviet Embassy Canberra where my position was that of Third Secretary and MVD Resident. On the third day of April, One thousand nine hundred and fifty-four, I left the Soviet Service and voluntarily sought and was granted political asylum in Australia.

2. My MVD Assistant in the Embassy was Filipp Vasilievich Kislitsyn whose

diplomatic rank was Second Secretary.

3. In the middle of September One thousand nine hundred and fifty-three Kislitsyn came into the MVD Office in Canberra with a smile of pride and satisfaction on his face. At the time he was carrying a newspaper which contained a report on the disappearance of Mrs. Maclean and her children from Lausanne on the eleventh day of September, One thousand nine hundred and fifty-three.
4. Kislitsyn said, "So it has come off at last. I knew about this business. It has

happened just as we planned it. I must cable Moscow to ask if they want the Australian press reports about it."

5. My wife Doosia as MVD cipher clerk sent off the cable and presently re-

ceived Moscow's reply asking for all important press references.

6. When my wife and I arrived in Australia in February One thousand nine hundred and fifty-one we had never heard the name of either Burgess and Maclean, nor were we aware of their existence. When the Australian Press on the eighth day of June, One thousand nine hundred and fifty-one, published reports of their disappearance on the twenty-fifth day of May of that year we knew nothing about the matter which had no bearing on our own special sphere of duties.

7. However, as I was Kislitsyn's MVD Chief in Australia, I insisted on knowing the background to his cables about Mrs. Maclean, and he gave me the follow-

ing account of what he knew about Burgess and Maclean:

(a) "Burgess and Maclean were long-term agents who had each been independently recruited to work for Soviet Intelligence in their student days at Cambridge University.

(b) "Their flight was planned and directed from Moscow, and Kislitsyn was present during the planning of the escape operation. The reason for their flight was that they had discovered that they were under investigation by the British Security Service.

(c) "Kislitsyn had been in personal touch with the work of these two agents over a period of years. At the end of the war he had been posted to the Soviet Embassy in London as MVD cipher clerk, and himself handled the material supplied by Burgess. At this time Burgess was bringing out briefcases full of Foreign Office documents, which were photographed in the Soviet Embassy and quickly returned to him.

(d) "Kislitsyn used to encipher the more urgent information and cable it to Moscow; the rest he prepared for despatch by courier in the Diplomatic

bag.

(e) "While he was in England Kislitsyn never saw either Burgess or Maclean. However, he knew the Soviet official who was in contact with Burgess and who used to return to the Embassy with muddy clothes after his meetings, which evidently took place at some obscure country rendezvous.

(f) "Kislitsyn was in London from 1945 until 1948 when he was recalled to Moscow. There after a year on an Intelligence training course in which he specialized in English, he was appointed to the First Directorate of the Committee of Information, where he was put in charge of a special one-man

section of the top secret archives.

(g) "This section was devoted solely to the great quantity of material supplied by Maclean and Burgess. Much of it had not even been translated or distributed to the Ministries concerned, but Kislitsyn used to show particular files and documents to high-ranking officials who visited his section for the purpose.

(h) "When Burgess and Maclean discovered that they were under investigation by British Security, they reported it to their Soviet contact in

the utmost alarm.

(i) "Kislitsyn was then in Moscow and attended the conference of senior MVD officers called to discuss the possibility of getting these agents out of danger to the safety of Soviet territory.

(j) "Among those present were Colonel Raina, Chief of the First Directorate (dealing with Anglo-American territories) in the Committee of In-

formation, and Gorsky, who succeeded Raina in that post.

(k) "At this conference, the perils of the proposed operation caused much misgiving and many plans were put forward and rejected. Kislitsyn mentioned that the route finally chosen included an air passage over the border into Czechoslovakia.

(1) "Kislitsyn met them for the first time on their arrival in Moscow from London. He often visited them at the comfortable house on the outskirts of Moscow where they were accommodated, and he was the

officer responsible for their maintenance and welfare.

(m) "He signed the requisitions for their material needs and prepared plans for the best exploitation of their services. He told us that when he last saw them, they were supplied with the best of everything, were in good health, but were missing their families.

(n) "At that time they were acting as advisers to the Soviet Ministry

of Foreign Affairs on Anglo-American matters.

(o) "Kislitsyn was aware of the second plan, to get Mrs. Maclean to Moscow, and recognised some of the details when he read in the Australian news-

papers of its successful execution.

(p) "Kislitsyn said that it had been intended that Soviet officials in London should get in touch with Mrs. Maclean on the matter, but that they became too apprehensive about British Security measures to risk making contact. Later, after she went with her mother and her three children to live in Geneva, she was in touch with an MVD representative.

(q) "When Kislitsyn left Moscow for Australia at the end of One

(q) "When Kishtsyn left Moscow for Australia at the end of One thousand nine hundred and fifty-two he handed over his special section to Sadovnikov who had previously been the MVD Resident in Canberra."

And I make this solemn declaration conscientiously and sincerely believing the same to be true under and by virtue of the provisions of the Oaths Act 1900–1951.

Made and declared by the said Vladimir Mikhailovich Petrov at Sydney this 29th day of March 1956.

In the presence of:

(Signed) V. M. Petrov. (Signed) K. J. Young, Justice of the Peace for the State of New South Wales.

Mr. Morris. Is there anything else about that incident that we should know about? Have you checked with Mrs. Krivitsky recently?

Mr. Levine. I talked to her a few months ago. She knew the story, of course, and she was wondering if MacLean was the same fellow that her husband had attempted to identify, you know.

Mr. Morris. We have been making inquiries, Mr. Levine, about people who had dealings with MacLean and Burgess, here in Wash-

ington.1

I noticed from Alger Hiss' calendar—he kept a calendar in Washington—I notice on September 14, 1946, he had an appointment with MacLean at the British Embassy. Whether that was official business or not, I don't profess to know. The only fact is there was that entry in his calendar.

I wonder if that fact, that there is this entry in the calendar diary, may go into the record. I don't know if it would be desirable to put the whole diary into the record, because he was a State Department official at that time. If it is widely read, it might be subject to dif-

ferent interpretations.

You might wish to take it up with the committee.

Senator Johnston. I think we should. This could have an effect that I would hate to assume the responsibility for.

Mr. Morris. There is an entry on September 14:

MacLean at the British Embassy.

Senator Johnston. I think it would be perfectly all right, where his name appears, to have it in the record. I don't think anyone would raise any question as to that procedure.

Mr. Levine. May I make an observation in connection with this

matter?

Mr. Morris. Certainly.

Mr. Levine. There is a curious parallel between the background of Alger Hiss and that of MacLean. Those good Americans who still are wondering why Hiss did what he did should study the MacLean case. Both came from good families which had fallen on bad times. Both were taken in at the same identical hour, so to speak, at a time of a worldwide depression and the rise of Hitler in 1933. Both read books on communism by Communist leaders and were convinced that the wave of the future was a Soviet America, and a Soviet Britain, and a Soviet world, you know. Both were brilliant in their studies, and both were completely amoral and unscrupulous in their methods, in their technique.

Both had sworn, when they entered the services of their governments, to uphold the Constitutions of their governments, and both subordinated them, these oaths, to what they believed was their higher

credo, or creed; that is, Leninism.

At this particular time, if I may—and I'll conclude shortly—when Moscow is wheeling out Leninism as a new worldwide creed with which to conquer and infiltrate and entice the still free world, whatever is left of it, I think the danger in the next few years of new Hisses and new MacLeans coming out of the better colleges—because MacLean, after all, had gone to Cambridge, you know, and we have their counterparts—is a danger to which some of our responsible leaders should be alerted in connection with the headlines that are pouring in upon us, because in 1935, when MacLean entered the Soviet service, we had a similar situation as today.

¹ See p. 1527.

The popular front, the united front, came into being in 1935. Today, without the benefit of the Comintern and even the Cominform, Moscow is actually building a bigger popular front than ever before, because it includes neutralist nations and heads of governments, in addition to ex-Communists and Communists and Socialists and ex-Socialists. It is a front designed to isolate, in the end, the United States; to encircle the United States.

On the other hand, as I tried to point out in my book, which is just out, which has to do with Stalin's past—on the other hand, the Tito thing, upon which Dr. Draskovich, I know, will speak with far greater authority than I can, is part, in my opinion, of a strategic move by Moscow to bottle up the satellite nations, together with Germany, in a vise extending from Stettin on the Baltic to Trieste on the

Mediterranean.

To Khrushchev and Bulganin, Tito, with his American-equipped army is the man who licked Stalin—the only man on record who licked Stalin—and he is the best ally of the Kremlin for an enveloping operation which would condemn Germany to perpetual division and condemn Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and other satellites to domination by Tito, Moscow's ally.

I thank you, sir.

Mr. Morris. Thank you, Mr. Levine. We appreciate the testimony

you have given us this morning.

Senator Johnston. You think, I judge from your statement, that a change in the form of the Russian Government at the present time is designed only to fit the times and conditions of Russia and the world?

Mr. Levine. Yes, sir.

Senator Johnston. In other words, they are changing their tactics, which were brutal under Stalin and involved a great many crimes—they are condemning that now in order to get the sympathy of the world, and let the people then come into their way of thinking in communism?

Mr. Levine. Yes, sir; and to raise an entire generation of new Hisses and new MacLeans, so that they can continue the subversion and the espionage work which Moscow considers as a necessary weapon in its fight to beat us.

Senator Johnston. Thank you for coming before us with this in-

formation.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Draskovich, will you step forward?

Senator, Mr. Draskovich has come from Chicago to be with us

today.

Senator Johnston. Do you swear the testimony you will give before this subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Draskovich. I do.

Senator Johnston. Have a seat, and give your full name and address to the reporter.

TESTIMONY OF SLOWODIN DRASKOVICH, CHICAGO, ILL.

Mr. Draskovich. Slowodin Draskovich, S-l-o-w-o-d-i-n D-r-a-s-k-o-v-i-c-h.

I am an author and lecturer. I live in Chicago, Ill.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Draskovich has been called today to testify in connection with the developments in Moscow and the internal security consequences that we might have to face if there is a full-scale alliance resulting between Tito and Moscow. This witness will testify from his own experience about that particular thing.

We have found here in the United States the following facts: We have a Yugoslav Embassy in Washington which has 12 officials with diplomatic status, and 18 Yugoslav nationals who are acting as

employees.

The Yugoslav U. N. delegation in New York consists of 6 officials

with diplomatic status and 6 employees.

In San Francisco, the Yugoslav consul has two Yugoslav officials. The Chicago consulate has four Yugoslav officials.

The New York City consulate has three Yugoslav officials.

The Pittsburgh consulate has one honorary official, who may or may

not be an American citizen.

In addition, there are four newspapers in various degrees of Communist control. Two are in Pittsburgh, one in Detroit, and one in Cleveland.

There is a Yugoslav-American home in New York City, and that is

at 405 West 41st Street, New York.

There are, in addition, other people in the United States whose loyalty to the United States would vary in accordance with the amount of loyalty Mr. Tito now has to the Communist organization. That is the purpose of our calling Mr. Draskovich, to learn something about that.

Senator Johnston. These newspapers—are they controlled by the

Mr. Morris. Mr. Draskovich can testify to that.

Mr. Draskovich, where were you born?

Mr. Draskovich. I was born in Belgrade, then Serbia, in 1910.

Mr. Morris. Give us a brief sketch of your experience in Yugo-slavia.

Mr. Draskovich. During the First World War my father was a member of the Cabinet of the Kingdom of Serbia. We spent 4 years

in France, a few months in Switzerland and France.

In 1919 we returned. The Communist movement was strong in Yugoslavia at that time, for various reasons. The main reason was the turmoil in Yugoslavia after the war and the revolution. There was a strong Communist movement in Yugoslavia. They succeeded, after their 1920 elections, to be the third strongest party.

At that time the Government believed in the free elections, and the elections were carried completely freely. However, at the same time, the Government realized the party was not a traditional political party, but part of the conspiracy of the Comintern, the Communist

International, to spread communism over the world.

While Communists were infiltrating the Government, the army, and so on, the Government was, on the other hand, infiltrating the Communist Party. It was a double infiltration; at that time the Government won. They found out all the preparations the Communists were making for the revolution, and the revolution was stopped.

The Communist Party was forbidden; their papers were stopped; their organizations, and so on. My father has to pay with his life

for that action.

Speaking 27 years later——

Mr. Morris. Before we get into that, Mr. Draskovich, why not just

give us a brief sketch of what positions you held in Yugoslavia.

Mr. Draskovich. I was professor of economics at the University of Belgrade in 1941. I was a member of the Institute of National Defense of the Ministry of War. I was a lieutenant in the Yugoslav Army.

Mr. Morris. What do you do now?

Mr. Draskovich. I am an author and editor, editor of a weekly Serbian newspaper, the Serbian Struggle, in Chicago. It is a world-wide circulation, all over the world.

Mr. Morris. Senator Johnston was asking if you know the nature

of those four newspapers we made reference to.

Mr. Draskovich. I studied very carefully 4 years ago the main 2 newspapers, 1 a newspaper in Croatian, Narodni Glasnik, the People's Herald. The other is in Serbian, Slobodna Rec, the Free Voice.

Both newspapers were, until the break with Tito, at the same time,

of course, pro-Moscow and pro-Tito.

Mr. Morris. That was before the break in 1948?

Mr. Draskovich. June 20, 1948.

At that time, however, after the split, only after a few days, they were following exactly the line of the Daily Worker. When the Daily Worker was stigmatizing Tito as a traitor, they followed. In those two newspapers, they were 100 percent against Tito as a Fascist and a traitor. That situation lasted until a few years ago—until, in fact, the visit of Khrushchev and Bulganin last year, in May and June, 1955, to Tito. Then they changed the tune.

Since then, it is just about a year, this last year, they have been at

the same time pro-Tito and pro-Moscow.

Mr. Morris. Do you mean all four papers?

Mr. Draskovich. I am speaking mainly now of Narodni Glasnik,

which was the leader, and Slobodna Rec, the other one.

The third paper, Narodna Volyna, has a special hue, communistic and separatist. I think it follows a special Moscow line of making a separate country of Macedonia, Yugoslavian, and Bulgarian and Greek Macedonia, into one unit, which was an age-old dream of imperialistic policy, and would best serve Soviet imperialistic interests now.

The fourth newspaper is Enakopravnost, a Slavonian paper, Equality of Rights, which is communistic. It has a good many articles against Slavonian Communists, which are quite numerous. But the most militant is the Croatian newspaper being published in Pitts-

burgh.

Mr. Morris. You say that paper was completely following the Communist line until 1948, and in 1948 it then followed the position Tito took?

Mr. Draskovich. Oh, no, on the contrary, they followed exactly, all the time through, Moscow line, so they were pro-Tito until 1948, because he was with Stalin. In 1948, when he broke with Stalin,

they turned against him.

One small detail: They are often publishing cartoons from the Daily Worker. They follow in the most close manner the line of the Daily Worker. They have been using all the language and abuses and invectives, and so on, of the Daily Work against Tito: exactly the way they carry their offensive, they follow. When that offensive subsided,

and when they stated that Yugoslav Communists were acceptable, they followed that line, too. So, there is the closest possible identity of that newspaper with the Communist line of Tito by Moscow.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Draskovich, the Senator-

Senator Johnston. Is it possible for you to be here tomorrow, Mr. Draskovich?

Mr. Draskovich. Yes, sir.

Senator Johnston. The Senate is in session now, and I am going to have to run over. That is what I am up against.

Off the record, just a minute. (Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Morris. Senator, we are having Mr. Raditsa, who was formerly a member of Tito's Cabinet, to testify tomorrow. Mr. Draskovich's testimony will coincide with his.

Senator Johnston. That would be in line, so if it is possible for

you to stay over-

Mr. Draskovich. Yes, sir. Mr. Morris. Mr. Draskovich came all the way from Chicago to

testify before this subcommittee.

Senator Johnston. At the present time, in the Senate they are having a great many things happen, and it makes us work in double time.

Mr. Draskovich. Certainly, sir.

Senator Johnston. It makes it very difficult. Several committees

are meeting at the same time.

Mr. Morris. Senator, may I just put into the record, before you leave, that Guy Burgess was in Washington in 1942, and then he was in Washington as the Second Secretary early in August 1950, until apparently early May 1951.


Donald MacLean was in Washington as the Acting First Secretary from May 2, 1944, until October 1946. Then, on May 11, 1950, and lasting until June 1, 1951, he was head of the American Section of

the British Foreign Office in Washington.

Senator Johnston. That will be made part of the record.

Mr. Morris. Thank you, Senator. Senator Johnston. We will adjourn until tomorrow at 10:30 a.m. (Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the subcommittee recessed, to reconvene at 10:30 a.m., Thursday, June 7, 1956.)

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SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES

THURSDAY, JUNE 7, 1956

UNITED STATES SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS, OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 11:10 a. m., in the caucus room, Senate Office Building, Senator James O. Eastland (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senator Eastland.

Also present: Robert Morris, chief counsel; William A. Rusher, administrative counsel; and F. W. Schroeder, chief investigator. Chairman Eastland. The committee will come to order.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Draskovich is the first witness.

Mr. Draskovich has been sworn, but Mr. Raditsa has not.

Chairman Eastland. Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you will give before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Raditsa. I do.

Mr. Morris. Senator, this hearing this morning is a consideration of the consequences on internal security which would result if the present visit of Tito to the Soviet Union results in a full-scale aliance between those two countries.

At stake in these hearings, as far as security is concerned, are the

following considerations:

The Yugoslav Embassy in Washington has 12 officials with diplo-

matic status and 18 Yugoslav employees;

The Yugoslav U. N. delegation in New York consists of 6 officials with diplomatic status, and 6 employees; the San Francisco consul has 2 Yugoslav officials; the Chicago consulate has 4 Yugoslav officials; the New York City consulate has 3 Yugoslav officials; the Pittsburgh consulate has 1 honorary official, who may or may not be an American citizen.

In addition, there are 4 Yugoslav publications in the United States,

2 in Pittsburgh, 1 in Detroit, and 1 in Cleveland.

There is a Yugoslav-American home in New York City.

In addition, we have training with our Armed Forces 2 Yugoslav officers at Fort Benning, 3 at Fort Monmouth Signal Corps, and 2 at Fort Knox Mobile Arms School.

In addition to that, many other situations exist in this country that

would be affected if this alliance should result.

Chairman Eastland, Proceed.

TESTIMONY OF SLOWODIN DRASKOVICH-Resumed

Mr. Morris. Mr. Draskovich has given certain testimony yesterday. I wonder, Mr. Draskovich, if you could briefly tell us what position

you had in the Yugloslav Government?

Mr. Draskovich. I was, before the war, professor of economics at the University of Belgrade. I was also a member of the Institute of National Defense of the Ministry of War, and secretary general of the Serbian Cultural Club of Yugoslav.

Mr. Morris. And what do you do now?

Mr. Draskovich. I am author and chief editor of a weekly newspaper in Serbian.

Mr. Morris. You spoke of 4 publications—you are familiar with

4 publications in Yugoslavian in America.

Mr. Draskovich. Yes; I am.

Mr. Morris. You are familiar with these papers, named Narodni Glasnik, Slobodna Rec, Narodna Volyna, and Enakopravnost?

Mr. Draskovich. I am.

Mr. Morris. I wonder if you could briefly tell us about those publications and what they involve?

Mr. Draskovich. The first is in Croatian, which is Narodni Glasnik,

the People's Herald.

The second is in Serbian; the third is in Macedonian; the fourth in Slavonian. They are all four communistic publications.

The one which is following most closely the Moscow line is the

first one, Narodni Glasnik.

Mr. Morris. That is the largest?

Mr. Draskovich. Yes.

Until 1948, until the break, true or alleged, between Moscow and Tito, the paper was for Tito, because he was for Moscow. After the break, the paper took the Moscow line. Up until the time Khrushchev and Bulganin went to visit Tito, they had an antagonistic attitude toward Tito. Since that time, they are rather friendly to Tito.

Now they are again in the same manner as Tito is hailed in Moscow as a friend of the Kremlin, the Soviet Union, and the promoter of world communism. The same attitude is taken by Narodni Glasnik, which is the paper of the people of Yugoslavian origin in America.

Mr. Morris. Are there other considerations that you know of that the Internal Security Subcommittee must give attention to in con-

nection with these recent developments?

Mr. Draskovich. Well, I am in constant contact with people throughout America, and especially in the area of Chicago. Most of the Serbian DP's work in factories, so that I have a close contact and means to know what is going on and to ascertain the consequences of the Titoist policy of the West as far as they are reflected among Serbian DP's and also American workers.

The main thing regarding this visit of Tito to Moscow is to know first—and I am speaking of the experience with the people who are there every day, in everyday contact with American workers—is

regarding what Titoism is.

A young man who came to this country recently and whom I met a few weeks ago—he is studying at an American university—I asked him how he liked America. He said, "I like everything in America

People are very hospitable; I like their way of life, their political system, but there is one thing I don't like—American Titoism."

He said, "We don't have Titoism in Yugoslavia, but there is Titoism in America. Often, unfortunately, at private meetings or public meetings, when I say I am from Yugoslavia, people say, 'How wonderful. How is our friend Tito?"

When he tries to explain that Tito is not a friend of America, but

a friend of the Kremlin, people say "How interesting."

Then they turn their backs on him.

I am mentioning this because it is definitely a consequence of the pro-Titoism of the West, a tremendous demoralization going on among the Serbian DP's and also among the other people as a consequence of the policy of weakness which is practiced by the West toward Tito and Titoism.

The main point is that, by practicing Titoism, the message of the West to people behind the Iron Curtain is that there is no hope for liberalization; and very many people tell you openly, "What is the use

of fighting if we stand no chance of achieving our freedom?"

The practical consequence is that many people who are Communists or Communist-inclined come easily to this country, and spread Communist propaganda around. I know of a case of a young man, about 32 or 33 years of age.

He came to this country and is speaking openly that Americans are capitalistic imperialists, they have no business in Korea, they have no business in China, they have no business elsewhere, and should

remain in America.

When friends of mine told him, "You must be a Communist," he said, "No; the proof that I am not a Communist is the American Embassy let me come here. They gave me a visa, consequently I am not a Communist."

There are quite a few cases where people can come to this country and spread communism. On the other hand, people who were before stanchly anticommunistic have lost hope and are desisting from any further struggle because they believe the cause is lost.

Mr. Morris. These, you say, are consequences of the United States

policy toward Tito?

Mr. Draskovich. Right.

Mr. Morris. By creating an atmosphere in which he is generally considered to be a friend.

Mr. Draskovich. Right.

Mr. Morris. You say these people who have emigrated to the United States from Yugoslavia and who know what the conditions are in Yugoslavia are being demoralized as a result?

Mr. Draskovich. Right.

There are many people who come temporarily. Among them are good people, but there are also people who, I believe, are sent deliberately by Tito to spread demoralization.

They say, "What is the use; you cannot fight alone. You do not

have America on your side."

The main thing is, in my opinion of what will be the consequences, depends mainly on this country, namely, the possibilities of fighting communism are tremendous, in my opinion.

What is too often forgotten is that there are 800 million people behind the Iron Curtain, allies of America. We speak too often of Communists among our own ranks. We speak too often of the infiltration of Communists in our own ranks, but I think our possibilities cannot be applied properly if we forget that we have 800 million people behind the Iron Curtain who are on our side, in our corner.

I mention this concretely in connection with the visit of Tito to Moscow, because how that visit will be reflected in the minds of the

people depends mostly on what we do with the visit.

The split in 1948 could have been used to destroy communism; I mean first in Yugoslavia and the consequences of wresting Yugoslavia away from communism would have been worthwhile. Unfortunately, that has not been done.

Instead of destroying communism, it has been helped and built up. Now, the visit of Tito to Moscow is the problem of what we do of it. It can be used against Moscow; it can be used against communism.

I am thinking of some friends of mine—American-born people here—the view they will take depends very much on the attitude which the West, and especially this country, will take toward Tito. It has been said he has shown completely his colors.

If we destroy that, people will lose their hope and be completely

demoralized

Mr. Morris. How many Yugoslav immigrants are there in the United States?

Mr. Draskovich. All together, I think there are about 400,000, if

not more. I think maybe 500,000.

Mr. Morris. Do you know anything about the circulation of these newspapers?

Mr. Draskovich. The Slobodna Rec has practically folded up. The

paper is now-

Mr. Morris. How about the Narodni Glasnik?

Mr. Draskovich. It is somewhere between 30,000 and 40,000.

Mr. Morris. You say there are about 400,000 Yugoslav refugees? Croatians and Serbs together?

Mr. Draskovich. Yes, sir.

Mr. Morris. Do you know anything about the Yugoslav military missions?

Mr. Draskovich. Military missions?

Mr. Morris. Yes.

Mr. Draskovich. I know Vladimir Popovic, who came to this country in 1951. He is an old-time Communist. He is a schoolmate of mine, and he has been a Communist, although he comes from a very

rich family, ever since he was 15 or 16.

He said to the Czech Ambassador to Yugoslavia, Corbell in 1948, in Belgrade, when Corbell asked him why isn't he so friendly with him as with other ambassadors—he said, "Look here; I have to be more friendly toward people who represent Communist countries, because they are Communists. I know you are not a Communist; I know what you think. I cannot open my heart before you."

That man is now 46 or 48. That man, when he came to America, he definitely didn't come only for an official mission, but he also con-

tacted people who in this country are spreading communism.

One year later came the chief of staff of the Yugoslav Army, Peko Dapcevic. He followed Popovic, who is now Foreign Minister. He

came 1 year later, and was accompanied by some other people who. even with himself, have been under suspicion that he is Cominform.

There are other people-three members of the delegation who

were known for their pro-Cominform sympathies.

I understand nothing was done to prevent them from inspecting whatever they wanted to see. I also know of some individual cases of people who were known to be stanch Communists who came for some military or other training; who contacted here in America, Communists. It is the military delegations, the economic delegations, the students. All those people, even in the period of, let's say, 1948 to 1953, when Tito was considered to be an ally of this country, and they were allegedly banned by Moscow. They would come to this country and contact people who were 100 percent for Moscow.

If they were against Moscow, they wouldn't be associated in this

country with people following the Daily Worker line.

Mr. Morris. You say in the delegations who have come here from Yugoslavia even during the period from 1948 to 1953, when there was a presumed break, that the members of the delegations associated freely here with people who were Communists?

Mr. Draskovich. Definitely.

Mr. Morris. Do you know that from your own experience?

Mr. Draskovich. Yes.

Mr. Morris. Do you interpret that as an indication that there was no real break in the first place?

Mr. Draskovich. Definitely.

I would like to add this: from an exchange of correspondence between Moscow and Tito in 1948 which has been published, one thing can be plainly seen, that it was not Tito who was rebelling, that it was Moscow who wanted to oust him.

Why I don't know. I think only Stalin knows that, and he took his

secret to the grave with him.

Tito was trying to pacify, to appease. He was saying, "Let's get to-

gether and discuss it; let's see what can be done."

The second main point is that the accusations of Stalin against Tito have been later on used by Western Titoists for their propaganda; No. 1, that Tito was allegedly against Moscow, which he was not.

No. 2, that he was for the West, which he never was. No. 3, that he was ideologically veering away from Marxism and Leninism. No. 4, that he was creating a different kind of communism, so-called national communism.

Here I am only guessing. I have presented facts. Here I am only guessing. Maybe Stalin gave a hint to Communists throughout the world what to do and how to build up Tito into a different Communist. The main merit of Tito for world communism has been to prove that communism can be different. That was the main idea of Titoism, because if one Communist can be different, then any Communist can be different.

Communism can change to the point where it doesn't any longer pose

a threat to the free world.

I think the main merit of Tito to communism is that he opened the gates of Asia to Moscow. Tito sent a Yugoslavian delegation to India. The main message they had to carry there was the message of different communism. After visiting a number of Indian and Burmese officials.

those people achieved tremendous success. I remember the name of one of the men, the governor of the State of Madras, Mr. Prakasha, who said to Djilas, then delegate of Tito, "You have the great merit of proving to us Asians that communism need not be imperialistic."

So, the basis of the triumphal visit of Khrushchev and Bulganin in November of 1955 in India was laid by Tito's delegate in 1953, and by the subsequent visit of Tito to those countries and Egypt in 1955.

If Khrushchev and Bulganin went to pay their respects to Tito, it was because he had achieved what Stalin could not do, to convince India that communism is not imperialistic.

He has proved to people who have not been for communism, one, communism is harmless; two, he has demoralized anti-Communists

and killed the hopes for freedom in the world.

Many Western Titoists have promoted the idea that there is no alternative to Titoism, but it is either Titoism or Stalinism. If you put it that way, it means that there is no hope for freedom. Titoism has the greater merit for Moscow that it has killed, with many people, the determination to fight communism.

Mr. Morris. There never has been any relaxation in Yugoslavia of

the Communist regimen, has there?

Mr. Draskovich. There has been some relaxation as in other countries, the Soviet Union and Poland, because they feel completely sure of their victory.

What they have done in Yugoslavia is they have not won to their side anyone, but they have killed the belief with many people that

communism can be destroyed.

If you once accept, not that communism is good, but that the advent

of communism is imminent, communism will win.

What Tito has succeeded in is to destroy the faith that freedom will finally prevail. Many people have withdrawn into their private lives instead of fighting communism.

Mr. Morris. Do you know anything about this Yugoslav Home in

New York City?

Mr. Draskovich. Yes, sir. It was during the war and after the war, and it is still today, one of the main centers of Communist propaganda and Communist action in the United States.

Mr. Morris. What is the Yugoslav-American Home?

Mr. Draskovich. Well, a distinction must be drawn between that home and the newspapers. While the newspapers were very strictly following the Moscow line—you could see when the break came they denounced very strongly Tito, because Moscow was anti-Tito. Now they are pro-Tito, because Moscow is pro-Tito.

In the Yugoslav Home, the situation was very different, because there was never a very clear break between the Titoists and the Stalinists. There were some disputes, even some brawls, some fights, but

all of them, Titoists or Stalinists, visited the center.

I think that is one of the proofs that the split among them was put up for the West, but it never reached the rank and file of the Communist Party anywhere.

Mr. Morris. I have no more questions of this witness.

Chairman Eastland. I have no questions.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Raditsa.

Mr. Raditsa, where do you reside? Will you give your full name and address to the reporter?

TESTIMONY OF BOGDAN RADITSA, NEW YORK, N. Y.

Mr. Raditsa. Bogdan Raditsa, sir. Mr. Morris. Where do you reside? Mr. Raditsa. In New York City.

Mr. Morris. Now, Mr. Raditsa, will you tell us what position you held in Tito's government?

Mr. Raditsa. I was chief of the foreign press department up to the

end of 1945.

Mr. Morris. Then you broke away from the Tito government?

Mr. RADITSA. Then I broke away from Tito at the end of 1945 and came back to the West.

In 1946 I was in this country, and I published a series of articles on

how Tito has communized Yugoslavia.

Mr. Morris. I see.

You wrote an aricle, did you not, in 1954 in which you forecast that there was forthcoming a close alliance between Moscow and Tito?

Mr. Raditsa. Yes, sir. I wrote an article in the magazine, Freeman, which came out on January 11, 1954, which produced the facts that immediately after Stalin's death, the initiative for the reestablishment of friendly relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union started.

In June of 1953, Tito sent emissaries to Moscow, and at that time they agreed that they are going to reorganize. The relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, and not only between the states of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, but even between the two Communist Parties, which Tito denied at that time.

When my article appeared in the Freeman, Tito came out-

Mr. Morris. Mr. Raditsa, you say that in 1953, Tito sent emissaries to Moscow?

Mr. Raditsa. Yes; where he already inaugurated, introduced, the parleys with the new leadership. At that time, Malenkov was the Prime Minister, but Khrushchev and Mikoyan were very important.

That proved that while Tito was fighting Stalinism, it was only the inner relations of this group which is ruling Russia right now. It doesn't astonish me, because it was Malenkov who introduced Tito as the secretary general of the Communist Party before World War II.

He introduced Tito to Stalin. Stalin had made at that time a great purge of the leaders of the Communist Party in the world, among whom were some of Tito's predecessors. So Tito took the Stalin line and brought that line to Yugoslavia among the Communists.

Now, Tito, in going back to our main subject, after Stalin's death,

started already to work out his new line with the Communists. That is to say, what was Tito's main and basic idea? Stalin, through his declining age, has brought Communism into a deadlock. There was a great danger to disrupt the Communist forces all over the world.

So Tito said the only thing to improve the Communist cause would be that we get rid of the Cominform, which, in fact, was dissolved before Tito went to Moscow 2 months ago, and that we reorganize the Communist organization on a new basis, where the Communist state in which the Communists already are now in power are going to be administered by their own native Communists so that we will give the impression to the West, particularly to America, that communism has been accepted already in Czechoslovakia, in Hungary, in Bulgaria,

in Rumania, and in Poland, and so the West and the Americans will lose any possibility to try to liberate these countries from their Communist henchmen.

Tito at that time denied me, but he denied me in a very strange way, very evasively. He didn't say that he was not going to establish the relations with Russia. He said, "All this has not yet been achieved."

Tito's denial convinced me more than the information I got at that time in Europe from some of the people who came to see me, from Yugoslavia to see me and ask me to tell to the American public opinion, that the whole business of prearrangement between Tito and the Moscowite leadership has been in process to be elaborated.

Yugoslav peoples have been very much afraid of Tito going again back completely into the Moscow fort. They have been afraid as they

are afraid and scared now.

You have to take into consideration that the Soviet fleet is in Dalmatia, on our seashores, in the same time while Tito is in Russia. Why? Because Tito and the Russians are afraid that the Yugoslav peoples could express more of their dissatisfaction against what is going on.

In any rate, it is my profound conviction that Tito, from June 1953 up to now, has closely worked together with the Russians for the

reorganization of the whole Communist work.

Now we are entering into one of the most dangerous, Senator Eastland, in the most dangerous phase of the whole strata of communism for world conquest. Tito has opened the gates of the world communism into Asia. His recent visit to Egypt has been in agreement with Moscow.

I can tell you as a fact that the arms from Czechoslovakia to Egypt have been delivered from the Adriatic shores, the ports of Rieka,

R-i-e-k-a, and Ploche, P-l-o-c-h-e.

They have been delivered all the time. Everybody could see. Even the American observers who are in Yugoslavia know that these arms

have been delivered not from Russia.

Czechoslovakia has no ports and harbors to deliver. They go from Czechoslovakia to Hungary, down the Danube, right into Rieka. From Rieka they are shipped into Egypt. People who delivered them in Ploche and Rieka speak to the natives in Russian. They are not even Czechs. They speak in Russian.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Raditsa, to be sure I understand that, you say that the arms that Czechoslovakia is supplying to Egypt are being

shipped through Hungary down the Danube—

Mr. RADITSA. From Czechoslovakia down the Danube to Yugoslavian ports.

Mr. Morris. And being shipped by Russians; you say?

Mr. Raditsa. People who have seen some of the seamen, Dalmatian seamen who came to New York harbor, said to some of my friends that the people who delivered those arms to the Egyptian ships and to the Yugoslav ships speak only Russian, so they must be Russian. That was going on all the last fall and all the last summer.

Mr. Morris. What do you believe is the consequence of the Tito

visit to Moscow?

Mr. Raditsa. To me that is not an astonishment. I always believe that Tito was a Communist. I knew him. I was in his government. They were always Communists, and they were always believing that

they are going to improve communism. I never believed that Tito is going to change or is going to become a Liberal Communist or a Democratic Communist, as many Liberals have built up a myth of

liberalization of communism through Tito.

On that matter, we must agree with Tito. He has never said he wasn't a Communist. He has constantly stated that he was a Communist. Even when the last fall, Secretary Dulles went to Brioni to visit him and gave the famous statement in which he stated that Tito has promised to liberate the people from the Communist yoke, Tito denied that statement immediately after and said that was not in agreement.

What Tito meant, when he was emphasizing the principle of independence and self-determination, was that the West doesn't interfere

into the countries which are conquered by the Communists.

The principle of self-determination, of noninterference to Communist countries, meant to Tito that the West doesn't interfere into those countries which have been conquered, and enslaved, by the Communist in 1945, because they are afraid if the West would be successful in the United Nations, imposed upon them the free election, controlled by the United Nations, they would lose the elections, because in all those countries, including Yugoslavia, the Communist Party has no more than 5 percent of the people.

So, he said, this is an ideological misunderstanding of the relations between the West and Tito. While Tito was talking about the self-determination, America thought it was the self-defense of Yugoslavia.

Tito was mainly interested in preserving the self-determination of the Communist Parties and other Communist Parties which had taken

power behind the Iron Curtain.

What we were doing at that time, even the Radio Free Europe in 1952, in emphasizing Titoism to the countries under the Communists, had this to say as to America. That was a typical broadcast beamed to Czechoslovakia on April 27, 1952:

As to America, she supports Tito. Even though Tito accepts America's bountiful assistance with open hands, the United States Government has not demanded

the denationalization of a single Yugoslav territory.

Yes; Tito never ceased to be a Communist. America says, "Let everyone do as he pleases." America says "Go ahead and be a Communist, if that is what you want. All we ask is that you stop supporting Russian imperialism."

America has no intention to force anyone, including Yugoslavia, to return to

communism.

This has demoralized the anti-Communists not only in Yugoslavia, but all over the Iron Curtain. We know the basic principle of freedom is economic freedom. Now, how do people behind the Iron Curtain who are in the majority anti-Communist—how can they believe that America is supporting a better Communist from a worse Communist? There is no such things.

I must tell you that that has confused very much the Americans of

Serbian, Croatian, Slavonian, and Macedonian descent.

Before 1950—not in 1948, because the break occurred in 1949—they believed that Tito was an enemy to America and an enemy to their own country. After 1950, after all this propaganda about Tito being a nice Communist, an honest Communist, it has confused them very much.

They knew the situation in the country, because that country has in the last 10 years survived, thanks to the goodness of the American

heart, to the millions and millions of dollars sent in food to the people of Yugoslavia, to the hundreds of thousands of parcels which every Yugoslav in this country sends to their natives, because they know the

situation there.

The situation in Yugoslavia has not improved. Cardinal Stepinac is still under home arrest. Priests, when they receive money from their American relatives to pray Masses in the Catholic part of Yugoslavia—that is to say, Croatia—those moneys are taken by the Government through the severe tax imposition, so that there is not even the possibility to pray Masses with the money which comes by private from America, from their spiritual understanding, because the Government takes it.

Mr. Morris. Do you think it has been a mistake to spend more than

a billion dollars, as the United States has?

Mr. Raditsa. That is what the official figures have told us.

Now, Mr. Senator, if I can draw your attention to prove to you what was going on from 1950 on, there were, as you know, many delegations which were coming practically every while from Yugoslavia

over here, as you know.

But it is very strange to observe—I have observed that in the last 6 years among the delegates in the United Nations, or with official business coming over here in America, there was Mr. Srgjan Prica. Mr. Prica is today Deputy Foreign Minister in Charge of the United States Affairs.

He has been, before the war and during the Second World War, in this country as one of the major Communist agents, as an editor of

the Slobodna Rec, which just was mentioned here.

Mr. Morris. That is the Serbian paper published in Pittsburgh? Mr. Raditsa. Yes; and he has been in charge of the whole Communist underground movement in this country before the war, the last

war, and during the war. He knows America very well.

He knows all the Yugoslav-American Communists in this country, because he was working with them. This man had the doors carte blanche open to him to travel all over America to see anyone, because he was a respected Communist.

Mr. Morris. That is after 1948?

Mr. Raditsa. And he has been well known as the man who has tried badly to reestablish good relations between Moscow and Belgrade.

Mr. Morris. During that period of 1948-53, what has been that line

of that particular publication, the Slobodna Rec?

Mr. RADITSA. It was at that time attacking Tito. Tito at that time had his own paper in New York City, Novilist, published by the Yugoslav Home you have just mentioned.

Novilist stopped to be published immediately after the Stalin death.

The last article which that paper brought as an editorial said:

Now, since the relations between the Socialist Republics of the world and the people's democracies have been established, we don't need to have a separate paper; other newspapers of the same kind are going to do the work for us.

That meant Narodni Glasnik and Slobodna Rec, and this Mr.

Prica was coming over here, of course, for a special purpose.

But another very interesting fact is that the former Tito Ambassador in this country, Vladimir Popovic, when he has been moved from Washington to Belgrade, he became the Ambassador of Tito to Mao Tse Tung, in Peiping, which means at that time, already to Peiping very important Communist affairs have been dealt, and they have been dealt by a man who knew America, since he was in this country several years and he was visiting all the Yugoslav colonies from the east to the west coasts, speaking to them what was going on in Yugoslavia, which intentions were Tito intentions.

Like all other Tito diplomats in this country, he has been free to do

what he wanted.

Chairman Eastland. I would like to ask you this question.

Mr. Raditsa. Yes; certainly.

Chairman Eastland. We have sent approximately a billion and a quarter dollars in military and economic aid to Yugoslavia. What good has this done this country?

Mr. Raditsa. Military, I am sorry to say, is wasted.

Chairman Eastland. What good has economic aid done this

country?

Mr. Raditsa. Economically, the country is still in the same povertystricken situation as it was before the money was poured into it, because Tito was not interested in improving the welfare of the people, in improving the national economy, because Tito was only interested in improving the Communist economy.

Chairman Eastland. I am not asking what good that economic aid

has done Yugoslavia. What good has it done the United States?

Mr. Raditsa. That is up to you to answer, Mr. Senator. Chairman Eastland. What is your judgment, sir?

Mr. Raditsa. I am not here as an American citizen, and I would

not like to answer that question.

I think in this country there are intelligent people; this is a great country which has an intelligent people, and they have to judge by themselves what they have done. I still believe——

Chairman Eastland. Now, you have got \$30 million in military aid set up at the present time for Yugoslavia. What good will that \$30

million do for the United States?

Mr. Raditsa. I think to the Yugoslavians it will do no good, because Marshal Tito yesterday in Moscow said in front of the press, when an American asked him, "You are not going, apparently, to get this \$30 million."

He said: "We don't care."

So already, Mr. Tito has received \$300 million—I think it is \$300 million—of credit offered by the Soviet Union to Tito. So this means that Tito is not even interested in taking this money. I think, in fact, that after the way Tito has dismissed this \$30 million, I would not even try to impose it upon him.

In the papers this morning, he absolutely has ridiculed this offer and said to all those Senators in the United States Senate who are opposing that that he doesn't need that money. If he doesn't need it,

it shouldn't be furnished to him.

Chairman Eastland. Mr. Draskovich, what is your judgment on

those questions I have asked?

Mr. Draskovich. Sir, I must say that, in my opinion, the effects have been disastrous for this country, because this country has been building up an enemy, a man who has done the greater service to world communism, much better and more efficiently than Stalin could have done.

In 1948, when the break came, the final words of Tito's message, of his last letter to Stalin, were:

We shall continue to build socialism in our country, and we shall remain faithful to the teachings of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin. In that manner, we shall prove that the accusations against us were wrong.

Well, all that Tito has done so far—he kept his word. He worked

for world communism much more efficiently than Stalin.

Unfortunately, this country—you must know the figures better than I do, but I think with the UNRRA aid, it is over \$2 billion. That has been, if I may use the language of the Communist manifesto, "digging our own grave," because we have been building the country and the forces to whom the main obstruction for world communism is this country.

To quote now one interesting example, in 1953, it was revealed by a United States general—the name slips my mind right now—but he said that while the war was going on, some vital jets which were indispensable for the training of United States fliers in Korea were not there in sufficient numbers. At that time Tito was receiving them.

Mr. Morris. You mean Tito was getting jet planes when we were

in short supply?

Mr. Draskovich. Right.

I think the name was General Anderson.

Chairman Eastland. Are there any further questions?

Mr. Morris. No, Senator.

Chairman Eastland. We thank you, gentlemen. Your testimony has been very important.

The hearing is adjourned.

(Whereupon, at 12 noon, the subcommittee adjourned.)

The following letter from Mikola Lebed, secretary general for foreign affairs of the Supreme Ukrainian Liberation Council, to Chairman Eastland, was ordered into the record at a meeting of the subcommittee on November 21, 1956:

> SUPREME UKRAINIAN LIBERATION COUNCIL, SECRETARIATE-GENERAL FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, New York, N. Y., July 30, 1956.

Hon. JAMES O. EASTLAND, United States Senator,

Schate Office Building, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR EASTLAND: Your chief counsel, Robert Morris, Esq., has been most kind in sending me a copy of your letter of July 26, 1956, to Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge. Jr., chief United States delegate to the United Nations in the matter of petitions received from Ukrainian political prisoners in Soviet concentration camps.

I wish to express my deeply felt gratitude for your very generous and prompt support given this matter as evidenced by your penetrating letter to Ambassador

Lodge.

Your keen and ready understanding of the cause and plight of those political prisoners is very heartening, inasmuch as it proves that their sacrifices, long

wait, and undying hope have not been in vain.

It is only a pity that the free world at large does not as yet fully grasp the significance of the unconquered spirit of such groups of persecuted political prisoners as the Ukrainians of Mordovian camps in this instance—hence I feel that it is indispensable that the matter be given moral support on the part of political leaders of the Western World—like you are doing at the present, and that it be given the widest possible publicity in the press of the free world.

Would it be possible, without imposing on your time, to suggest that your viewpoint, as expressed in your letter to Ambassador Lodge, be given the widest possible circulation?

Very sincerely.

/S/ M. LEBED.

The following transcript of a parolee hearing by the Immigration and Naturalization Service with four Russian seamen was ordered into the record at a meeting of the subcommittee on November 21, 1956:

INTERVIEW ACCORDED ALIEN PAROLEES BY THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE

Place: Central Office, Immigration and Naturalization Service, 119 D Street NE., Washington, D. C.

Date: April 27, 1956. Time: 3 p. m.

Alien parolees: Nikolov Michail Ivankov, Benedict Eremenko, Victor Tatarni-

kov, Victor Solovyev.

Present at interview: Mr. Marques (presiding); Mr. Crawford, representative, State Department; Mr. Van Hoogstraten, representative, Church World Service (sponsor); Georgi Nicolai Zaroubin, Russian Ambassador to the United States; Piotr Salamatin, Chief, Consular Division, Russian Embassy (also present was an unidentified person who took notes and who was traveling with the Russian Ambassador); Mr. Rudnick, Immigration and Naturalization Service; Mr. Alexander Logofet (State Department), interpreter.

Mr. Logofet acted as interpreter throughout the interview.

Mr. Marques. Gentlemen, the first person who will come in is Mr. Nikolov Michail Ivankov. At the beginning I would like to say that this is a parolee interview. These interviews are granted periodically to determine certain questions, only questions that have to do with their status in the United States: if they are happy here, the state of their health, and their wishes as to whether they desire to remain in the United States or to depart. Do you understand?

Mr. ZAROUBIN. Yes, I understand. Mr. Marques. Gentlemen, in view of the fact that we have the language situation, I would like to state that we would appreciate it very much if we would direct our questions in such a manner that our interpreter would have an opportunity to translate the questions from Russian to English and from English to Russian in order that we all know what we are talking about before proceeding further. I feel that if we proceed along these lines we will get along much faster and each time that one of the parolees, one of the gentlemen coming in, we will go through the same procedure so that each person will understand what the procedure is going to be.

(Mr. Ivankov is brought into the room and he seats himself.) Mr. Marques. Mr. Ivankov, I would like to ask you some questions regarding your parole status in the United States. I would like to know how you are and the state of your health. Would you please tell me?

Mr. Ivankov. I feel quite normally and I am happy. I do not want for any-

thing better.

Mr. Marques. What is the state of your health?

Mr. IVANKOV (through interpreter). (I was unable to hear, necessitating a move and lost what was said.)

Mr. Marques. You have stated that you are satisfied here? Mr. IVANKOV. Yes, I am very satisfied.

Mr. Marques. You have stated that you wish to remain in the United States? Mr. IVANKOV. I want to stay here.

Mr. Marques, I understand from the parole documentation, Mr. Ivankov, that you came to the United States to procure asylum.

Mr. Ivankov. Yes, that is so.

Mr. Marques. I understand that is the only reason why you came to the United States.

Mr. IVANKOV. This is one of the basic reasons. The other reason is in order to lead a normal human existence.

Mr. Marques. Then, you are happy here in the United States?

Mr. Ivankov. Yes, I am very happy.

Mr. Marques. Since your arrival in the United States, Mr. Ivankov, has anyone intimidated you or any one of your fellow sailors to remain in the United States?

Mr. Ivankov. No, that never happened.

Mr. Marques. While you have been in the United States has anyone coerced you to leave the United States?

Mr. IVANKOV. My decision was not influenced by anyone. This is my old

desire and I am very happy that it came about this way.

Mr. Marques. Then you wish to remain in the United States of your own free will?

Mr. Ivankov. Yes, and of my own free will.

Mr. Marques. Then, Mr. Ivankov, you will be permitted to remain in the United States under this parole agreement. Then you should know that as long as you remain in the United States you have the protection of the Government of the United States. You should further understand that as long as you are in this country should anyone in any manner intimidate you or take any action against your desires, you should feel free at the earliest possible time to seek the assistance of the Immigration and Naturalization Service or the group to which—who is sponsoring your parole, the Church World Service?

Mr. IVANKOV. I understand that.

Mr. Marques. Now, Mr. Ivankov, the Ambassador from the Soviet Republic is here and the head of the Consular Division is here and they wish to talk with you.

(Mr. Ivankov nods his head.)

Mr. Marques. I am referring to Ambassador Zaroubin and Mr. Salamatin, I

think it is pronounced.

Mr. Zaroubin. I am the Ambassador and I have instructions from my Government to inform you that the Soviet Government is aware of all the conditions under which you find yourself here and takes into account your conditions which forcing you to be here. And the Soviet Government instructs me, of course, if you desire so, to offer you to return to your relatives and of which, in my capacity and under the instructions of the Soviet Government, I assure you that you will be given full guaranty that no administrative measures will be taken against you, knowing under what conditions you were—under what conditions you find yourself here.

And I want to assure you that all talks and rumors as to that any administrative measures have been taken against your relatives are—has been lies. And the steamship company where you were employed continues to help your relatives, and if you want to have any contact with your relatives you will be given full opportunity to do that and, as we understand, you have some children.

Nobody is going to exert any pressure on you. Question is your own affair. Of course, you are an adult man and you have to decide your own. If you need any assistance whatsoever from the Soviet Embassy, the Soviet Embassy will be prepared to help you return to your relatives at any time. And the Embassy is prepared to inform your relatives and your children of whatever you want to tell them.

And, therefore, I repeat again that I have received instructions from my Government that the Soviet Government understands under what conditions you were and under which conditions forced you to arrive here and I assure you that you will be given every assistance at any time. Therefore, you have to decide this question by yourself. Nobody is going to try to exert any pressures on you. This is your own personal affair. At any rate, if you decide your decision, the Soviet Embassy will be prepared at any time to help you in any possible way, to help you to return to your family. Your children are waiting for you there—

Mr. IVANKOV (interrupting). I do not [interpreter inaudible] I want to stay

here forever.

Mr. Zarouein (continues speaking while Mr. Ivankov is speaking) And also, to go back to your comrades. It was rumored that when they came to the Soviet Union that they were put in prison. It was not true.

Union that they were put in prison. It was not true.

Mr. Marques. Mr. Zaroubin, I feel that when we started this interview, that which is a matter of public record in the newspapers, with regard to whatever

reference to the others, I feel he has had opportunity to read it.

Mr. Zaroubin (interrupting). I object, as the Ambassador of the Soviet Union. And if I am going to be put into some frames, I think we might discontinue this conversation. I received information from the State Department that I would be given an opportunity to talk to the former sailors and I was not informed that I shall follow a certain set of questions, and besides, I have finished what I intended to say; I told him what I wanted to say. Only I want to add that today in American papers was printed the complete statement of the five sailors———,

(Ambassador Zaroubin continues talking while Mr. Marques attempts to get his attention and answer him. I was unable to hear interpreter.)

Mr. MARQUES. May I answer you?

(Ambassador Zaroubin continues talking but interpreter speaking Russian and

apparently translating Mr. Marques' question.)

Mr. Marques (continuing). Would you please let me answer you? We are not trying to delimit any question that you want to ask your national. I do not feel, this being a parole interview, that it would be proper for us to discuss what is in the newspapers; he can read about what has happened to everybody else.

Mr. ZAROUBIN. I do not discuss; I only state that this is lying information.

Mr. Marques. Do you have any other questions?

Mr. ZAROUBIN, I said what I wanted to say and what I was instructed to say.

Mr. Marques. We have already said that. (Interruptions again and unable to hear.)

Mr. Marques. Mr. Van Hoogstraten is sponsor of this man and he can render

anv-

Mr. ZAROUBIN (interrupting). I ask that the Church World Service [interpreter inaudible]. The Ambassador wants to talk with him some more. I ask that there be nobody except the sailors and the representatives of the American Government and the Soviet Union.

Mr. Marques. That is all we have here. Mr. Zaroubin. As you decided to have the Government of the United States and you represent a private organization; I do not want to talk to the representatives of organizations; I am the representative of the Soviet Government.

Mr. Marques. Mr. Zaroubin, please. We have to be reasonable. This Church World group is the sponsor and the sponsors are permitted to be present at

every one of these parole interviews.

Mr. Zaroubin. I repeat this group does not interest me. I came—Mr. Marques. The Government has to have present the sponsor.

Mr. ZAROUBIN. I was not informed about that; I can assure you that if I knew it I would refuse to be present here. Therefore, if the conversations are going to be conducted in this manner, I will discontinue. I would like to be shown a courtesy as the Ambassador of the Soviet Union. I have the right to expect that.

Mr. Marques. Would the Ambassador tell me where we have been remiss in

being courteous?

Mr. ZAROUBIN. I came here to discuss this situation, not for the presentation of American private organization, but to declare to this Soviet citizen what I was instructed to state by the Soviet Government in the presence of the Government officials-nothing to do with any private organizations. If going to be private American organizations, I am ready to discontinue this.

Mr. Marques. If he were paroled by the Government and sponsored by a private organization, that sponsor is responsible to the Government. Would be find it objectionable if it were a Mr. John Smith who were a private citizen and

it were necessary to be present at this hearing?

Mr. ZAROUBIN. I was told that I would be given an opportunity to state the instructions received by me from the Soviet Government; to state the instructions to the sailors from the Soviet Union. If this opportunity is not going to be given to me, I am ready to leave this building immediately. I have the right to insist this respect to the Ambassador of the Soviet Union. I do not consider it proper and I am ready to discontinue all conversations. I do not want to have anything to do with any private organizations and I am not going to.
(At about this time Mr. Van Hoogstratem, accompanied, I think, by Mr.

Rudnick, left the room temporarily.)

Mr. Marques. Will you please permit me to answer you? You put me in a position where you make a statement and you do not permit me to answer you.

Mr. Zaroubin (answering in English). I am sorry.

Mr. Marques. We do want to give you every opportunity to let you talk with the sailors. It is our desire to grant to you as representative of the Soviet Government every courtesy possible.

Mr. ZAROUBIN. I see the sincere courtesy and I thank you for this, Mr. Marques. We do not like to make you feel that we are encroaching upon your privilege as Soviet Ambassador.

Mr. ZAROUBIN. Do not only create a semblance of that but you do that. Therefore, I categorically object to that.

Mr. Marques. I think we have had Mr. Van Hoogstraten leave temporarily and in our desire to be as pleasant and as cooperative with your Government and to maintain the pleasant relations that we should have in a simple hearing like this, we-

Mr. ZAROUBIN (interrupting). This is my opinion——

Mr. MARQUES. Just a moment.

Mr. Zaroubin. All right. Mr. Marques. We try to be as pleasant and cooperative as possible and that is why Mr. Van Hoogstraten left the room. Whether he will come back, frankly, I do not know. Therefore, let me continue. The provisions provide that the sponsor be present in these interviews. However, it is entirely up to the sponsor if he wishes to withdraw and if you will be patient we will see whether the

sponsor is desirous of returning.

Mr. ZAROUBIN. I am not interested; that is the business of the American authorities. I am not interested in this interview. And once again I repeat that if you—and I explain to the Government of the United States I do not want to be interrogated by any representative of any private organization. I consider it necessary to say what my Government instructed me to say; I do not-you cannot object to my treatment because I was courteous. I speak here not only on behalf of my Government but also on behalf of any government.

Mr. Marques. We realize that. Mr. Zaroubin (continuing). I do not permit myself anything out of the way. We are trying officially here to make this hearing as pleasant as possible to make

discussing nothing of any moment to him, I don't want this to get out of order.

Mr. IVANKOV. That is right.

Mr. Marques. Are you through with him? Can we remove him now?

Mr. Ivankov, I would like to answer. I don't think there will be any necessity of the second meeting; to what I said, I have nothing to add. I decided to meet here. This information about my family is mistaken; that is all I have to say. Under no conditions I am going to have any second meeting; I am not going to have this unpleasantness; the Ambassador has said that he has nothing more to say.

Mr. Marques. We are going to dismiss Mr. Ivankov. (About this time, Mr. Van Hoogstraten reeuters room.)

Mr. ZAROUBIN. Mr. Marques, I understand that I must get up and leave; that

my request is not being granted.

Mr. MARQUES. We want to make this hearing available so that you can meet the needs of your citizens and your Government. I told you that under these hearings the sponsor must be present as that is the sponsor's-

Mr. Zaroubin (interrupting). I must leave.

Mr. Marques. Would you please let me finish? I want to tell Mr. Van Hoogstraten that the Soviet Ambassador objects to his presence and whether he wishes to leave is of his own volition.

Mr. ZAROUBIN. I have nothing against this gentleman; it is a question of

principles.

Mr. Marques (to Mr. Rudnick): Would you please take him [Mr. Ivankov] back?

Mr. Marques (continuing). Now, this has nothing to do with these fellows, so now that he is out of the room we can agree that it has no affect upon his thinking. Now, so far as Mr. Van Hoogstraten is concerned-how do you feel about this? You do not have to leave unless you want to. The rules-

Mr. VAN HOOGSTRATEN. For the purpose of this meeting I fully realize that I have the right to remain here. I will voluntarily decide to withdraw from this meeting, at the same time requesting you, Mr. Chairman, to give me the possibility, if you so see fit, to be able to be in contact with the fellows who have been entrusted to us by our organization.

Mr. MARQUES. Yes. I would like to tell you that you are on the parole papers; the organization is still the sponsor; and we not only will make it possible for you to do so but we expect you to do so because you are the sponsor.

Mr. ZAROUBIN. This is an internal arrangement.

Mr. Marques (to Mr. Van Hoogstraten). We appreciate your cooperation and we certainly want the Ambassador to be able to discuss this with his people and we thank you for making it possible.

(Mr. Van Hoogstraten leaves room and second alien, Mr. Eremenko, is

brought in.)

Mr. Marques. This young man here, Benedict Eremenko, he is also on parole and he has also sought asylum in the United States.

Mr. ZAROUBIN. What exactly do you mean "on parole"?

Mr. Marques. A person who seeks asylum in the United States but who otherwise does not have an immigration status is released on parole of his own word and to a sponsor.

Mr. Zaroubin. Yes; I understand. Mr. Marques. It has no legal implications; it is simply that he is released to someone who is responsible-

Mr. ZAROUBIN (interrupting). I thank you for the explanation.

Mr. Marques. As we stated before, we will start each one of these interviews in the same manner. So that the person interviewed knows exactly what we

are about, Mr. Eremenko, this——
Mr. Zaroubin. Perhaps I would begin at first.
Mr. Marques. Fine; do that; you are welcome.

Mr. ZAROUBIN. I am the Ambassador. I have special instructions from the Soviet Government to apply to the American Government for the request of meeting you and to inform you of the following in the name of the Soviet Government. I regret very much that this opportunity has been given to me after I first asked it. But that is not at question. My Government has asked me to tell you that the Soviet Government knows very well the conditions at which you found yourself in Taiwan, and have known all the provocations that have been applied to you and the situation in which you find yourself now. As Soviet Ambassador, I tell you to take into account all the conditions under which you were. I was instructed to guarantee and tell you that no administrative measures, knowing what conditions have been before, no administrative measures will be applied to you and, therefore, I am offering—I was instructed to offer you this as Ambassador. Your five comrades came to Moscow. Reading the papers of their statements—if you wish, I can give you their statements according to the foreign correspondents of Moscow, of the information that when your five comrades came to the Soviet Union they were not persecuted in any way. No information that was taken in the Soviet Union that does not correspond to the reality.

To your parents the steamship company where you worked is continuing to give aid. Therefore, the Soviet Union and the Embassy leave that question for decision to you. If you wish to return, every kind of assistance will be given to you. Nobody is going to coerce you and any information to that effect simply does not coincide with reality. You are a grownup man and you must decide yourself. To return to your country, any kind of help will be extended at any time and we give full guaranty that you will have an opportunity to continue your honest work, as you worked before until that unfortunate happenings in which you found yourself. That is what I wanted to say; that is what I as Ambassador was instructed to tell you, and to deliver to you the address of your relatives-that they expect you back and then you have to decide yourself.

Mr. Eremenko. I do not want to return. Mr. Zaroubin. That is your business; the Ambassador says you have to decide yourself.

Mr. Eremenko. Inform my relatives that I do not want to return.

Mr. ZAROUBIN. I have no other questions.

Mr. Marques. Mr. Eremenko, this interview is a normal interview that is granted people in your status. The Immigration Service, as you know from experience, has from time to time so that we can determine how you are, so that we can find out if you are healthy, so that we can find out if you still desire to stay in the United States, and if you desire to leave. Now, normally I start the conversation in order to tell you what the hearing is about. The Soviet Ambassador requested permission to talk to you first and I was very happy that he did. That will make my questions comparatively less than had I started at the beginning. I gather, then, that you are happy in the United States?

Mr. Eremenko. Yes.

Mr. Marques. And that you wish to remain in the United States of your own free will?

Mr. Eremenko. Yes.

Mr. Marques. And that you came—did you come to the United States to seek asylum, and was that the only reason?

Mr. Eremenko, Yes.

Mr. Marques. Since your arrival in the United States has anyone intimidated you or has anyone intimidated any of your fellow sailors to remain in the United States?

Mr. EREMENKO. No.

Mr. Marques. Then I wish to tell you that you should understand and keep in mind that as long as you are in the United States should anyone in any manner intimidate or take any action against you, against your desires to remain here, you should feel free at the earliest possible time to seek the assistance of this agency, and that is the Immigration and Naturalization Service, which is responsible for you while you are in the United States, and that under the provisions you are sponsored by the Church World Service organization and that you can also go to them for assistance. Now, do you have anything that you wish to say?

Mr. Eremenko. No; I have nothing to say.

Mr. Marques. Mr. Ambassador?

Mr. ZAROUBIN. No; I have nothing else to say. I said what I was instructed to say and now it is his own decision. I want to repeat once more that if you need the Embassy's help in any way at any time, it will be rendered to you. That is all that I want to tell you.

Mr. Marques (to Mr. Eremenko). Now you will leave.

(Mr. Eremenko leaves.)

Mr. Marques. I will have Mr. Tatarnikov come in.

(About 10-minute intermission.)
(Mr. Tatarnikov enters the room.)

Mr. MARQUES. Would you sit here, Mr. Tatarnikov?

Mr. Tatarnikov, this is the normal interview that we have with aliens seeking asylum in the United States and during this hearing or interview it is a little bit different from those others. That is, we have with us the Ambassador of the Soviet Government who wishes to talk with you.

This is Mr. Zaroubin who is Ambassador and he wishes to talk with you at

this time and when he is through I will talk with you.

Mr. ZAROUBIN. I am the Ambassador. The instructions of the Soviet Government were to request the American Government to give me an opportunity to talk with you. Unfortunately, this opportunity was granted to me only now. want to tell you that the Soviet Government knows the conditions under which you were. I know very well the conditions under which you found yourself before; the Soviet Government knows the conditions which prompted you to come here; therefore, the Soviet Government does not have any complaints against you and instructs me in behalf of the Government of the Soviet Union to tell you that the Soviet Government, as well as your relatives, invites you to return back to your native country and also I have been instructed to guarantee to you that no disciplinary measures will be concerned against you because the Soviet Government and myself we know under what conditions you found yourself. The steamship company where you worked is still helping your parents. Therefore, now the decision depends upon you personally. Nobody intends to influence you to change your opinion. Nobody is going to do that. No unpleasantness expects you if you return. All this talk has no foundation whatso-The others have returned to Moscow and are reunited with their families. ever. They have the opportunity to join any steamship company that they desire.. Therefore, I have to tell you once more that if you decide to return to your native country the Embassy will help you in any way and assist you. After that, you have to decide yourself. You seem to be a grownup man; you perfectly well understand we do not intend to exert on you any kind of pressure. Only once more I can tell you that you are being invited to return by the Government and by your relatives and also by the comrades who returned already which stated the day before yesterday at the press conference in Moscow and you can read this statement today in the papers. This is the object of my conversation That is what I-

Mr. Tatarnikov (interrupting and rising to leave). I thank you but I cannot

return; I have no other questions.

Mr. Zaroubin. Will you tell him that I have no other questions? I was telling him what I was instructed to say. I don't think I was offending him or saying anything to offend him.

Mr. Marques. Mr. Tatarnikov, I want to ask you some questions. I understand that you came to the United States to procure asylum, and that is the only purpose for which you came here. Is that true?

Mr. TATARNIKOV. Yes.

Mr. Marques. Are you happy in the United States?

Mr. TATARNIKOV. Yes.

Mr. Marques. Have you been—since your arrival in the United States have you been intimidated by anyone or have any of your fellow companious been intimidated by anyone while in the United States?

Mr. TATARNIKOV. No. nobody.

Mr. Marques. Then you wish to remain in the United States of your own free will?

Mr. Tatarnikov. Yes, nobody exerted any pressure on me.

Mr. ZAROUBIN. I have one question. Mr. Marques. Then you wish to stay here of your own free will?

Mr. Tatarnikov. Yes.

Mr. MARQUES. Then I wish to tell you that as long as you remain in the United States you have the protection of this Government. You should further understand that as long as you are in the United States, should anyone in any manner intimidate or take any action against your desire, you should feel free at the earliest possible moment to seek assistance from the Immigration and Naturalization Service. You should also, of course, feel free to seek assistance from the sponsor, the Church World Service organization. Do you undertand that?

Mr. TATARNIKOV (nodding). Yes.

Mr. MARQUES. The Ambassador has stated that he wishes to ask you one

question.

Mr. ZAROUBIN. (I was unable to hear what interpreter was saying at first.) * * in order to force them to come back to the Soviet Union. I want to ask if really anybody tried to intimidate or exert any pressure on you in that respect.

Mr. TATARNIKOV. I reply truly that nobody ever tried to exert any pressure.

Mr. ZAROUBIN. That is all.

Mr. Tatarnikov. I can talk for myself; nobody ever exerted any pressure on me.

Mr. Zarboubin. What do you want to transmit to your parents?

Mr. Tatarnikov. Nothing at all. Mr. Zarboubin. That is all my questions.

Mr. Marques. That is the purpose of this interview.

Mr. TATARNIKOV. May I go now?

(Mr. Tatarnikov is permitted to leave the room, and Mr. Victor Solovyev is

brought into the room.)

Mr. Marques. Mr. Solovyev, this is the interview that the Immigration Service grants to persons who seek asylum in the United States, and these are held to determine how you are and to determine your wishes as to whether you wish to remain in the United States or whether you wish to leave the United States. That is the sole purpose of these interviews.

During this interview we are—we have with us representatives of the Soviet Government, and Ambassador Zaroubin wishes to speak with you, and this

[pointing to Ambassador Zaroubin] is Mr. Zaroubin.

Mr. ZAROUBIN. My object is to carry out instructions of the Soviet Government, to meet you and to tell you what I was instructed to tell you. To meet you the Embassy tried to arrange several months ago, but, unfortunately, until now this opportunity was not presented.

I am instructed to tell you the following:

The Soviet Government knows very well the conditions in which you found yourself, your first days at which you found yourself after the provocations of the Tuapse and we know what compelled you to come here and, therefore, my Government instructed me to tell you and to give you a guaranty that they have taken into consideration the conditions under which you have found yourself and understanding that you had no other solution but to seek the opportunity to come here we know what sentiments prompted you when you took this decision. Therefore, the Soviet Government and your mother offer you to return, and I, as Ambassador, was instructed to tell you that the Soviet Government guarantees to you complete safety if you return to the Soviet Union. The decision whether you want to return will depend only on you; your comrades where you were and with whom you worked have now returned to Moscow. The Black Sea Steamship Co., where you worked, continues to help your mother.

Nobody intends to exert on you any pressure and the decision depends on you only. No pressure is going to be exerted but I want to tell you that if you decide to return then the Embassy will render to you any kind of assistance at any

time. And one question I would like to ask:

I heard you answer in the Commission, and according to the press you stated that your mother stated that there is some persecution against her. I immediately communicated * * * and was informed that your mother did not write this to you-

(At this point Mr. Solovyev started talking while Ambassador Zaroubin was still talking and, of course, interpreter talking simultaneously, so I was unable

to hear what interpreter was saying.)

Mr. ZAROUBIN. You said that she was persecuted. Now I am going to finish, The decision of the Soviet Government is entirely different and nobody is permitted to oppress the relatives. Now, if you, or—I have a letter from your mother. If you want to get it, I will give it to you. This is the object of my visit and I want to assure you that I do not want to exert any pressures. If you decide to return back to your mother, then we can guarantee you complete safety.

Mr. Solovyev. I want to answer first about the letter. It is quite correct the handwriting looked mother's, but the address was written by somebody else.

My mother didn't know until now where I am.

Mr. ZAROUBIN. How could she know? America is great. If you want me to

help you send your letter-

Mr. Solovyev. Yes, I will write-I want to say about the letter; it is very strange that my mother didn't know where I was while all the papers showed

Mr. Marques. And as I stated before, these interviews have one purpose, and that is to determine the welfare of the person who has sought asylum in the United States and to determine whether that person wants to leave the United States or remain in the United States. Now this interview has an additional reason, which is unusual; but at the request of the Ambassador, who desired to speak with you, we are pleased to have him here to talk with you and to meet the needs of his Government.

Mr. Zaroubin. It would be very well if that were done 6 months ago and not

today.

Mr. Marques. Mr. Ambassador, we have no control of that.

Mr. ZAROUBIN, I understand. Mr. Marques. Now, let me ask the questions. I do not wish to go into a discussion with you over your correspondence or any of those factors. I simply want to know if you are happy in the United States.

Mr. Solovyev. Yes.

Mr. Marques. I want to know if you came to the United States to procure asylum.

Mr. Solovyev. Yes.

Mr. Marques. And is that the only reason for which you came?

Mr. Solovyev. Yes; that was the only object.

Mr. Marques. I want to ask you if you want to remain in the United States of your own free will?

Mr. Solovyev. Yes.

Mr. Marques. I wish to ask you if you have been coerced by anyone to leave the United States.

Mr. Solovyev. No.

Mr. Marques. I wish to ask you if anyone in the United States, since you have been here, has intimidated you or any of your fellow seamen to remain in the United States.

Mr. Solovyev, I do not know about comrades: I can speak only for myself: I

can say "No."

Mr. Marques. Then you desire to remain in the United States of your own free will?

Mr. Solovyev. Yes. I want to add, if there is any free communication and transportation between Russia and the United States I would be one of the first to go home.

Mr. Marques. The question is, Do you wish to go home?

Mr. Solovyev. I do want to stay in the United States; I do not want to go home.

Mr. Marques. Then I want to advise you—I want to tell you that as long as you remain in the United States you have the protection of the Government of the United States and you should further understand that as long as you are in the United States should any person in any manner intimidate or take any action against your desire to remain here, you should always feel free at the earliest possible time to seek assistance from the Immigration and Naturalization Service and you should also feel free to go for assistance to your sponsor, the Church World organization.

(Mr. Solovyev nods.)

Mr. Marques. Mr. Ambassador, do you have any question?

Mr. ZAROUBIN. I want to repeat to you that if you want any assistance in going home always apply to the Embassy and the Embassy will take you under their care and protection and provide for you to go home. We are not going to exert any pressure and you have to decide yourself. You can still write to your any pressure and you have to decide yourself. mother; write to her because she does not know where you are.

Mr. Marques. You have an address where you can always be reached at the

Church World Service.

Mr. ZAROUBIN (handing a white piece of paper about 3 by 5 inches to Mr. Solovyev with typing on it). You may be—this is to tell you the name and address of my Government.

(Mr. Solovyev started to say something but was interrupted by the Am-

bassador.)

Mr. Marques (to Mr. Solovyev). You were going to say something?

Mr. Solovyey. I want to return to that question of letter. My mother has always wrote to me; I know that she is not literate at all and she writes to me as if she were from the university.

Mr. ZAROUBIN. You better write to her because she does not know where you

Why do you feel this way? Why don't you write?

Mr. Solovyev. Mother knows that I am in the United States.

Mr. Zaroubin. Yes, your mother does know.

Mr. MARQUES. I am sure that if Mr. Solovyev wishes to write to his mother that is his concern and that issue is not material at this hearing.

Mr. Zaroubin. I wanted to tell him what I considered it was necessary.

Mr. Solovyev (in English). Good.

Mr. Marques. That is all.

(Mr. Solovyev leaves the room.)

Mr. ZAROUBIN. I must now thank you and apologize for the—at any rate, I thank you for the consideration.

Mr. Marques. Well, Mr. Ambassador, we are pleased to have you and we are always at your service and we are as near to you as your telephone.

Mr. Zaroubin. I shall remember that. Mr. Marques. So you call us, if you have need of us.

Mr. ZAROUBIN. I am very, very grateful to you. Mr. Marques. I suppose, Mr. Ambassador, that the few minute instances of the discussion we had were just a part of a slight misunderstanding and we are very pleased that Mr. Van Hoogstraten decided to leave and we would not wish to cause you any inconveniences.

Mr. ZAROUBIN. I must say that I would not consent to come here if I knew that representatives of the Church World Service were here. I do not want to tell

you anything that it was evident that there was a misunderstanding.

Mr. Marques. It was evident that it was.

Mr. ZAROUBIN. Let's consider that this question is finished, but the question that you furnish your cooperation and assistance, I shall remember.

Mr. Marques. I hope that you will remember it.



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
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SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY UNITED STATES SENATE

OF THE

EIGHTY-FOURTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES

JUNE 8, 11, AND 29, 1956

PART 29

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary



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SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES

FRIDAY, JUNE 8, 1956

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL
SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to recess, at 10:30 a.m., in room 457, Senate Office Building, Senator John Marshall Butler presiding.

Present: Senator Butler.

Also present: Robert Morris, chief counsel; William A. Rusher, administrative counsel; Benjamin Mandel, research director; and F. W. Schroeder, chief investigator.

Senator BUTLER. The hearing will come to order.

Mr. Morris. Will Mr. Bialer and Mr. Jan Karski come forward, please?

Mr. Karski, will you stand first, please?

Senator Butler. Will you raise your right hand?

Do you solemnly swear that you will interpret to the witness the questions directed to him and you will truly interpret the answers given by the witness to the best of your ability, so help you God?

Mr. Karski. I do.

Mr. Morris. Will you give your full name and address to the reporter?

Mr. Karski. My name is Jan Karski, professor, Georgetown

University.

Mr. Morris. That is in Washington, D. C.?

Mr. Jan Karski. Washington, D. C.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Bialer, will you stand, please?

Senator Butler. Do you solemnly swear in the presence of Almighty God that the evidence you are about to give to this subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth?

(The oath was interpreted to the witness.)

(The witness spoke in Polish.)

The INTERPRETER. I do.

Senator Butler. The witness is sworn. Counsel will proceed.

TESTIMONY OF SEWERYN BIALER, WASHINGTON, D. C., AS INTERPRETED BY JAN KARSKI

Mr. Morris. Will you give your full name and address to the reporter?

The Interpreter. Seweryn Bialer.

Mr. Morris. And you reside now in Washington, D. C., do you not? The Interpreter. Yes, sir.

Mr. Morris. When did you come to the United States?

The Interpreter. May the 4th, 1956.

Mr. Morris. Were you an official of the Polish Communist Govern-

ment?

The Interpreter. Until 1951, I was employed by the Polish Government, in Poland. After 1951, I was assigned to the Polish Communist Party.

Mr. Morris. And when did you leave the Polish Communist Party?

The Interpreter. The 31st of January 1956. Mr. Morris. What happened on that occasion?

The Interpreter. I passed from East Berlin to West Berlin on that day.

Mr. Morris. Did you at that time defect from the Polish Communist

Government?

The Interpreter. I left Poland in the middle of January. I went to East Berlin and then I left East Berlin for the West. And I was a member of the official Polish delegation to East Berlin.

Senator Butler. Will you ask him what his duties were with the

Polish Government?

The Interpreter. Until 1951 I had leading political positions in the Polish militia.

Mr. Morris. Will you tell us what they were?

The Interpreter. My last position was the Chief of the Political Division of the Headquarters of the Polish Militia.

Mr. Morris. Will you tell us why you made your decision to defect

on January 31, 1956?

The Interpreter. I came to a firm conclusion that all this that I was doing for the long 15 years was unjust, bad, and I wanted to break relations with all this.

Mr. Morris. You say it was unjust and bad?

The Interpreter. Yes, sir.

Mr. Morris. Was there anything more you would like to tell us about

your decision to defect?

The Interpreter. I would tell you there are four main reasons for my decision. The first one is the political reason. I came to a conclusion, on the basis as an eyewitness, that the Communist system is contrary to all rules of democracy. The second reason was an economic reason. From the economic point of view, I could see that the system is contrary to economic justice.

There was also a moral reason. Communist morality is contrary to

human nature, and I came to that conclusion.

And then came also ideological reasons. I saw that the Communist theory and Communist practice do not go together, that the practice defies the theory, and I saw it.

It means that the theory does not agree with the facts.

Mr. Morris. I wonder if you could tell us, Mr. Bialer, whether those are the four elements that prompted you to defect.

The Interpreter. Yes, sir.

Mr. Morris. I wonder if you would tell us what positions you had in the Polish Communist Party dating down to January 31, 1956.

The Interpreter. I was employed by the Central Committee of the Polish Communist Party in the propaganda division.

In that propaganda division I was one of the chiefs of the anti-

Western and anti-American propaganda.

I was also a lecturer for the Central Committee.

I was the first secretary in the party organization to the two most important Communist schools in Poland.

I was also an ideological adviser to the official leading Communist

paper in Poland, the People's Tribune.

I also contributed to other papers in Poland.

I was also a professor of the Institute of Social Sciences at the Central Committee of the Communist Party, and also I worked as a research worker in the Institute of Economic Sciences of the Polish Academy of Science.

Mr. Morris. I wonder if you would tell us briefly how you carried on the campaign of propaganda against the West, and particularly

against the United States.

The Interpreter. There were many ways. The first one: I wrote articles on different subjects. Secondly, I delivered very, very many lectures in Poland. Thousands of people were listening to me.

Then I was the author of instructions to the party workers, how should they carry on anti-American and anti-Western propaganda in

Poland.

From time to time I had meetings with the Communists from other countries behind the Iron Curtain. We exchanged views, and also I would give them advice as to how carry on this type of propaganda.

Mr. Morris. Now, Mr. Bialer, have you prepared a summary of your experiences in Poland for the purposes of giving advice on the psycho-

logical warfare campaign for the Free Europe Committee?

The Interpreter. You have in mind, sir, this document you have in your hand?

Mr. Morris. Yes; The Declaration of a Former Communist.

The Interpreter. I wrote it in Polish. Mr. Morris. You wrote it in Polish?

The Interpreter. Yes, sir.

Mr. Morris. And it has been translated into English?

The Interpreter. Yes, sir.

Mr. Morris. And you prepared this particularly on psychological warfare; is that right?

The Interpreter. Yes, sir.

Mr. Morris. I see. Did you do that on behalf of the Free Europe Committee?

The Interpreter. Yes, sir.

May I smoke?

Mr. Morris. Pardon?

The Interpreter. May I smoke? Mr. Morris. Yes, by all means.

And this was prepared, then, during the month of May, was it not?

The Interpreter. Yes, sir.

Mr. Morris. Since you arrived in the United States? Now, are all the statements in there truthful statements?

The Interpreter. Yes, sir.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to put in the record of this subcommittee this paper entitled "The Declaration of a Former Communist," with the identification made by the witness, written for the purpose he has described here this morning.

I would like that to go into our record in its entirety, Senator. Senator Butler. It will be made a part of the record.

Mr. Morris. And there is, Senator, as you will notice a biographical sketch which composes the first page of this declaration.

Senator Butler. That will be made a part of the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 286," and reads as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 286

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA OF SEWERYN BIALER

Born: November 3, 1926.

1942: joined the underground anti-Nazi Communist organization in Lodz. July 1944-May 1945: inmate of Auschwitz and Friedland concentration camps. May 1945-June 1951:

Chief of the Political Department of the training center of the Citizens'

Militia at Slupsk.

Chief of the Political Department of the Central Command of the Citizens' Militia in Warsaw.

Other executive political positions in the Citizens' Militia. June 1951-January 31, 1956:

A Party activist of the Central Committee of the PZPR.

Worked in the propaganda department of the Central Committee of the

Lecturer of the Central Committee of the PZPR.

Secretary of the Party Committee in the Institute of Social Sciences and the Higher School of Marxism-Leninism affiliated with the Central Committee of the PZPR.

Ideological advisor to Trybuna Ludu, the Ceneral Party organ.

Editor of Zeszyty Teoretyczno-Polityczne.

Contributor to Nowe Drogi, Trybuna, Ludu, Ekonomista, and other Party and professional publications.

Research scholar for the School of Economic Sciences, affiliated with the

Polish Academy of Sciences.

Coauthor of Party training textbook and other Party publications.

Member of the delegation of the Central Committee of the PZPR to Moscow, Leningrad, East Berlin, and other cities.
Delegate from Poland to the Youth Congress in Bucharest.

Holder of a number of high Polish decorations and orders of merit.

THE DECLARATION OF A FORMER COMMUNIST

At the end of January last when I was breaking with Communism once and for all, and crossing the border into West Berlin, I knew that I was wiping out my past life. I took this step with my eyes open, however, after carefully

deliberating for several months.

I was 15 in 1942 when I enrolled in the Communist underground organization in Lodz. I was trained by the Party and trained others to be loyal to it. eral thousand PZPR activists in Warsaw, Lodz, Wrocław, Bydgoszcz, Kielce, and other cities know me from the lectures and briefings I held as a lecturer appointed by the Central Committee of the Party. Readers of Party publications also know me well from my articles. My colleagues at the Social Science Institute and the Central Committee's school of Marxism-Leninism—where I was Secretary of the Party authorities-also know me well. I am known to Party members from various other institutions and scholarly positions, as well as propaganda posts with which I was associated. I owe all of these people an explanation: Why did I break with the Party? Why did I stop believing in Communism?

The Communist System Is Antidemocratic

They know perfectly well that I did not escape to the West to secure a job or to make a career because all this was secured for me by the Party, and open to

me in Poland.

Shortly after the war, at the age of 19, I became head of the Political Department at the Citizens' Militia Training Center and after that I advanced swiftly, When I was leaving Poland, I belonged to the Central Committee Party aktiv and the Party leadership had complete trust in me. As a result of the duties I was charged with and the posts I occupied, I had access to materials, facts, and documents which are often inaccessible to the majority of Party activists, not to speak of the rank and file and the general public. As a result, I could gradually acquaint myself with the truth and more and more discover the fraudulence and the evil. For a very long time I thought that poverty, waste, terror, and falsehood were the inevitable price every revolution has to pay for progress. Having been for many years active in the Party I was thoroughly familiar with its working methods, its system of government, and I arrived at the conclusion that it was an antidemocratic system which could not exist without poverty, waste, and falsehood.

The Dictator Died but the Dictatorship Remains

Why did this change of attitude toward Communism take place in me during the last, post-Stalin period? Because I saw them with a particular intensity and became convinced that the evil connected with Communism does not arise from individual mistakes, but from the Communist system itself. The dictator's death had to bring about certain changes in the shape of the dictatorship, both in Russia and in the captive countries. However, as I learned from the experience of the past three years in Poland, that did not mean the disappearance of the dictatorship itself. The Membership of the Politburo has changed, and perhaps will continue to change, but its omnipotence has remained, as has the symbol of its power and dictatorship, the First Secretary of the Central Committee, Edward Ochab, who took Bierut's place after his death, and is notorious for the brutal Stalinist methods he uses.

I was particularly struck by the fact that the same people who blamed Stalin and Beria for everything bad simultaneously practiced the use of the same Stalinist and Beria-like methods as much as they could. What is more, when it is deemed necessary, they restore these methods, fighting openly and secretly against any pronounced attempts at the democratization of Party and national

life.

I shall give you at least one example. At the end of 1952, at the Politburo office, I was shown a letter which the Presidium of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union had written to Soviet Party activists explaining the way Beria had been liquidated. One of the reasons for the Beria purge was his alleged attempt to get into contact with Tito and the Yugoslav Party. A year later, the same Khrushchev who had signed the above-mentioned letter to the Party activists, went to Belgrade to win Marshal Tito over and to ask his forgiveness. making Beria responsible then for Tito's excommunication. It told me that Khrushchev and company were fighting for power against their antagonists by the same methods Stalin had used, though externally their methods might seem different. I also ascertained irrefutably that the Party leadership continued to disclose and condemn only those crimes and dark pages of Communist history which could not be kept secret, or which had to be disclosed because it was necessary for the leadership. They continued to treat the rank and file of the Party, not to mention the people at large, as an object of their rule, and to suppress the truth about the many internal events in the Party, and most of the problems discussed by its leaders. How can one explain otherwise the paradoxical fact that the resolutions of the III Plenum were not published, though the Plenum was allegedly an epoch-making event aimed at the democratization and gradual revelation of Party activities in Poland?

The Party Leadership Fears the Progress of the Thaw

As an activist and employee of the Central Committee, I took part in the debates in the Central Party aktiv. I had access to many documents and I know the way comrades from the Politburo tried to smother and suppress the so-called "thaw" because they were panic-stricken by its results. I also know what a farce Rokzanski and his comrades' trial was. I know how passionately Berman, Bierut, Ochab, and others shielded, as long as they could, Beria's successors in Poland-Radkiewicz, for example-and how they tried to make them suffer as

little as possible.

For several years I was particularly closely connected with the ideological work of the Party. In this work I was in touch with the leading Marxists in Russia and the Soviet bloc countries. I devoted many years to the study of Marxist-Leninist ideology and finally concluded that in the Communist version of it, real freedom of scientific research is impossible. The repudiation of some of the theoretical theses formulated by Stalin by the present Russian Communist leaders does not change anything because the head of the Party continues to be the highest and virtually infallible scientific oracle in all matters of economics, philosophy, history, agronomy, and many other branches of knowledge. (Stalin's place has now been taken by that noteworthy personality, from the intellectual and scholarly point of view, Nikita Sergeyevitch Khrushchev, called Nikita Kukuruznik by the Party activists themselves.)

The fact that in 1955, long after the old tyrant's death, during the rule of the new and allegedly democratic party authorities in Russia, a ban was placed on discussion of the main problem of economic policy, I mean the problem of the relation between development of heavy industrial production and consumer goods production, in Russia and all the captive countries. Fearing that we might discuss these problems, we, the workers of the Party's ideological front and intellectual activists, were instructed to limit ourselves to writing essays which would merely explain the official Party line on the priority development of

heavy industry.

Facts Are Against Communism

One of my Party assignments was to prepare guidances for the propaganda policy aimed at the West. I had, therefore, access to materials, facts, and statistics which are carefully kept secret from the Party and the general public. On the basis of those materials I became convinced that both Communist theory and practice are false because they are contradicted by the facts. They are contradicted by the improvement of the situation of the working classes in the West, and by the poverty in the Communist countries. Taking part in the work of various institutions and in various scholarly posts, I was able to acquaint myself with the methods of falsification, embellishment, and suppression of data and statistics concerning the standard of living in Poland, and with the methods of garbling Western statistics for Communist propaganda purposes.

Step by step I learned the truth and lost faith in Communism. I had to lie, pretend, and play a double game. Finally, I arrived at the conclusion that I was unable to live that way any longer, that it was better to erase 15 years of wasted life than to continue to live without faith that what I was doing was

right.

These are the reasons I broke with Communism. That is why I gave up brilliant prospects in the Party and took the decisive step which was so difficult for personal reasons. That is why I crossed the Western border, so that I could freely and openly tell what I know about the facts the Communist leadership tries to suppress, so that I can tell what I know about Communist theory and practice.

BERIA'S CASE

In March 1953, greatly impressed by Stalin's death, I listened together with other Party members to the speeches that Beria, Malenkov, and Molotov gave in Moscow's Red Square. They all spoke of the inflexible unity of the Party leadership and promised to guard that leadership unity constantly. I believed them then and listened to their speeches with great emotion.

However, before four months had elapsed, I was taken aback by the communique about Beria's arrest and next about his purge. The official explanation

in the press filled me with serious doubts.

In the autumn of 1953, at the office of the PZPR Politburo, I was given a secret letter from the Soviet Party Presidium to the Party aktiv in Russia. The letter explained the reasons that made Beria's purge necessary. Besides myself, some other chosen members of the Central Party aktiv were allowed to read the letter. Afterwards, it was probably return to the PZPR Politburo's safe where it probably still lies under Ochab's vigilant eye.

I read this letter with great interest. I had no illusions whatsoever as to Beria's role as Security Police chief. On the other hand, I realized that many

official reasons for his liquidation had been invented and did not apply exclusively to him. That's why I was curious about whether in a letter reserved for a small group of the most trusted comrades I would find some explanation for my doubts. However, the contents of the letter, instead of dispelling my doubts, increased them even further. The letter repeated many of the charges I knew from the communique in the newspapers. Thus, Beria was accused of having transformed the security apparatus into an organ independent of the Party. There was also the same charge about Beria's mistakes in his nationalities policy, especially with respect to the small nations in the Soviet Union. Even the absurd charge about Beria's having been a spy and an imperialist agent, recruited in 1918, was repeated.

Beria Surrounds Other Politburo Members with Spies

In addition to those well-known charges, there were other accusations. Thus, Beria was accused of using the security apparatus in the struggle for power within the Soviet Politburo. I remember that this charge was corroborated, among other things, by the fact that Beria had seized control of the Kremlin guards and with their help had organized surveillance and wiretapping of the conversations of the other Politburo members. The second fact quoted in the letter was even more typical. It was maintained that when one of the Politburo members was leaving for Lwow, Beria summoned the head of the NKVD in Lwow and ordered him to put the member under surveillance in Lwow. When the head of the Lwow NKVD expressed his surprise that such an order could be issued about a Politburo member, Beria reminded him what refusal to execute his order would entail, and said—I remember the phrase very clearly: "If you don't carry out my orders, I shall crush you into labor camp dust." In spite of that, the NKVD agent from Lwow was so shocked that he immediately called upon other Politburo members to tell them about Beria's order.

Other charges in the letter referred to economic matters. They were very numerous and I want to mention them here only briefly. Among other things, Beria was accused of having hampered the development of agriculture by his influence in the Politburo. Besides, Beria was also accused of having consistently hindered the policy of raising the standard of living of the working classes by

opposing any lowering of prices.

The Amoral Profile of Beria

The Soviet Politburo letter also said that Beria was a moral degenerate in his private life. As proof, the following facts were listed. It was maintained that Beria had a special apartment in Moscow where he organized erotic orgies in selected company. On his orders, specially chosen women were brought from the Moscow prisons. According to the letter, these women were later liquidated in labor camps. Beria also forced other women he liked to take part in those orgies. When he grew bored with them, they were arrested and sent to special labor camps.

The letter also said that Beria had appropriated authorship of the book called The History of the Bolshevik Organization in Transcaucasia, whose authors he had shot. According to the letter, the book contained many historical falsehoods which exaggerated Beria's role. This charge was particularly interesting to me because Beria's book was one of the official manuals of the history of the Bolshevik Party used in the Party training which I myself had organized in Poland.

Nor did the list of charges end there. The letter maintained that Beria had persecuted the family of the dead Party leader Ordjonikidze because he had been one of the first to suspect Beria and to mistrust him. After Ordjonikidze's death, Beria transferred his hatred to his family, persecuting and destroying it.

Who Performed the Murders in Leningrad?

From the letter on Beria I also learned for the first time officially about the socalled Leningrad Affair. The Politburo accused Beria of having conducted a policy of liquidation of people devoted and loyal to the Communist Party simply because they were devoted and loyal. The "Leningrad Affair" was an example where in a series of secret trials, the flower of the political aktiv of Leningrad was liquidated. According to the letter, the material evidence in those trials had been fabricated by Beria.

It is very possible that Beria was actually one of the men who organized the Leningrad trials. But I understood the perfidy of this accusation only later, in February 1955, when I read another Politburo letter explaining Malenkov's dismissal. In that letter, I found, among other things, a charge that Malenkov was

also responsible for the organization of the Leningrad trials. I then came to the conclusion that Khrushchev, aiming at seizure of power in the Party, had adopted the tactics of removing his rivals one by one. As long as it was necessary, he, together with Malenkov, accused Beria of staging the Leningrad trials. Eighteen months later, when Malenkov's turn came, Khrushchev made him coresponsible.

Beria Wanted, but Khrushchev Went . . .

The most perfidious charges in the letter, against the background of the present Party line, were the charges that the proof of Beria's work as an imperialist agent was in his attempts after Stalin's death to get in touch with Tito and the Yugoslav Party. According to the Politburo letter, the Yugoslav Party was a fascist and anti-Soviet Party. I even remember a certain detail in connection with that charge. Beria was accused of having tried to make direct telephone contact with Belgrade for private talks with the Yugoslav leaders. The question was about reopening a direct telephone line which had been cut off between the Kremlin and Belgrade after Yugoslavia's expulsion from the Cominform.

The perfidy of this charge appeared to me only much later. When Khrushchev went to Belgrade and when the new Politburo policy toward Yugoslavia was announced, I remembered that part of the letter which had accused Beria of trying to establish relations with a fascist and anti-Soviet Yugoslav Party. On one hand, Khrushchev blamed Beria for having broken off relations with Tito and Yugoslavia and, on the other, he accused him and indicted him for having at-

tempted to recstablish those relations.

At the end of the letter, the Soviet Politburo asked the question: "Why was Beria so rapidly unmasked after Stalin's death?" The letter gave the following answer: the Soviet Politburo could unmask him so soon because Beria became domineering and reckless after Stalin's death. He made careless moves and thus enabled the Politburo to unmask him as an imperialist agent. In this way the Soviet Politburo gave one to understand that before Stalin's death it had not known of Beria's criminal activities, but it had discovered them only in the past two or three months and therefore was not responsible for Beria's past activities.

Further the letter explained that in investigating Beria's hostile activities and in its fight against him, the Polithuro had to be very careful since any rash step would have aroused his suspicions. While being aware of Beria's criminal activities, the Polithuro had to pretend that it did not suspect him of anything. Because of this, it had to accept certain of Beria's moves though it did not agree with them. The letter gives as an example the question of the policy line preceding the Berlin riots in June 1953. In it, the Soviet Polithuro declared that the policy imposed by Beria on the Soviet authorities in East Germany, and on the political leadership of the German Democratic Republic, which resulted in the June riots, was false. The Soviet Polithuro was aware of the fact that the policy being conducted in East Germany was in error, but could not oppose it because it did not want Beria to guess that he was suspected of being a spy.

Khrushchev Uses Stalin's and Beria's Methods

Such were the contents of the secret letter of the Presidium of the CPSU to the political aktiv in Russia. This letter was one of the documents which helped to evaluate the situation properly. Not immediately, of course, but later, when I compared other Khrushchev moves with the letter's charges about Beria, I became profoundly convinced that both the secret trial and the fabrication of certain of the charges in Beria's purge were typical of the methods both Stalin and Beria had applied. And the responsibility for those methods could not be fixed only on Beria or Stalin. After the letter about Malenkov, after Khrushchev's visit to Belgrade, and after the July Plenum last year, it became clear to me that in large measure Khrushchev was fighting for power with the same methods as Beria and Stalin had used. I also came to the conclusion that there was no difference between the trials organized by Stalin and Beria, and Beria's trial, insofar as trumping up charges or in the methods of conducting the trial itself.

MALENKOV FORCED TO RESIGN: KHRUSHCHEV DEGRADES MALENKOV

After Beria's purge the next step in the power struggle inside the Soviet Politburo was Malenkov's forced resignation. Before it happened we had a period of awakened hopes. After the Beria affair, some changes were introduced into the Party leadership system. The question of the improvement of the standard of living was considered the most important task. I must state that in 1954 I myself and a considerable number of the Party activists really believed that the power struggle in the Soviet Politburo was over. We believed that after Beria's

removal, the highest Soviet leadership was united.

Yet, in February 1955, the news of Malenkov's removal came like a thunderclap. It shocked the entire Party aktiv: we knew immediately that the struggle in the Politburo continued. We were indignant at the way in which Malenkov had been removed, rather like a schoolboy, and not like the Premier of a great country which was considered as a model democracy. Finally, we thought that the official reasons for Malenkov's dimissal in which we were asked to believe, and which we were asked to tell others, were ridiculous.

Bierut and Ochab Said Only One Thing: Obey the Moscow Politburo

We turned for an answer to our doubt to the PZPR leadership, to Bierut, Berman, and Ochab. They had only one answer for us, however: we must trust the Soviet Party Presidium completely. Moreover, they attempted to cut short all discussion of the subject. I remember, for example, that in February 1955, at one of the Party meetings at the Institute of Social Sciences of the Central Party Committee, I was sitting next to Berman and expressed my doubts about Malenkov's resignation. Berman answered with phrases about full confidence, and greatly agitated cut off further discussion.

When, shortly thereafter, at the Politburo office, I was given a Soviet Communist Party Presidium letter to the Soviet Party aktiv, concerning Malenkov this time, I wondered whether I would find an answer there to the questions that

haunted me-and I found it.

Because up to today, the reasons for Malenkov's removal have not been given to the Russian people, or to the Party, or to the Polish people, I would like to tell about the contents of that letter. These are the reasons mentioned in the confidential letter, not those given in the press, which were so absurd that no one could believe them. I shall enumerate them one by one.

The Main Emphasis Was Not Farming and the Farmer's Life, but Power

The first charge concerned Malenkov's responsibility for serious errors in his farm policy. This accusation was already known to me from Malenkov's statement explaining his resignation. In the Soviet Politburo letter the charge was amplified. It was said that Malenkov was in charge of farm policy. The state of farming in the Soviet Union was alarming, and Malenkov was chiefly responsible.

sible for this state of affairs.

When I read those charges, the following questions came to my mind. First, if Malenkov were responsible for the farm crisis, what could we say about Khrushchev who had for many years been Party Secretary in the Ukraine, the granary of the Soviet Union? Secondly, if Malenkov knew so little about agriculture, what could be said about his successor, Bulganin, who, as I learned from his biography, had never had anything to do with farming? Thirdly, if Malenkov were little acquainted with agriculture, he knew even less about electric power stations, and yet in spite of it, he had been appointed minister of electric power stations. Finally, the first steps which, in the opinion of Khrushchev and the entire Politburo, were to change the farm situation completely had already been taken under Malenkov. Therefore, it was not Malenkov who was preventing implementation of agrarian reforms. Consequently, the question of farming was not involved. My suspicion was subsequently confirmed when, in spite of Malenkov's resignation, no really new resolutions on farm questions were announced.

What also struck me was that Beria was also accused of being responsible for the farm crisis. This coincidence of charges being brought against Beria and Malenkov became even more striking when I read the rest of the letter. I shall write of it later in connection with the coresponsibility for the "Leningrad Affair."

Light Industry-No!

Before coming to that matter, I should like to mention other charges brought against Malenkov in the Soviet Politburo's confidential letter. Attention was drawn to the danger caused by Malenkov's policy to the regular development of the People's Democracies. This charge was formulated cautiously, and like the entire letter, briefly. Such a policy, as conducted by Malenkov, could bring about a decrease of economic effort in the People's Democracies. I understood

then immediately what it was all about. At that time, there was great interest in the Polish Party in the developments in Hungary after Imre Nagy had come to power. During that period, Hungary abandoned the principle of stressing heavy industry at any price and by any means. Not only I, but many other people, saw in it a great relief for the Hungarian people. During this period, pressure was brought to bear on the Party leadership in Poland by the *aktiv* to follow the Hungarian example more resolutely in establishing the relation between heavy industry and consumer goods production so that the standard of living could be raised.

This pressure was firmly resisted by the Party leadership. They were at that time greatly displeased by the Hungarian comrades who were making the situation in Poland more difficult. I remember especially well that Szyr was furious when some of the activists maintained that Hungarian economic policy

was more sensible than Polish.

Shortly after Malenkov's removal, even before I had occasion to read the Soviet Politburo's letter, I learned about Imre Nagy's dismissal and that is why, when I read in the letter than Malenkov had been accused of endangering the orderly development of the People's Democracies, I understood how this charge was justified from the Soviet Politburo viewpoint. Malenkov had, in fact, conducted a policy which might have brought some measure of relief in the economic situations of the captive countries. In the long run, however, this would mean an increase in the independence of those countries and with such a policy, Khrushchev and the rest of the Politburo could not agree. Besides, during Khrushchev's stay in Poland in the spring of 1955, I could personally ascertain it from listening

to his very aggressive and unpublished speeches.

The next charge in the letter concerned Malenkov's incorrect attitude toward developing heavy industry, which was closely connected with what I have said before. When I read the Soviet Politburo's letter, I was struck by the fact that Malenkov was actually accused of deviation from Stalinism, for one of Stalin's fundamental economic principles was priority of heavy industry and maintenance of a steady difference of tempo between heavy industrial and consumer goods industry development. The simple conclusion occurred to me that whatever is convenient in Stalinism to the present Party leadership will, without fail, be maintained. I also remember that during that time there were numerous discussions of economic policy, of the ratio between heavy industry and consumer goods industry, in the Party, and after Malenkov's dismissal, these discussions were severely forbidden.

And so Malenkov's Turn Came. Who Next?

Finally, there was yet another charge which gave me much to think about in that confidential letter. The Soviet Politburo accused Malenkov of a conciliatory attitude toward Beria and of coresponsibility for the "Leningrad trials." The charge was formulated as follows: during the period of struggle against Beria, Malenkov adopted a conciliatory attitude toward him and was, moreover, coresponsible for the "Leningrad Affair." I noted immediately that this charge was identical with one of the charges made against Beria, though formulated in a less emphatic way, the charges on which the purge of Beria had been based. Yet, I thought, Malenkov had been Khrushchev's aide when Beria was purged. Still another question occurred to me. Why wasn't Malenkov accused of it in those days. The answer was clear enough. Malenkov was indispensable in the fight against Beria, and his turn had not yet come.

In this way the "Leningrad Affair" and the crisis in agriculture were exploited by Khrushchev twice in order to rid himself of his two most important rivals. This tested method of removal was applied by Khrushchev, as I was to learn later, with great success. When Molotov was removed in July, I remembered that at the same session of the Supreme Soviet at which Malenkov had been forced to resign, Molotov had given a speech on foreign policy. In that speech, he had expressed the same views on the Yugoslav problem as those for which he was later severely criticized at the July Plenum. He had also then formulated the same thesis with respect to the stage of development of communism in Russia

which he was publicly asked to withdraw.

But Molotov's mistakes were tolerated by Khrushchev at that time. The reason was obvious: Molotov's help was necessary to force Malenkov's resignation. In February, Molotov was still indispensable to Khrushchev, as Malenkov had been indispensable during the purge of Beria in July 1953. Molotov's turn came at the July Plenum last year. . . .

How Khrushchev Carried Out Molotov's Political Demotion

The third step in Khrushchev's showdown with his Politburo rival was to remove Molotov from all influence on political affairs in the Party leadership.

This took place last July at the Plenum. How did it come about?

In July 1955 the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU was held. The materials connected with the Plenum filled the Soviet and Polish press for several days; they were the subject of discussions and official training in the PZPR. The subject discussed at the Plenum, at least what one could judge from the materials, was the question of introducing new technical methods into Soviet industry. Bulganin made a speech. I remember I considered a positive thing that all the speeches of the participants had been published, a rare thing at Russian plena and even at Polish ones. The discussion was not secret and in many cases was very lively.

True, I found it odd that in view of such important events in the international arena as Khrushchev's and Bulganin's visit to Belgrade, the Austrian problem, and the Geneva Conference, no foreign policy problems were discussed at the Plenum. However, I did not attach great importance to it. It did not occur to me that so early after Malenkov's removal, new personal showdowns were in the making. Besides, it was a period of intensification of the "thaw" in Poland,

and these problems occupied my attention completely.

Three months passed and the questions connected with the July Plenum were slowly forgotten. The problems of the Plenum ceased to be discussed at training centers. But in October Bierut suddenly called a meeting of the members of the Central Committee, and a part of the Central Party aktiv. When we gathered on the 6th floor of the building of the Central Committee, Bierut got up and told us that the July Plenum besides its public part had had a secret and unpublished part. In a short talk Bierut informed us of some of the matters which had been discussed in the secret part of the July Plenum. Our meeting was strictly confidential. I remember Bierut told us that we could not make notes.

Bierut's brief information was later passed on, even more briefly, to certain groups of the Party *aktiv* in Warsaw, and Jerzy Morawski reported on the secret part of the Plenum to the lecturers of the Central Committee. For my part, I made a report on those matters to Party schools and again it was understood that no notes could be taken. Also, attendance at the meeting was closely checked on the basis of a list and Party identity cards. No questions or discussion were permitted; in short, the material was treated as strictly confidential. But it all became clear to me when I read a stenographic record of the secret part of the Plenum.

A few days after the meeting with Bierut in the Politburo office, they gave me the full stenographic record of the July Plenum to read. It was the only copy sent to Polund for the use of the Polish Politburo. Only a very small number of the members of the Party aktiv were permitted to read it. The record was very long. The Plenum had lasted 8 days and some of the speeches several hours, so I shall only deal with some of the problems discussed at the Plenum.

The Third Step in the Career of the Collective Leadership: Khrushchev

What was the chief subject of the secret part of the July Plenum? After reading the record carefully I saw that it concerned itself chiefly with the showdown between Khrushchev and the rest of the Soviet Politburo on one hand, and Molotov on the other. The secret part of the July Plenum was, therefore, the third step in clearing the way for the so-called collective leadership, therefore, for Khrushchev.

What was the platform of this showdown? The Yugoslav issue. The problem of the attitude of the Soviet Communist Party toward Marshal Tito and the Yugoslav Party. But it would not be fair to restrict the discussion to Tito's case. The fact is that the question of Yugoslav relations was only a point of departure for a long discussion of political and economic problems. I shall

enumerate only the most important ones.

A good deal of space was given to a discussion of coexistence with the capitalist countries, to the problem of political relations between the Russian Party and the Parties of the People's Democracies, to the problem of diplomatic relations with the People's Democracies. The question of the underdeveloped countries was also discussed, and the attitude toward Socialist Parties in the West, and the attitude toward Stalinism. However, the most important subject, and the basis for the showdown with Molotov, was the Yugoslav problem.

What follows is based on the shorthand minutes of the secret part of the Plenum

about the showdown itself.

In February, at the Supreme Soviet meeting, Molotov's attitude had already been different from the line taken toward the Yugoslav problem by Khrushchev and most of the other Politburo members, and this became clear to me, and to the majority of the Political aktiv when we heard of the Khrushchev-Bulganin visit to Belgrade. In February, however, Khrushchev did not attack Molotov because he needed him in the showdown with Malenkov. This is proved by the fact that the Soviet Politburo permitted his official address to the Supreme Soviet to express views which opposed those of the majority of the Politburo. Yet there is no doubt that the texts of such speeches are scrupulously approved by the Politburo, and primarily by the First Party Secretary before they are made.

From the stenographic record of the secret part of the Plenum, it seemed that preparations for Molotov's removal began immediately after Malenkov's resignation. In the spring of last year, the Politburo held a meeting at which Molotov was criticized as Minister of Foreign Affairs for his attitude toward the Yugoslav problem and several other international problems. Molotov was accused of having hampered the reestablishing of Soviet-Yugoslav relations by

all means.

Khrushehev and Molotov Battle Over Tito

Before the Khrushchev and Bulganin departure for Belgrade, the Politburo held another meeting at which Molotov opposed the visit. Molotov was for reestablishing international relations with Yugoslavia but, for ideological reasons, resisted reestablishment of Party relations with the Yugoslav Communist Party. What he had in mind was not only Khrushchev and Bul-

ganin's visit to Belgrade but also the character of their visit.

These facts were given by Khrushchev in his opening speech to the secret part of the July Plenum. As a result of Politburo discussions, Khrushchev continued, Molotov still had not changed his attitude. The disagreement found its expression in the adoption of two Politburo resolutions. In one, the majority of the Politburo recognizes the necessity of the Belgrade visit and the necessity of attempting to reconstitute inter-Party relations with Yugoslavia. In the second resolution, Molotov's attitude was described, appraised by Khrushchev and the rest of the Politburo, and a decision was taken to put it up for discussion at the earliest Plenum of the CC of the CPSU.

At the July Plenum, Khrushchev once again charged Molotov with having prevented the reestablishment of international relations with Yugoslavia, and denounced his attitude on this issue as both erroneous and against the Party

line.

Molotov Battles And

The stenographic record showed that Molotov addressed the meeting after Khrushchev's speech and explained his viewpoint. However, in the discussion which followed and lasted for several days, the Plenum of the CC declared itself against Molotov's position. In addition to Khrushchev, Bulganin, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Susslov, and Shepilov criticized Molotov severely. The discussion was accompanied by a series of personal skirmishes, abusive remarks flowed freely, and time and again speeches were interrupted. This was particularly true of Molotov's speech.

I shall give an example. When Molotov was explaining his viewpoint that Party problems should not be discussed with Tito because Tito was anti-Soviet and his views far removed from Communism and rather close to those of anti-Communists, Khrushchev interrupted him, shouting: "But in 1939 you could talk to Ribbentrop!" Incidentally, it occurred to me while I was reading the minutes that the comparison to Ribbentrop was not very flattering for Tito.

* * * and Capitulates

As a result of the violent discussion, Molotov made a short declaration toward the end of the secret meeting, occupying not more than one page of the shorthand minutes, in which in an extremely formal manner, he listed Khrushchev's charges and admitted that they were well founded. He also said that he yielded to the Central Committee's view of the Yugoslav problem. His declaration was so formal that I had no doubt when I read it that it was only Molotov's attempt to save what still could be saved. It was an attempt to take away from Khrushchev all the arguments which could be used for Molotov's dismissal.

An Allegedly "Impersonal" Encounter

The shorthand minutes showed that the discussion was full of Khrushchev's personal remarks about Molotov. Khrushchev therefore devoted a great deal of space in his closing speech to assurances that there was no question of a personal misunderstanding between him and Molotov. Personally, he said he had nothing against Molotov: his sole concern was Party matters. These assurances were so numerous that I understood them to mean their opposite. Besides, even in his closing comments, Khrushchev could not resist making a personal remark leveled at Molotov. He said, and I remember that passage extremely well, "Vyacheslav Mikhailovitch, all this is your wife's fault. It would be much better for you if you didn't listen to her. She pushes you and makes you ambitious. She is your evil spirit."

Such was the general outline of the showdown with Molotov at the secret

session of the Plenum last July.

THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO POLAND IS NOT A DIPLOMAT BUT A PROCONSUL

The stenographic of the secret part of the Plenum of the CC of the CPSU also contained many matters which pertained to Poland and Polish-Soviet relations. The question of the real role of the Soviet Ambassadors to Poland, particularly Popov and Lebediev, confirmed a state of affairs I had suspected for a long time. The Soviet ambassador in Poland was more a proconsul interfering in the internal affairs of the country than the diplomatic representative of a friendly nation. He does not take into account either the feelings of the people, or the Party leaders' ambitions. There is, of course, nothing new in this. What is new is that it was described in this manner at a Central Committee meeting in Moscow with Khrushchev and Kaganovitch there.

How was it that the question of the behavior of the Soviet Ambassadors to Poland was discussed at the secret meeting of the July Plenum? It so happened that Molotov's activity as Minister of Foreign Affairs had already been examined, and in order to substantiate their criticism of him, Khrushchev, Kaganovitch, and others cited facts which either directly or indirectly discredited him. Among other things, the activities of the Soviet ambassadors to Poland emerged.

Long before I read the shorthand minutes of the July Plenum, I heard rumors and sometimes even full details which threw light on the real role of the Soviet ambassadors to Poland. Besides, I was in personal contact with other Soviet inspectors in Poland. Thus, I often met Professor Alexandrov, ideological tutor of some of the Polish training schools, Comrade Nietchkina, guardian of the Polish philosophers, Professor Kuzminov, who occasionally came from Moscow to inspect the Polish economists and their work, Comrade Pankratova, member of the Central Committee in Moscow and patron of Polish historians, and many others. On the basis of these contacts and seeing their condescending attitude toward Poles, I could easily imagine how the Soviet ambassador, whose rank was much higher, behaved. But it is quite a different thing to imagine things and to find a confirmation of one's suspicions in Khrushchev's or Kaganovitch's speeches, and the stepnographic minutes of the July Plenum secret session confirmed them amply.

Kaganovitch Admits that Popov Liked to Give Orders

At the Plenum Kaganovitch criticized Molotov's activities as Foreign Minister and, among other things, appraised the Soviet ambassador's work in Poland. Kaganovitch maintained that Popov's behavior was simply inexcusable. What was this inexcusable behavior? According to the report, Popov thought he was fully entitled to issue orders to the Comrades in the leadership of the Polish Party. He grossly interfered in Polish internal affairs. Kaganovitch said that Popov was intriguing among the Polish Party leaders and inciting them one against the other. Moreover, Popov spoke disparagingly, in the presence of Polish comrades, of the Polish Party leadership. Such behavior on the part of a Soviet Ambassador to Poland, Kaganovitch said, was inadmissible.

While I read the above criticisms of the Soviet Ambassador's hehavior by Kaganovitch, I involuntarily asked myself the following questions: First, Popov became ambassador to Poland in June 1953 and remained at his post until March 1954. He was, therefore, Ambassador after Stalin's death, after Beria's purge, and when Khrushchev was made First Party Secretary, and came to Warsaw on

several occasions. It is hard to believe that the Soviet leadership was unaware of Popov's behavior, yet in spite of this his activities in Warsaw were tolerated.

Second, I wondered how meek the PZPR Politburo was if it had tolerated Popov's actions for so long. This same Popov was not even a member of the Central Committee of the CPSU. They even tolerated him when they were no longer obliged to listen to Stalin's orders.

But the criticism of the Soviet ambassadors to Poland made at the July Plenum was not limited to Popov only. In his closing speech at the secret session of the Plenum, Khrushchev violently attacked another Soviet ambassador to Poland,

Lebiediev.

Khrushchev Admits That Lebiediev and Popov Are Like Twins

Commenting on Lebiediev's activities, Khrushchev used the same expressions as Kaganovitch did about Popov. Among other things, Khrushchev maintained that Lebiediev took it upon himself to be a leader of political life in Poland, and used to summon the highest Polish Party dignitaries to the Soviet Embassy and tell them what to do. In addition, Khrushchev accused Liebiediev of having written a book on Poland which had already been sent to be printed, but its publication was stopped at the last moment. Had it been published it would have done irreparable damage to Polish-Soviet relations. Lebiediev had stated in his book, among other things, that the bulk of the Polish intelligentsia was fascist.

Nor was that all, for Khrushchev also said that Lebiediev formulated a fundamentally erroneous thesis that the Polish Workers Party had been set up as a result of the Soviet offensive on the eastern front, and as a result of the great Russian victories. And yet, Khrushchev said, the roots of this Party were in

the Polish people's independent struggle.

In the light of the stenographic record of the CC's secret session in Moscow, it is easy to understand why Khrushchev considered the appearance of Lebiediev's book a disaster. The these contained in it would have discredited the Soviets in

the Polish readers' eyes.

After criticizing the book, Khrushchev returned to Lebiediev's activities in Poland, emphasizing that Lebiediev's constant interference in Polish domestic matters was revolting and inexcusable. Khrushchev several times pointed out that such behavior was inconsistent with the instructions of the Soviet Party leadership. Khrushchev supported this statement with a quotation from the Russian Party's CC resolution which forbade ambassadors to interfere in the domestic matters of the People's Democracies. What struck me was the fact that Lebiediev had been Soviet Ambassador to Poland for seven years and therefore had not been complying with CC decisions for some time. In addition, Khrushchev also hinted that this type of harmful activity was connected with the past and with Beria's times.

For Breaking Party Resolutions: the Order of Lenin

This violent Khrushchev criticism of Lebiediev was made at the Plenum in July of last year. The minutes of the speech reached Poland in October, but almost simultaneously a Moscow Pravda communique reached Warsaw about Lebiediev having been awarded the Order of Lenin. It so happened that I read that issue of Pravda and the minutes of the Khrushchev speech during the same week. Which was I to believe? The Khrushchev who had criticized Lebiediev's conduct as Soviet Ambassador to Poland so violently, or the Khrushchev who had awarded him the highest Soviet decoration for meritorious achievements and services rendered to the Soviet fatherland? Who was I to believe the Khrushchev who accused Lebiediev of violating the Central Committee resolutions or the Khrushchev who considered Lebiediev to be a suitable man for the post of Soviet Ambassador to Finland?

MIKOYAN ON THE "BROTHERLY SOVIET AID"

One of the most interesting problems discussed at the secret session of the July Plenum in Moscow was the problem of economic relations between the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies. Mikoyan devoted a good deal of space to that problem in his speech. I read those passages with a good deal of interest because I had written a series of articles on those relations for Party and economic publications. One of my articles, published in Trybuna Ludu, was reprinted in the Cominform paper, For A Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy. Why do I speak of that now? Because I had closely followed the Party

line in my articles, yet when I read Mikoyan's speech I saw that everything I had written in those articles was simply a lie. Of course I knew many facts which proved that the Soviet Union was taking advantage of many privileges in its economic relations with Poland, but only after reading Mikoyan's speech did I realize that economic discrimination was applied to all of the captive countries.

Mikoyan denounced these discriminatory measures and plainly implied that it was not exceptional but the general rule. What was this general economic discrimination with regard to the captive countries? I shall mention some of the examples I found in the stenographic record of the secret session of the

July Plenum.

Joint Stock Companies for Exploitation, Not For Help

The problem Mikoyan discussed particularly extensively was that of the so-called mixed companies' activities. Mixed companies were commercial or industrial enterprises set up by the Soviets in almost all the captive countries. In such a company there are two partners: the Soviet Union and the People's Democracy in which the company operates. According to the statutes of these

companies, there is complete equality between the two partners.

In all the variety of forms of so-called Soviet brotherly help extended to the People's Democracies, the mixed companies always set up as an example of the Soviet Union's sacrifices for its younger brothers. The Romanian Premier Gheorghiu-Dej once said that mixed companies were the most efficacious and profitable form of Soviet brotherly aid offered to the countries building socialism. The mixed companies were given in ideological training as an example of proletarian internationalism. This was the official Party and ideological line. However, at the secret session of the July Plenum, Mikoyan said that the mixed companies were the most conspicuous form of Russian interference in the domestic economic affairs of the People's Democracies. They were, in Mikoyan's opinion, a sign of Soviet nationalism, a form of exploitation of weaker countries by the U. S. S. R., and they had become an example of economic exploitation of the People's Democracies which is why they had to be dissolved.

Chinese Communists Slap Moscow's Face

But the mixed companies were dissolved not only because they were inconsistent with the principle of proletarian internationalism. And Mikoyan himself admitted it. Here is a passage of the shorthand minutes which I remember particularly well: "Did we need those mixed companies?" Mikoyan asked. "Were we very happy when our Comrade Mao Tse-tung put our nose out of joint by refusing to allow similar companies to be established in China? Shouldn't

we draw a lesson from past mistakes and dissolve those companies?"

Mikoyan then explained in detail how the Soviet nose had been put out of joint by Mao Tse-tung. This even took place after Stalin's death when the Soviet Union proposed founding such mixed companies to China, for the production of tropical fruits in China which would then export a certain quantity of them to Russia. Mao Tse-tung did not agree to the offer and proposed instead that China export tropical fruits on a normal commercial basis. Thus, Mao gave a very eloquent appraisal of the mixed companies' activities from the point of view of Chinese interests.

The Negro Did the Job and Was Sent Away With Praise

In my opinion, these experiences explain why it was decided to wind up the mixed companies. However, while Mao was putting the Soviet nose out of joint about mixed companies in China, mixed companies in the European People's Democracies continued to be a symbol of Soviet brotherly aid. In December 1954 I was in Moscow and heard a certain Meinshikov read his paper on Mixed Companies, Symbol of Soviet Brotherly Aid Offered to the People's Democracies, to a Conference of Social Sciences at the Soviet Central Party Committee. As we know, most of the mixed companies have been dissolved, but some of them still exist. Secondly, what struck me particularly when I read the minutes of the secret session was that the dissolution of the companies was not in the least explained by the arguments given by Mikoyan to the secret session of the July Plenum.

On the contrary, in the communique announcing their dissolution, I read that they had played a very important role in the development of the People's Democracies, that they had been a symbol of the brotherly Soviet aid offered to these countries, that they had been dissolved merely because their task had been completed. The Soviet dictators of the mixed companies received the highest decorations from the countries in which they had operated. That is why I was

amazed at the fantastic hypocrisy of the Soviet Party leaders, and their unwillingness to tell the truth, when I saw the minutes of Mikoyan's speech. In practice, I saw one of the aspects of the alleged open sincerity of the political life in the new post-Stalin era.

Soviet Experts Are Arrogant and Overpaid

In another passage of the record of the secret session, Mikoyan also gave a fair assessment of the behavior of the Soviet experts and delegates in the People's Democracies. The work of our experts abroad, Mikoyan said, necessitates a good deal of tact and modesty. In no case can we hurt the feelings of the local population. But in practice, Mikoyan said, our experts have constantly violated this rule. They have been patronizing and arrogant. They thought that every-body could learn from them, and that they had nothing to learn. In this way they often did a disservice to the cause of friendship between the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies. Mikoyan also admitted that the excessively high salaries of Soviet specialists were a source of discontent among local workers and employees.

Mikoyan devoted a great deal of space to Soviet-Yugoslav economic relations. He admitted that the breaking of the trade agreement with Yugoslavia in 1949 was a violation of international law, and there were many other instances, on a larger and smaller scale, of breaking trade agreements. Indeed, they were

imperialistic moves. Mikovan said.

Principles Are Principles: But Business Is Business

When I read this exceptionally frank statement of Mikoyan's I remembered several cases of unilateral breaking of trade agreements with Poland by the Soviet Union. I know, for example, that in the past few years, the Soviets broke the agreement on supplying wheat and cotton for Poland, and besides, the Soviet Union never paid any indemnity. Poland, on the other hand, was forced hastily to look for new sources of grain and cotton supplies on the Western markets.

From the minutes of the secret session, it emerged clearly that Mikoyan had violently condemned all discriminatory practices concerning the People's Democracies. Last January I could ascertain how sincere this condemnation of past mistakes was. I was told that Mikoyan had delivered an address at the Conference of Mutual Economic Aid which had been held last December in Budapest. There, the Polish delegation proposed, quite justifiably after all, that the export of Polish coal and farm products to the Soviet Union and the other People's Democracies, should be decreased. The Polish delegation also called attention to the necessity of increasing exports of machines because this was the only way to improve Poland's difficult economic situation.

In a long speech, Mikoyan said, among other things, that Poland's traditional exports were coal and farm produce and that she should continue to export them. I wonder how Mikoyan would have described this sort of economic aid last July?

WHAT IS POLAND TO THE SOVIET POLITBURO?

As I have mentioned several times, the secret session of the July Plenum was primarily a scene for the battle between Molotov and the rest of the Politburo. As usual in such battles, there was plenty of violent discussion and mutual recrimination, and we know that in the heat of argument, matters about which one normally remains silent reveal themselves. That is precisely what hap-

pened in the course of those discussions.

It began with Khrushchev attacking Molotov because the latter did not fully appreciate the damages that had arisen from the break with Marshal Tito and from the subsequent history of Soviet-Yugoslav relations. This accusation seemed to have hurt Molotov a great deal. He violently defended his policies and in his reply to Khrushchev's attacks, Polish affairs were brought suddenly to the surface. In his comments on Poland, Molotov revealed the truth about Soviet leaders' attitudes toward the People's Democracies.

I quote here briefly some of the arguments Molotov used as I remember them

from reading the stenographic report of that secret session.

Molotov began with an appraisal of the situation which preceded the break with Yugoslavia. Indeed, he said, we made a grave error here. Why? Because without having exhausted all the possibilities for conciliation, we brought about a break with Yugoslavia so sharply. I admit, he went on, that this error in our policy caused many disadvantageous complications. Can the blame for this, however, be put on Beria and Beriaism?

I must admit that I read this last sentence with great emotion. Was it Molotov's intention, I thought, to blame the break with Tito on Beria, and also on Stalin and his other collaborators? But Molotov had something quite different in mind. No, he said, to blame Beria and only Beria for breaking with Yugoslavia would have been a great error and untrue for an equal share of guilt belongs to Yugoslavia and Marshal Tito. At that time, Tito's behavior was provocative and anti-Soviet. If we had not then adopted the strong and definite stand we took, he continued, we would have been confronted with grave complications in the other People's Democracies.

And that is how Polish affairs came to the surface. I read and did not believe

my own eyes.

Poland is So Many and So Many Divisions . . :

Let us take Poland as an example, Molotov continued. Which is more important to use, Poland or Yugoslavia? Poland has 10 million people more than Yugoslavia and I'oland can mobilize 10 divisions more than Yugoslavia. And we know only too well that not everything was right with the Polish Army at the time of our conflict with Tito. There was, as we remember, Gomulka in Poland. If we had not taken a strong stand in Yugoslavia's case, Molotov explained, who knows what would have happened in Poland? Poland would have wavered and gone Yugoslavia's way. That is why, Molotov stated, our sharp and definite reaction in the Yugoslav affair was perfectly justified, for it prevented a still greater disaster.

However, we must admit, Molotov said, that our tactics were not always proper. The best proof of that is the fact that we failed to repair our position in Yugoslavia; hence, the conclusion that the policy we followed was false.

in Yugoslavia; hence, the conclusion that the policy we followed was false.

I must say that I read this part of Molotov's speech with great irritation. Molotov was altogether cynical. Is that, I thought, the way a Soviet Foreign Minister and Moscow Politburo member treats the friendly People's Democracies? Is Poland for him merely the equivalent of so many people and so much cannon fodder? For only in this sense was Poland more valuable to him than Yugoslavia. What should we think of our own Party line with respect to Soviet policy, I thought, a policy which allegedly treats large and small nations equally? Wasn't this cynical statement of Molotov's, the acting chief of Soviet foreign policy, a proof that the Soviet Union was quite ready to sell out a smaller ally for the price of gaining a stronger one, one who has at its disposal a larger number of divisions?

While reading Molotov's statement I was further struck by the fact that—as he put it—Soviet policy with respect to Yugoslavia was wrong because it failed to bring the anticipated results. Is it true, I thought, that even in dealings with the People's Democracies, Molotov considers all methods, including

provocations, permissible provided they bring the expected results?

All Wolves Howl the Same

I was particularly indignant about the fact that Molotov was justifying this policy of threat and blackmail even after Stalin's death. Even in the post-Stalinist period, Moscow's policy of table pounding with respect to Poland and the other Beach's Decrease in the staling policy of the pounding with respect to Poland and

the other People's Democracies was still justified.

I have already written that Molotov's speech made me indignant. I had naively supposed that in the other Politburo members' speeches, particularly in that of First Party Secretary Khrushchev, I would find unequivocal condemnation of Molotov's stand. When I finished the stenographic record, I saw that my illusions were naive.

Certainly Khrushchev and other Politburo members attacked Molotov sharply, but their views were merely the other side of the same coin. Their attitudes toward the People's Democracies were similar to Molotov's; they differed from him only in their estimate of the situation. As an example, let us take Khrushchev's final speech. He argued against Molotov's thesis that in the Yugoslav case the policy was basically justified even if errors in it had taken place, for it prevented Titoist outbreaks in the other People's Democracies. Thus, Khrushchev said exactly the same thing as Molotov, except perhaps that he saw a different danger in the Yugoslav example.

What was the difference between them? Molotov saw the danger in the absence of harsh policies toward Tito: he maintained that without such policies, other countries would follow in Yugoslavia's footsteps. On the other hand, Khrushchev maintained that the danger lay in making policy too harsh and this would result in pushing other People's Democracies on the Yugoslav road,

and this might have happened particularly after Stalin's death. Not with so much as a single word did he object to Molotov's contemptuous treatment of the

People's Democracies.

I understood then that Molotov, Khrushchev, and Mikoyan were in perfect agreement as to the basic role of the People's Democracies. The difference lay only in the degree of advantage that a policy would bring to the Soviet Union. Was it to be a line of compromise and ignoring of ideological deviations, as Khrushchev and Mikoyan wanted, or was it to be the older policy advocated by Molotov? But all of them—Khrushchev, Mikoyan, and Molotov treated the People's Democracies with equal contempt. The only difference was that the estimate by the first two was more realistic.

Mr. Morris. Now, Mr. Bialer, did you have a mission at any time to go to Moscow?

The Interpreter. Yes, sir.

In November and December, 1954, I was the Assistant Chief of the official delegation of the Central Committee of the Polish Communist Party to the party authorities in Moscow.

Mr. Morris. Now, while you were in Moscow, were you able to meet

any of the top leaders of the Soviet Union?

The Interpreter. My most important task was rather to get in touch with the propaganda agencies in Moscow and Leningrad connected with the Russian Communist Party.

Naturally, in this capacity I met different, what you would call important people, both in the Soviet Union as well as in Poland.

But as far as the relations and the state of affairs in the Russian Communist Party are concerned, among the leadership of the Russian Communist Party, I know this from the official secret instructions which were sent from Moscow to Warsaw, and thus I got acquainted with most of them.

Mr. Morris. Do you recall a visit that Mr. Khrushchev made to

Warsaw in April of 1955?

The Interpreter. Yes, sir; I recall this very well, indeed.

Mr. Morris. Did Khrushchev address the Communist Party work-

ers in Warsaw in 1955?

The Interpreter. Khrushchev, after his arrival in Poland, first had a meeting with a large body of the workers in Novahuta. His second meeting in Poland was in Warsaw with the Central Committee and the active of the Polish Communist Party in Warsaw. I was present at both meetings.

Mr. Morris. Now, will you describe the makeup of the audience that attended this second meeting at which Khrushchev spoke?

The Interpreter. We called it the active of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Poland. This means the most active, important members of the Communist Party.

Mr. Morris. What was the number? The Interpreter. No more than 200 people, rather much less.

Mr. Morris. Much less than 200 people.

Now, will you tell us what Khrushchev said to that particular group of Polish Communists?

This is now April 1955, is it not?

The Interpreter. Yes, sir.

First, both of his speeches were very aggressive.

I drew a conclusion that the aim of his speech was to maintain an offensive spirit among the party workers.

First, he started his speech by saying that the heavy industry and the armaments must be maintained at all cost.

Mr. Morris. Heavy industry and armaments must be maintained

at all cost?

The Interpreter. At all cost.

For instance, I remember such a detail. He said:

It is true that you do not have good ladies' hats. It is true that there is probably not enough food in Poland. But you must remember, we must have, first of all, heavy industry. The more steel we produce for the Soviet bloc, the more sleepless nights Mr. Dulles will have in Washington.

Mr. Morris. "Mr. Dulles will have in Washington"?

The Interpreter. In Washington. Literally, he said, "He turns in

his bed when he learns about it."

Again, the most provocative incident in his speech against the Western World was the following, and again I quote almost his words since I remember them so well:

"We are discussing coexistence, but, of course, we must realize that we cannot coexist eternally, for a long time. One of us must go to

his grave."

Mr. Morris. Meaning the free world and the United States on the

one hand, and the Polish nation on the other?

The Interpreter. On the one hand the United States, the Western World; on the other hand, the Soviet bloc. One of us must go one day to his grave.

[Continuing:] "We do not want to go to the grave.

"They," meaning Americans and the westerners, "they do not want to go to their grave, either.

"So what can be done?

"We must push them to their grave." This was the general tone of his speech.

Certainly we could recognize immediately the difference between his tone when he was speaking for the newspapers or conferences and when he was speaking to us at that meeting.

Mr. Morris. There was a difference in his tone?

The Interpreter. There was a difference, a basic difference, in his

tone. And, of course, the text, too.

Mr. Morris. Now, when you described that conversation to us, did Khrushchev use precisely the same emphasis that you have given us, or is that your estimate of Khrushchev's speech?

The Interpreter. Of course, there is a possibility that I misquoted 1 or 2 words. Basically I quoted him, since they were so important and

I remembered them, and they were fixed in my memory.

In addition, of course, his speech was put on a tape and then I had the opportunity to listen to the tape again; so I remember this very well.

I heard it after the Geneva Conference.

Mr. Morris. Now, as an active propagandist, did you deal with the concept of coexistence?

The Interpreter. This was one of the most important matters to

which I attended.

For instance, after the first Geneva Conference, I was sent to many provincial towns where I met the active of the local Communist Party, discussing the situation.

I authored several instructions, several papers, for the party workers in this matter.

And, of course, there were organized for me several discussions in which I would pass, orally, my advices and instructions.

Mr. Morris. What is the concept of coexistence? Is it used as a

weapon in Communist warfare?

The Interpreter. I would summarize this in such a way: Our most important task with regard to the coexistence business was to convince and to show to the people that the concept of coexistence is not a withdrawal on the part of the Soviet bloc, but an offensive.

Mr. Morris. You say it is not a withdrawal?

The Interpreter. Withdrawal—Mr. Morris. But an offensive?

The Interpreter. But an offensive of the Soviet bloc.

This was necessary, because in the first period of the so-called coexistence, even the high membership of the Communist Party sometimes misunderstood the meaning of the Soviet policy.

This is why we were forced to organize a very large campaign all over Poland in order to straighten them out and to explain to them the

real meaning of the coexistence campaign.

Senator Butler. In other words, this is just another twist in the

devious road of the Communist Party to world domination?

The Interpreter. Basically, yes, sir, with this difference, that this is so important in the Communist strategy that I would call it, rather, basic strategy.

I would place it in a category of basic strategy, since one of the main purposes is to isolate the United States from the political, economic, and ideological point of view, in the world, and this, of course, is very important.

Senator Butler. In your opinion, is it equally important as the dis-

solution of the Comintern?

The Interpreter. I would say that the dissolution of the Comintern—

Mr. Bialer. Cominform.

The Interpreter. Cominform—is one of the expressions of this isolation campaign against the United States.

Senator Butler. In other words, it is part of the general policy? The Interpreter. Yes, sir; part of a very large political program.

Mr. Morris. And would you say, Mr. Bialer, it was your purpose as an active propagandist to instruct the workers as to the meaning of this new strategy, particularly with respect to that aspect of it which indicated that it was not a withdrawal, but rather an offensive measure?

The Interpreter. Yes. This was one of my most important tasks. We considered it as the most important job at that time. There was, for instance, a saying, a joke, circulated among the party members: "It is true that we do not want any more revolution because the Westerners will settle it themselves."

Mr. Morris. Now, how did the Geneva Conference of 1955 fit into

this framework?

The Interpreter. As far as I conceived, on the basis of my observations as a propagandist in Poland, that Conference indeed was a point of issue for our propaganda, for all this coexistence campaign which I described for.

Not only in Poland, but also in the Russian Communist Party, in the Soviet Union, everywhere, this Conference was presented as a great Soviet victory. And may I tell you that my conviction is that the masses believed it.

Mr. Morris. The Polish masses and the people in the Communist

countries believed it?

The Interpreter. This is my opinion.

Mr. Morris. Now, do you know anything about Khrushchev's ma-

nipulations of Beria, Malenkov, and Molotov?

The Interpreter. Yes; I can speak about these matters on the basis of three secret documents which I knew and which deal with this matter.

The first document was a letter, a secret letter of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party, dealing with the matter of

the Beria incident.

The second document was a letter of the leadership of the Russian

Communist Party dealing with the dismissal of Malenkov.

And the third document is a secret official stenogram, minutes, of the plenum of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party, which took place in July 1955.

Mr. Morris. Now, you went into these three episodes in this declara-

tion that you prepared, did you not?

The Interpreter. Partly.

Mr. Morris. Now, will you succinctly, as briefly as possible, tell us about those three documents with respect to the question?

The Interpreter. First, these 3 documents describe the 3 basic stages

in the personnel changes in the Soviet leadership.

The first will be liquidation of Beria, the second, dismissal of Malenkov, and the third, the alienation from the leadership of Molotov.

In the first letter, the reasons for the liquidation of Beria were given. In addition to those accusations which were made public in the press, there were also other accusations unknown to the party.

For instance—and this comes to my mind in view of the present visit of Marshal Tito in Moscow—one of the important accusations

against Beria, secret accusations, was the following:

The accusation was such: The best proof that Beria was engaged in espionage activities directed against the Soviet Union was his suggestion, after the death of Stalin, to reestablish relations with Tito.

Mr. Morris. You mean that accusations were made against Beria

because he sought to reestablish contact with Tito?

The Interpreter. Yes, sir.

For instance, I remember there was a very particular accusation that Beria wanted to establish a special telephone line between Moscow and Belgrade in order to be in touch with Tito.

In addition to those accusations which I enumerated in the document you mentioned, there was given also the method by which Beria

was liquidated.

For instance, there was a paragraph I remember that a political bureau of the party could not reveal for some time its suspicions concerning Beria. So they had to approve even erroneous decisions of Beria for a certain period of time.

And one of the examples was the German affair.

For instance, the Soviet policy toward Eastern Germany in 1953 which resulted in the Berlin revolt of June 1953, was initiated by Beria. The political bureau of the Russian Communist Party realized it. They didn't want to stop Beria's policy, so that he would not realize that they suspected him.

There is also, I remember now, another paragraph in that document which will probably interest you in view of the present de-Staliniza-

tion campaign.

And this paragraph consisted: There was a question:

How was it possible that we, the leadership of the Russian Communist Party, were able to liquidate Beria in such a short time after Stalin died, in only 3 months?

The whole idea of this argument was to prove that as long as Stalin lived, the leadership of the party did not know the true activities of Beria.

The final phase of this argument was that Beria became careless, and because he became so careless and also impudent, convinced of his power, we could discover his activities against the people.

I want to remind you that at that time Beria was liquidated with

the help of Malenkov, who was against him.

In February 1955, Malenkov's turn came.

The most characteristic aspect of the second document dealing with Malenkov's affair is that very many accusations directed against Beria

had been repeated now with regard to Malenkov.

Of course, this is one of the aspects of the Soviet tactics. Those accusations were not revealed at the time of the liquidation of Beria, but the leadership waited for Malenkov's help to liquiate Beria, and then they liquidated Malenkov with the same accusations.

For instance, an accusation concerning the agricultural crises was repeated with regard to Beria and then also with regard to Malenkov.

The main accusation against Malenkov was that he underestimated the importance of building the heavy industry.

It was maintained that such a policy of underestimating heavy industry was to become dangerous for the people's democracies. This was in connection with Imre Nagy, the Prime Minister of

Hungary, who was following the same Malenkov line in Hungary. Malenkov was also indicted for coresponsibility in the Leningrad trials.

The Leningrad trials lasted several years, and in those trials several thousands of very active Communists were liquidated.

It was on that occasion of the dismissal of Malenkov that Shepilov,

the present Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, appeared. At that time, it was Shepilov who was directing the whole anti-

Malenkov campaign.

I think that one could say that probably the present appointment of Shepilov is a kind of reward for his services in the dismissal of Malenkov.

During the same session which decided the dismissal of Malenkov,

the Molotov affair started.

Again, the same method was applied as with regard to Malenkov. Molotov was accused of a nonconformist speech which he delivered at the time of Malenkov's dismissal. He was not accussed at the time of the Malenkov dismissal because he was helpful at the time. He was accused of this several months later.

Around 6 weeks after the dismissal of Malenkov, Molotov's incident

took place.

At that time, the secret meeting of the Presidium of the Russian Communist Party took place, and the discussion concerned the relations with Yugoslavia.

At that meeting Molotov announced himself against the reestablishment of relations with Yugoslavia, relations government-to-govern-

ment.

He was criticized at that meeting and then at the time when Khrushchev and Bulganin left for Belgrade to visit Tito, he agreed, of course, with their policy, meaning to reestablish the official relations between

the two governments.

However, although Molotov agreed to a reestablishment of the official international relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, he did not approve of Khrushchev's and Bulganin's visit, and he did not approve of a reestablishment of party relationship between the Russian Communist Party and Tito's Communist Party.

However, he was outvoted. The decision was taken that Khru-

However, he was outvoted. The decision was taken that Khrushchev and Bulganin should go to Yugoslavia, and the decision was taken that Molotov's disapproval should be discussed in July of the same year at the next meeting of the Presidium of the Communist

Party.

And indeed, in July 1955, the meeting took place and the central committee of the Communist Party officially condemned Molotov's position.

In addition to this matter, several other important matters were

discussed at that meeting.

Mr. Morris. Now, do you cover those in this declaration?

The Interpreter. The minutes of the July meeting of the central committee took more than 100 pages, and, of course, I couldn't cover them in this document.

Mr. Morris. Does it cover the general area?

The Interpreter. Yes.

Mr. Morris. Now, are there any more points that you want to make

with respect to my general question at this time?

Mr. Bialer, I realize it is a vast subject. There are some aspects of intelligence which directly relate to the work of the Internal Security Subcommittee. If you think that you have made a fairly representative statement in response to the question, we might go to these other subjects.

The Interpreter. I hope that perhaps at another occasion I will have an opportunity to speak about this document, which is very interesting. So probably at the present moment I shall not continue.

Mr. Morris. Do you want to make some statements about it now, by way of concluding that last aspect of your testimony?

The Interpreter. I would like to add that there was also a very long and important discussion concerning Austria at that meeting.

Molotov proposed the Soviet withdrawal from Austria.

Now, the argument against his position, the argument taken by Khrushchev, was that the Soviet withdrawal from Austria will not cost the Soviet Union anything; it will be without any importance, anyway.

This kind of withdrawal would not weaken the Soviet Union from

any point of view, from any practical point of view.

It would not weaken the Soviet Union.

That is all for the moment as far as this matter is concerned.

Mr. Morris. Now, in your work in the Communist Party of Poland, did you come to know anything about espionage or military intelligence that was carried out by the Polish Communist leaders?

The Interpreter. You mean, against the United States?

Mr. Morris. Against the United States.

The Interpreter. Yes, I know certain facts. Are you interested? Mr. Morris. Do you know any Polish military intelligence agents who came to the United States?

The Interpreter. I know two such cases. The first case concerned Colonel Melchior. Mr. Morris. Who was Colonel Melchior?

The Interpreter. He is one of the most outstanding and respected employees of the Polish military intelligence.

I have known him personally for the last 10 years.

In 1949, we were working together and then at that time in 1949 he passed to the strictly military intelligence activities.

He was appointed as the Polish vice consul in New York City.

Mr. Morris. Now, was that a cover for his activities, or was that his real role?

The Interpreter. Well, sir, I will answer this way: Colonel Melchior is on such a level and he is considered as such an outstanding member of the military intelligence in Poland, and so well known in Poland, that if he were appointed as the Ambassador to the United States, it would not be too much of a distinction.

So since he was only vice consul, which is not such a high position,

it was evident that this was only a cover for his other activities.

Senator Butler. That was not the question. The question was whether he was using his position as a cover for his real activities.

The Interpreter. Yes, I am sure of it, that this was only a cover

for his activities concerning military intelligence.

Senator Butler. And espionage? The Interpreter. Yes, sir.

I see as, for instance, one of the indications, that after his return to Poland, he went directly to military intelligence and is working in the same department he was working in at the moment he left Poland.

I saw him in December 1955, exactly in that capacity.

Mr. Morris. Now, did he use the name of Melchior, or did he go by any other name?

The Interpreter. No, sir. His true name was Melon, but the name

which he is using for years is Melchior, the first one.

Mr. Morris. Now, what was the other example of espionage in the United States?

The Interpreter. The second case, well known to me, was sending to the United States an officer of the Polish military intelligence, Samuel Ehrlich.

I have known him also for very many years. In 1950-51, there were rumors spread on purpose that he was leaving for Moscow for a special school in the field of intelligence.

So he disappeared from Poland.

In reality, as I learned later, he did not go to Moscow at that time. He was sent to the United States and he was assigned to look for a job, and he received a position at one of the American universities. .

He went to one of the American universities.

Mr. Morris. And do you know that he had an espionage assignment

at the time?

The Interpreter. I am certain of it. He was and he is presently a captain in the Polish military intelligence. I saw him before I left Poland, in Poland.

Mr. Morris. Now, you do know what that man looks like; do you

not

The Interpreter. Very, very exactly, I know.

Mr. Morris. And if we show you some pictures, you might be able to tell us who he is?

The Interpreter. Surely.

Mr. Morris. You do not know whether he used the name of Samuel Ehrlich when he was teaching at one of the American universities.

The Interpreter. He was not a professor at that university. He

was at the university, and, of course, I would recognize him.

When I said that he was at the university, I did not mean that he was a professor. He was a student at the university, in order to have an official coverage for his activities in this country. He is not an old man.

Mr. Morris. Now, how is the Polish intelligence organized?

The Interpreter. I couldn't give you exact information on this subject. This is a very specialized subject.

Mr. Morris. And your field is propaganda and not intelligence? The Interpreter. Yes, sir; mostly political propaganda.

Mr. Morris. Now, did you know any of the American Communists who left the United States and returned to Poland, their native Poland?

The Interpreter. Yes; several cases.

Mr. Morris. Did you know a man named Arski?

The Interpreter. Yes, sir; I know him.

Mr. Morris. Is that Stefan Arski? The Interpreter. Yes, sir.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, Stefan Arski used to be one of the people on the Polish desk of the Office of War Information in the United States.

What was Stefan Arski doing?

The Interpreter. Mr. Stefan Arski is presently in Poland. He is a journalist, and one of the most violently antiwestern and anti-American journalists. He specializes in American affairs, and he contributes mostly to the People's Tribune, an official organ of the Communist Party in Poland.

He wrote several books which we used as a kind of basis for our

anti-American propaganda.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Mandel here has the testimony before the Kersten committee, the House committee that investigated the Katyn Forest massacre, and Mr. Arski of the Office of War Information figured in that inquiry.

I wonder if we might put that testimony before that committee

about Mr. Arski into the record.

Senator Butler. It will be so ordered.

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 287" and reads as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 287

Excerpt from the Katyn Forest massacre, hearings before the Select Committee To Conduct an Investigation of the Facts, Evidence, and Circumstances of the Katyn Forest Massacre, 82d Congress, 2d session on investigation of the murder of thousands of Polish officers in the Katyn Forest near Smolensk, Russia, part 7. November 11, 1952 (p. 1993)

Mr. Machrowicz (Representative Thaddeus M. Machrowicz of Michigan). Did you know a Stefan Arski, alias Arthur Salman?

Mr. Davis (Elmer Davis, wartime director of the Office of War Information).

Mr. Machrowicz. For your information, he was also employed by the Office of War Information in 1945. He is now in Warsaw, Poland, and is editor in chief of the Communist paper Robotnik, which means the Worker, the most outspoken anti-American organ in Warsaw. He at that time was also an employee of the

Office of War Information. You have no recollection of him? Mr. Davis. No.

Mr. Machrowitz. You have no recollection of either Ambassador Ciechanowski or Congressman Lesinski warning you about the fact that these three persons were known Communists, and were in the employ of the Office of War Information?

Mr. Davis. I don't remember that Mr. Lesinski ever warned me about anything. Mr. Ciechanowski, perhaps by his excessive number of warnings, made me forget which particular ones he especially spoke about.

Mr. Machrowicz. Would it refresh your recollection if I told you that you

told Ambassador Ciechanowski to keep away from that matter?

Mr. Davis. I don't know, * *

Mr. Morris. Now, did you know Irving Potash?

Mr. Chairman, Irving Potash was convicted under the Smith Act and ordered deported to Poland in 1955.

What is Mr. Potash doing in Poland?

The Interpreter. Yes, I know him. I spent with Irving Potash, formerly a member of the political bureau of the Polish Communist Party, of the American Communist Party—I spent with him 2 weeks at the International Communist House, Holiday House, in Zakopane, in Poland. This was March 1955.

Mr. Morris. Now, what is Potash's job in Poland?
The Interpreter. The most characteristic factor concerning this man is that he was not used in Poland for the propaganda work, and he disappeared in Poland altogether.

He disappeared. He is no more.

I remember those 2 weeks I spent with him. At that time he was very much emotionally broken, affected. He suffered very much seeing the reality in Poland.

He had no idea before how bad things are in Poland.

Particularly he was impressed by the unfriendly attitude of the Polish people, the Polish masses, toward the Polish Communist Party.

In any case, the fact that a man of this caliber was not used in Poland in a propaganda way, this is a very exceptional case, and rather indicates that unpleasant things happened to him.

Mr. Morris. Do you know Henrik Podolski?

Mr. Chairman, Henrik Podolski was the former editor-in-chief of Glos Ludowy, a Polish Communist paper in Detroit. The Interpreter. Yes, I know Henrik Podolski.

Henrik Podolski has two main assignments presently in Poland. The first one is to work in the campaign of repatriation of the Polish emigres, postwar emigres in the West, and the second, to instruct the American paper, People's Voice, in Detroit.

Mr. Morris. You mean, he is still running the Detroit newspaper? The Interpreter. This paper receives strict instructions from Poland, and he is the man who is sending them.

I met him several times in connection with his work in the propaganda division and foreign affairs division of the central committee

of the Polish-Communist Party.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I have many other such instances, at least some other instances such as that, together with a great deal of other material, and if you say, Senator, we do have to stop now, I think we will have to resume again on Monday.

Senator Butler. Yes. We will adjourn now and recess until

Monday.

I would like to say this for the record, that the testimony of Mr. Bialer this morning, with its importance to the work of the Internal Security Subcommittee and the understanding of recent world events, indicates the great usefulness of defectors. This testimony shows very convincingly that there are important people behind the Iron Curtain who want to join the free world. When these people come over to us, they bring important intelligence information.

In this way, we can learn the real meaning of the Communist

strategy of world conquest.

But more important, their defection impresses on the world the great vulnerability of the Communist world—the fact that these people are kept in bondage. All our agencies as well as the Congress should do everything possible to encourage more defections.

I want to thank you, Mr. Bialer, for coming here. We will stand

in recess until Monday morning.

Mr. Morris. Senator, the Judiciary Committee meets Monday morning. Suppose we make it 2 o'clock in the afternoon on Monday? Senator Butler. We will stand in recess until 2 o'clock Monday afternoon, at which time we will ask you to return, Mr. Bialer.
Mr. Morris. Will you return at 2 o'clock, Mr. Bialer?

The Interpreter. I want to thank you, sir, for the opportunity which you gave me to come to this committee and to give this

Mr. Morris. And we are grateful to you, Mr. Bialer.

Senator Butler. Thank you, sir.

(Whereupon, at 11:55 a. m., the subcommittee recessed, to reconvene at 2 p. m., Monday, June 11, 1956.)



SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES

MONDAY, JUNE 11, 1956

United States Senate, Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the

Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to recess, at 10 a.m., in room 318, Senate Office Building, Senator James O. Eastland (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senator Eastland.

Also present: Robert Morris, chief counsel; William Rusher, administrative counsel; and Benjamin Mandel, research director.

Chairman Eastland. The committee will come to order.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, both the witness, Mr. Bialer, and the interpreter have been sworn. It is a continued hearing.

Chairman Eastland. Proceed.

TESTIMONY OF SEWERYN BIALER, AS INTERPRETED BY JAN KARSKI—Resumed

Mr. Morris. Senator, in connection with the aspects of the testimony of Mr. Bialer on internal security, we had at the last session mentioned the case of Samuel Ehrlich, who was an important intelligense espionage personality in Poland, who was sent to the United States with the knowledge of the witness. He came here under the cover of a student at an American university.

We also had the case of Colonel Melchior, who was the Polish vice consul in New York, and Mr. Bialer has testified that, even though he was appearing as a vice consul in New York, he was actually one of

the top military espionage people in Poland.

We had discussed the case of Irving Potash, who is now in Poland. We had the case of Stefan Arski, who was one of the officials of our own Office of War Information, who is one of the people in Poland directing anti-American propaganda against the United States.

We had the case of Mr. Podolski, who is now, according to the testimony of Mr. Bialer, directing a Detroit newspaper from Warsaw.

Now, we have some more cases like that, Senator. I would like to go into those at the beginning of this hearing.

Chairman Eastland. Proceed.

Mr. Morris. Did you know a Mr. Kalescki?

The Interpreter. Michael Kalescki.

Mr. Morris. Michael Kalescki. What is Michael Kalescki doing now?

The Interpreter. He arrived in Poland in the summer of 1955.

Mr. Morris. From the United States?

The Interpreter. From the United States. Yes. He was working in the United States, in the United Nations Organization, and he arrived in Poland in the summer of 1955.

Presently he occupies a position of personal economic ambassador to

the virtual economic dictator of Poland, Minc.

Mr. Morris. What is he doing? You say he is an economic adviser? The Interpreter. A personal economic adviser.

Mr. Morris. To the-

The Interpreter. To the virtual economic dictator in Poland, named Minc. In addition, he is also charged with studies concerning the economic situation in the United States and in other parts of the world.

Mr. Morris. Now, what is George Siskind doing?

George Siskind, Senator, was an American Communist who was prosecuted under the Smith Act and has been deported to Poland.

The Interpreter. Presently, he is working in the Institute of International Affairs, which is attached to the Polish Foreign Ministry. And again in this institute, he is charged with American affairs.

I would like to stress here that Siskind is particularly active pres-

ently in Poland in the field of anti-American propaganda.

The second question which I would like to stress here is this: As you know, recently there were discussions in Poland concerning relaxation of the propaganda and also a tendency to disclose more truth about the Western World to the Polish people. Siskind was one of those men who did not want it.

Recently, for instance, he published an article in this year, the current year, an article in a Communist paper, New Roads, in which he

attacked America with fantastic lies.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, do we have anything in the record to show what position Mr. George Siskind had with the American Communist Party?

Mr. Mandel. He was a member of the Central Committee of the

Communist Party and a teacher at its national training school.

Mr. Morris. In the United States?

Mr. Mandel. In the United States. Mr. Morris. Now, did you know Mr. Katz-Suchy?

The Interpreter. I have known him very well indeed. I worked with him for a while.

Mr. Morris. And you say you have known him very well?

The Interpreter. Yes, sir.

Mr. Morris. Will you tell us what he has been doing in Poland? The Interpreter. First, he is director of that Institute of International Affairs which I mentioned before, where Siskind is working; and, as you know, he is also a Polish delegate to the United Nations, to different conferences of the United Nations.

At the return of Katz-Suchy to Poland from the United States, where he was a guest of the United States, it was exploited by him

and by the party for violent anti-American propaganda.

I must say that he was doing it in a very primitive, obvious way.

I would like to add here, lately I could observe some changes in him. For instance, in December 1955 I took part in a certain discussion in

the party where Katz-Suchy was also present.

The discussion concerned peaceful coexistence, and there Katz-Suchy made an observation that he doubted personally if the United States really wanted a war.

For this he was criticized very much by other participants in the

discussion.

Mr. Morris. What was that last answer? I am sorry, sir.

The Interpreter. For this he was criticized by other participants in the discussion.

Mr. Morris. I see.

Is there anything more he wants to say about Mr. Katz-Suchy? The Interpreter. At the present, I would prefer not to say more. Mr. Morris. Do you know anything about the Soviet truce team

in Korea, the Polish truce team making up the neutral commission in Korea?

The Interpreter. Yes; I have certain information from the high-

est sources.

The first one, for instance: The Chairman of the Polish Truce Commission in Korea, General Morsky, was my subordinate in the party before he left for Korea.

For instance, the Polish commissions for Korea and for Vietnam received a special fund in order to get collaborators from other nations,

for instance, Swiss people, or Canadians, or others.

In this respect, I would like to say, for instance, how well it was organized. In the summer of 1955, a special officer of the Polish military intelligence, Major Chylinski, left for Vietnam in order to check, or supervise, this kind of activity.

He left in order to check how the work of getting agents from

among the Swiss, Canadian, or French commissions was going on.
Mr. Morris. Let me see if I understand that, now. You say that Mr. Bialer says that special funds were allocated by the Polish Communist Government so that these funds could be used to recruit and to get agents in other delegations who would help the Polish team?

The Interpreter. Yes.

Chairman Eastland. Now, wait a minute. He said he had that

information from the highest sources. Who are those sources?

The Interpreter. As I told you, Senator, the first source of information was General Morsky, the chairman of the Polish team in Korea, who was my subordinate in the party. The second source of information was General Krzenien, his predecessor in Korea. The third source of information was General Grosz, the chairman of the Polish team in the neutral commission in Cambodia.

But the most reliable information certainly was that from Major Chylinski, who was sent to Vietnam to supervise this action of recruit-

ing agents.

I had also other sources of information which I would prefer to give you at some other occasion.

Mr. Morris. Now, was this an intelligence— The Interpreter. I have in mind closed-door.

Mr. Morris. I see. Was this an intelligence operation?

The Interpreter. Yes, sir.

Mr. Morris. Have you other—

The Interpreter. He was formerly adjutant of the chief of the Polish military intelligence, General Komar.

Mr. Morris. Now, I wonder if you would give us same more ex-

amples as to how this operation was conducted.

The Interpreter. Yes, sir.

There was one other means. There is a special instruction and funds for the Polish member of the Polish team to give loans, even to impose financial loans to the members of other commissions to have them in hand.

Mr. Morris. Let me see if I understand that. You mean there was a money grant made so that people on the Polish team could make money

loans to people on the other neutral teams?

The Interpreter. Yes, sir. And one other instance: Usually Polish members have vodka, a certain amount of vodka which they distribute in order to get social relations with them and to have occasion to speak to them and to get them as agents, to have social relations as often as possible with them.

What is probably more important is this: Any derogatory information about anyone from any other commission is very meticulously collected and immediately sent to Warsaw and eventually used in the

future.

Another factor, for instance: The Polish teams in South as well as North Korea are in closest touch with the central committee of the

Communist Party in North Korea.

In this respect, numerous meetings of the central committee of the North Korean Communist Party were held. Members of the Polish teams would be there, and they would receive advice from the central committee of the North Korean Communist Party.

Mr. Morris. You mean the North Korean Communists would be ad-

vising the members of the so-called Polish neutral team?

The Interpreter. Yes, sir.

Mr. Morris. Are there any other such instances, Mr. Bialer?

you know of any other such instances?

The Interpreter. I know this problem well. So I think probably it would be better, sir, if you would ask me specific questions. I don't know what you have in mind.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, a news dispatch in today's Washington

Daily News, for instance, says that:

Allied forces in South Korea are gradually being disarmed by the creeping obsolescence of their weapons compared with the illegally modernized Communist forces in North Korea, high American officials charged today.

If the United States, the Republic of Korea, and other allies continue to abide

by the 1953 truce restrictions much longer, their forces in Korea will be com-

pletely outdone by the Communists, these sources warn.

Now, do you know that the Communists in North Korea are building up their forces against the American forces and the U. N. forces in

The Interpreter. Of course, I couldn't tell you to what degree the armaments in North Korea could be dangerous to South Korea or our allies. But I can only say that there is a strict collaboration between the Polish teams in the truce commission and the North Korean Communist Party.

And these armaments are taking place and the Polish teams are doing everything in their power to cover those armaments before the world public opinion.

Mr. Morris. Now, do you know what currency makes up these special funds? Is it American currency or what currency?

The Interpreter. Not in Polish currency, but in different western

Mr. Morris, Mr. Bialer, do you know what Oscar Lange is doing now?

Oscar Lange, Mr. Chairman, was formerly an American citizen, who sometime late in the war and shortly after the war went over to Soviet Poland.

The Interpreter. I know him very well. Oscar Lange holds a very

high position in the present Poland.

Mr. Morris. Now, I believe he passes as a Socialist. Is he a Socialist?

The Interpreter. He is a member of the central committee of the

Polish Communist Party.

He is a member of the state council in Poland and altogether he is a very high official in Poland. Presently he is out of Poland. Presently he is in India performing a task of an economic adviser to the Indian Government. He spent a certain time in India also last year, and there he was helping the Indian Government form their economic plan.

Naturally, he represents the interests not only of the Polish Com-

munists but of all the Soviet bloc in India.

Mr. Morris. Now, Mr. Bialer, we have been taking testimony in the Internal Security Subcommittee for the last 6 or 8 weeks on the repatriation campaign.

Have you had any experience with the Polish repatriation

campaign?

The Interpreter. Yes; I have certain information in this repect. First, as far as the aim of repatriation is concerned, it is in the main an economic one. Repatriation has an aim, particularly political goals. They charge that repatriation is important from the internal and from the international point of view.

The party in Poland wants first of all the repatriation of the Polish

intellectuals.

So far they consider in Warsaw that no great achievements took

place as far as the return of intellectuals is concerned.

They are interested particularly in repatriation of those who left Poland after the war and went to the West. They wanted them to come back. For instance, the Polish sailors. There were several Polish sailors on the ship Labor, and they asked for asylum in the United States.

Some of them returned to Poland and then they were used in Poland

for a very serious propaganda campaign.

Particularly I would like to stress that they want back those who left Poland after the war, in order to use them for propaganda.

They do not care so much for the so-called old emigrees.

As far as the methods are concerned, there is a special radio station called Kraj, The Country. There are also leaflets which are being This concerned the so-called old emigration, those people who left Poland before the Second World War.

This kind of propaganda from Kraj, from leaflets, from the old emigration, exaggerates so much that even they go further than the official Communist propaganda, because they believe that the old emigrees would believe it.

As far as the new emigration is concerned, meaning the emigration of the Second World War and after the Second World War, there were

mainly four methods used.

Mr. Morris. These are the four steps in their repatriation campaign?

The Interpreter. Yes; in working on them.

First of all, as far as the new emigration is concerned, the personal contacts play a very important role. So first they received individual letters from their families.

Mr. Morris. Now, did you personally engage in this repatriation

campaign?

The Interpreter. These activities were carried on by the foreign section of the Central Committee of the Polish Communist Party. I collaborated closely with that section.

Mr. Morris. I see.

And you say the first means of getting people to repatriate is by personal contact, letters, and personal discussions?

The Interpreter. Yes. Altogether, personal contacts, they stress

them very much.

So the first step, the first method, is those letters from their families. Here I want to say that those letters are genuine letters. They are really written by the families. Of course, they were enforced by the party.

Mr. Morris. They were enforced? The Interpreter. They were enforced.

Mr. Morris. In other words, the people had to write them?

The Interpreter. Yes. They were not written of their own initiative. They were ordered to write them.

It was organized; the whole campaign.

Mr. Morris. Now, what is the second point?

The Interpreter. The second method is promises:

If you return to Poland, you will have a better job and you will make more money and you will have more opportunities than you have in the country in which you are living presently.

The third method is an appeal to ambition, to vanity, to a desire of a personal glory:

If you return to Poland, you will be famous; you will have opportunities to speak to the people.

The fourth method is simply blackmail, sheer blackmail.

Mr. Morris. Will you explain that?

The Interpreter. So here in this respect I would like to draw your attention to one thing. Before, the blackmail was a direct blackmail. A man would come to a prospective returnee and tell him, "If you do not return. we will say about you this and this." Now, this direct blackmail is not carried on anymore. More subtle methods are being used.

So now they learned not to speak so directly. So a man from the Embassy, for instance, would approach such a Polish emigrant and he will tell him, "We advise you to come back, Comrade. Remember, you have a family over there. You want them to be happy." They

do not finish their threat; this in order that it cannot be proved that they blackmailed the man.

Naturally, a man who is from Poland, even if the conversation is not finished, understands very well what the other man wants to tell him.

But legally, naturally, he cannot prove that he was blackmailed.

Mr. Morris. Were you in Poland when the Polish seamen returned last October?

The Interpreter. Who?

Mr. Morris. The Polish seamen who redefected, returned?

The Interpreter. Yes, sir. I was in Poland.

Mr. Morris. Would you tell us something about that?

The Interpreter. So far as those sailors, or seamen, were concerned, exactly these kinds of methods were used with regard to them.

Mr. Morris. And was that much of a propaganda victory for the

Communists in Warsaw?

The Interpreter. I think that they are very successful in this kind of propaganda activities.

Mr. Morris. Was that particular one a success?

The Interpreter. Yes. It was a very great success and I doubt if

all of you realize it in this country.

Mr. Morris. Now, do you know, a few years ago two Russian flyers, a man named Barsov and a man named Pirogov, both defected. In the course of time, one of them, Barsov, redefected. Now, we have heard from Mr. Petrov, in Australia, that Mr. Barsov was executed in the Soviet Union after he redefected. Do you know anything about that?

The Interpreter. No; I don't know anything about this fact. But I know something about another fact of the same nature.

Mr. Morris. Will you tell us what that was?

The Interpreter. This concerns a certain Polish private who tried to go abroad who was caught and who was killed in Poland.

Mr. Morris. He was killed when his escape failed? The Interpreter. Yes; after he tried to escape.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, we have not been able to get any verification of the information which Mr. Petrov has given, namely, that he had heard that Barsov had been executed after he went back to Russia. If so, it is an important fact for us to establish, Senator.

Would you tell us about the propaganda that was being made in Poland from sources in the United States such as the labor-research group and the output of the United Electrical and Radio Machine

Workers in the United States?

The Interpreter. These two organizations which you mentioned, sir, they are fundamental, they are basic sources of anti-American propaganda, not only in Poland but all over the Soviet bloc.

If you are interested, I could give you countless instances in which statistics, for instance, of these two organizations are being used over

there in an anti-American propaganda campaign.

For instance, materials prepared by the United Electrical Workers are mimeographed. They were sent to Poland; they were discussed at the Central Committee of the Polish Communist Party, and they were recommended then to different agencies for use in order to falsify life in America.

I would like to indicate why the material of these two organizations is so important in Poland.

The party in Poland realized that many people in Poland do not

believe them any more.

Then the party distributes the material prepared by these two organizations, saying, "You know, this is American material, prepared in America, written by Americans. We have nothing to do with it in this case." Of course, people believe it.

For instance, I remember there were discussions with Soviet officers, party workers, and others, and in these discussions very often, when the factual material given by the Soviet propaganda was challenged, the Soviets would say again, "Here we have material which is coming from the United States. You cannot put this in doubt." We quote it. And naturally, they close the mouth of anybody who does not believe their propaganda.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you identify for the record the Labor

Research Association?

Mr. Mandel. It has been cited by Attorney General Tom Clark on December 4, 1947. It is known as a direct auxiliary of the Communist Party. It publishes labor fact books and economic releases for the Communist press, and it is headed by two leading Communists, Grace Hutchins and Robert Dunn.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, you describe it as a direct auxiliary of the Communist Party. They do not bill themselves as such, though,

do they?

Mr. Mandel. No; they do not.

Mr. Morris. They do not acknowledge that they are a Communist source; do they?

Mr. Mandel. They do not. Mr. Morris. Has he finished?

The Interpreter. Yes, sir. I explained to him what you were saying.

Mr. Morris. Now, I wondered, were you in Poland when Swiatlow's

defection and subsequent broadcasts were beamed to Poland? The Interpreter. Yes, sir; I was in Poland at this time.

Mr. Morris. Did you know Swiatlow at all before he defected? The Interpreter. No; I never met him.

Mr. Morris. What was the effect of his defection in Poland?

The Interester. In this respect, first, it is very obvious to me that one could not say that Swiatlow's defection was a cause for all personal changes which are taking place in Poland now.

But naturally, his defection contributed to these changes very lately. The first importance of Swiatlow's defection was that the party and the Government had been forced to reveal very many details concerning those men they liquidated later which otherwise they would not be forced to reveal.

In addition, all this which American radios, different stations from abroad, all this information supplied on Swiatlow's material, of course, they opened the eyes of many people in Poland concerning the real nature of the Communist Government in Poland.

In this respect, for instance, I remember such an interesting detail: The foreign radio is beamed generally in Warsaw. But you can listen to it in the suburbs of Warsaw. At the time of Swiatlow's broadcasts to Poland, there were literally huge crowds of people who were trying to get to the suburban houses evidently to listen on the radio to what Swiatlow was saving.

Swiatlow's defection and the broadcasts he was giving here caused

great nervousness among the governmental and party officials.

Could I assure you that if Bierut were ill and had heart trouble at that time, no doubt one of the causes of his heart trouble was Swiatlow.

Mr. Morris. Do you recall the visit of Boris Polevoj to the United He had a group of political writers. I think it was the

summer of 1955.

The Interpreter. There were several things which are interesting in respect to Polevoj and Bierazkow—there are several things which I would like to mention. They gave interviews here in the United The nature of those interviews was such that they were not published in Poland. They were not allowed to be published in Poland.

Mr. Morris. You mean, what they said over here-

The Interpreter. Was not allowed to be published in Poland.

Mr. Morris. Why was that? Was it so obviously false? The Interpreter. The reason why those interviews could not be published in Poland was this: Polevoj gave so many lies concerning the life behind the Iron Curtain that if his lies would be reprinted in Poland, evidently not only would nobody believe in it, but this would result in a contrary opinion. The public opinion would learn how the Polish and the Soviet regimes are misguiding the Western World.

For instance, I remember such a case: Polevoj's interview was mimeographed and distributed among the members of the central committee of the Communist Party in the district of Cracow, and this was distributed only among the party workers. When the party authorities in Warsaw learned about it, they criticized very much the decision of the party organization in Cracow. They criticized the activities of the director of propaganda of the Communist Party in Cracow.

It was the first case in which an interview of a Communist given abroad, outside of the Soviet bloc, was banned within the Soviet bloc.

Chairman Eastland. We will take the rest of it in executive session. Mr. Morris. Mr. Bialer, Senator Eastland has to terminate the hearing at this particular time. He has asked if we would continue on to take the testimony in executive session later on this afternoon, and then put that executive session testimony in the public record at some date later in the week.

Chairman Eastland. Mr. Bialer, we will take the rest of your testi-

mony in executive session. It will later be released.

I want to thank you, sir. I think your testimony points up the importance of defectors and how helpful they are to our Government. They are something that we should certainly encourage.

(Whereupon, at 2:55 p. m., the subcommittee recessed to reconvene

in room 319 at 3:05 p.m.)

Mr. Morris. This is a continuation.

Mr. Bialer, do you know anything about schools of international communism?

The Interpreter. Yes, sir.

Mr. Morris. Would you tell us about it?

The Interpreter. I will tell you you about those schools I know personally.

There is a school in the suburbs of East Berlin where they train

Communist workers for Western Germany.

This is a very secret school, guarded by the police. Nobody has any access to it.

The school had been organized in the woods, and it is completely

unavailable to any kind of public.

I lectured at that school in 1955; in June 1955.

The subject of the education in that school is, first, how to carry on Communist activities in the West; then also other things like mili-

tary training included.

In respect to the military training, I remember, for instance, in 1955 that there were special courses on how to get into the Army in Western Germany. There were classes, lectures, on how to get into and work with the Western German Army.

Those who lecture in that school are both Communists from the Western part of Germany, and of course, Communists from East

Germany.

The second school—

Mr. Morris. What was the name of that first school?

The Interpreter. This was a secret school without any name.

This was a school just for the party apparatus in Eastern Germany, for the party members from West Germany trained in that school. The second school I was acquainted with personally was a higher school, a party school in Moscow.

The school is housed in the same building where, before, the

Comintern was operating, the schools of the Comintern.

At that school, which is mainly for the Soviet Communists, there are also special groups consisting of Western Communists, of the Communists outside of the Soviet bloc.

There are classes where there are German, East and West German, Communists, French, and others, Polish, Czechoslovak, German, East

and West.

As far as Western Communists are concerned, there are not as many of them, and they form special classes for them, and also, from the conspirational point of view, probably it would not be good to have large clases for them.

This is why this kind of Communists in the West, they are distributed under false names among other groups in the groups of the

Russian Communists.

Mr. Morris. And where was this second group held?

The Interpreter. In Moscow. Mr. Morris. In what building?

The Interpreter. I don't remember the street; in the building where formerly the Comintern schools were operating.

The fact that in that building there is this particular school is public knowledge. Of course, people do not know what happens there.

The fact of the existence of the school is publicly known.

Mr. Morris. Now, do you know about the case of Herman Field? The Interpreter. Well, I would like to give you some information about what the party people were saying after Herman Field was released.

So first, the second man in importance at that time in the Communist Party, Berman, was saying that Herman Field was a naive, innocent man, that he was arrested unjustly.

Mr. Morris. Unjustly from the Communist point of view?

The Interpreter. Yes; that he was not guilty; that he was naive, and not guilty.

Mr. Morris. "Guilt" in this case being spying for the Americans?

The Interpreter. Yes.

The second version concerning Herman Field was being spread in more narrow party circles, and it was spread by Ochab, the present

first secretary of the Polish Communist Party.

And his version was such that the crimes committed by the previous administration were of such magnitude that not only innocent people could have been arrested but also that people who were guilty, their affairs were so mixed up, so confused, that they had to be released.

Mr. Morris. Did you ever see Herman Field?

The Interpreter. No, sir; only pictures.

But I met his wife at some friends' before he was arrested.

Mr. Morris. What year was that? The Interpreter. Most probably—it is difficult to remember—it was 1948.

I saw her in the house of a certain George Durac and his wife. was in the suburbs of Warsaw, called Zoliborz.

By the way, the wife of that Durac was later arrested and spent several years in jail because of her connections with Herman Field.

She was a secretary to Berman, and she contacted Field and Berman. Mr. Morris. Did you know anything about the Katyn Forest massacre?

The Interpreter. Yes.

There were very few people, actives of the Polish Communist Party,

who wouldn't believe that the Russians did it.

Their opinion, nevertheless, was divided, of those who believed the Russians did it, and it was divided following two lines: Some of them were say that the Russians were right doing it; others were saying that the Russians were wrong having done it.

Mr. Morris. But they all agreed that the Russians did it? The Interpreter. But all agreed that the Russians did it.

But I must stress until I left Poland, no efforts were seen to reveal it or to declare that the Russians did it. On the contrary, if anyone would make such statements openly, the party would immediately suppress the statement.

Mr. Morris. Where were you at that time? That was in 1940, was

it not?

The Interpreter. Katyn, 1940. I was in Poland at that time.

Mr. Morris. And you know nothing about it personally? Mr. Bialer. No.

Mr. Morris. Could you tell us something about the fall of Molotov and the rise of Shepilov?

The Interpreter. First, Molotov fell, not in June 1956, but rather

in July 1955.

In July 1955 there was a plenum of the central committee, and at that plenum practically Molotov was separated from any important work of the party.

Mr. Morris. How do you know that?
The Interpreter. I know it from the minutes of that particular plenum, which was sent to the party in Poland, to the political bureau of the Polish Communist Party.

As it was indicated by the party at that time, the main reason for Molotov's downfall was his disagreement with the Soviet policy with

regard to Yugoslavia.

There were also other reasons as given by the party why Molotov had to go. Of course, the most important reason was, among others, the personal struggle for power within the party.

Mr. Morris. When you say that Molotov's position with respect to Yugoslavia was the reason, what was his position with respect to

Yugoslavia?

The Interpreter. I mean that Molotov did not approve of estab-

lishing party relations with Yugoslavia.

He was saying that the Yugoslavian Party was not a Communist

Party and consequently there was no sense to establishing relations. Khrushchev did not agree with Molotov. He agreed with him as to the nature of the Yugoslavian Communist Party, but his argument was that if we do not establish relations with them, we will be unable to get them into the Soviet bloc.

Mr. Morris. Now, do you know to what extent the absorption of Yugoslavia back into the Soviet bloc, to what extent that has taken

The Interpreter. Throughout the last year there were efforts being made for establishing relations between different countries of the Soviet bloc and Yugoslavia.

In order to get this rapprochement, for instance, orders were given

in the Polish Communist Party against any criticism of Tito.
Mr. Morris. You mean the Polish Communist Party was forbidden to criticize Tito?

The Interpreter. To criticize Tito.

Mr. Morris. In what year was this, now?

The Interpreter. In 1955.

I have in mind public criticism of Tito.

As far as the actual state of affairs was concerned, it was different. I ran across 2 members of the Polish delegation, 2 chairmen of the Polish delegations to Yugoslavia. The name of one was Wolvnsky, and the second one was Wolpe.

After their return to Poland, openly they restrained themselves

from any criticism of Tito and Yugoslavia.

At the same time, there was a meeting of the active of the Polish Central Committee, and at that meeting the same two men were criticizing very sharply Yugoslavia and Tito.

The same applies to the economic state of affairs in Yugoslavia. In

general, I would say the policy was such:
"Tito is a friend; Tito is an enemy."

Mr. Morris. In other words, Tito no longer represents Titoism?
The Interpreter. No. This means that Tito, as the chief of state, and Yugoslavia, as a country, the Soviet Union wants to get them into collaboration, but the system which is prevailing in Yugoslavia, they do not want to have this system in other satellite countries.

Until I left Poland, this border separating the Soviet communism and Yugoslavian type communism was still not passed. And as far as I remember, this border is the limit of the so-called political thaw in Poland.

Mr. Morris. I did not understand that last.

The Interpreter. This distinction between the Communist Party in the Communist bloc and the system prevailing now in Yugoslavia, the distinction between these two, this is the limit of the so-called thaw.

Mr. Morris. That is, the limit of the thaw? The Interpreter. The limit of the thaw.

Mr. Morris. Now, what then is your interpretation of Tito's recent visit to Moscow, currently?

The Interpreter. Before I answer your question, sir, I would like

to say this:

At that meeting in July 1955 I remember Mikoyan at a certain moment told Molotov:

At the present not only do we hope to bring Tito to our Soviet bloc; we are sure we will get him.

I think that this was not achieved yet.


So the last visit of Tito in Moscow in a way is a payment for the Soviet benevolence, for the downgrading of Stalin, for the last stage of the Soviet policy.

But as far as I know, still Yugoslavia did not become a Soviet sat-

ellite. It is still independent.

Mr. Morris. That will be all at this time.

(Whereupon, at 3:50 p. m., the subcommittee adjourned.)



SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES

FRIDAY, JUNE 29, 1956

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER
INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS, OF THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:05 p. m., in room P-63, United States Capitol, Senator Herman Welker presiding.

Present: Senator Welker.

Also present: Robert Morris, chief counsel, Benjamin Mandel, research director; William A. Rusher, administrative counsel.

Senator Welker. The hearing will come to order. The first witness

will be sworn.

Mr. Morris. Will you swear, Dr. Karski, please, before swearing the witness.

Senator Welker. You will be sworn as the interpreter.

Do you solemnly swear that you will take the questions propounded to you by the committee in English and correctly translate them into the Polish language to the witness and his answers in the Polish language to you will then be interpreted by you truthfully and honestly in the English language to the subcommittee, so help you God?

Mr. Karski. I do.

Senator Welker. Mr. Bialer, do you solemnly swear that the testimony you will give before this subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Bialer. I do.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Bialer has testified previously before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee. He has been recalled today because of the revolt that took place at Poznan vesterday. He is trying to determine for this public record whether there are any implications or aspects of the uprising in Poznan may have a bearing on our internal security in the United States.

I wonder if you would repeat for the record, very briefly, Mr. Bialer, the 2 or 3 top positions you held in the Polish Communist Party in the Polish Government before defecting to the United States on Janu-

ary 31 of this year?

TESTIMONY OF SEWERYN BIALER, AS INTERPRETED BY DR. JAN KARSKI

The Interpreter. I was a functionary of the Central Committee of the Polish Communist Party. I was one of the leaders of the anti-

Western propaganda in Poland. I was the first secretary of the party organization in the highest ideological party schools in Poland. an ideological adviser to the party central organ, People's Tribune; and I held several other positions in the ideological sector of political life.

Mr. Morris, I think you told us once before, Mr. Bialer, that you were one of a group of three top propagandists in charge of anti-

American and anti-Western propaganda.

The Interpreter. Yes, sir.

Mr. Morris. Are you acquainted with, are you conversant with the revolt that took place in Poznan in the last few days?

The Interpreter, Yes; I know what was given by the press.

Mr. Morris. How much of the situation in and about Poznan and Warsaw generally are you conversant with, with respect to this particular uprising?

The Interpreter. Could you give me, sir, a few minutes so I could

give my evaluation of the recent happenings in Poland?

Mr. Morris. Yes; that is what we would very much like to have. The Interpreter. The last 3 years were being called all over in Poland as the period of the thaw. In that period, really, certain liberalization of the Communist terror was taking place.

Mr. Morris. You say there was a liberalization of the Polish Com-

munist terror taking place?

The Interpreter. Yes, sir; it was a liberalization of the life in Poland and liberalization of the Communist mass terror in Poland.

Mr. Morris. This is as of what time?

The INTERPRETER. That period after the death of Stalin, the beginning was after the liquidation of Beria. The first period, from 1953 until the end of 1954, I would call it a period of the thaw in baby clothes.

Mr. Morris. I didn't understand that.

The Interpreter. Period of the thaw in those baby clothes.

Senator Welker. Let's do a retake on that one.

Mr. Morris. The Senator didn't understand it either, sir.

The Interpreter. It was the period of the liberalization of the life

in Poland in its primitive first original stage.

The second period was from the end of 1954 until the time I left Poland—and I would call that period the medium stage, when the thaw was spreading all over Poland.

Mr. Morris. What was spreading over?

The Interpreter. The thaw. The liberalization of Poland.

Mr. Morris. Thaw. That is an expression Mr. Bialer has used previously in which he refers to the relaxation of the terror on the part of the Polish Communists.

You have referred that from the period, from 1954 until the time you left Poland, which was on January 31, 1956, that this was the intermediate stage, this was where the thaw was beginning to show? The Interpreter. Spreading; yes. The present stage of that re-

laxation period I would call it a stage of a stormy period.

Mr. Morris. This is the third period of relaxation.

The Interpreter. The present one.

Mr. Morris. You describe that as a stormy period.

The Interpreter. Stormy period; yes.

I was asking myself a question and I am sure that others in Poland were asking themselves that question, "What is the origin of that socalled relaxation in Poland?" There is only one answer, which I could prove by hundreds of facts. Some of those facts concern the highest party authorities.

The short answer is such, the essence of the present period of the so-called liberalization is unprecedented in this history of communism, pressure exercised by the Communists themselves on the party

leadership for more relaxation, and secondly the pressure-

Mr. Morris. See if we understand the first one?

The essence of this relaxation is the unprecedented demand for liberalization, on the part of the Communists themselves against the Party leaders?

The INTERPRETER. Yes, sir. That is the first one. The second aspect is the pressure of the nation, of the people, on the government

for the same purpose.

Mr. Morris. And the second aspect of it is the people themselves, as opposed to the Communists, are also exerting pressure on the Polish leaders for a liberalization?

The Interpreter. Yes, sir.

I would like to give you some facts concerning such a matter, how the leadership of the party was opposing the pressure for liberalization, and how the leadership of the party was forced to cede step by step to liberalize the life.

Mr. Morris. This now, if I may understand your testimony, is fact-This is from your own personal experience with the Polish

Communists?

The Interpreter. It is; I said, on the basis of my personal experiences, experiences particularly in the last 3 years. I was taking part in these activities.

Mr. Morris. You say that, on the basis of this experience, there was opposition, on the part of the party leaders, to pressure for liberaliza-

tion?

The Interpreter. Yes, sir.

Mr. Morris. And you are going to tell us about this opposition on

the part of the party leaders to the liberalization?

The Interpreter. Naturally, this problem is a very complex one, and I tried to write and elaborate on it and several pages took place. I will try to be as concise as possible.

I will give you the first example. The Minister of Security and

the main oppressor in Poland, Radkiewicz, R-a-d-k-i-e-w-i-c-z.

Mr. Morris. That is R-a-d-k-i-e-w-i-c-z?

The Interpreter. That's right.

Mr. Morris. He was the Minister of——

The Interpreter. Of Security.

As at the beginning of 1954, after the crimes committed by the Security became known, an enormous pressure by the party memberships, as well as by the people as a whole, was being exercised. pressure was that Radkiewicz had to go.

Mr. Morris. He was eliminated?

The Interpreter. The pressure was to eliminate him.

Mr. Morris. Yes.

The Interpreter. Until the end of 1954, at all party meetings, and I know since I participated in those meetings, the party leadership was opposing such demands; was opposing even a discussion on this

At the very end of 1954, under the pressure even of the activists of the Communist Party, the leadership was forced to dismiss Radkiewicz as a Minister of Security and to demote him to a post of a Minister of Agriculture.

Mr. Morris. May I repeat that again.

As a result of the pressure exerted on the party leaders, including the pressure on the part of the leading activists of the party, the party leaders were forced to depose Radkiewicz and give him the assignment of the Minister of Agriculture?

The Interpreter. That's right. Mr. Morris. When was he deposed? The Interpreter. The very end of 1954.

However, even after that dismissal from the position of Minister of Security to the position of Minister of Agriculture, still he retained his position as a member of the Politburo of the Polish Communist Party.

Mr. Morris. And even in his position as Minister of Agriculture,

he retained his position as a member of the Politburo?

The Interpreter. Yes, sir.

After that event, the pressure within the party to eliminate Radkiewicz from the Politburo was continuing. I participated in several party meetings where the party membership was demanding openly a final elimination of Radkiewicz from any post.

Mr. Morris. Now you participated in Communist Party meetings

where the rank and file of the party continued their pressure to have Radkiewicz—his membership in the Politburo taken away from him?

The Interpreter. That is correct.

Again, I want to stress at that period the leadership of the party, Bierut, B-i-e-r-u-t; Berman, B-e-r-m-a-n; and Ochab, O-c-h-a-b, were doing their best to preserve Radkiewicz and to preserve his influence.

Nevertheless, the summer of 1955 came, and at the secret meeting of the Central Committee of the Polish Communist Party, Radkiewicz,

supposedly on his own initiative, resigned from his post.

Mr. Morris. May I recapitulate. In spite of the pressure on the part of the three top leaders of the Polish party, Bierut, Berman, and Ochab, despite the fact that they wanted him to remain on in the summer of 1955, at a secret meeting, a secret Communist meeting, Radkiewicz offered his resignation?

The Interpreter. Yes, sir. Senator Welker. I am going to get to a little more current events. You are aware, are you, of the revolt going on in Poland as of this moment at Poznan?

The Interpreter. I was giving you certain facts in order to make a background for the present happenings.

Senator Welker. I understand that.

Will you answer my question? You are aware of that revolt going

on now?

The Interpreter. Naturally, I possess only information which I received from the American press. I do not have any other direct

Senator Welker. I think we are all working from what we have

read in the press.

Now, based upon your experience in the Communist Party, did you expect the Polish people to arise and have a revolution as early as of this date?

The Interpreter. Yes; I was expecting them to a great extent, and in addition, too, I consider that they are a logical outcome of the pre-

vious development of the situation in Poland.

Senator Welker. There is no question in your mind but what the people in Poland are God-fearing, freedom-loving people and want their freedom restored to them?

The Interpreter. I have no doubt, sir, of any kind to this question. Senator Welker. What significance do you attach to the press release that the Polish people in their uprising were crying, "We want

bread; bread." Does that mean that they were hungry, that the Communist Party was not feeding them?

The Interpreter. Yes; they were claiming the amelioration of the economic situation in Poland, their standard of living which is presently extremely low in Poland, tragically low.

Senator Welker. Tragically low? The Interpreter. Tragically low.

Senator Welker. And the Communists work the Poles very hard,

do they?

The Interpreter. The workers in Poland work extremely hard under orders of the party, I was making certain statistics while in Poland. The standard of living of the Polish workers, according to my research, is 3½ times lower than the standard of living of the workers in Germany—Western Germany.

Mr. Morris. The standard of living is 3½ times lower than the

standard of living of workers in Western Germany?

The Interpreter. Yes, sir.

However, I would like to draw your attention, sir, that what is happening in Poznan should not be considered only as an economic activity. The background is economic. However, every activity of this kind in a Communist-controlled state has political aspirations in view, and are being suppressed as political opposition.

Senator Welker. Now, they are seeking freedom. Isn't that

correct?

The Interpreter. Yes, sir.

Senator Welker. I notice in the afternoon edition of a prominent Washington newspaper that the Warsaw radio announced that 38 people were killed and 270 wounded in this well-organized revolt at Poznan.

Do you assume for a moment, sir, that this uprising has ended as of now, or do you think that it will still be brewing and last for years

to come until they get their freedom?

The Interpreter. I believe that it is very possible that riots of this kind, although on a smaller scale, will be repeated in other localities. However, I believe that riots to such an extent will not be repeated in the immediate future.

Senator Welker. That last answer was—I didn't get that.

The Interpreter. That riots so serious as those in Poznan, on a mass scale, will not be repeated elsewhere.

Mr. Morris. You say there will be some other riots, but not of the

extent of this one.

The Interpreter. Yes.

Senator Welker. And that is because the people of Poland have nothing but their fists to fight with in the form of arms. Is that it?

The Interpreter. Yes, sir; first of all because the Polish nation from the times of the end of the war, had no possibilities to express their will in any way. They couldn't vote, and they have no other technical way to express their will.

Senator Welker. And of course they have little to look forward to when they, with their hands, have to combat tanks of the size you see here in the picture of the newspaper I am showing you, huge tanks which are shooting down those people which are uprising.

The Interpreter. Yes, this is the reason.

Senator Welker. Now, directing your attention to the newspaper which I am sending you, Mr. Witness, the second picture after the picture of the tanks and the people, I am asking you whether or not there is any significance to the flag that is flying over the people, which would appear to the Senator from Idaho to be of rather serious concern. Is there any significance to that flag flying there?

Mr. Karski. May I read the caption to him? Senator Welker. Go right ahead, Doctor.

The Interpreter. The Polish flag has two colors, white and red, the national Polish flag. It looks to me that this flag has also some two colors, and it looks like white and some blood stain which probably symbolizes to them the national flag.

Mr. Morris. When you say the Polish national flag, do you mean the national flag of the current government of Poland or the previous

government

The Interpreter. The previous government has the same flag, except the same flag as the flag before the war. But nevertheless, for the Polish nation, the white and the red color symbolizes the Polish

national color and symbolizes the freedom of Poland.

Senator Welker. Now, based upon your experience as a former Communist agent in Poland, based upon the knowledge you have learned from the press, is it a safe assumption that what is going on in Poland yesterday and today—and we hope forever, without the loss of life and injury to those patriots—would it be safe to say that other freedom-loving satellite countries have the same unrest and same freedom urge that the Poles are evidencing now?

The Interpreter. Before I left Poland, I was in touch with other nations behind the Iron Curtain, and I came to the conclusion that the desire for freedom is the same, although that campaign for achieving more liberalization was carried on in Poland on a larger scale than

in other satellite countries.

Mr. Morris. You say the desire for liberalization and the willingness to express pressure to bring about liberalization was stronger in Poland than it was in the other satellite countries, even though based on your travels in the other satellite countries, you did recognize there was this desire for liberalization and this unrest?

The Interpreter. Yes, sir.

Senator Welker. I have one concluding question, Doctor, that you

might interpret to the witness.

I will ask you if it isn't a fact that the Polish freedom-loving people who have suffered, some killed, some wounded and some very unhappy, and those who have been in this revolt as they call it—had they had

the arms or the armaments or the tools to work with—I will ask you if it isn't a fact that they would have turned against the Communist

and shot him dead wherever they saw him in Poland?

The Interpreter. Well, I couldn't tell you, of course, if they were armed or not in this particular riot in Poznan, since I have no way to know, but I can tell you, on the basis of my personal experience, that Polish Communist police do not hesitate to kill people in this kind of riot anywhere.

Senator Welker. I think we have misunderstood each other. I am referring now to this fact, would the Polish people who have been revolting against this tyranny—would they have any reluctance to shoot down the Communists and the secret police had they had the

arms to do it with?

The Interpreter. In the present situation, where there is no democracy and no rights, and where the governmental control over the people is extended to all walks of life—first of all, there is no possibility that the people would get arms. It is physically impossible. Senator Welker. I understand that, but mine was a hypothetical

question based upon the fact if they could get arms, would they use

The Interpreter. If they had arms, I firmly believe that the great part of the Polish nation, most of the Polish nation, would fight

against the regime.

Mr. Morris. You believe that if they did have arms, a great part of the Polish people, in fact most of the Polish people, would take up arms against the Polish Communist leaders?

The Interpreter. Yes. I mean the part greater than that those

who support communism.

Mr. Morris. It is the majority.

The Interpreter. Yes.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Bialer, I wonder if you could tell us what happened after the secret meeting in 1955 when the pressure became so great that Mr. Radkiewicz had to resign from the membership in the

Politburo in the Polish Communist Party?

The Interpreter. May I draw your attention, sir, that Radkiewicz resigned from his position in the middle of 1955, but the party leadership withheld that information from the people and from the party membership. I am sure that even today, the people in Poland and the party membership do not know that he was dismissed as early as in the middle of 1955.

Senator Welker. I think that would be a rather wholesome thing to broadcast to the people of Poland, don't you, that he was forced

to resign in the middle of the summer of 1955?

The Interpreter. I tried my best, sir, exactly to do this.

Mr. Morris. Then, does that complete the background or do you have more aspects of this background leading up to the interpretation

of the present situation?

The Interpreter. From those examples which I gave you, and I have hundreds of other examples, the main point is that the Polish nation and the party membership are continuously exercising a pressure for more liberalization. The party leadership is and was opposing that pressure and only being forced to accept the principle that more liberalization should be introduced.

The Poznan riot was one of many efforts on the part of the Polish workers to attain, to force the party to bring more liberalization and higher standards of living, and a change in the national position in Poland.

Mr. Morris. Your interpretations, Mr. Bialer, that the ever-extending pressure for liberalization, which you have described in great detail through the years, has been the direct cause or contributing cause to the present uprising?

The Interpreter. Yes, I am deeply convinced that it was so.

Mr. Morris. Does the fact that the Polish national flag was unfurled during the course of this demonstration indicate to you that the uprising was political in content rather than the demand for food?

The Interpreter. Those riots basically were political, although, I repeat, under a Communist regime, economic demands and economic

situation is a result of the political Communist rule.

Mr. Morris. I wonder if I might ask this question—is there any possibility that this revolt may have been falsely stimulated by the Communist leaders in order to bring out any underground resistance

that may exist in the Communist regime?

The INTERPRETER. I don't believe, sir, in this. The price which the regime is paying for these riots, and the price is the loss of authority in Poland and the revelation before the whole world how terrible the situation is in Poland—the price is so great that they wouldn't be willing to pay it.

Mr. Morris. The answer is the price is so great—in other words, a revelation to the whole world how bad the situation is in Communist Poland and the fact that there is so much resentment against the regime—that the price would not be worth the effort. You do not

believe in that?

The Interpreter. Absolutely, I do not believe it.

Mr. Morris. Do you believe the Warsaw radio would announce that the revolt was of such proportions—38 killed and 270 wounded—if

the revolt were not serious?

The Interpreter. The fact that Warsaw admits that 38 people were killed and 270 wounded indicates to me, on the basis of my knowledge of the Communist methods, that even the expression "serious" is too mild; too delicate. It means that this was a bloody battle which was waged in Poznan.

Mr. Morris. Do you know anything of a revolt that took place between the Polish people and the Soviet occupation forces in a town Szczecin in 1951? I believe that is the Polish for Stettin, is it not?

The Interpreter. Yes, sir; I have knowledge about it.

Mr. Morris. Will you tell us briefly what happened at that time? The Interpreter. In 1951, a Soviet officer shot a Polish lady. This provoked an outstanding part of the Polish population in Stettin, an outrage and outbreak, which was being hidden by the Communist regime for many years. As a result, there were outbreaks in Stettin; there were public demonstrations, and naturally, as a consequence, reprisals on the part of the regime. All of them were being concealed from the Polish people. However, I would like to stress here that at

that time, it was much easier for the regime to curb those riots because

the security organs were much stronger than they are today.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Bialer, could you tell us what you feel the United States policies should be now, with respect to this expressed desire on

the part of the Polish people to gain the liberation of control.

The Interpreter. First of all, sir, I believe that the most important thing in this field is this: Let the American people convince the Polish people that they first sympathize with them, and secondly, that the Americans will never reconcile themselves with the loss of freedom in Poland.

Mr. Morris. Let the American people know that they sympathize with the Polish people and that they will never reconcile themselves

to the loss of freedom on the part of the polish people.

The Interpreter. Let the Polish people know it.

Mr. Morris. Let the Polish people know that the Americans sympathize with their feeling that they will never reconcile themselves to

the loss of their freedom?

The Interpreter. I want to stress very, very strongly this fact. The Polish Communist Party and the Polish Communist regime are doing everything possible to silence the Western World and the Americans not to let them—to stop them—saying the truth about the situation in Poland.

Mr. Morris. The Communist leaders are doing everything possible in order to cause the leaders of the West and the people of the West not

to express themselves on these subjects.

The Interpreter. Yes, to such a degree that I would put it in such a slogan it amounts to this: The Communist leaders in Poland are saying to the Western World, very smartly, very cleverly, "Don't you criticize us in your radios and we will not jam your broadcasts."

Mr. Morris. Should we continue to criticize them?

The Interpreter. Naturally, if we stop the campaign of criticizing them and revealing the truth, this would mean a great help to them in their oppression of the Polish people.

Mr. Morris. And therefore, a policy which would cause us to soften our criticism of the Polish overlords would be a bad policy for

us to pursue?

The Interpreter. I think that such a policy would be a very terrible policy as far as the Polish people are concerned, and in consequence

would be a bad policy for the United States.

Senator Welker. Now, Mr. Witness, and Doctor, we thank you very much for your testimony here today. We are now going to conclude this phase of the hearing. It may be necessary that we reopen a

hearing at a later date.

The acting chairman wants to recognize the fact that the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee of the United States Senate is honored indeed to have today as its guest, Arthur Bliss Lane, former Ambassador to Poland and his lovely wife. As all of us know, Arthus Bliss Lane wrote the famous book, I Saw Poland Betrayed. There has come to my attention a press release this great man gave when he heard of the activities on the part of the oppressed people of Poland. I am going to read that into the record, if it is all right with you, Mr. Lane.

Mr. LANE. Yes, sir.

Senator Welker. I quote Arthur Bliss Lane in a statement he made yesterday:

The reports which have come over the radio today regarding the riots in Poznan, the largest city in what used to be German Poland, are highly significant. The fact that the Polish official radio confirms these reports emphasizes the seriousness of the situation. This courageous action in Poznan may quite probably be followed by other acts of patriotic violence against Communist despotism

not only in Poland but in other captive nations as well.

Probably the Poles have taken advantage of the recent dramatic changes in the Soviet Union and the criticism of Khrushchev by foreign Communist parties which surely have been communicated to the various captive states, including Poland. The spirit of liberty of the Poles, which never in history has been completely quenched, has finally burst forth in a brave, although perhaps for the moment futile, attempt at liberation from their Communist masters who have been under the heel of Moscow since the puppet Lublin government was formed in Poland under Stalin's direction on July 21, 1944. Rokossovsky, the Minister of Defense, formerly a marshal in the Soviet Army, who was appointed to his present position by Stalin, will undoubtedly put down the insurrection with customary Communist cruelty.

But regardless of the inevitable loss of life, the attempt is all to the good. We did not gain our independence without Washington having been willing to

risk his life as well as those of his men.

I do not place any credence in the relationship of this uprising to the recent visit of Tito to Moscow. I am not as naive as some persons in this country who hold to the fallacious theory that Tito represents a different type of communism of the Trotskyist or Bukharin school. All forms of communism are the same. They are aimed at the destruction of all we hold dear: democracy, religion, and liberty, and specifically the overthrow of the United States.

Therefore, all Americans should hail this bold revolution. It is in the interest of the liberation of Eastern Europe and of the security of the United States.

God bless the Polish people.

Arthur Bliss Lane, that was a profound statement made by you yesterday. On behalf of Chairman Eastland and the entire subcommittee and its staff, we want to thank you for permitting us to use that as part of the record in this hearing, which is a hearing following one of the crucial things in the history of the modern world.

Mr. Morris. We may have a staff session with Mr. Bialer and if we learn anything at that staff session, we can put it in the public record.

Mr. Bialer (through the interpreter). May I add just one sentence, sir?

Senator Welker. Yes.

The Interpreter. Could I tell you, I would symbolize what is happening now in Poland in such a way: There is a legend in Poland about a witch who liberated certain forces and then was unable to control them any more. This is what is happening in Poland. The Communist regime liberated certain forces in Poland to speak, and now it looks they can't control them any more.

Senator Welker. Thank you very much. The committee now stands adjourned.

(Whereupon, at 2:55 p. m., the subcommittee adjourned.)

(The following letters from Chairman Eastland to Attorney General Herbert Brownell, Jr., were ordered into the record at a meeting of the subcommittee on June 21:)

June 8, 1956.

Hon. HERBERT BROWNELL, Jr.,

Attorney General of the United States, Department of Justice, Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Attorney General: On June 8 the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee heard the testimony of Seweryn Bialer, who was until recently a leading activist and propagandist for the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Poland. He testified with regard to a wide range of subjects, including the activities of one Henry Podolski. His testimony concerning Podolski follows:

"Mr. Morris. Do you know Henry Podolski?

"Mr. Morris (turning to the chairman). Mr. Chairman, Henry Podolski was the former editor in chief of Glos Ludowy, a Polish-Communist paper published

in Detroit.

WITNESS (through interpreter). Yes; I know Henry Podolski. Henry Podolski has two main assignments presently in Poland. The first one is to work in the campaign of repatriation of the Polish emigres, postwar emigres, in the West, and the second, to instruct the American paper People's Voice in Detroit.

"Mr. Morris. You mean he is still running the Detroit newspaper?

"Witness (through interpreter). This paper receives strict instructions from

Poland, and he is the man who is sending them.'

According to our records Glos Ludowy (People's Voice) is a Polish language newspaper, published weekly at 5858 Chene Street, Detroit, Mich. It is the official organ of the Polonia Society of the International Workers Order, which has been cited by the Attorney General as "one of the strongest Communist Henry Podolski was formerly its editor in chief. Throughout organizations." its existence Glos Ludowy has never failed to follow the line of the Communist Party, as a study of its issues will show.

In the light of this testimony, the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee feels that a new problem has been posed which we present to you for such action as may in your judgment be warranted: namely, the existence in this country of a publication conducted under the proven direction of an agent of the Com-

munist Government of Poland.

Sincerely.

(Signed) JAMES O. EASTLAND, Chairman, Internal Security Subcommittee.

JUNE 18, 1956.

Hon. HERBERT BROWNELL, Jr.,

Attorney General of the United States, Department of Justice. Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. ATTORNEY GENERAL: I write this letter to ask your assistance in a matter that constitutes a serious present threat to the internal security of the United States.

Seweryn Bialer, who was a leading Polish Communist until his defection a few months ago, recently told the Internal Security Subcommittee that propaganda prepared by the United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers Union in the United States is the most effective propaganda device being used today by the Polish Communist leaders against their people. This propaganda is directed against America, and is further being used to keep the Polish people in bondage.

Two of the leaders of this union have been James Matles and James Lustig. Both have been demonstrated to be Communists and both are the subject of denaturalization proceedings I believe that your office filed denaturalization suits against them on February 13, 1952, and on December 16, 1952, respectively. Since that time apparently nothing has been done to enable the immigration

authorities to follow up on their deportation proceedings.

There is also the case of Constantine Radzi, who our record shows has been a member of the control or disciplinary committee of the Communist Party. Radzi was observed watching one of our hearings in New York in 1952, and was subpensed to testify. In that case, both the Immigration Service and the Department of Justice acted expeditiously and filed a denaturalization proceeding on December 17, 1952, against Radzi. Since that time apparently nothing has been done on this case. Radzi is not even on bail, and is pursuing his work of undermining our Government without molestation.

I further call your attention to the case of Louis Weinstock, against whom suit was filed on January 22, 1953, and to the cases of almost a score of other

Communists who are still engaged in trying to destroy our way of life.

May we have your assurance that the Department of Justice is taking all possible steps to expedite the denaturalization and deportation of the named individuals, and of others in the same position?

With kindest regards, I am,

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) JAMES O. EASTLAND, Chairman, Internal Security Subcommittee.

(An exchange of letters between Chairman Eastland and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, together with a letter to Senator Walter F. George, and a cable message to which reference is made were ordered into the record at a subcommittee meeting on July 18, 1956. The text of these documents follows:)

JULY 5, 1956.

Hon. John Foster Dulles,

Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Secretary: Enclosed herewith, for your information, is a copy of a cable which Robert Morris, chief counsel of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, has received from Hon. William C. Wentworth, member of the Australian Parliament and member of the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee. I am also enclosing a copy of my letter of today's date to Hon. Walter F. George as chairman of the Foreign Relation's Committee, transmitting a copy of this cable to him with the request that it be brought to the attention of his commitee.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) James O. Eastland, Chairman, Internal Security Subcommittee.

JULY 5, 1956.

Hon. WALTER F. GEORGE,

Chairman, Foreign Relations Committee, United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Chairman: The Honorable William C. Wentworth, Member of the Australian Parliament and member of the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee, has transmitted the enclosed cable to Robert Morris, chief counsel of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee. Inasmuch as it bears on matters related to our foreign policy, I am transmitting herewith a copy of this cable, with the request that you place it before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

The Australian Parliamentary Affairs Committee is made up of 13 members. The fact that 12 of these members have signed the within cable would indicate

that their sentiments represent committee thinking.

Very sincerely yours,

[s] JAMES O. EASTLAND, Chairman, Internal Security Subcommittee.

[Telegram]

JULY 3, 1956.

ROBERT MORRIS,

Chief Counsel, Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Washington:

Twelve members of Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee, including myself, have signed the following statement for press statement begins the massacres and mass arrest in Poznan show that Poland is still a police state whose people are kept in subjection to totalitarian terror.

are kept in subjection to totalitarian terror.

Public comment from Communist leaders in other Soviet satellites to the effect that the Polish uprising proved the need for greater party vigilance is at least an indication that this is still the normal method of government through-

out the Communist world.

The new leaders in the Kremlin now profess penitence for the misdeeds of the criminal Stalin. It should be remembered that Stalin's greatest crimes were committed not against the Russian people but against neighboring free people, particularly Poland, who were enslaved by force of Russian arms and have been kept in subjection by violence and electoral fraud.

The Kremlin confessions regarding Stalin's activities constitute new evidence justifying the reopening of the Polish case of 1945.

Surely there is some international organization which will support the prin-

ciple of free and properly supervised elections in Poland.

The Poznan uprising proves—if any further proof were needed—that there are still Poles who are willing to sacrifice their lives for their nation.

The free world should not sit on the sideline while the unctuously penitent men in the Kremlin proceed to repeat Stalin's crimes of 1945 and apply the jackboot to Poland once again.

We must protest against Communist methods and develop our protest into an

effective demand for free elections in Poland.

Meanwhile the press and radio of the world should not relax its efforts to expose the administrative and judicial terror being employed against the Polish

people.

We should demand the fullest and most factual account of the happening, and if press correspondents are denied freedom of movement in Poland and freedom of access to the accused, the world should know about it and protest accordingly.

The methods adopted by the Communist authorities in Poznan throw a lurid

light on the insincerity of the Kremlin much advertised change of heart.

WENTWORTHSY.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Washington, July 12, 1956.

Hon. JAMES O. EASTLAND, United States Senate.

DEAR SENATOR EASTLAND: Thank you very much for your letter of July 5, enclosing a copy of a cable sent by 12 members of the Australian Parliamentary Affairs Committee, as well as a copy of your letter to Senator George.

Both of these enclosures will be called to the attention of appropriate officers

in the Department.

Sincerely yours.

/S/ ROBERT C. HILL, Assistant Secretary (For the Secretary of State).

(The following letter from Chairman Eastland to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and a reply from Theodore C. Streibert, Director of the United States Information Agency, were ordered into the record at the subcommittee meeting on July 18, 1956:)

July 2, 1956.

Hon. John Foster Dulles.

Secretary of State, Department of State, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: On June 29, 1956, Seweryn Bialer testified before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee in connection with the recent riots in Poznan, Poland. As you know, Mr. Bialer was, until January 31 of this year, a member of the Central Committee of the Polish Communist Party, specializing

in anti-Western and anti-American propaganda.

Enclosed herewith, for your information, is a copy of the transcript of Mr. Bialer's testimony, setting forth important evidence concerning recent events in Poland. As his testimony shows, the Polish Communist leaders have been forced to permit a certain liberalization of conditions; and it is this, he states, which unleashed the forces that caused the Poznan uprising.

I particularly call your atttention to the following colloquy near the close

of Mr. Bialer's testimony (pp. 3413-3415):

"Mr. Morris. Mr. Bialer, could you tell us what you feel the United States policies would be now with respect to this expressed desire on the part of the

Polish people to gain their liberation from control?

"Mr. Bialer. First of all, sir, I believe that the most important thing in this field is this: Let the American people convince the Polish people first that they sympathize with them; and secondly, that the Americans will never reconcile themselves with the loss of freedom in Poland.

"Mr. Morris. Let the American people know that they sympathize with the Polish people and that they will never reconcile themselves to the loss of freedom

on the part of the Polish people?

"Mr. BIALER. Let the Polish people know it.

"Mr. Morris. Let the Polish people know that the Americans sympathize with their feeling that they will never reconcile themselves to the loss of their

Mr. Bialer. I want to stress very, very strongly this fact. Communist Party and the Polish Communist regime are doing everything possible to silence the Western world and the Americans, not to let them-to stop them-saying the truth about the situation in Poland.

"Mr. Morris. The Communist leaders are doing everything possible in order to cause the leaders of the West and the people of the West not to express

themselves on these subjects?

"Mr. Bialer. Yes; to such a degree that I would put it in such a slogan—it amounts to this: The Communist leaders in Poland are saying to the Western world, very smartly, very cleverly, 'Don't you criticize us in your radios and we will not jam your broadcasts.'

"Mr. Morris. Should we continue to criticize them?

"Mr. BIALER. Naturally, if we stop the campaign of criticizing them and revealing the truth, this would mean a great help to them in their oppression of the Polish people.

"Mr. Morris. And therefore, that is-a policy which would cause us to soften cur criticism of the Polish overlords would be a bad policy for us to pursue?

"Mr. Bialer. I think that such a policy would be a very terrible policy as far as the Polish people are concerned, and in consequence would be a bad policy for the United States."

I have taken the liberty of setting forth this particular portion of Mr. Bialer's testimony, because I believe it sheds important light upon an issue of policy concerning which there has been a great deal of debate in recent months.

On all sides we hear it said nowadays, that America should take the lead in relaxing international tensions, as a means of promoting the goal of world peace. To this end, it has been suggested that the United States should modify the tone of its broadcasts to the captive nations of Eastern Europe, to avoid giving any possible offense to the Communist overlords of those areas. Mr. Bialer's testimony serves to emphasize how ill-advised such a course would be, and what dreadful consequences it might have, both for the Polish people and for the United States.

I therefore express the hope, Mr. Secretary, that nothing will deter this country from speaking with fearless candor to the oppressed populations behind the Iron Curtain. Only from us can they hear the truth, and only the truth can

make them free.

Sincerely yours,

JAMES O. EASTLAND, Chairman, Internal Security Subcommittee.

JULY 11, 1956.

DEAR SENATOR EASTLAND: Thank you for sending me a copy of the letter which you sent to the Secretary of State on July 2, 1956, concerning part of Seweryn Bialer's testimony before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee. As you may know, the United States Information Agency has made extensive use of interviews with Mr. Bialer.

With regard to the colloquy in which Mr. Bialer advised the American people to convince the Polish people that Americans sympathize with them and will never reconcile themselves to loss of freedom in Poland, I can assure you that the Agency endeavors to exploit all suitable opportunities to emphasize these The following are typical of the numerous applicable statements that points. are being broadcast to Iron Curtain countries:

"* * * May 3 is the day on which this country and the people of Poland renew a mutual faith in freedom, and in the strong bonds of friendship and common purpose which unite us across all the barriers the Iron Curtain imposes"—Department of State statement on Polish Constitution Day.

** * * The peaceful liberation of the captive peoples has been, is and, until success is achieved, will continue to be a major goal of United States foreign

policy"-White House statement.

"* * We believe that all free peoples will be watching the situation closely to see whether or not the Polish people will be allowed a government which will remedy the grievances which have brought them to a breaking point"—Department of State statement on the Poznan demonstrations.

Since your letter to the Secretary of State also mentions the Poznan uprising, I think you would be interested in knowing that the Agency's treatment of this subject highlights sympathetic reaction from the United States and elsewhere.

Our treatment has also been drawing upon the heavy flow of eyewitness accounts, news reports, and commentaries that (1) show the uprising as a manifestation of legitimate grievances arising from conditions that are typical of East European regimes, (2) interpret the uprising as an act of desperation stemming from privations while the U. S. S. R. and the satellites are making grandiose offers of aid to nonbloc countries, (3) offer more evidence that the satellite regimes constitute dictatorial minority rule, and (4) again underline the importance of permitting all people to enjoy the right to live under governments of their own choosing.

I believe these lines, which are being applied to a familiar current development, accord fully with the points brought out in the aforementioned colloquy.

I can also assure you that the policy of the Agency calls for a consistent, vigorous presentation of the truth to the captive peoples of Eastern Europe. This policy will continue. The determinant factors in the tone and content of the Agency's output to these peoples are the attainment of national policy objectives of the United States and the means considered most likely to be productive for this purpose.

Sincerely yours,

THEODORE C. STREIBERT, Director.

(The following article by Jay Lovestone, published in the AFL-CIO American Federationist of August 1956, was ordered into the public record:)

CAN COMMUNIST PARTIES BE "INDEPENDENT FROM MOSCOW"?

(By Jay Lovestone, executive secretary, free trade union committee, AFL-CIO)

There is very little that is spontaneous or genuine about the June 24, 1956, statement by Communist Party of the United States declaring its "independence from Moscow." This is a synthetic declaration ordered by Moscow. Under instructions of Moscow, the British, Italian, and French Communist Parties and Europe's No. 1 fellow traveler, Pietro Nenni, have also made such declarations. Other Communist Parties have since then done likewise.

Quite naturally, one is tempted to ask: How can Moscow order supposedly independent parties functioning in other countries what to do? And why should

Moscow resort to such a weird way of doing things?

These questions appear baffling to many in the free world because they tend to apply to Communist Parties the yardsticks and standards they employ in judging organizations which are political parties in the democratic sense of the word.

No Communist Party is a political party in this sense. It is, therefore, necessary, first of all, to examine the particular nature, the specific character, the peculiar features that distinguish the Communist Parties from other political

parties in the free world.

The overriding and overwhelming preeminence of the Russian section of the international Communist movement has always been accepted by all other Communist Parties and their fellow travelers. This is understandable. After all, the Russian Communists, led by Lenin, were the first to triumph in their revolution. This victory, the progress achieved in Soviet consolidation, and the Kremlin's increasingly important role in the international area have given the Russian Communists immeasurable authority and prestige among Communists and their followers throughout the world.

For these reasons it has become almost second nature for Communists outside of the Soviet Union to echo and copy everything which the clique that happens to be dominant in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union says or does. For years, Communist parties everywhere have oriented themselves and behaved as auxiliaries of the already victorious Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Secondly, the dominant leader, or the ruling clique, of the Soviet Communist Party, at any particular moment, has always insisted on, and exploited, such

¹ Jay Lovestone was formerly secretary of the Communist Party in the United States. In 1929 he was expelled for fighting against Stalinism and has since then become one of the leading fighters against communism of every hue and stripe.

behavior of the Communist parties outside the Soviet borders for its own factional advantage and interests. As Russian Communist factional struggles became more violent and destructive, as inner party groups were defeated and annihilated, as the base of leadership in the Soviet Communist Party narrowed, this exploitation of the Communist parties outside the Soviet Union for enhancing the Kremlin's ruling clique interests became established Comintern practice and policy.

Thus, in 1929, the leadership of the American Communist Party, which had the overwhelming support of the organization in the United States, was purged by Stalin himself. This Russian purge of the organization in the United States

came primarily because these leaders were suspected of being sympathetic to Bukharin, then the principal ideological opponent of Stalin.

After Stalin thus drove thousands of members out of the Communist Party of the United States, he went on to foist upon it a general secretary and other leaders who were his supine henchmen. The latter hastened to hail all the programs Stalin subsequently launched against his opponents in the Soviet Communist Party and throughout the Comintern. The other sections of the Comintern lost no time in imitating and copying the hooliganism of Stalin by

mass party expulsions and drastic purges.

After years of devastating faction struggles inside the Soviet Communist Party, it became a party of robots-a party of total political automation. Only Stalin and the small clique of yes-men around him counted. Stalin fully understood what this robotization meant for the functioning, future behavior, and inner life of the Soviet Communist Party. That is why he had the 17th Party Congress (March 1939) abolish the mass purge. Once ideological differences, discussions, and groups were no longer possible inside the Soviet Communist Party, the mass purge of hundreds of thousands of Communist Party members and millions of so-called kulaks was entirely unnecessary.

Thus had the mass purge "outlived its historical usefulness." It had even begun to engulf Stalin's closest collaborators and to threaten the very physical

existence of the Communist Party.

Under conditions in which narrow cliques or power-mad individuals replaced ideological groups, the rulers of the Bolshevik Party found it necessary to have a different sort of purge—the purge of picked and strategically placed followers of a particularly ambitious individual leader whom Stalin or his immediate entourage feared. This is the difference between the Khrushchev purge of Beria and his henchmen and Stalin's mass purges of numerous ideological supporters of Trotsky, Zinoviev, and Bukharin in the Bolshevik ranks.

Between Bukharin and Stalin and between Trotsky and Stalin there were very important political and ideogolical differences. But between Khrushchev and Malenkov or Molotov and between Khrushchev and Beria there were no serious ideological differences. Theirs was primarily a clash over the amassing of power-actually a stage in the conflict over who is to succeed Stalin as the

omnipotent and omniscient party dictator.

This is the inevitable logic of internal organization development in all totalitarian parties. This is especially true for a Communist Party which directs an ironclad dictatorship over the people in every walk of life and human endeavor.

In this connection, it is necessary to note that, under the very cover of paying continuous and loud lipservice to the principle of collective party leadership, Stalin grabbed total power for himself. While proclaiming loyalty to this "principle," Stalin eliminated physically every potential political opponent of his, everyone who might conceivably be able to have an idea of his own or demonstrate sufficient courage to work and fight for his convictions.

Today Khrushchev is following faithfully this Stalin pattern of elimination of leaders and gradual concentration of power in his own hands. Here we have the key to the political demotion and humiliation of Malenkov and Molotov and the most recent "retirement" of Kaganovich from active life in the Soviet Party and Here we have the why and wherefore of Khrushchev's ordering

the execution of Beria and his closest colleagues.

While this transformation of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was going on, the other Communist parties were also being changed in their composition and character, in their anatomy and physiology, in their structure and functioning. They also became parties of blind and mechanical followers. They also hardly attracted any critical-minded individuals.

They became primarily paramilitary outfits organized to execute Kremlin commands and to make shifts of Communist Party line quickly and with least

loss of members, regardless of how sharp the turn was.

Only Communist Parties thus molded could weather as they did the shift brought into painful relief by the Stalin-Hitler pact and the present anti-Stalin campaign. Only organizations hammered into such shape and malleability could hail the Stalin-Hitler pact which led to World War II as a great service to world peace. This explains why and how the Communist Parties throughout the world—which had for years boasted about their militant antifascism—could commend Nazi Germany as a force for peace and condemn the allied democracies as warmongers and aggressors.

In the same spirit and for the same reason, the Communists in the United States and other democracies tried to sabotage armament production. They sought to help the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo Axis with which their Soviet "paradise" was then pact-bound. This is what the Communists did—until Hitler forced

Stalin to change his line by attacking him.

This process of political automation which has been going on for years inside the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was mechanically and rigidly carried over by Stalin into all other Communist Parties. The Communist Party of every country was transformed completely into a pupper outfit slavishly and

mechanically supporting all Soviet foreign and domestic policies.

Thus were the internal cliques, intrigues, and conflicts afflicting the Soviet Communist Party mechanically transplanted into and automatically reflected inside every other Communist Party. Every non-Russian party leadership was soon turned into a rubberstamp of the dominant ruler of the Communist Party outside the Soviet Union, of the international Communist movement as a whole.

When Stalin decided during World War II to liquidate the Comintern, the very ones who were its top functionaries and titular leaders did not know about the Kremlin ukase ordering the end of their organization. They learned about

the "demise" only after they had read its "death" notice in Pravda.

In view of this total political automation, it was not so difficult for the very ones whom Stalin had put into the "leadership" of the various Communist parties to denounce him as a murderer, sex pervert, and arsonist—once the clique controlling the Soviet Communist Party turned on Stalin. The "leaderships" of the other Communist parties almost automatically and with very few exceptions followed the same course of denouncing Stalin, whom they had for many years sycophantically hailed as a supergod.

This fantastic turnabout and repudiation of themselves was not very difficult for those with years of experience in echoing, aping, and supporting the policies and maneuvers of whoever happened to rule the Communist Party of the Soviet

Union at any moment.

It is very instructive to note that all the Communist parties outside of the Soviet Union not only fell in line with the denunciations of Stalin as a demon. They fell in line with equal precision in supporting the entire international strategical and tactical line laid down for world communism by the 20th Congress (co-existence, united and popular fronts, different roads to "socialism," etc.). This habit of automatic reflection of Soviet Communist Party life and regimen has become a cardinal characteristic, sort of second nature, for Communist organizations throughout the world.

It is this inherent feature of Communist (Leninist-Stalinist) organizational structure and functioning that accounts for the speed, skill, and shamelessness with which the Communist parties outside the U. S. S. R.—the puppets and dependents of the present Kremlin regime—are now carrying out the instructions

from Moscow to proclaim their "independence" from Moscow.

The very manner, the very timing, the whole international sequence and chorus of this proclamation of "independence" only demonstrate anew the brazennes and cynicism of the real rulers of world communism. The very occasion for and manner of these Communist parties proclaiming their "independence from Moscow" provide crushing confirmation of how hopelessly dependent these organizations are on whatever clique happens to be dominant in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Obviously, their dependence has taken on a sort of "new look." However different the countenance of this dependence may appear, its contents are essen-

tially unchanged

The "declaration of independence" is not so new. After all, once the Comintern was declared dissolved, every Communist Party was "on its own" and, therefore, "independent." The relations between every Communist party and Moscow—under such circumstances—could be only bilateral. This is exactly the relationship that the latest Communist Party of the United States declaration proposes to have with the Soviet Communist Party and other Com-

munist parties. Other Communist parties have already followed with the same

proposal.

Here we must note that several Comintern officers, who have since broken with Moscow, have disclosed that, in spite of the formal dissolution of the Comintern, an international Communist organization did continue to function under the direction of the Kremlin. So history will repeat itself after the more recent dissolution of the Cominform, which covered only a limited area.

Contradictory? Confusing? Weird? Well, let Lenin himself explain this "mystery," this flexibility and duplicity of Communist tactics, this readiness on the part of Communists to turn somersault, to lie, to resort to all sorts of frauds, to wallow in the mud in order to build their most cherished instrument—the party

which is their engine of subversion and destruction of democracy.

Said Lenin:

"It is necessary to be able to * * * agree to any and every sacrifice, and evenif need be—to resort to all sorts of stratagems, maneuvers, and illegal methods, to evasion and subterfuge in order to penetrate the trade unions, to remain in them and to carry on Communist work in them at all costs. * * * Of course, in Western Europe, which is particularly saturated with inveterate legalist, constitutionalist, bourgeois-democratic prejudices, it is more difficult to carry on such work. But it can and must be carried on, and carried on systematically." (Left Wing Communism, an Infantile Disorder, pp. 95-96.)

Soviet imperialist interests and the interests of the present dominant clique in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union demand that the peoples of the Soviet Empire should believe that there is something really new and better about the post-Stalin regime. These interests demand that the outside world, the non-Soviet world, particularly the Western democracies and the labor movements of the free world, should believe that the Soviet "new look" is something genu-

inely different, something truly new and better.

Why is this so? Stalin's domestic and foreign policies had already exhausted their usefulness even before the 19th Soviet Communist Party Congress, held in October 1952. Stalin himself had begun to recognize that his political and his organization technique had run their course both at home and abroad. recognition by Stalin was reflected in the decisions of the 19th Party Congress.

The roots of the present Khrushchev strategy and tactics and the basis of the current Soviet domestic and foreign policies are to be found in the line laid down by Stalin himself at and for the 19th Soviet Communist Party Congress. What is really new in the U. S. S. R. since this congress is that the Khrushchev leadership-which was created by Stalin-is now trying to avoid all blame and condemnation by the Soviet peoples and the outside world for the disastrous moral, political, and economic consequences of Stalinism.

The Khrushchev leadership continues to be loyal to the fundamental political and organization principles of Leninism-Stalinism-that is, to totalitarian communism and its goal of world domination. But the Krushchev leadership is realistic enough to know that it must rely on new methods and different tactics in order to revitalize and improve the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which is its engine of total power over the economic, military, political, and cultural life of the Soviet Empire.

No one should seek to deny or even belittle the significance of the changes which they are making inside the U. S. S. R. and throughout the international Communist movement. But these changes are being made by Khrushchev and his clique solely to strengthen their grip on the Soviet Communist Party, to bolster the position of the Soviet Union in the current critical international

situation.

These changes aim to modernize and streamline the machinery of the world Communist movement so as to enable it to carry out all the more effectively the new line of the 20th Communist Congress—the line of greater infiltration and penetration, more extensive subversion and the conquest of the free trade unions, social democratic parties, and other labor organizations in the free world.

Significant as these changes are, they do not prove that Khrushchev and his collected leadership are moving toward liberalism and taking steps which will lead even slowly yet surely to the replacement of aggressive Communist totalitarian dictatorship with a democratic system of government dedicated to living

in peace with all other nations.

Khrushchev and his aids realize that the new times call for a new approach. They realize that the new tasks demand that Communist parties drop their old methods of work, break with their former practically open avowal of loyal subservience to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and to the Soviet Government which it controls. Here we have one of the principal reasons for the maneuver of pretended and pretentious "independence from Moscow" now being

made by all Communist parties.

But it would be a mistake to consider this formal and noisy disavowal of dependence on and subservience to Moscow as only a maneuver—as merely formal compliance with orders from Moscow. It is all that, but it is also much more. Even more important than the Moscow-dictated maneuver itself is the reason for the Kremlin making it at this time. In this instance, the why of the action is even more important than the significant action itself.

The Khrushchev leadership is compelled to make this sweeping maneuver in the ranks of world communism for basically the same reason which impelled it to resort to the denigration of Stalin. The Kremlin ruling clique is trying to preserve the essence and substance of Stalinism within the U. S. R. and throughout world communism, while seeking to blur or disown its crudest and

most obviously repulsive features.

Decades of bestiality, political depravity, moral degradation and human enslavement have revealed the hideous nature of Soviet and world communism, its degrading organization and its reprehensible methods of functioning. These dark decades have produced a soil fertile for the seeds of disintegration of international communism as an ideology, as a universal philosophy, as a Weltanschauung.

Khrushchev and his aids are fully aware of this. They are trying to check this trend toward the disintegration of communism as an ideology of enchantment or an avenue of escape by making certain superficial and surface changes in their methods of rule and leadership, in their strategy and tactics, in their control of the Communist parties outside the U. S. S. R. They are doing this in order to preserve and promote the overriding aim of communism which, under Khrushchev no less than under Lenin or Stalin, remains the conquest of the world and its transformation along the lines of the Soviet pattern.

We cannot warn too strongly against confusing the moral and political corrosion of communism as an ideology with the corrosion of the Communist dictatorship as a political power system. The two are related. But they are not identical. There are elements of serious disintegration in communism as an ideology. But, at this moment, there are no important signs of disintegration of communism as a political power system within the Soviet Union or in any of

its satellites.

The ruthlessness and dispatch with which the Warsaw puppet regime recently crushed the revolt of the Poznan workers for bread and freedom show that Moscow continues to control the machinery of the world Communist conspiracy. Moscow continues to inspire, direct, and finance this worldwide subversive conspiracy and fifth-column apparatus.

But in this control Moscow is bound to face new and serious complications and difficulties. We must never forget that, though all Communists and Communist parties continue to owe their first loyalty to the Soviet dictatorship, they are, especially in the Western democracies, also subjected to the influence of other

forces.

The effects of Communist ideological disintegration cannot be helpful to the Communist political power system. However, the Communist power system can be used effectively to counteract the manifestations of ideological disintegration. Khrushchev is now using very effectively his giant political power system for this purpose. In this the top boss of Soviet and world communism has been greatly helped by two factors: (1) the failure of the free world to exploit the moral and political bankruptcy of communism as an ideology, and (2) the readiness of too many in the free world to swallow the Soviet "new look," hook, line and sinker.

The move to have each Communist party publicly proclaim its "independence" from Moscow is calculated to eradicate, or at least to halt, the trend toward the disintegration of communism as an ideology. It is easier for a robotized Communist outfit which proclaims its being "free from Russian control" to serve the interests of Soviet foreign policy and enhance the prestige of the Kremlin

rulers than for an outfit that can be easily labeled "made in Moscow."

To prove their "independence," all Communist parties will, henceforth, be permitted, upon specific instructions from their masters in Moscow, to "differ" from and "criticize" certain particular Soviet actions. This move seeks also to allay the discontent and the dismay which undoubtedly existed in the various Communist parties, especially after the Khrushchev revelations about Stalin.

However, as long as their parties are Leninist, Communist, they will never disayow the basic aims of communism. They will never oppose or even question the fundamental interests and basic line of the totalitarian Soviet Government. They will never dilute their essential primacy of loyalty to the Soviet ruling

party and its dominant clique.

Moscow is taking a calculated risk in this audacious maneuver. Some "comrades" in the free world will fall by the wayside. The recruiting of new members will certainly be slowed down in this area. For a while recruitment may even be brought to a grinding halt. But since the Communist Party is essentially a paramilitary cadre organization, it can afford such a halt for a period of time.

Through this new "independence from Moscow" line, the Kremlin aims to facilitate the Communist development of united and popular front strategy and tac-Through these tactics Moscow's Communists hope to gain new and fresh

recruits from Socialist, labor, and liberal ranks.

Moscow is sure that the winning of such recruits and the success of the popular front policy will soon again bring Communists into the cabinets of western governments. Moscow is confident that the "independent" Communist parties will find it easier at least to lead these governments toward much less suspicion

or even to far greater faith in the Khrushchev regime.

The naive attitude of French Foreign Minister Pineau toward the Khrushchev regime now at the helm of Soviet imperialism, the loose talk in Washington and London about Moscow's readiness to remove the sources and causes of world tension, the deliberate weakening of NATO and their own military forces by some western powers all confirm the marked success which the Kremlin has already had in hoodwinking western statesmanship. The latter has, unfortunately, shown a terrific capacity for wishful thinking.

To permit the various foreign appendages of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to tak about or, in a limited sense, even to act their "independence" from Moscow is a very small price for the Kremlin to pay-if, in return, it should be able to plant its fifth columnists and dupes in important posts in western

democratic and neutralist governments.

Indeed, this is a very small price to pay for making it easier for the Communist parties and their followers to soften and undermine the will and the determination of the free world to reject and resist the basic aims of Soviet communism—the fundamental, aggressive, totalitarian aims which have not been dropped or even modified in the least.

In this light, it is not hard to understand the sudden "moral" awakening of Nenni-leader of the pro-Soviet Italian Socialist Party-about political degradation in the Soviet Union. In this light, it is easy to understand Nenni's dissatisfaction with the way the Kremlin has of late been mauling Stalin, who had been his guide, guardian, and benefactor for years. But the world has still to hear a single word from Nenni as to when he will break his pact of common action with Khrushchev's agency in Italy—the Communist Party headed by Togliatti.

We have yet to hear from Nenni, from Foster (titular head of the Communist Party in the United States), from Togliatti, from the French Communist boss Thorez and from the Chinese Mao Tse-tung a demand that the Kremlin should correct and atone for the crimes it perpetrated under Stalin's guidance against

the captive peoples of Europe and Asia.

We have yet to hear from these servants of the Kremlin a single word of repudiation and condemnation of the germ warfare charges leveled by the Moscow-

Peiping Axis against the United States.

Of course, if and when Khrushchev should press a button and give the Communist Party automatons in the United States the order to do so, his fifth column in our country will surely respond. Only then will the Daily Worker have enough "independence" to denounce as a Stalinist fraud the Moscow-Peiping germ war-

fare charges against our country.

As long as this world Communist regime and relationships continue, all talk about the Communist Party in the United States or any other Communist Party being independent from Moscow is just plain nonsense. As long as these parties remain Communist in aim and character, they will continue to function as dependents, as auxiliaries, as agencies of their parent body, the Communist Party of "Holy Mother Russia."

Only when such organizations or individuals disown and break with the principles and practices of totalitarian communism, only when they are no longer Communists, only when they fight actively against the pernicious Communist evil can they stop being instruments of Moscow in intent or content, in aim or

action.

It might be said that the Tito experience proves that there can be going Communist concerns which are independent of Moscow. It is rather significant that, today, Moscow is especially interested in promoting this illusion. Why? Because Tito has a very important role to perform for Moscow in advancing the Soviet's new line of penetration and subversion of the Social Democrats, neutralists, and even some bona fide free trade-union organizations.

Let us look into this Tito myth a bit farther. It took nearly a billion dollars worth of American military aid—plus untold other western aid, comfort, and confidence—to keep the Tito Communist regime alive. Tito's Communist dictatorship could never have survived without this unstinting "capitalist" generosity. Moreover, as soon as Moscow began to change its tactics—not its principles and aims—Tito began a sweeping rapprochement with the Soviet Government in the arena of international diplomacy and also with the Communist Party and the Soviet political police apparatus.

Obviously, Yugoslavia cannot dominate or direct the Soviet Union's foreign or domestic course. Khrushchev may have formally apologized to Tito for "Stalin's crimes:" but, in return, Tito has actually and actively alined himself with the Khrushchev regime in support of all its important foreign policies and

in hailing the Soviet "new look."

These foreign policies aim to preserve the loot seized—under Stalin's leader-ship—for Soviet imperialism. These Soviet foreign policies seek to promote the drive for Communist world domination. The hub of a Communist world empire would be Moscow, not Belgrade. Its hero, or its fuehrer, would be a Khrushchev, not a Tito.

In view of all these changes and bewildering maneuvers by the Soviet rulers of world communism, it is very important to keep in mind that neither Lenin, nor Stalin, nor Khrushchev is individually or collectively solely to blame for the inhuman savagery, the moral degradation, and the physical and intellectual

enslavement suffered by countless millions behind the Iron Curtain.

Of course, no one should seek to absolve these criminals and paranoids of any guilt for their bestial crimes. But as criminals they are the products, the most powerful specimens and most noxious weeds, of communism as a totalitarian system and ideology. Stalin and the present Khrushchev leadership which he created and trained are certainly criminal desperadoes. But the Communist system which breeds and rears such criminal types as the rulers and leaders of its society is even more horribly criminal.

Lenins and Stalins may come and go. Khrushchevs may rise and fall. But as long as the Communist system continues, new and perhaps more dangerous and even more deprayed criminals are bound to take their place in perpetrating

the blackest crimes against the Soviet peoples and all humanity.

Those in the United States or anywhere else who continue to have faith in dictatorship, in totalitarianism, in the Soviet Union as an historically progressive and humanely beneficial system, in the fundamental aims of communism, can never be truly independent of Moscow—either as individuals or as organized bodies and parties.

As long as these people or parties remain loyal to the basic aims of Soviet communism or continue to place their faith in the principles of totalitarian communism, they cannot be anything else but apostles, agents, and agencies of totalitarian dictatorship—instruments of deceit, brutality, and aggression.

No matter how loudly or how often such individuals or organizations may shout about their "independence from Moscow," they will remain prisoners of a horrible power and a morally degrading faith whose seat and center, whose head and heart are in Moscow.



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SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES

Communism on the Waterfront

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY UNITED STATES SENATE

EIGHTY-FOURTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES

JUNE 21 AND JULY 12, 1956

PART 30

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ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS

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SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES

Communism on the Waterfront

THURSDAY, JUNE 21, 1956

UNITED STATES SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY.

Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 11 a.m. in room 104B, Senate Office Building, Senator William É. Jenner presiding. Present: Senators Jenner and James O. Eastland, chairman.

Also present: Robert Morris, chief counsel; Benjamin Mandel, research director; William A. Rusher, administrative counsel.

Senator Jenner. The subcommittee will come to order.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, we had scheduled for this morning, in New York City, the appearance of eight witnesses. Now, when the decision was made yesterday that Senate business would make it impossible to have the hearing in New York, we directed seven of the witnesses to appear here in Washington.

With respect to Mr. Victor Riesel, we did the following, Senator:

We had his questions and answers sworn to in New York, and I would like to offer this into the record, this transcript into the record

Senator Jenner. It may go in the record and become a part of the official record, but I think it should be read.

Mr. Morris. I will read the questions and Mr. Mandel will read Mr.

Riesel's answers.

Mr. Morris. Will you please state your name and address? Mr. Riesel. Victor Riesel, New York City. Mr. Morris. Now you have been a labor reporter for many years; have you not. Mr. Riesel?

Mr. RIESEL. Twenty-five years.

Mr. Morris. I wonder if you would give us a free sketch of your experience in that field.

Mr. Riesel. In the past 25 years I have covered every conceivable part and written considerably of the history of American labor and international labor. To do this I have not only covered the United States but in great detail European labor, and have gone around the world to cover labor and labor in politics. In addition, I have covered the Communist movement, its leaders, its labor chiefs, directors, and its activities over the same period of time and over the same worldwide area.

Mr. Morris. And approximately a year ago you made a trip around the world,

did you not, where you saw many of the labor conditions firsthand?

Mr. RIESEL. That is true. I went completely around the world, stopping in Hawaii.

Mr. Morris. How long did you stay in Hawaii?

Mr. RIESEL. One week, and also stopped at Tokyo, Hong Kong, and so on across the world.

Mr. Morris. In taking this trip you worked very closely with the labor leaders

in the various cities you visited.

Mr. Riesel. In very great detail and complete openness and frankness I worked especially closely with a great many, perhaps all, of the labor leaders in Honolulu, except, of course, for the pro-Soviet labor organization run by Harry Bridges and Jack Hall, who is his Hawaiian lieutenant.

Mr. Morris. Based on your experience which you have just set forth, Mr. Riesel, I wonder if you would tell us how Communist operate on the various waterfronts, New York, San Francisco, and Honolulu and throughout the United

States.

Mr. Riesel. I was especially interested in Hawaii where with some 1,300 water-front workers, the International Longshoremen and Warehouse Workers Union is able to shut off all entrance to and egress from the island except, of course, by air.

I was very much interested in the fact that this union, which is essentially a waterfront union, was also deep in the agricultural economy of the island.

Mr. Morris. When you say "this union" do you mean the International—

Mr. Morris, When you say "this union" do you mean the International—
Mr. Riesel. Harry Bridges' Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union,
ILWU.

Mr. Morris. By controlling the 1,300 waterfront workers they are able to

block the port?

Mr. Riesel. Not only are able, but were able and did this some time ago to the point where it would have taken the Army or the Navy to move stuff in and out.

I was told in some instances there was so little feed for cattle or the cattle died off or had to be slaughtered, that food supplies ran low, and that the whole economy of the islands was shaken. To me this was vital because the Hawaiian Islands, in addition to being a strategic outpost, as witnessed in the tragedy of Pearl Harbor, are the second most important military, naval, air, and marine defense outposts, second only to the Pentagon.

From the Hawaiian Islands are the commands reaching to the Asian shores down in New Zealand, and there you have your Far Eastern central command

under Admiral Stump.

Mr. Morris. And you say that port, which is as important as you say it is, is

now under the control of Harry Bridges?

Mr. RIESEL. It is absolutely so; there is no doubt. And from the port he has developed the considerable political influence and has, of course, his union reaching into the agricultural part, the sugar and pineapple fields.

Mr. Morris. What to you mean by that, Mr. Riesel?

Mr. RIESEL. He and his union control the workers on the great plantations, which he has also shut down from time to time and has thoroughly hurt the economy. At any given moment, should he decide to call a strike, the structure of the union is such that he has the power, through his lieutenant, Jack Hall, that he could not only shut the port, but close down the entire economy by calling an agricultural strike on the big plantations of the island.

Bridges has not been satisfied with just controlling the port and the agricultural economy of the island, but has begun to take government workers into his

union of waterfront workers and longshoremen.

It is now quite probable that he will have the same influence in Government offices that he has amongst the waterfront and plantation rank and file.

Mr. Morris. Now, does the Bridges lifeline to Honolulu go from San Francisco?

Mr. RIESEL. Yes; the command is in San Francisco and no one should make any mistake about that. It is in the hands of Harry Bridges who takes, of course, considerable advice from Louis Goldblatt, and is entirely concentrated with international headquarters in San Francisco.

Mr. Morris. Now, what controls does Bridges exercise over the port of San

Francisco?

Mr. RIESEL. He could do the same in the port of San Francisco that he could do in Honolulu or elsewhere in the Hawaiian Islands. He could shut the port down, and, in fact, has proven that, but he is the boss of the waterfront and warehouse workers in San Francisco and therefore able, at either end of the lifeline from Hawaii to California, to immobilize it, so it would take the military forces of the United States to actually keep them open and alive should he decide to call a strike at any one strategic moment.

Mr. Morris. And do you consider that this poses a threat to the internal secu-

rity of this country?

Mr. Riesel. I certainly do, and I have considered it such for a long time, and for a long time have tried to bring out the story. That is one of the reasons why I stopped in Hawaii and why I spent practically all my time talking to labor leaders in the island.

Mr. Morris. Now, could you tell us how this control extends to the east coast

or toward any of our Southern States?

Mr. Riesel. He has influence in Lousiana and New Orleans. The Justice Department has just indicted the president of one of his warehouse locals there on charges of falsely filing a non-Communist affidavit.

This individual has a record of supporting Communist causes, including an effort to keep the atomic spies from being executed for stealing atomic secrets.

Mr. Morris. The Rosenbergs, for example?

Mr. RIESEL. Of course. He has tried to extend the influence from the west coast to the east coast. He has denounced whatever most other American citizens have held as one of the most progressive steps toward the fighting of crime on the waterfront. He has denounced the Bi-State Commission, which has had, by the way, bipartisan support by both the Democrats and Republicans.

He has denounced a regular AFL effort to dislodge unsavory characters from the waterfront. He has denounced the ousting of longshoremen from the AFL. His union has sent thousands upon thousands of dollars to certain elements on the east coast. He has tried to work his way into the east coast and on the

docks.

As a matter of fact, at one time he came here and personally directed it. But mostly he has been working through—and it has been acknowledged he worked through—Irving Charles Velson, Jeff Kibre, one of the union's agents here, and there are others, I believe.

Mr. Morris. Now. Mr. Riesel, is it your position then that Bridges controls the port of Honolulu and controls the port of San Francisco, but with respect to ports such as New Orleans and New York, that he is trying to extend his

control and, now lacking that, he has only influence here?

Mr. RIESEL. He has tried to extend this control and the reason he has failed has been due to the intelligence of the working longshoremen who have many times rejected communism, who have helped in the boycott of Soviet imports, and who would fight whomever they could against infiltration by pro-Communist forces.

Now, it would be a serious matter if this man, who is a champion of Communists and Soviet causes, and in his paper has berated and derogated the United Nations war against aggression in Korea; who was one of the first to carry a two-page spread which encouraged brainwashing of our GI's in Korea, it would be unfortunate if this man were able to extend his influence to the port of New York, for example.

Here we have this terrific naval base at Lernardo; here we have the Army port of embarkation; here we have the Brooklyn Navy Yard; here we have docks in Manhattan and Jersey which load cargo for the rest of the world.

My own inquiries, as studied in detail and substantiated and made official by Army officials, show that the Brooklyn port of embarkation in Brooklyn, the Army base, feeds our entire arc of bases from Thule up near the Arctic Circle, all the way down to the hydrogen base being built in Spain, to north Africa.

I think that if one man could control such a line that runs from Hawaii and has some extensions tangentially to Alaska, then on to San Francisco and other west coast ports, then into New York where you have this concentration, it

would be a pretty grim picture.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Riesel, do you think that if we traced the activities of Harry Bridges in the various ports that we would have a good idea of what Communist activities on the waterfront are?

Mr. Riesel. Of course. Mr. Morris. Thank you.

Senator Jenner. I certainly, on behalf of the committee, want to thank Mr. Riesel for this forthright testimony. As the whole world knows, he has paid a terrific price for being so forthright in these matters. I notice in his testimony he makes reference to Jack Hall, as he described him as Harry Bridges' lieutenant in Honolulu?

Mr. Morris. Yes.

Senator Jenner. I want to state at this time for the record that Jack Hall, who is running the port of Honolulu today as Harry Bridges' lieutenant, was convicted under the Smith Act on November 5, 1952. This man, despite his conviction, almost 4 years ago, is still loose and posing a great threat to the internal security of this country. This delay on the part of the court to confirm the conviction of Jack Hall is to me a shocking thing, and I think the Department of Justice should immediately check on this important matter.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to give you a report now

on the appearances of the witnesses here this morning.

Mr. Charles Irving Velson has not been served. Mr. Charles Keith and Mr. Hyman Bershad, both of whom were subpensed to appear here today, were instructed to appear here after they were due to appear in New York yesterday but have notified the committee through their attorney, Leonard Boudin, that they could not be here. They stated that the 12 or 15 hours' notice we gave them to shift here to Washington was such they could not be here. Mr. Boudin said he had great difficulty in reaching his clients.

Now, Mr. Sam Madell has appeared by Charles Recht, and has asked for adjournment, and Mr. John Steuben, who was also subpensed, has indicated, or his attorney has indicated, he is too sick to be here today.

We have, however, Mr. Jeff Kibre, who is the Washington repre-

sentative of the ILWU and he is ready to testify, Senator.

Senator Jenner. Let the record show that Senator Eastland is presiding.

(The chairman is now presiding.)

Senator Eastland. You may call the witness.

Mr. Morris. Senators, Mr. Kibre was mentioned in Mr Riesel's testimony as one of the two east coast representatives of Mr. Bridges.

Senator Eastland. Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give the Internal Security Subcommittee shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Kibre. I do.

TESTIMONY OF JEFF KIBRE, WASHINGTON REPRESENTATIVE, INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN AND WAREHOUSEMEN'S UNION, WASHINGTON, D. C., ACCOMPANIED BY JOSEPH FORER, HIS ATTORNEY

Mr. Morris. Will you give your name and address to the reporter? Mr. Kibre. My name is Jeff Kibre, my address is 1341 G Street NW., Washington, D. C.

Mr. Morris. Now, Mr. Kibre, will you tell us what your work is,

what is your job?

Mr. Kibre. Yes; I am the Washington representative of the International Longshoremen and Warehousemen's Union. In that capacity, it is my job to push legislation which is beneficial to our membership and which is beneficial to the labor movement as a whole and also to represent the union in Washington in connection with various executive agencies having to do with the maritime industry. That is my job and that is the nature of my job.

Mr. Morris. And, now, do you, from time to time, have occasion

to go to New York?

Mr. Kibre. Yes: I have had occasions to go to New York.

Mr. Morris. And what do you do on those trips to New York, Mr. Kibre?

Mr. Kibre. If you can be a little more specific?
Mr. Morris. Would you tell us, in a general way, what your duties are when you visit New York in connection with, or on behalf of the

union?

Mr. Kibre. Some years ago, during the winter of 1953 and 1954, when there were a series of strikes in New York involving the International Longshoremen Association, I was asked by the officers to observe the development, keep in contact with the development, and keep the officers informed what was taking place.

Mr. Morris. And now is Charles Irving Velson the leading repre-

sentative of the ILWU from New York?

Mr. Kibre. Mr. Velson, as far as I know, was hired by Mr. Bridges, I think about a year and a half ago, to undertake certain limited duties which were explained by Mr. Bridges in a press conference last November in New York. And I can repeat to the committee here exactly what Mr. Bridges said in the course of that press conference.

Mr. Morris. I wish you would.

Mr. Kibre. In the course of that press conference, which was held down at the Luckenbach dock, as I recall, Mr. Bridges explained that he had hired Mr. Velson for the purpose of keeping track of the operations of the waterfront commission and, further, for keeping track of certain rating activities on the part of the SIU, Seafarers International Union, with respect to improvements of conditions in longshore jurisdiction in the maritime industry. Those were, as I understand it, the limited purposes for which Mr. Velson was hired.

Mr. Morris. And I wonder if you could tell the committee exactly what you do when you go to New York? Do you confer with Mr.

Velson?

Mr. Kibre. Well, I will tell you I have only been to New York about 2 or 3 times in the last year, or last year and a half.

Mr. Morris. For instance, you told us that you ran into Mr. Velson

yesterday; did you not?

Mr. Kibre. Yes, that is right. That is because I told our attorneys in New York, that I was going to be in New York in connection with this hearing and asked them to try to get in touch with Mr. Velson, who, I understood, was on vacation. When I got to the lawyers' office yesterday afternoon, Mr. Velson finally showed up there.
Mr. Morris. The fact of the matter is, Senators, the United States

marshals have been trying to serve a subpena on Mr. Velson for almost

2 weeks.

Mr. Kibre. I might explain that he informed me he would be on vacation, and his vacation was to run through the end of this week. I suggested to him, as long as the hearing was taking place in New York, he should stick around for an extra day and he intended to. However, when I discovered later that the hearing had been shifted back to Washington, Mr. Velson said he would be back on the job next week and would be available then.

Mr. Morris. I wonder if you could tell the committee what you do

as representative of the ILWU here in Washington?

Mr. Kibre. Yes. In the last 2 years I have been working at great length on 2 basic programs, both legislative in nature. The first is a program which has been developed by the House Merchant Marine Committee or the Bonner committee to bring about stabilization in the maritime industry. One of the basic points raised in the course of these lengthy hearings, which went on over a period of about a year, and that was to bring about common termination dates of all longshore contracts, with a view toward ending certain practices which have been prevalent in the industry over a period of years—certain practices which brought about unsettled conditions in the maritime industry. And the ILWU has strongly supported such a stabilization program. I have been working closely with the House Merchant Marine Committee on that program.

As a matter of fact, the ILWU, in relation to that program, recently extended its contract involving longshoremen on the west coast for a period of 2 years. The night before, it entered into a 5-year contract with a no-strike clause in Honolulu in the islands, and again carrying out this program of stabilization, entered into long-term contracts in the islands for the sugar industry and for the pineapple industry. That was one of my basic jobs, to work with the House Merchant Marine Committee in developing the details and practicalities of this

Mr. Morris. Was that done on the Bonner committee, did you say? Mr. Kibre. Yes.

Mr. Morris. You have been working with that committee?

Mr. Kibre. I have the records of those very, very lengthy hearings right here, in case the committee is interested, and I would certainly like to offer the transcript of that hearing. It is a bit thick for the information of the committee. I think you would learn some very interesting facts there which would go a long way toward refuting some of the allegations made by Mr. Riesel. And I do want to say that I do greatly sympathize with Mr. Riesel even though I may differ with him, I greatly sympathize with him, and I certainly hope that the persons who are responsible for inflicting the injury upon him, will be brought to justice, but I do want to say that those allegations are completely unfounded and I can show it by offering, for the committee records, some of these lengthy proceedings.

Mr. Morris. Well, now, Mr. Kibre, I wonder before getting into that. Do you know Jack Hall, who was mentioned by Mr. Riesel as the person who was a lieutenant of Harry Bridges, who virtually con-

trols the port of Honolulu?

Mr. Kibre. I have had very little contact with Jack Hall.

Mr. Morris. Do you know that, as Senator Jenner stated, he was convicted on November 5, 1952, under the Smith Act in Honolulu?

Mr. Kibre. Yes, I know that he was so convicted and it is the opinion

of our attorneys that that conviction will be reversed on appeal.

Mr. Morris. And, now, do you know, as Mr. Riesel pointed out there, that the New Orleans representative of the ILWU has recently been indicted?

Mr. Kibre. I have read in the newspapers that Mr. Nelson was

indicted.

Mr. Morris. What was his name?

Mr. Kibre. Andrew Nelson?

Mr. Morris. He is your organizer in New Orleans?

Mr. Kibre. He is the business agent elected as the business agent or president, elected by the membership of the local in New Orleans. May I say that an indictment is not a conviction, and I trust that the committee will withhold judgment with respect to Mr. Nelson, and I am sure that it will until such time as the courts have tried the matter.

Mr. Morris. Now, Mr. Kibre, I wonder if you could tell us whether or not Mr. William Glaizer preceded you as the Washington repre-

sentative of the ILWU?

Mr. Kibre. Mr. Glaizer was my predecessor as the Washington representative and left Washington to take over a post in the international office in February of 1953, which was the time that I came back.

Mr. Morris. Where is he now?

Mr. Kibre. He is presently working in the international office as an administrative assistant to the officers.

Mr. Morris. Now, Mr. Kibre, are you now a member of the Commu-

Mr. Kibre. I will decline that question on the basis of my privilege under the fifth amendment, not to be a witness against myself.

Mr. Morris. Now, have you been a member of the maritime commis-

sion of the Communist Party?

Mr. Kibre. I will decline that answer on the same grounds.

Mr. Morris. Have you attended meetings of the Communist Party, at which were discussed plans for Communist activity on the water-

Mr. Kibre. Same answer.

Mr. Morris. You decline to testify?
Mr. Kibre. Yes; on the basis of my privilege under the fifth amend-

ment, and I think I would use the first amendment, too.

Mr. Morris. Now, do you know that there has been testimony before other congressional committees that you were a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. Kibre. I have read some of that testimony and it deals, primarily, with events that took place in Hollywood back in 1936, 1937.

Mr. Morris. Were you a Communist at that time?
Mr. Kibre. I would decline to answer that question, but I could go on at great length to bring out the facts that existed at that time, when one of the biggest gangster conspiracies to take over the union in our country was taking place. It was a gangster element I fought against, and tried to clean out, and that was the simple nature of that

Senator Eastland. Do you know anything about a Communist con-

spiracy to take over the union at that time?

Mr. Kibre. At that time, I was a member of the union, sir, and I may say, respectfully, that I was leading a rank and file movement to oust Willie Bioff along with the Al Capone mobsters who had taken over the union.

Senator Eastland. I would like you to answer my question. Do you know anything about a Communist conspiracy to take over the union at that time?

Mr. Kibre. I don't, not to my knowledge, sir.

Mr. Morris. Were you a Communist when you came here to Washington to take up your job as a Washington representative of the ILWU!

Mr. Kibre. I decline to answer that on the same grounds.

Senator Jenner. Do you draw a distinction between gangsters and Communists, as far as controlling of the union is concerned?

Mr. Kibre. Well, if you would put it to me a little more explicitly,

Senator.

Senator Jenner. Is one better than the other?

Mr. Kibre. I don't know, but I can tell you I have had a great deal of experience with what the gangsters did in Hollywood, between 1936 and 1937.

Senator Jenner. Have you had any experience with what the Com-

munists have done?

Mr. Kere. I will decline to answer that. Senator Jenner. Under what basis?

Mr. Kibre. Fifth amendment.

Senator Jenner. Your answer might tend to incriminate you?

Mr. Kibre. It is possible.

Senator Jenner. It is possible.

Mr. Kibre. I am thinking, particularly, if I might say, sir; I would just like to say a word on that. Back in 1937 and 1938, when Willie Bioff and his gang were in the States, the main thing that they did was to invent and create a tremendous amount of propaganda designed to show that the revolt against this gangster bunch was a big Communist plot, and I can tell you, sir, that they invented and made public more smears in the short space of a year or two than I could possibly add up. And it is for that reason, I am sure, that a great many people are forced to take advantage of their privilege under the Constitution.

And I would love, sir, to tell you about the situation as it took place in those years of 1937–40, when this Al Capone mob had complete control of the industry and was taking 2 percent of our wages as a tribute, refused to hold any meetings of the union, refused to call any meetings, had complete control of the collective bargaining, and, as a result, brought about conditions which robbed the workers of millions and millions of dollars in a few short years. And I might add that the Government finally, I think in 1941 or 1942, confirmed all this

when they convicted the entire mob.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Kibre, did you use the alias Barry Wood at that time?

Mr. Kibre. I will decline to answer that, sir, under the fifth amendment.

Mr. Morris. Did you ever use any name other than your own at any other time?

Mr. Kibre. I decline to answer that on the same grounds.

Mr. Morris. Have you been to San Francisco on the west coast in connection with the organization of the fishermen's union there?

Mr. Kibre. I was for many years an official of the fishermen's union on the west coast.

Mr. Morris. Approximately what year, Mr. Kibre?

Mr. Kibre. Well, I was originally hired as a coordinator for the California locals and I think it was the fall of 1940, and then about 1944 or 1945, I can't recollect exactly, I was elected by the convention as the international secretary-treasurer. I kept that post until 1950, when the fishermen's union merged with the ILWU.

Mr. Morris. And when did you last see Harry Bridges?

Mr. Kibre. Well, to the best of my recollection, Bridges was here in Washington and testified before the Bonner committee sometime in April. I think that is the last time I saw him, if I recall.

Mr. Morris. You saw Mr. Velson yesterday?

Mr. Kibre. Yes.

Mr. Morris. Senators, I have no more questions.

Mr. Kibre. May I add one thing, sir, in all due deference to the committee, and that is this: I do want to object at the many allegations that Mr. Riesel has made and again I say that with all due sympathy with Mr. Riesel. I want to object because it is my opinion that these unfounded allegations are going to seriously impede and interfere with this very worthwhile program which the House Merchant Marine Committee is trying to develop and the project which the ILWU

supports 100 percent.

Things like this, loose allegations like this, about the ILWU controlling the lifeline when, as a matter of fact, we just signed a 5-year contract in the islands and this is bound to create misinformation among the public, and that kind of stuff is bound to react to the detriment of the merchant marine and the industries, maritime industry. And I do hope, for example, this committee would examine carefully the record of these hearings by the Bonner committee in order to get an accurate picture of exactly what the ILWU program is. The ILWU, as it was testified to at great length by Mr. Bridges before the Bonner committee—

Senator Jenner. May I ask a question? If a union is dominated by a Communist do you think that the contract would mean anything

o them ?

Mr. Kibre. The only answer I can give you is that the ILWU is dominated only by its membership and that the ILWU has a reputation on the west coast of observing its contracts and has a record on the west coast of not a single strike since 1948 in the maritime.

Senator Jenner. I didn't ask you that question. I asked you if a union was dominated by Communists, do you think a contract would

mean anything to the Communists?

Mr. Kibre. Well, I am sorry, Senator, I just can't answer that, because I have had no experience under a situation like that. That is why I say the only situation I have had is when the ILWU and the kind of program that has been carried out, the kind of reputation we have now, which the employers, themselves, have testified to in many congressional hearings, the statements they have made before the Bonner committee, in which they have said repeatedly—

Senator Jenner. You are making your answer responsive to your

union. I asked you a hypothetical question.

Mr. Forer. He said he didn't know.

Senator Jenner. If he doesn't know, that is his answer.

Mr. Kibre. I am sorry, I just don't know.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Kibre, in connection with the Bonner committee, was testimony taken under oath before that committee?

Mr. Kibre. As I recall, I can't say for certain, but I think it was

taken under oath.

Mr. Morris. But Mr. Bridges wasn't asked at any time whether he was a Communist; was he?

Mr. Kibre. I don't recall.

Mr. Morris. You were there, weren't you?
Mr. Kiere. I was there, but I don't recall such a question. He did testify at one informal session, at which I wasn't present. That is why

I express some qualification.

I would say this: That I do have one recollection where Mr. Bridges testified under oath that he was not a Communist and has so testified repeatedly and has been ultimately cleared of charges of being a Communist by a recent court action.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, do we have any report of any activity of

the witness here today?

Mr. Mandel. We have information from the files of the Committee

on Un-American Activities, giving the record of Jeff Kibre.

Mr. Morris. May that go into the record at this time, Senator Eastland?

Senator Eastland. Yes, it will be admitted in the record.

(The report was marked "Exhibit No. 288" and reads as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 288

INFORMATION FROM THE FILES OF THE COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES. United States House of Representatives

NOVEMBER 18, 1955.

For: Hon. James O. Eastland. Subject: Jeff Kibre.

The public records, files, and publications of this committee contain the following information concerning the subject individual. This report should not be construed as representing the results of an investigation by or findings of this committee. It should be noted that the individual is not necessarily a Communist, a Communist sympathizer, or a fellow-traveler unless otherwise indicated.

Organization	Activity	Source
American Jewish Labor Council 1 .	Signed appeal to President to lift Palestine embargo (identified as secretary-treasurer, International Fishermen and Allied Workers of America.	Daily Worker, Feb. 18, 1948, p. 5.
American Slav Congress 1 2	Sent greetings	The Slavic American, fall, 1947,
Civil Rights Congress, Los Angeles. 12	Signed appeal in behalf of indicted Communist leaders.	vol. 1, No. 1, p. 78. The Independent, Long Beach, Calif., Nov. 22, 1948, p. 29 (advertisement).
International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union. ² International Fishermen and Al-	Named to represent union in Washington. National secretary-treasurer;	Daily People's World, Feb. 3, 1953, p. 8; May 29, 1953, p. 7. Daily People's World, Nov. 3,
lied Workers, CIO. ² International Fishermen and Allied Workers, a division of International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union. ²	indicted. Officer of local 33; fined \$150 in cases growing out of 1949-50 strike set- tlement of union fishermen at San Pedro.	1949, p. 2. Daily People's World, July 12, 1941, p. 6.
Petition to President Roosevelt	Signer	Daily Worker, Jan. 25, 1942, p.
for release of Earl Browder.	Made statement in support of Harry Bridges, on latter's conviction.	5. Daily People's World, Apr. 6, 1950, p. 12.
	Spoke at mass meeting Mar. 2 under auspiees of a committee for defense of Hugh Bryson, indicted under Taft-Hartley non-Communist pro- vision (spelled Kuyber in article).	Daily Worker, Mar. 4, 1954, p. 2.
	Signer of statement in behalf of Seattle Six.	Leaflet, Someone's Got to Take a Stand, 1949.
	Protested firing of Communist teachers at University of Wash- ington.	Daily Worker, Feb. 8, 1949, p. 6.

BARRY WOOD

Organization	Activity	Source
American Youth Congress 12	Editor, AYC publication, Winner (identified as Communist Party name for Jeff Kibre, "well-known party leader of southern California").	Memorandum of Attorney General Biddle on the Amer- ican Youth Congress (re- printed in Congressional Record, Sept. 24, 1942, and quoted in committee Culde to Subversive Organizations, 1951, p. 156.).

See also the following references in publications of this committee:

Hearings on H. R. 1884 and H. R. 2122, bills to curb or outlaw the Communist Party of the United States, March 24-28, 1947, pages 250, 261

Hearings regarding Communist infiltration of the motion-picture industry, October 20-30, 1947, pages 347-349, 351, 352, 356, 394-397, 544, 545

Communist infiltration of Hollywood motion-picture industry, part 2, April 17—May 18, 1951, pages 478–481, 483–485, 488, 493, 519, 525, 527, 528 Communist infiltration of Hollywood motion-picture industry, part 4, September 17–19, 1951, pages 1426, 1446, 1449, 1466, 1467, 1588, 1589

Communist infiltration of Hollywood motion-picture industry, part 5, September 20-25, 1951, page 1732

Communist activities among professional groups in the Los Angeles area, part 1, January 21–25, 1952, page 2484

Guide to Subversive Organizations and Publications, May 14, 1951, House Document No. 137, page 156

Annual Report of the Committee on Un-American Activities for the Year 1952, December 28, 1952, House Report 2516, January 3, 1953, pages 61, 67

Communist Methods of Infiltration (Government-Labor), 1953, pages 1618, 1622 Investigation of Communist Activities in the Los Angeles Area—Part 6 (1951 and 1953), pages 2311-2315, 2325, 2328

Annual Report for 1953, page 39

Report on the March of Labor (1954), page 16

Investigation of Communist Activities in the Los Angeles, Calif., Area—Part 3 (1955), page 1744

Mr. Morris. And, Mr. Chairman, in connection with the witness' use of the word "clearance" of Harry Bridges, I would like to have him explain what he means by that.

Mr. Kibre. Clearance? I don't know-

Mr. Morris. Didn't you use the word "clearance"?

Mr. Forer. I think he did. What he was referring to was the recent district court decision.

Mr. Kirbe. I may have used it in connection with the recent district court decision in San Francisco, which finally threw out the last evidence against Mr. Bridges and exonerated him.

Mr. Forer. After a trial.

Mr. Kibre. After a trial. And bearing in mind that he has been before the Supreme Court twice. There has been 20 years of litigation which ended up in a victory for Mr. Bridges, and, as I understand it, the Justice Department finally accepted the decision as being final.

Mr. Morris. I have no more questions of this witness.

Senator Jenner. I have no further questions.

Mr. Kiere. May I offer this transcript for the record? Senator Eastland. It will be accepted as an exhibit.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 289" and placed in the committee files.)

Cited by United States Attorney General.
 Cited by Special Committee and/or Committee on Un-American Activities.

Mr. Morris. One of the things I am interested in, as I asked Mr. Kibre, is whether or not that committee ever asked Mr. Bridges if he was a Communist, and I didn't see it in there, and I looked for quite some time.

Senator Jenner. The record will speak for itself.

Senator Eastland. In this connection, I would like to bring to the attention of the committee the following facts which have been

called to the attention of the Attorney General.

I believe that the delay in these cases is, likewise, caused by the inability of our courts to take the requisite action that is called for in view of this grave threat that we have been hearing about in our hearings.

I am going to read from a letter which was sent on June 18 to the

Attorney General. It is signed by the chairman.

Two of the leaders of this union have been James Matles and James Lustig. Both have been demonstrated to be Communists-

Mr. Morris. Senator, that is in connection with the United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers Union?

Senator Eastland. Yes. [Reading:]

Both have been demonstrated to be Communists and both are the subject of denaturalization proceedings. I believe that your office filed denaturalization suits against them on February 13, 1952, and on December 16, 1952, respectively. Since that time, apparently, nothing has been done to enable the immigration authorities to follow up on their deportation proceedings.

There is also the case of Constantine Radzi, who, our record shows, has been

There is also the case of Constantine Radzi, who, our record shows, has been a member of the control or disciplinary committee of the Communist Party. Radzi was observed watching one of our hearings in New York in 1952, and was subpensed to testify. In that case, both the Immigration Service and the Department of Justice acted expeditiously and filed a denaturalization proceeding on December 17, 1952, against Radzi. Since that time, apparently nothing has been done on this case. Radzi is not even on bail, and is pursuing his work of undermining our Government without molestation.

I further call your attention to the case of Louis Weinstock, against whom suit was filed on January 22, 1953, and to the cases of almost a score of other Communists who are still engaged in trying to destroy our way of life.

May we have your assurance that the Department of Justice is taking all possible steps to expedite the denaturalization and deportation of the named

possible steps to expedite the denaturalization and deportation of the named individuals, and of others in the same position?

Mr. Morris. Senator, may I state that Senator Jenner has made

a previous request.

The facts are, in connection with the ILWU, that Jack Hall, the Honolulu representative of the union, was tried on November 5, 1952, and, despite that, nothing has been done about him. He is still free to carry on his activities, which have been described here today. And, in connection with those cases, Senator, there are almost a score of them. They were highlighted recently when Mr. Bialer, who testified before the committee, said that the most important propaganda that is being used by the Polish Communist government is propaganda of the United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers Union, of which Mr. Matles and Mr. Lustig have been the leaders. And that their cases have been on the calendars since 1952, denaturalization cases, and others as you see—many of them run 4 years and more. There has been no activity, Senator, to the best we can learn, as a result of our inquiries. Apparently the delay is in the courts, and nothing is being done to follow up these prosecutions.

Senator Eastland. Who is your next witness?

Mr. Morris. John Lautner. Mr. Kibre has indicate a desire to leave early and, as far as I am concerned, I have no more questions.

Senator Eastland. The committee will excuse him.

Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give this hearing shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. LAUTNER. I do.

TESTIMONY OF JOHN LAUTNER

Mr. Morris. This witness has testified before this committee before, but he is a person who is in a position, by virtue of the fact that he was one of the leading members of the Communist Party of New York State, to give competent testimony about Communist organization on the waterfront. And he has been recalled for that purpose.

Now, Mr. Lautner, you were a member of the Communist Party

until 1950; is that correct?

Mr. LAUTNER. That is correct.

Mr. Morris. You had a leading position on the State committee at that time; did you not?

Mr. LAUTNER. No. I was the head of the New York State review

commission of the Communist Party—disciplines committee.

Mr. Morris. You were head of the New York State disciplinary committee of the Communist Party at that time?

Mr. Lautner. Yes.

Mr. Morris. And you had been a Communist conversant with Communist activities in New York for how long up to that time?

Mr. LAUTNER. Well, from 1945 to the time I left the Communist Party in 1950. I attended organizational committee meetings, where all the organizational activities of the party were planned and discussed and checked.

Mr. Morris. I see. And as such, Mr. Lautner, you were able to observe the activities that the Communist Party conducted with respect

to the Communist Party on the waterfront?

Mr. Lautner. Yes.

Mr. Morris. Would you tell us how Communist activities on the waterfront, concerning the waterfront, were carried out up to the time that you left the Communist Party in 1950?

Mr. Lautner. Yes.

Mr. Morris. Would you give us your firsthand experiences?

Mr. LAUTNER. Yes. Right after the reconstruction of the Communist Party in 1945, a three-prong program was developed. This program revolved around the reorganization of the Communist Party in New York State, the reindoctrination of the party membership away from the policies of Earl Browder. And the three prong was the institution of a concentration policy for New York State. major concentration activity was transport; and I don't mean subway riding or riding on the bus, but transportation, the waterfront, the railway terminals in New York, and longshore. And there was a divisional industrial-concentration activity delegated to the county organizations as such, but there were a number of concentration organizations that were supervised directly by the New York State apparatus, by the New York State organization of the Communist Party. Such was the maritime section of the Communist Party, the teamster

section of the concentration section of the Communist Party, and the longshore section of the Communist Party. At the head of the maritime section of the Communist Party they had numerous organizers in a short period of time and, finally, George Watt became the party leader on the New York waterfront, pertaining to maritime workers and shipping. The person who was in charge of longshore concentration and under the supervision of the New York State labor commission of the Communist Party, of which I was a member, was a person by the name of-I will recall his name later. Later, I was sent to Gary, Ind.

Senator Jenner. Later on, what?

Mr. Lautner. Later on I was sent to Gary, Ind., as a columnized

party leader into steel, into Gary, Ind.
George Powers, that is his name. He was in charge of 1947, 1948, and part of 1949, of longshore concentration in New York City. And then the third phase of it, the railway concentration, was in charge of a person by the name of Robert Woods. All three officers were at the New York State Headquarters of the Communist Party on the 5th floor at 35 East 12th Street, and they worked under the super-

vision of the New York State leadership of the Communist Party.

Now, with the reorganizational party with the first prong—I mentioned the three prongs. Now the concentration activity. The first prong was completely reorganized in such a way that all of the community organizations of the Communist Party in New York lent themselves, in order to aid and help to realize whatever the concentration tasks were through the industrial sections, concentration industrial sections of the Communist Party.

In 1947 a commission was set up, the commission was composed of Jim Tormey, Louis Sass, Leonard Levenson, and myself, to make a survey on the party on what are the concentration points in New

York County.

We made a survey of all of the teamster sheds beginning from the Battery all the way up to the Fifties and on the East Side. We made

a survey of all the railway terminals.

Mr. Morris. This is in connection with your work in connection with transportation, Communist Party transportation described it?

Mr. Lautner. That is correct.

Mr. Morris. Proceed.

Mr. LAUTNER. We made a survey of all the railway terminals, like the New York Central on the west side in the lower Bronx, and all of the ferrying that is being done by railways through the Erie line and the Lackawanna lines into Long Island and into Brooklyn. A complete survey was made in order to allocate party organizations, neighborhood organizations, community organizations, to give a hand to the industrial sections who were doing concentration work, building the party in these particular concentration points.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lautner, in that connection may I break in to ask you, as this information comes in as a result of these surveys, where

does that information go?

Mr. LAUTNER. That information went into the hands of party specialists, who specialized on that phase of party activity. First, it went to the New York State labor commission of the Communist Party and then to the national labor commission of the Communist Party, one headed by the—the national headed by John Williamson

and the New York State headed by Hal Simon.1

Mr. Morris. In other words, Mr. Lautner, all the intimate details relating to the transportation and the transportation lines of New York City, for instance, in connection with this inquiry, are held

quite tightly and known by the Communist leaders?

Mr. Lautner. Yes, it is. It is held first of all and assimilated by the labor commissions of the Communist Party and it becomes the property of the party leadership, the board, the New York State board or the national board in the way of reports by these commissions, and then it goes back into the hands of other specialists to check, for instance, reports on transport and waterfront concentration, and New York State labor commission becomes the property of so-called labor specialists in the party, like Johnny Steuben.

Mr. Morris. John Steuben?

Mr. Lautner. He was a member of the New York State board of the Communist Party. And persons like Norman Ross, who is the New York County chairman of the labor commission in New York County. It becomes the property of coordinators like Al Lannon, who was the head of the subcommittee, a subcommittee of the labor commission of the Communist Party, head of the maritime commission. It comes into the hands of these people who can weigh the line of the party to all the party members concerned to work in these particular industries or who try to penetrate further into these industrial setups. It is practically a three-way check.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, that testimony would indicate that the most intimate details of the organization of our waterfront and organization of transportation systems, as described by Mr. Lautner, are known by the Communist leaders of the Communist Party in the United States. The great deal of testimony has indicated in the past, if all those facts are available to the Communist Party, because of the relationship with the Communist Party to the Soviet Union, it is quite obvious the Soviet Union would know all these details that the

witness is testifying about today.

And you knew John Steuben to be a member of the Communist Party, did you not?

Mr. Lautner. Yes.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Steuben was one of the witnesses that we have scheduled to appear here today and he said he could not appear because of his doctor's certificate.

Do you know Mr. Charles Keith?

Mr. LAUTNER. I knew him as a Communist in waterfront section in 1930. He was expelled from the party in 1946 and at that time he organized his own little group within the maritime union on the New York waterfront that was called the Fore and Aft. What Mr. Keith is doing at the present time I have no knowledge whatsoever.

Mr. Morris. Do you have any knowledge that he has returned to

the Communist Party?

Mr. LAUTNER. That may be so at the present time. He may be one of the absorbed or vindicated fellows. It is a fad now in the Communist Party to bring back some of these people who were expelled.

Mr. Morris. But you did not know directly?

Mr. LAUTNER. I have no knowledge.

¹ Also known as Al Simon. (See p. 1630.)

Mr. Morris. Do you know Mr. Sam Madell?

Mr. Lautner. Sam Madell worked under George Powers in 1947 and he was on the payroll. He was subsidized by the New York State organization of the Communist Party as one of the waterfront organizers for the Communist Party.

Mr. Morris. And now, how about George Watt? Mr. Lautner. George Watt, yes, I know him.

Mr. Morris. Do you know if he is a member of the Communist

Party?

Mr. Lautner. Yes. In fact, shortly after I left the Communist Party he became the national secretary of the national review commission of the Communist Party, the disciplinary committee.

Mr. Morris. How about Al Simon?

Mr. LAUTNER. Simon was a member of the New York State board, New York State committee of the Communist Party, and head of the labor commission.

Mr. Morris. How about Al Lannon?

Mr. LAUTNER. Lannon was the maritime coordinator for the Communist Party and a member of the national committee.

Mr. Morris. How about Babin, Toma Babin?

Mr. LAUTNER. Babin, he was a Yugoslav Communist Party leader on the waterfront among Yugoslavs, and longshoremen in New York. He was deported from the United States, I think, around 1940 or 1939. He is in Poland today.

Mr. Morris. With the exception of Mr. Babin, then, Mr. Lautner, if we followed the activities of those other people mentioned we would have a fairly good idea of what communist activities on the

waterfront are?

Mr. LAUTNER. And some other people yet, too. Mr. Morris. Who were they, Mr. Lautner?

Mr. Lautner. Well, I know—

Mr. Morris. You mentioned Mr. Steuben.

Mr. Lautner. Yes, Steuben. There is one Mitch Baronson, who was the party coordinator of longshore activities in Brooklyn, in Red Hook, or the Brooklyn waterfront. There is another person to get acquainted with. There were a number of concentration branches set up by the Communist Party to cover shapeups on the New York waterfront to distribute leaflets and sell Daily Workers. At the moment I don't exactly know, but I think I will know some of these members who were members of these concentration branches from the Communist Party who were assigned to do waterfront work in New York

Senator Jenner. I would like to ask you a question, since you have been a member of the Communist Party, high in the official ranks for several years. What is your opinion, or if you have actual knowledge, tell us what a Communist agreement or contract means?

Mr. LAUTNER. It means only so much.

Senator Jenner. How much?

Mr. Lautner. If the agreement serves the interest of the party, the agreement will be upheld. If it does not, the minute it does not serve the interest of the party, that agreement isn't worth the paper it is written on.

Senator Jenner. So, if the Longshoremen's Union, I believe that is the title, has a 5-year contract, according to these hearings before

us, in Honolulu, and a 2-year contract in San Francisco, with your experience in the Communist Party, what would the contracts actually

mean?

Mr. LAUTNER. It means this: At the present time they are following a certain line, and as long as that line is followed and the contract jibes or coincides with the thinking of that particular line, it is all right. As soon as there is a change in the situation, that contract isn't worth anything.

Senator JENNER. Thank you.

Mr. Morris. Is there anything else that we covered in our executive session, Mr. Lautner, that we haven't covered in this open session that you can recall?

Mr. LAUTNER. No.

Mr. Morris. Well, I want to thank you very much, Mr. Lautner,

for your testimony here today.

Senator Jenner. Thank you very much for aiding this committee.

In conclusion, let me state that when the enemies of decency in the union movement threw acid in the eyes of Victor Riesel they merely focused national attention on the evil he has done so much to combat. I want to say again, as I said earlier, I want to commend Mr. Riesel not only for his courage in fighting communism and racketeering in the unions, but also for the resilience of this courage which he has demonstrated after his attack. His fight goes on. We hope Mr. Riesel keeps up his fight against communism and racketeering and we do appreciate his cooperation with this committee.

Mr. Morris. Senator, I have some letters which Senator Eastland, on behalf of the committee, has written in the last week and I would

like all those to go into the public record of this committee.

Senator Jenner. They may become a part of the official record. (The letters are as follows:)

(The letters are as follows:)

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Washington, D. C., June 26, 1956.

JAMES O. EASTLAND,

Chairman, Internal Security Subcommittee, United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

Dear Senator Eastland: This is in response to your letter dated June 18, 1956, wherein you refer to the cases of James Matles, James Lustig, Constantine Radzie, and Louis Weinstock and ask my assurance that the Department of Justice will take all possible steps to expedite their denaturalization and deportation.

As you know, the Department of Justice has been vigorously pursuing proceedings designed to denaturalize and deport any naturalized citizen whose presence in the United States may constitute a threat to internal security. This is but one aspect of the Department's program to protect our national security against the criminal conspiracy of communism.

As indicated in your letter, judicial proceedings to denaturalize the individuals referred to have been pending in the United States District Courts for the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York for some time. The delay in the actual trial of these cases has been due not only to congested trial calendars but also to an important legal issue which was but recently settled by the Supreme Court

that of these cases has been due not only to congested that calculate but also to an important legal issue which was but recently settled by the Supreme Court. In United States v. Zucca (125 F. Supp. 551 (S. D. N. Y., 1954)), it was held that revocation proceedings cannot be maintained unless the affidavit showing good cause therefor is filed with the complaint. This decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (221 F. 2d 805). Since the filing of the affidavit would be disadvantageous to the Government, the Department requested Supreme Court review. Pending Supreme Court decision, the cases filed without affidavits in the district courts within the Second Circuit were removed from the trial calendars. On April 30, 1956, the Supreme Court ruled, by a 5-to-4

vote, that the affidavit must be filed, United States v. Zucca (351 U. S. 91). The Department has since issued appropriate instructions to the United States attor-

nevs governing the filing of the required affidavits.

Insofar as bail is concerned, the defendants are all citizens until denaturalized and the pending proceedings are civil in nature. The law makes no provision for the detention of the defendants in such proceedings and there is thus no authority for bail.

The Matles case in the Eastern District of New York has already been set for trial and efforts are being made to have it placed at the head of the nonjury civil calendar for the October term. It will be personally presented by the chief of the criminal division of that district. The Lustig, Radzie, and Weinstock cases will be restored to the trial calendar of the Southern District of New York as soon as possible. You may rest assured that the Department is taking all possible steps to expedite the denaturalization and deportation of these individuals and of all others in the same position.

Sincerely.

WARREN OLNEY III, Acting Deputy Attorney General.

July 2, 1956.

Hon. JOHN FOSTER DULLES.

The Secretary of State,

Department of State, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: On June 29, 1956, Seweryn Bialer testified before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee in connection with the recent riots in Poznan, Poland. As you know, Mr. Bialer was, until January 31 of this year, a member of the Central Committee of the Polish Communist Party, specializing in anti-Western and anti-American propaganda.

Enclosed herewith, for your information, is a copy of the transcript of Mr. Bialer's testimony, setting forth important evidence concerning recent events As his testimony shows, the Polish Communist leaders have been forced to permit a certain liberalization of conditions; and it is this, he states,

which unleashed the forces that caused the Poznan uprising.

I particularly call your attention to the following colloquy near the close

of Mr. Bialer's testimony (pp. 3413-3415):

"Mr. Morris. Mr. Bialer, could you tell us what you feel the United States policies would be now with respect to this expressed desire on the part of the

Polish people to gain their liberation from control?

"Mr. BIALER. First of all, sir, I believe that the most important thing in this field is this: Let the American people convince the Polish people first that they sympathize with them; and secondly, that the Americans will never reconcile themselves with the loss of freedom in Poland.

"Mr. Morris, Let the American people know that they sympathize with the Polish people and that they will never reconcile themselves to the loss of freedom

on the part of the Polish people?

"Mr. BIALER. Let the Polish people know it.

"Mr. Morris. Let the Polish people know that the Americans sympathize with their feeling that they will never reconcile themselves to the loss of their freedom?

"Mr. Bialer. I want to stress very, very strongly this face. The Polish Communist Party and the Polish Communist regime are doing everything possible to silence the Western world and the Americans, not to let them-to stop them—saying the truth about the situation in Poland.

"Mr. Morris. The Communist leaders are doing everything possible in order to cause the leaders of the West and the people of the West not to express

themselves on these subjects?

"Mr. Bialer. Yes; to such a degree that I would put it in such a sloganit amounts to this: The Communist leaders in Poland are saying to the Western World, very smartly, very cleverly, "Don't you criticize us in your radios and e will gram your broadcasts."
"Mr. erchas. Should we continue to criticize them?
"Mr. Bialer. Naturally, if we stop the campaign of criticizing them and revealwe will

ing the truth, this would mean a great help to them in their oppression of the Polish people.

"Mr. Morris. And therefore, that is—a policy which would cause us to soften our criticism of the Polish overlords would be a bad policy for us to pursue?

"Mr. Bialer. I think that such a policy would be a very terrible policy as far as the Polish people are concerned, and in consequence would be a bad policy for the United States."

I have taken the liberty of setting forth this particular portion of Mr. Bialer's testimony, because I believe it sheds important light upon an issue of policy concerning which there has been a great deal of debate in recent months.

On all sides we hear it said nowadays, that America should take the lead in "relaxing international tensions," as a means of promoting the goal of world peace. To this end, it has been suggested that the United States should modify the tone of its broadcasts to the captive nations of Eastern Europe, to avoid giving any possible offense to the Communist overlords of those areas. Mr. Bialer's testimony serves to emphasize how ill-advised such a course would be and what dreadful consequences it might have, both for the Polish people and for the United States.

I therefore express the hope, Mr. Secretary, that nothing will deter this country from speaking with fearless candor to the oppressed populations behind the Iron Curtain. Only from us can they hear the truth, and only the truth

can make them free.

Sincerely yours,

James O. Eastland, Chairman, Internal Security Subcommittee

> DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Washington, July 5, 1956.

Hon, JAMES O. EASTLAND,

Chairman, Internal Security Subcommittee,

United States Senate.

DEAR SENATOR EASTLAND: Thank you for your letter of June 18, 1956, supplemented by your letter of June 20, 1956, addressed to the Secretary.

The Department was aware of the identity of the two Soviet nationals referred to by Michael Shatov during the course of a hearing before the Internal Security Subcommittee on June 13, 1956, and had initiated an inquiry into their alleged redefection activities.

The Department is reviewing the Shatov testimony, together with other relevant information which it has received.

Sincerely yours,

ROBERT C. HILL, Assistant Secretary.

JULY 3, 1956.

Hon. JOHN FOSTER DULLES,

Secretary of State, The State Department,

Washington, D. C.

Note in Tuesday's Washington Evening Star a report that Assistant Soviet Military Attaché Col. Ivan Bubchikov was expelled from this country on June 24 on the ground for espionage. Please furnish particulars of Bubchikov's activities for inclusion in the record of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee in connection with its investigation into scope of Soviet activity in the United States.

James O. Eastland, Chairman, Senate Internal Security Subcommittee.

JULY 5, 1956.

Hon. WALTER F. GEORGE,

Chairman, Foreign Relations Committee, United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Honorable William C. Wentworth, Member of the Australian Parliament and member of the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee, has transmitted the enclosed cable to Robert Morris, chief counsel of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee. Inasmuch as it bears on matters related to our foreign policy, I am transmitting herewith a copy of this cable, with the request that you place it before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

The Australian Parliamentary Affairs Committee is made up of ... 3 members. The fact that 12 of these members have signed the within cable works, dicate that

their sentiments represent committee thinking.

Very sincerely yours,

JAMES O. EASTLAND, Chairman, Internal Security Subcommittee.

[Telegram]

SYDNEY, AUSTRALIA, July 3, 1956.

ROBERT MORRIS.

Chief Counsel, Committee on the Judiciary. United States Senate, Washington:

Twelve members of Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee including myself have signed the following statement for press. Statement begins "the massacres and mass arrest in Poznan show that Poland is still a police state whose people are kept in subjection to totalitarian terror.

"Public comment from Communist leaders in other Soviet satellites to the effect that the Polish uprising proved the need for greater party vigilance is at least an indication that this is still the normal method of government throughout

the Communist world.

"The new leaders in the Fremlin now profess penitence for the misdeeds of the criminal Stalin. It should be remembered that Stalin's greatest crimes were committed not against the Russian people but against neighboring free people, partic' ' , Poland, who were enslaved by force of Russian arms and have been kept in subjection by violence and electoral fraud.
"The Kremlin confessions regarding Stalin's activities constitute new evidence

justifying the reopening of the Polish case of 1945.

"Surely there is some international organization which will support the principle of free and properly supervised elections in Poland.

"The Poznan uprising proves—if any further proof were needed—that there are still Poles who are willing to sacrifice their lives for their nation.

"The free world should not sit on the sideline while the unctiously penitent men in the Kremlin proceed to repeat Stalin's crimes of 1945 and apply the jackboot to Poland once again.

"We must protest against Communist methods and develop our protest into

an effective demand for free elections in Poland.

"Meanwhile the press and radio of the world should not relax its efforts to expose the administrative and judicial terror being employed against the Polish people.

"We should demand the fullest and most factual account of the happening and if press correspondents are denied freedom of movement in Poland and freedom of access to the accused the world should know about it and protest accordingly.

"The methods adopted by the Communist authorities in Poznan throw a lurid light on the insincerity of the Kremlin much advertised change of heart."

WENTWORTH.

Mr. Morris. There is one other thing. We have to set a return date for the testimony of John Steuben, Charles Keith, Sam Madell, Charles Irving Velson, when we are able to effect service on the last person.

Senator Jenner. All right. The committee is adjourned.

(Whereupon at 12 noon the subcommittee adjourned.)

SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES

Communism on the Waterfront

THURSDAY, JULY 12, 1956

United States Senate,
Subcommittee To Investigate the
Administration of the Internal Security
Act and Other Internal Security Laws
of the Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 11:40 a.m., in room 457, Senate Office Building, Senator William E. Jenner presiding.

Present: Senator Jenner.

Also present: Robert Morris, chief counsel; William A. Rusher, administrative counsel; Benjamin Mandel, director of research; Frank Schroeder, chief investigator; and Edward Duffy, investigator.

Senator Jenner. The hearing will come to order.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, the subject of today's hearing will be the possible extent of Soviet activity on the New York waterfront.

Several weeks ago we heard testimony—we had testimony from Victor Riesel and John Lautner. Victor Riesel testified that Harry Bridges has considerable control of the San Francisco waterfront and the Honolulu waterfront, and that he is making efforts to organize on the New York City waterfront and in New Orleans.

John Lautner, having been a former official of the Communist Party, gave us extensive evidence about Communists who are active on the waterfront. On other things, he testified that Communists were able to have access to all the intimate details of shipping, transportation,

cargo import and export from the port of New York.

The third witness last week was Jeff Kibre. Jeff Kibre is the Washington representative of the ILWU, which is Mr. Bridges' union. Mr. Kibre described his assignment with the ILWU here in Washington, and when we asked him whether or not he was presently a member of the Communist Party he invoked his privilege of the fifth amendment.

Senator, this morning we are prepared to continue these hearings, and we have subpensed five witnesses. One witness, John Steuben, has not appeared and has sent a doctor's certificate. John Lautner has testified that John Steuben has been one of the leading Communists who are active on the New York waterfront. He will not be able to testify here this morning, but the other four persons subpensed are now here and will testify.

¹ The medical report on Mr. Steuben appears at the conclusion of the day's hearing.

Senator Jenner. We will proceed. Call the first witness.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Velson. Is Mr. Velson here? Senator Jenner. Mr. Velson, will you take the witness stand at the

end of this table. Will you be sworn to testify?

Mr. Malament. Mr. Chairman, may we have an understanding that my client doesn't want his picture taken, and I think he should have been consulted about this. I thought it was the understanding that we would be consulted before pictures could be taken.

Senator Jenner. I had no understanding of that kind, and it is perfectly all right if the witness does not want his picture taken while

he is testifying. If you so wish, he will not have his picture taken. Will you swear that the testimony given in this hearing will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Velson. I do.

Senator Jenner. We are ready to proceed. Proceed, Mr. Morris.

TESTIMONY OF IRVING CHARLES VELSON, BROOKLYN, N. Y., AC-COMPANIED BY EDWARD J. MALAMENT, HIS ATTORNEY

Mr. Morris. Will you give your full name and address to the reporter.

Mr. Velson. Irving Charles Velson, 1798 Bedford Avenue, Brook-

Mr. Morris. Now, Mr. Velson, what is your occupation?

Mr. Velson. I am a representative of the International Longshoremen and Warehousemen's Union.

Mr. Morris. What is your title in the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union?

Mr. Velson. Representative.

Mr. Morris. Now, will you describe your duties as representative of the ILWU?

Mr. Velson. My duties as representative of the ILWU are to keep the officers of the union informed as to the activities of the Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor, as to its interference with collective bargaining, its discrimination and refusal of employment of individual longshoremen, its interfering with hiring, and to keep our union informed on any new technical developments in the way of loading practices and new methods of operation-

Mr. Morris. Speak up a bit more. That is not a public address sys-

tem, by the way.
Mr. Velson. Yes, sure.

(Continuing:) And to generally keep our officers advised as to what the commission is doing in the way of its relationship to individuals, the activities of various steamship companies, and their relationship to the waterfront commission, the effect of the waterfront commission on loadings and arrivals and loss of cargo to other ports, the effect of the tax on particular types of cargo which may have been diverted to other places, and matters of that sort.

Mr. Morris. In other words, you are really more of a reporter than anything else, reporting back to the ILWU as to what is going on in

Mr. Velson. I would say that I am an observer for the ILWU on things around New York.

Mr. Morris. And what you observe, you report to Mr. Bridges, do you not?

Mr. Velson. Yes, sir.

Mr. Morris. Now, when did you last see Mr. Bridges?

Mr. Velson. I last saw Mr. Bridges about 2 or 3 weeks ago. Mr. Morris. And where did you meet him on that occasion?

Mr. Velson. I met him at the headquarters of the ILWU in San Francisco.

Mr. Morris. And what did you report to him at that time?

Mr. Velson. We discussed one question that our union was very, very much concerned with, and that was the new type of spardeck tanker which carried loaded trailers. There are about forty-odd ships, either committed for or under construction, which will now carry cargo in containers, as against individual items in the hold, and our union was very much concerned about how this particular method of operation worked, how many men were involved, what loss of man-power there was as regards previous methods of loading, what the method of operation was, what type of machinery was used, and they are very, very much interested in this service which is already in effect between New York and Houston, and when it is introduced, it will have a very direct bearing on the work opportunities of the membership of our union on the Pacific coast and in Hawaii.

Mr. Morris. Do you deal with the waterfront commissioners or members of the staff of the waterfront commission? Do you deal

with them direct?

Mr. Velson. Would you repeat that?

Mr. Morris. Do you have any personal dealings with the commissioners of the New York Waterfront Commission or any members, any employees thereof?

Mr. Velson. No; I do not.

Mr. Morris. In other words, your observations of the waterfront commission's activities are at a distance?

Mr. Velson. Well, I wouldn't say they are at a distance. I would say that by talking with individual longshoremen and people in the union, they are very close to the heart of the waterfront commission's operation.

Mr. Morris. I see. But you do learn about the waterfront com-

mission from somebody between yourself and the commission?

Mr. Velson. That is correct.

Mr. Morris. You do not deal with them directly; you do not learn

firsthand what they do?

Mr. Velson. I think I learn very firsthand, Judge. I think that the people who are affected by the activity of this commission, where they interfere with the daily routine of a longshoreman's life, and there is always a possibility—there was talk of such a commission being set up out on the Pacific coast. That is our concern primarily, how it affects the individual workingman. And I think I get it right from the horse's mouth.

Mr. Morris. Now, when were you hired first by the ILWU? Mr. Velson. In September of 1954.

Mr. Morris. I see. Now, who hired you? Did Bridges personally hire you?

Mr. Velson. No. I was hired by the organizing committee, which consists of—not the organizing committee. I was hired by the officers

Mr. Morris. Who, specifically, hired you? Mr. Velson. Mr. Robertson.

Mr. Morris. Who is he? Identify him for the record. Mr. Velson. He is the first vice president of the ILWU.

Mr. Morris. And you had personal negotiations with him, which terminated with your being retained?

Mr. Velson. He asked me if I would work for the ILWU, through

mail.

Mr. Morris. How long have you known Harry Bridges?

Mr. Velson. Well, I think I first met him in 1942 at a CIO convention, or 1943. I am not quite certain.

Mr. Morris. And you have seen him and met with him and conversed

with him in the intervening time?

Mr. Velson. Would you repeat that? Mr. Morris. You have seen him and met with him and conversed

with him from time to time in the intervening years?

Mr. Velson. No. I didn't see him—shortly before—I don't think I saw Mr. Bridges until shortly before I went to work for the ILWU. Mr. Morris. Now, do you know a man named Roy Hudson, who has

been identified as an important Communist labor leader?

Mr. Velson. I decline to answer that question on the grounds of the fifth amendment.

Mr. Morris. You won't tell us when you last saw Mr. Hudson?

Mr. Velson. Beg pardon?

Mr. Morris. When did you last see Roy Hudson? Mr. Velson. I have already answered that question.

Mr. Morris. What is your answer?

Mr. Velson. My answer is I declined—I had previously declined

to answer that question.

Mr. Morris. Now, have you ever done any longshore organizing, longshoreman organizing? Have you organized longshoremen at any time?

Mr. Velson. I have never organized longshoremen into the ILWU. Mr. Morris. Have you done any organizational work other than the

activity that you have described here on the east coast?

Mr. Velson. I have done no organizing for the ILWU. We are also—since I was originally appointed, we are very much interested in getting passed the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, which provides for an increase in compensation pay for disabled, injured longshoremen, who are injured on the ship itself, which comes under the Federal law. We have been very active in that. We have been-our position on other matters of maritime interest, we are very much interested in the revival of intercoastal trade because we have lost thousands of jobs to other forms of transportation because there was no agreement as between the two coasts as to how intercoastal trade can be used. We have also-

Mr. Morris. Tell me this——
Mr. Velson. We have also been very much concerned in this connection with a reduction in Panama Canal tolls, so that the subsidy which the trucking people get as a result of free use of the highways is at least in some way comparable to intercoastal shipping.

There are many matters along that line that we have an interest in. From time to time, if the officers ask me to find out about it, I do my

best to try and advise them.

Mr. Morris. Have you ever been on the payroll of the International Longshoremen's Association, independent?

Mr. Velson. No, sir. Absolute falsehood.

Mr. Morris. Have you had any dealings with the ILA through their officers or officials?

Mr. Velson. Yes. I have talked to ILA officers.

Mr. Morris. Do you know a gentleman named Teddy Gleason?

Mr. Velson. I do.

Mr. Morris. Who is Teddy Gleason?

Mr. Velson. Well, Teddy Gleason is the general organizer of the ILA.

Mr. Morris. Do you see him from time to time; do you know?

Mr. Velson. I do.

Mr. Morris. Do you work in conjunction with him in any organizational work?

Mr. Velson. No.

I have had occasion to talk to Mr. Gleason many times. I might have some information that I feel I am not certain about and I might ask—I would ask him if he knows if such-and-such is true. I have talked to him about the Longshoremen and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, and other matters.

Mr. Morris. Do you derive any of the information that you report back to Mr. Bridges from Mr. Gleason? Is he one of the sources

that you have told us about?

Mr. Velson. No.

I would say that Mr. Gleason—no, he wouldn't be any source, particularly. I might ask him if such-and-such is true.

Mr. Morris. And then if he tells you—

Mr. Velson. Of course, you hear all sorts of rumors.

Mr. Morris. If he tells you such-and-such a thing is true, then do you report that fact back to Bridges and the other officials?

Mr. Velson. I look around and I try not to report anything.

Mr. Morris. He is one of your sources?

Mr. Velson. I talk with him.

Mr. Morris. And you do see him regularly : do you not?

Mr. Velson. No special regularity. I might see him twice in 1 week and might not see him for 2 or 3 weeks.

Mr. Morris. When did you last see him? Mr. Velson. About a week or 10 days ago.

Mr. Morris. Now, what was the occasion of your meeting him a

week or 10 days ago?

Mr. Velson. Our union had—I had returned from San Francisco and one of the things that our union was undertaking in connection with its current negotiations with the Pacific Maritime Association was a reduction in the hours of work from 9 to 8 hours, with the same take-home pay, and this, of course, especially in view of the fact that many of our members are older men, would be a tremendous boon to them, and I thought that the fellows in New York, in the ILA, would

be interested, because if that comes about, it means that our hourly rate will go up to \$2.67 an hour.

Mr. Morris. Now, Mr. Velson, do you have an office?

Mr. Velson. No.

Mr. Morris. Do you use the office of the United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers at all for your activities?

Mr. Velson. I go there occasionally, but I don't use it as an office.

My office is in my home.

Mr. Morris. How often do you go to the office of the United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers Union?

Mr. Velson. I don't recall. I haven't been there in 3 or 4 weeks.

Mr. Morris. Who were the personalities there that you visit, when you do go there? Will you describe where this office is, the UERMW office?

Mr. Velson. 11 East 51st Street.

Mr. Morris. And whom do you see there when you go there?

Mr. Velson. Excuse me.

Well, I generally go there to use a typewriter, occasionally, if I want to get something typed without going home to Brooklyn.

Mr. Morris. That was not answering the question. Whom do you

see? What personalities, individuals?

Mr. Velson. I don't go there to talk to anybody, but anybody I know who I meet there I talk to them.

Mr. Morris. Who runs the office at 11 East 51st? Who is the head?

Mr. Velson. Mr. Fitzgerald is.

Mr. Morris. He is not operationally in charge of that office, is he? He is not president? Does he have an office there?

Mr. Velson. Yes; he has an office.

Mr. Morris. Do you see him from time to time? Mr. Velson. I have seen him; talked to him. Mr. Morris. Who else have you seen there?

Mr. Velson. I say—I have seen—I don't recall everybody I have met there, but I have run into the officers there occasionally. They haven't been-mostly secretarial people that I see there. Some of them—I don't even recall their names.

Mr. Morris. Well, Mr. Velson, do you come to Washington from

time to time?

Mr. Velson. Very rarely.

Mr. Morris. For what purpose do you come to Washington?

Mr. Velson. Well, generally when there is a hearing on some matter of interest to our union I come.

Mr. Morris. Did you come here in connection with the hearings of

the Bonner committee?

Mr. Velson. Not all of them; some of them. I have attended some of them.

Mr. Morris. Did you take up the affairs of the ILWU with the Bonner committee?

Mr. Velson. I did not. Mr. Morris. You left that—

Mr. Velson. I have never taken up any affairs of the ILWU with any committee. I merely am an observer. I am not an official; I am not a policymaker of any kind. The officers handle all that stuff— Mr. Bridges.

Mr. Morris. Do you see Mr. Jeff Kibre, who is your Washington representative?

Mr. Velson. I generally always do.

Mr. Morris. You exchange information with him, and he exchanges information with you, and you discuss with him the work of ILWU as it relates to New York and Washington?

Mr. Velson. Well, we talk about matters of mutual interest.

Mr. Morris. Now, Mr. Velson, were you born in New York City on June 13, 1913?

Mr. Velson. Yes, sir.

Mr. Morris. Was Ruth Young your former wife?

Mr. Velson. Yes, sir.

Mr. Morris. And that marriage terminated in divorce, did it not?

Mr. Velson. It did.

Mr. Morris. And your present wife's maiden name is Evelyn Minsky?

Mr. Velson. That is right. Mr. Morris. And now, have you been—are you now a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. Velson. I decline to answer that question on the grounds of

the fifth amendment.

Mr. Morris. Now, in the 1930's were you the national military director of the Young Communist League?

Mr. Velson. I decline to answer that question on the same grounds. Mr. Morris. That is, privilege under the fifth amendment?

Mr. Velson. Right.

Mr. Morris. Were you known on the New York waterfront as Charlie Wilson, ever known as Charlie Wilson?

Mr. Velson. I decline to answer that question on the grounds of

the fifth amendment.

Mr. Morris. Were you ever known as Shavey Wilson?

Mr. Velson. I decline to answer that question on the same grounds. Mr. Morris. Have you been president of an organization called the Apprentice Association?

Mr. Velson. I think I was secretary. Mr. Morris. You still are secretary?

Mr. Velson. No. I haven't been an apprentice for 25 years. Mr. Morris. I thought you said "I am."

Mr. Velson. I think I was secretary. I don't recall being president, but I may have been. That was 25 years ago.

Mr. Morris. Will you describe what the Apprentice Association

Mr. Velson. The Apprentice Association was all the apprentices who worked in the Navy Yard, of which I was one.

Mr. Morris. You organized them?

Mr. Velson. No. It was organized before I ever came to work

Mr. Morris, I see.

Have you done any organizing whatever in the Brooklyn Navy

Mr. Velson. Well, I organized at least 10 local unions of the American Federation of Labor among various crafts there who were unor-

Mr. Morris. You say in the Brooklyn Navy Yard?

Mr. Velson. Various crafts in the Brooklyn Navy Yard who were

unorganized.

Mr. Morris. I wonder if you could tell us briefly how you carried on that work, just briefly. Tell us what you did, and how you did it. Were you working there at the time?

Mr. Velson, I was working there. I served my apprenticeship

there.

Mr. Morris. What year was that?

Mr. Velson. 1930 or 1931. I don't quite recall the time. I became a journeyman.

Mr. Morris. You did organize AFL unions who were unorganized

in the 1930's?

Mr. Velson. Well, the union I belonged to, I think had been in existence for 40 or 50 years before I ever came there.

Mr. Morris. You say you did organize-

Mr. Velson. I organized some unions, some crafts that were not organized. The wage scale in the Navy Yard at that time was substantially below comparable wages paid in private industry.

As a matter of fact, when I was an apprentice under Mr. Hoover,

we got a wage cut to \$9 a week.

Mr. Morris. Under Mr. Hoover?

Mr. Velson. Herbert Hoover. Do you remember him?

Mr. Morris. Oh, ves.

Mr. Velson. A long time ago. We got \$9 a week. No way to live, and we wanted to get a little more money, so we organized. That was the apprentices. Then the wage scale for the journeyman was so far below comparable wages paid in private industry that we tried to get our wages increased to comparable wages paid for similar crafts in other fields of work. That was a long drawn-out proposition. The organization-

Mr. Morris. How long did you carry on that work in the Brook-

Mr. Velson. A couple of years, I guess.

Mr. Morris. Didn't your work carry on into the early 1940's, the

first part of the war?

Mr. Velson. Yes, I believe it did. We got—I got in the hair of the officials, the navy yard officials down there, because we were pressing very, very hard on this thing and we were extremely unpopular.

Mr. Morris. Well, were you at that time a member of the Com-

munist Party?

Mr. Velson. I think I have already said that I decline to answer

whether I was a member of the Communist Party.

Mr. Morris. You said you decline to answer whether you are presently one. The question is: Were you a member of the Communist Party when you were organizing workers at the Brooklyn Navy Yard during the 1930's and during the early part of the war?

Mr. Velson. I decline to answer that question on the grounds of

the fifth amendment.

Mr. Morris. Were you a Communist when you were holding the position which you recall was secretary of the apprentice association, which was-

Mr. Velson. The answer is the same, Mr. Morris.

Mr. Morris. You will not tell us?

Mr. Velson. No.

Senator Jenner. Same answer; fifth amendment?

Mr. Velson. Yes, sir. Mr. Morris. Was there any kind of a security action taken in conjunction with the Navy Intelligence about your being denied access to the Brooklyn Navy Yard?

Mr. Velson. I was fired after we put on this wage campaign. They

unloaded me fast.

Mr. Morris. Did that dismissal have anything to do with security? Mr. Velson. Let me—I was fired after we put on this wage cam-They said I had given them—I forget the exact details, but we really got in their hair organizing these locals, and tried to get more money, so they unloaded me.

Mr. Morris. Now, in 1943 you were a member of the executive board of the Greater New York Industrial Union Council, were you not?

Mr. Velson. Not in 1943.

Mr. Morris. January 8, 1943?

Mr. Velson. Excuse me. I don't recall. I think I was a member later on, Mr. Morris, but I don't think I was a member at that time. I may have been, but I am not positive.

Mr. Morris. What union did you represent?

Mr. Velson. I represented the Industrial Union of Marine and Shipbuilding Workers. I was president of the port of New York district. Mr. Morris. Saul Mills was the person running the Greater New

York Industrial at that time? Mr. Velson. That is right.

Mr. Morris. Did you frequently meet with Saul Mills?

Mr. Velson. Very rarely. I don't think our local union was affili-

ated until much later. I may be mistaken, but I don't recall.

Mr. Morris. During this period, were you in frequent contact with Roy Hudson, the Communist Party functionary I asked you about before, this period of 1943-44, when you were on the executive board of the Greater New York Industrial Union Council?

Mr. Velson. I decline to answer that question on the grounds of the

fifth amendment.

Mr. Morris. Now, do you have any security clearance to move about, to have access to the waterfront, move on the waterfront?

Mr. Velson. I don't work on the waterfront.

need any clearance, as far as I know, to go down-

Mr. Morris. You mean, it is unnecessary?

Mr. Velson. I don't work—go on any piers. Mr. Morris. You don't have to have Coast Guard clearance for your activity?

Mr. Velson. I don't get any closer to the waterfront than maybe

4 or 5 blocks away.

Mr. Morris. Do you know anything about this regulation of the Coast Guard, security regulations for the Coast Guard, as to who would have access to the waterfront? There have been some reports. Does that come within the scope of your work?

Mr. Velson. Repeat that, please. I don't get your question. Mr. Morris. Do you have any experience whatever, or know anything about the Coast Guard requirements for securing people who will have access to the waterfront, who will work on the waterfront?

Mr. Velson. I don't have access to the waterfront. Mr. Morris. Do you know anything about it?

Mr. Velson. I know that there are some regulations, some of which I understand have been dumped by the circuit court of appeals.

Mr. Morris. Have you been working before against these regula-

tions in any way?

Mr. Velson. That isn't part of my activity. I haven't taken any

part, one way or the other, in it.

Mr. Morris. We have testimony from Mr. Louis Budenz, who used to be one of the editors of the Daily Worker, in executive session testimony, that you were working in the Communist underground section of the Communist Party with Alexander Stevens, who was also known as J. Peters.

Did you ever know J. Peters?

Mr. Velson. I decline to answer that question on the grounds of the fifth amendment.

Mr. Morris. Did you ever do any organizational work for Alex-

ander Stevens, otherwise known as J. Peters?

Mr. Velson. You are going too fast. Will you repeat that? Mr. Morris. Will the reporter read back the question?

(Question read.)

Mr. Velson. I didn't get it.

Senator Jenner. Did you ever do any organizational work for Alexander Stevens, otherwise known as J. Peters?

Mr. Velson. I decline to answer that question on the grounds of

the fifth amendment.

Mr. Morris. Senator, I think Mr. Budenz' testimony on this point, if not in our record at this point, I wonder if I may have permission to put it in the record.

Senator Jenner. It may go in the record.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Connors, staff member of the Internal Security Subcommittee, on August 23, 1951, was examining Mr. Budenz, and the colloguy is as follows:

Mr. CONNORS. Mr. Budenz, is it not correct that Alexander Stevens, otherwise known as J. Peters, for a time controlled the underground section of the

Communist Party?

Mr. Budenz. Yes, he decisively did. He described himself to me, and I so swore at his trial for deportation, that he was the liaison officer between the Communist international apparatus in this country and the Soviet Secret Police. In other words, he was the channel of clearance for espionage activities.

Mr. Connors. Mr. Budenz, within your recollection of Mr. Velson and Mr.

Stevens, is there any point in common between the two men?

Did they work closely together?

Mr. Budenz. To my knowledge, Velson communicated with Peters and was under his direction for a period of time. I can't give you the period. I know that to be a fact.

Now, did you ever work under the direction of Mr. Peters?

Mr. Velson. I have already answered that question. I declined to answer that question on the grounds of the fifth amendment.

Mr. Morris. In other words, you will not deny the testimony Mr.

Budenz has given in the record?

Mr. Velson. I decline to answer that question on the grounds of the fifth amendment. I don't think that constitutes affirmation or denial. Senator Jenner. All right. The witness will be excused.

Call the next witness.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Bershad.

Mr. Bershad. Mr. Chairman, before I am sworn, I request that there be no pictures taken while I am testifying.

Senator Jenner. While you are testifying there will be no pictures. It is all right for these gentlemen to take pictures prior to your testimony.

Do you want to be sworn now?

Mr. Bershad. Yes.

Senator Jenner. Will you swear that the testimony given at this hearing will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Bershad. I do.

Senator Jenner. You may be seated.

Proceed, Mr. Morris, with the questioning of the witness.

TESTIMONY OF ABRAHAM J. BERSHAD, BROOKLYN, N. Y., ACCOM-PANIED BY LEONARD B. BOUDIN, HIS ATTORNEY

Mr. Morris. Will you give your name and address to the reporter, Mr. Bershad?

Mr. Bershad. My name is Abraham Joseph Bershad.

Mr. Morris. Will you spell that?

Mr. Bershad. B-e-r-s-h-a-d.

Mr. Morris. And where do you reside?

Mr. Bershad. 386 Sixth Avenue, Brooklyn, N. Y.

Mr. Morris. And what is your occupation, Mr. Bershad?

Mr. Bershad. I decline to answer that question under my constitutional rights, as guaranteed in the first amendment, and under my constitutional privileges, as guaranteed in the fifth amendment.

Mr. Morris. You mean, you will not even tell this committee what

your occupation is?

Mr. Bershad. I have already answered that question.

Mr. Morris. The question relates to now, sir.

Senator Jenner. Let the record show that his refusal to answer on the first amendment is overruled, that his refusal to answer on the fifth amendment is recognized.

Mr. Morris. Now, Mr. Velson has told us in executive session that he has met with you and conversed with you from time to time. Do

you know Mr. Velson?

Mr. Bershad. I decline to answer that question under the grounds previously stated.

Senator Jenner. Same record, Miss Reporter.

Mr. Morris. Have you had any organizational activities on the New York waterfront?

Mr. Bershad. I decline to answer that question under the same

grounds.

Mr. Morris. Now, I wonder if you could tell us, Mr. Bershad, when you were last on the New York waterfront.

Mr. Bershad. I decline to answer that question under the grounds

previously stated.

Mr. Morris. Have you been organizing Brooklyn longshoremen? Mr. Bershad. I decline to answer that question under the grounds previously stated.

Mr. Morris. I would like to offer this witness a photograph wherein

there are four people. May we show that to the witness?

Do you appear in that photograph?

Mr. Bershad. I decline to answer that question on the grounds of the fifth amendment.

Mr. Morris. Well, your picture is right there; is it not?

Mr. Bershad. I decline to answer that question.

Mr. Morris. Will you identify the other gentlemen whose pictures appear in that photograph?

Mr. Bershad. I decline to answer that question under the grounds

previously stated.

Mr. Morris. Now, did you ever see the man on the left, the extreme left, the tall gentleman on the left?

Mr. Bershad. I decline to answer that question under the grounds

previously stated.

Mr. Morris. Well, he is a Brooklyn longshore organizer; is he not?

Mr. Bershad. I decline to answer that question.

Mr. Morris. Now, may I see that picture? Irving Velson appears in this picture; does he not?

Mr. Bershad. I decline to answer that question under the previous

grounds.

Mr. Morris. I would like to call your attention to the fact that this is a picture of the last witness, Mr. Irving Velson. Mr. Jeff Kibre appears in this picture; does he not?

Mr. Bershap. I decline to answer that question.

Mr. Morris. I would like to submit the picture here of Jeff Kibre, who is similar to the Jeff Kibre who appeared here before this com-

Mr. Bershad, you are in the foreground of this; are you not? Mr. Bershad. I have already declined to answer that question.

Mr. Morris. And you will not tell us what your experience or knowledge of the gentleman on the left, who has been described as a longshoreman organizer from Brooklyn?

Mr. Bershad. I decline to answer that question.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, may that photograph go into the record, just bearing on the answers given to the questions put to this particular witness?

Senator Jenner. It will go into the record, and become a part of

the official record of this committee.

(The photograph referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 290" and is reproduced below:)

Mr. Morris. Mr. Bershad, where were you born? Mr. Bershad. I was born in Brooklyn, N. Y.,

Mr. Morris. In what year?

Mr. Bershad. September 28, 1925. Mr. Morris. I wonder if you will tell us what your educational

background has been.

Mr. Bershad. I went to Public School 100 in Brooklyn, and then when my family moved to lower Manhattan, I went to Public School 65 and, I believe, Public School 20. Then I went to the High School of Music and Art in New York City. I went 2 years at Brooklyn College, and, as to any further educational experience, I decline to answer on the grounds previously stated.

Senator Jenner. You went to the University of Michigan, didn't

you?

Mr. Bershap, I refuse to answer.

EXHIBIT No. 290



Senator Jenner. You were a Communist at the University of Michigan; weren't you?

Mr. Bershad. I refuse to answer, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Morris. Well, you were—

Senator Jenner. Just a moment.

For the reason that your answer might tend to incriminate you?

Mr. Bershad. I didn't hear that.

Senator Jenner. For what reason do you refuse?

Mr. Bershad. I refuse to answer under the grounds previously stated, my constitutional rights under the first amendment, and my constitutional privileges under the fifth amendment.

Senator Jenner. Same record, Miss Reporter. Overruled as to

the first amendment, recognized as to the fifth.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, our information here indicates that the gentleman named Abraham J. Bershad—and that is your name; is it not?

Mr. Bershad. Correct.

Mr. Morris (continuing). Had been chairman of the Labor Youth League at Ann Arbor, Mich., in the 1950's.

Is that a fact?

Mr. Bershad. I decline to answer that question. Mr. Morris. Were you associated with Ralph Neafus, the Ralph Neafus Communist Club in Ann Arbor, Mich., in the year 1948?

Mr. Bershad. I decline to answer that question under the grounds

previously given.

Mr. Morris. In 1950, did you attend a State legislative meeting of the Labor Youth League, at Detroit, Mich.?

Mr. Bershad. I refuse to answer that question under the same grounds.

Mr. Morris. In 1949, were you actively engaged in the affairs of

the Civil Rights Congress?

Mr. Bershad. I refuse to answer that question under the same grounds.

Mr. Morris. In 1950, did you aid the Committee for Democratic

Far Eastern Policy?

Mr. Bershad. I refuse to answer that question.

Mr. Morris. Have you been organizing longshoremen in Brooklyn?
Mr. Bershad. I think I have already declined to answer that question.

Mr. Morris. Do you know a man named Ben Glazier?

Mr. Bershad. I decline to answer that question under the grounds previously stated.

Mr. Morris. Is Ben Glazier, to your knowledge, associated with the

ILWU?

Mr. Bershad. I decline to answer that question.

Mr. Morris. Have you done any organizational work for a person

named Tony Anastasia?

Mr. Bershad. I decline to answer that question under the grounds previously stated.

Mr. Morris. When did you last see Mr. Anastasia?

Mr. Bershad. I decline to answer that question under the same grounds.

Mr. Morris. Have you applied for registration as a longshoreman

with the Waterfront Commission?

Mr. Bershad. I decline to answer that question under the grounds previously stated.

Mr. Morris. Do you know a longshoreman organizer named Joseph

Banks?

Mr. Bershad. I refuse to answer that question under the grounds

previously given.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Bershad, do you have any clearance, Coast Guard clearance, to be active on the waterfront, to have access to the various waterfront activities?

Mr. Bershad. I decline to answer that question under the grounds

previously stated.

Mr. Morris. When did you last see Harry Bridges?

Mr. Bershad. I decline to answer that question under the grounds previously stated.

Mr. Morris. Are you now a Communist, Mr. Bershad?

Mr. Bershad. I decline to answer that question.

Mr. Morris. Have you ever handled any finances or any money for Harry Bridges?

Mr. Bershad. I decline to answer that question under the same

grounds.

Mr. Morris. Senator, I have no more questions.

Senator Jenner. The witness will stand aside, be excused.

Call the next witness.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Keith is the next witness, Senator.

Senator Jenner. Are you ready to be sworn?

Will you swear that the testimony given at this hearing will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? Mr. Keith. I do.

I request no pictures, and that the lights be turned off.

TESTIMONY OF CHARLES L. KEITH, NEW YORK, N. Y., ACCOM-PANIED BY LEONARD B. BOUDIN, HIS ATTORNEY

Senator Jenner. Proceed with the questioning of the witness.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Keith, I wonder if you will give your full name and address to the reporter.

Mr. Keith. Charles Lawrence Keith, 104 East 17th Street, New

York City.

Mr. Morris. And what is your present occupation, Mr. Keith?

Mr. Keith. I decline to answer that question on the grounds of the

fourth, fifth, and ninth amendments of the Constitution.

Senator Jenner. Let the record show that the witness' refusal to answer under all the grounds stated with the exception of the fifth amendment will be overruled.

Mr. Morris. When have you last been on the New York waterfront? Mr. Keith. I decline to answer that question on the same grounds. Mr. Morris. Will you tell us whether you have had any direct or indirect relations with the Soviet Embassy?

Mr. Keith. I decline to answer that question on the same grounds. Mr. Morris. Have you received money, directly or indirectly, from the Soviet Embassy?

Mr. Keith. I decline to answer that question on the same grounds.

Senator Jenner. Same record, Miss Reporter.

Mr. Morris. Have you expended any money in the organizational activities on the New York waterfront?

Mr. Keith. I decline to answer that question on the same grounds. Mr. Morris. Now, Mr. Chairman, John Lautner who testified here 2 weeks ago, has sworn that the present witness here today was active in the New York waterfront of the Communist Party, to his knowledge, while Lautner was a Communist in the party.

Do you know a man named John Lautner?

Mr. Keith. I decline to answer that question on the same grounds. Mr. Morris. Mr. Keith, you were an active Communist organizer in New York all during the war, were you not?

Mr. Keith. I decline to answer that question.

Mr. Morris. Now, in 1946—— Senator Jenner. For the same reasons?

Mr. Keith. Yes, sir.

Mr. Morris. In 1946, you were formally expelled from the Communist Party, were you not?

Mr. Keith. I decline to answer that question for the same reasons.

Mr. Morris. There has been a notation to that effect in the Daily Worker.

While the subcommittee doesn't want to take any stock in the statements made therein, in the Daily Worker of April 5, 1948, you are listed as a renegade from the waterfront of the Communist Party.

Were you expelled from the Communist Party, as the Daily Worker

says, in 1946?

Mr. Keith. I decline to answer that question, Judge.

Mr. Morris. Have you since made up with the Communist Party?

Mr. Keith. Same declination, sir.

Mr. Morris. You will not tell us whether you are now actively a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. Keith. I decline to answer that question.

Mr. Morris. When did you last see Harry Bridges?
Mr. Keith. I decline to answer that question on the same grounds. Mr. Morris. I take it you are not going to tell us anything about your activity in the New York waterfront?

Mr. Keith. I decline to answer.

Mr. Morris. Where were you born?

Mr. Keith. Rutland, Vt.

Mr. Morris. When did you come to New York?

Mr. Keith. About 35 years ago. Mr. Morris. Thirty-five years ago? Mr. Keith. Yes, sir.

Mr. Morris. And what has been your educational experience?

Mr. Keith. Educated in New York City public schools and high

Mr. Morris. And you will not tell us what job you have now?

Mr. Keith. I decline to answer that question, Judge.

Senator Jenner. If there are no further questions, the witness will be excused.

Call the next witness.

Mr. Morris. I made reference to an article in the Daily Worker. I would like to put that into the record for whatever evidentiary value

Senator Jenner. It may go in the record and become part of the

(The article appearing in the Daily Worker was marked "Exhibit No. 291" and reads as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 291

[Daily Worker, April 5, 1948]

LIST 15 RENEGADES FROM WATERFRONT COMMUNIST PARTY

The New York State board of the Communist Party yesterday released a list of dropped and expelled Communist Party members who are operating in the National Maritime Union to disrupt, through redbaiting, "all steps toward unity of the maritime unions whose contracts expire this June 15."

Working through a so-called rank-and-file caucus, the small band of renegades is aiding the enemies of the working class, said the Communist Party board. These individuals tried to cripple the waterfront section with factional fights, the board declared. Today they have found the logical end of the trail with "Trotzkyites, ACTU'ers, anti-Negro, anti-Semitic elements, FBI agents, and company stool pigeons," the Communist Party said.

The full statement follows:

The New York State board of the Communist Party feels it necessary at this time to bring to the attention of the entire membership of the party and to workers everywhere, the wrecking antiunion, antiparty activities of a small

band of renegades from the Communist Party.

These renegades are today concentrating their activities among the maritime workers who are facing crucial struggles with the shipowners this June 15, and who face the combined attacks of the Government, the FBI, the shipowners and their agents who are out to destroy the powerful National Maritime Union as a progressive, militant rank-and-file union.

REDBAITING CAUCUS

These renegades are carrying out their disruptive antiunion activities on the waterfront through a so-called rank-and-file caucus which has been conducting a vicious redbaiting attack upon all progressive maritime workers. The program of this caucus is to defeat all steps toward unity of the maritime unions whose contracts expire this June 15; to undermine the powerful Wallace and third party movements among the seamen; to sell to the maritime workers the imperialist war policies of the Truman administration, especially the Marshall plan; and behind a whipped-up anti-Communist hysteria to capture the National Maritime Union for the shipowners.

These renegades are the active leaders of this rank-and-file caucus which consists of an alliance of Trotzkyites, ACTU'ers, anti-Negro, anti-Semitic elements, FBI agents, and company stool pigeons. These renegades, who a short time ago were members of the Communist Party find themselves perfectly at home with all these degenerate anti-working-class elements because they have become completely fused with them. They have found the logical end of their

trail.

Several years ago they started out as a factional grouping within the waterfront section of the Communist Party. They carried on an unprincipled attack upon the party and its leadership. They fought for a policy of capitulating to the enemies of the party and the union.

WEAKENED UNITY

Through their disruptive actions within the waterfront section of the party they weakened the unity of the party in the face of vicious enemy attacks. It was merely a short step from this unprincipled factional campaign within the party to complete amalgamation with notorious enemies of the working class.

Today they further attempt to mask their treachery through the publication of a newsletter called For n' Aft and they have set up a maritime committee for a Communist Party. Some of them try to capitalize on the prestige of your party by still calling themselves Communists. They hope by this to deceive the

workers.

Some of these elements still attempt to maintain connections with honest workers and members of the Communist Party. It is for this reason, and especially because of the sharpness of the struggle, because of the increased attacks of the imperialist reaction upon the working class and our party using every weapon at their disposal that the State board feels it necessary at this time to reveal the names of these individuals.

The list includes:

M. Hedley Stone, dropped in 1945
Jack Lawrenson, dropped in 1945
Thomas Ray, dropped in 1947
John Robinson, expelled in 1947
David Drunmond, dropped in 1946
Charles Keith, expelled in 1946
Joe Keller, expelled in 1947
Bob Dupont, expelled in 1947

Mrs. Evelyn Dupont, dropped in 1947, now working as secretary for the

Adrian Duffy, dropped in 1945 Harry Alexander, dropped in 1946 Stanley Rose, dropped in 1946 H. Warner, dropped in 1945 James Drury, expelled in 1946 (west coast) Joseph Sands, expelled, October 1947

Mr. Morris. The next witness is Sam Madell.

Mr. Madell and counsel, Mr. Recht, come forward, please.

Senator Jenner. Will you be sworn to testify?

Mr. Recht. He is sworn already.

Mr. Morris. The Senator would like to have Mr. Madell sworn in

open testimony.

Senator Jenner. Will you swear that the testimony given at this hearing will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

I didn't get your answer.

Mr. MADELL. I do.

TESTIMONY OF SAM MADELL, NEW YORK, N. Y., ACCOMPANIED BY CHARLES RECHT. HIS ATTORNEY

Mr. Morris. You appear here by attorney today? You are appearing here with your attorney today?

Mr. Madell. Yes. Mr. Morris. Mr. Recht, inasmuch as you haven't been here now for

some time, will you identify yourself for the record?

Mr. Recht. My name is Charles Recht. My office is at 10 East 40th Street, New York City; mailing address, New York Postal Zone 16. Mr. Morris. And you are appearing for Mr. Madell here today?

Mr. RECHT. That is correct. Mr. Morris. Thank you.

Mr. Madell, John Lautner, in testifying here several weeks ago, identified you as a person who has been active in the New York waterfront and as a person who has been a Communist.

I wonder if you would tell us, Mr. Madell, what—can you give your

address, by the way, to the reporter?

Mr. MADELL. My address is 222 West 23d Street, New York City.

Mr. Morris. And what is your present occupation?

Mr. Madell. Carpenter.
Mr. Morris. Now, have you been a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. Madell. I refuse to answer that question on the grounds of the

fifth amendment.

Mr. Morris. Are you presently a Communist?

Mr. MADELL. I refuse to answer on the grounds of the fifth amendment.

Mr. Morris. Now, will you tell us the maiden name of your wife,

Mr. Madell?

Mr. Madell. Rosa L. Grapp.

Mr. Morris. The subcommittee has received evidence that you have been active on the New York waterfront. Have you been active on the New York waterfront?

Mr. Madell. I refuse to answer, under the privilege of the fifth

amendment.

Mr. Morris. Have you ever been the editor of Shape-Up, a publication of the Communist Party, waterfront section of New York?

Mr. MADELL. I refuse to answer, on the privilege of the fifth amend-

Mr. Morris. As to whether or not you were the editor of that publication?

(Mr. Madell nods head affirmatively.)

Mr. Morris. Has your wife been active in distributing films for Artkino, a Soviet film distributor?

Mr. MADELL. I decline to answer that on the grounds of the fifth

amendment.

Mr. Morris. Now, do you know Harry Bridges? Have you ever met Harry Bridges?

Mr. Madell. I refuse to answer that on the grounds of the fifth amendment.

Mr. Morris. Now, do you know a man named Joe Stack, who has been described to the committee as a long-time associate of Harry Bridges?

Mr. Madell. I refuse to answer that question on the grounds of the

fifth amendment.

Mr. Morris. Now, have you ever had any dealings, directly or indirectly, with the Soviet Embassy?

Mr. Madell. I refuse to answer that on the grounds of the fifth

amendment.

Mr. Morris. Have you ever received any money, directly or indirectly, from the Soviet Embassy?

Mr. Madell. I refuse to answer that on the grounds of the fifth

amendment?

Mr. Morris. Have you specifically ever received any money from Charles Keith?

Mr. Madell. Same answer.

Mr. Morris. Well, will you tell us anything about your experiences on the New York waterfront?

Mr. Madell. I refuse to answer on the grounds of the fifth amend-

ment.

Mr. Morris. Will you tell us anything about your experiences with the publication Shape-Up?

Mr. Madell. Same answer.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions.

Senator Jenner. The witness will be excused.

Mr. Morris. May we put the following documents into the record? Senator Jenner. They may be incorporated as part of the record. (The documents referred to are as follows:)

NEW YORK, N. Y., July 7, 1956.

Hon. HERMAN WELKER,

Senator from Idaho,

Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR WELKER: My attention has just been called by my friend, Victor Lasky, consultant to the American Committee for Liberation from Bolshevism, Inc., to the printed transcript of a hearing on March 8, 1956, before the Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act subcommittee To investigate the Administration of the internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws. Since you were the only Senator present at this hearing, I write to you to request your assistance in obtaining immediate correction of a harmful and inaccurate reference to me.

On page 408 of the printed transcript, exhibit No. 168, headed "Government Employees Connected With the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy and Its Official Organ, Far East Spotlight," the following item appears:

"Bernstein, David: Former United States adviser to Philippine Government—

Far East Spotlight, October 1947, page 7."

In inserting the entire list, Mr. Morris added the "caveat that it purports only to be a compilation made by Mr. Mandel, research director of the committee, in the course of trying to determine to what extent individuals connected with the United States Government have been associated with these publications and these organizations."

The fact is that I was never, in any way, connected or associated with these publications and these organizations. To the extent that I knew of their existence at all I considered them then and now to be following the Communist Party

If there was any reference to me by name on page 7 of the October 1947 issue of Far East Spotlight—and I myself was not aware of it at the time—I would judge by the date that it was a reference to or quotation from my book, the Philippine Story, which was published in September 1947.

This book is available to you at the Library of Congress. It was among the first publications to identify the Communist leadership of the Huks in the Philippines. Its conclusions are perhaps best summed up in one sentence on page 259: "Unless the basic economic and social problems of the Philippines are solved wisely and fairly, with our help, there will always be the danger that the archipelago will fall within the Soviet orbit—and we will awaken abruptly to our weakness in the very place where we have thought ourselves strong." The book was not dignified with a review in the Daily Worker, so far as I know, but it was bitterly attacked in the Daily People's World. And my magazine writing on the Philippines as well as on many other subjects, since long before October 1947, make it clear that my understanding of the Communist threat predates that of many professional lattenday anti-Communists. many professional latterday anti-Communists.

Yet your subcommittee lists me as having been connected or associated with

the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy and its official organ, Far East Spotlight. I suggest that this is hardly the way to protect the security of our country. I am sure you will agree that I am entitled to an apology and a retraction. And I look to you for advice on how best to obtain them.

Incidentally, the reference to me as "former United States adviser to Philippine Government" is also inaccurate. During the years when I was an adviser to President Manuel L. Quezon and President Sergio Osmena, I was not in the employ of the United States Government but only of the Commonwealth of the

Philippines.

I would appreciate a prompt reply to this letter for a serious charge has been leveled against me and I like it no more than you would yourself if I were to describe you as having been connected or associated with Miss Maud Russell for, after all, your name appears alongside hers many times in the committee print.

Sincerely yours,

DAVID BERNSTEIN.

JULY 10, 1956.

Mr. DAVID BERNSTEIN, New York, N. Y.

DEAR MR. BERNSTEIN: I have received a copy of your letter to Senator Welker, dated July 7, 1956. Your statement will be placed into the record at our next hearing. We are glad to make this correction of the record which was taken from the Far Eastern Survey of October 1947.

Very truly yours,

BENJAMIN MANDEL, Research Director, Internal Security Subcommittee.

American Arbitration Association, New York, N. Y., July 6, 1956.

Hon. James O. Eastland,

Chairman, Internal Security Subcommittee, United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

Dear Senator Eastland: In accordance with your wire received this morning, enclosed is a copy of Mr. Corsi's award in the American Newspaper Guild and New York Times case.

If we can be of any further service, please do not hesitate to advise us.

Cordially yours,

J. NOBLE BRADEN, Executive Vice President.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

VOLUNTARY LABOR ARBITRATION TRIBUNAL

In the matter of the arbitration between American Newspaper Guild, AFL-CIO, Local 3, Newspaper Guild of New York and the New York Times Co.

AWARD OF ABRITRATION

I, the undersigned arbitrator, having been designated in accordance with the arbitration agreement entered into by the above-named parties, and dated

December 17, 1954, and having been duly sworn and having heard the proofs and

allegations of the parties, award, as follows:

The New York Times Co. was justified in dismissing Jack Shafer for just and reasonable cause in accordance with the provisions of the collective-bargaining agreement.

EDWARD P. CORSI, Arbitrator.

June —, 1956.

STATE OF NEW YORK, County of New York, ss:

On this __ day of _____, 19__, before me personally came and appeared Edward P. Corsi, to me known to me to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same. Case No. L-16194-NY-L-38-56.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

VOLUNTARY LABOR ARBITRATION TRIBUNAL

In the Matter of the Arbitration Between American Newspaper Guild, AFL-CIO, Local 3, Newspaper Guild of New York and the New York Times Co.

L-16194-NY-L-38-56

OPINION

This arbitration is between the Newspaper Guild of New York (hereinafter referred to as the guild) and the New York Times Co. (hereinafter referred to as the Times).

It concerns the dismissal by the Times of one Shafer, a copyreader on the foreign desk, and the demand of the guild that he be reinstated on the ground that the dismissal was in violation of the collective bargaining agreement between the Times and the guild.

A hearing was held by the arbitrator at the offices of the American Arbitration Association on March 26, 1956, at which time the facts were reviewed and the

position of the parties amply explored.

Also briefs were filed by the parties supplementing the testimony at the hearing. The arbitrator finds that there is essential agreement on the facts, which, briefly, are as follows:

The Times first employed Mr. Shafer in early 1949. His performance on the job was satisfactory. In addition to performing the duties of a copyreader, he acted as assistant night editor and on at least two occasions as night editor in charge.

In describing the nature of his assignment, it was testified by representatives of the Times that Mr. Shafer not only read the copy of the foreign news reaching his desk but he edited it, often revised it, and wrote headlines for it.

It was testified also that he was often the last member of the staff to pass upon

items of foreign news before this news finally appeared in print.

Acting in this capacity, it is obvious that Mr. Shafer had much influence in determining what items of news would be printed, where they would appear, and what headlines they would carry.

It was generally agreed at the hearing before the arbitrator that the tasks assigned to Mr. Shafer on the Times involved the exercise of sound judgment and

discretion in a high degree.

Mr. Shafer enjoyed the full confidence of his superiors.

On November 15, 1955, Mr. Turner Catledge, the managing editor of the Times, informed Mr. Shafer that he would be receiving a subpena to appear before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, popularly known as the Eastland committee, and Mr. Catledge advised Mr. Shafer that upon receipt of the subpena he should relate to the Times what he knew to be the basis for his call by the Senate

After receiving the subpena, Mr. Shafer met with his attorney, Mr. Needleman. and then contacted Mr. Catledge who advised him to meet with Mr. Loeb, the

legal representative of the Times.

At a meeting of Messrs. Shafer, Needleman, and Loeb, on November 17, Mr. Shafer related that he had joined the Communist Party in 1940, had become inactive after 1941, reactivated his membership in 1946, and finally resigned in 1949 before joining the staff of the Times.

Later in the day of the 17th, the Times top level management was apprised of Mr. Shafer's earlier disclosures to Mr. Loeb.

It was decided to dismiss Mr. Shafer, but first to afford him the opportunity of

resigning.

As an immediate step pending final action and because at the time Mr. Shafer was working on an important report of the Geneva Conference he was suspended.

Mr. Needleman advised Mr. Loeb that Mr. Shafer would not resign.

On the 21st, Mr. Shafer was informed that the Times had decided to dismiss

him effective immediately.

Pursuant to the collective-bargaining agreement of November 1, 1954, the guild, as the bargaining representative of a number of Times employees, including Mr. Shafer, called for a grievance session to consider Mr. Shafer's dismissal.

With Mr. Shafer's permission, the Times disclosed to the guild the grounds

for the dismissal of Mr. Shafer.

The grievance session ended without resolution. The guild then submitted the matter to arbitration in conformity with the collective agreement between the parties providing for arbitration in disputed matters of this sort.

These, in a nutshell, are the facts. Now, what is the issue for arbitration?

Aside from such considerations as burden of proof, due notice, etc., raised by the guild and which the arbitrator considers important but not decisive, the controlling question, it seems to him, is whether or not Mr. Shafer was dismissed in accordance with the provisions of the agreement between the parties and specifically with article XI-2 of that agreement, which reads:

"There shall be no dismissal except for good and sufficient cause."

In defense of its action in dismissing Mr. Shafer, the Times insists that Mr. Shafer's membership in the Communist Party, his original membership in 1940 and the reactivation of this membership in 1946, is, in view of his sensitive position on the staff (which involved the handling of news from the Communist countries of the world), a justifiable cause for loss of confidence which, in turn, is good and sufficient cause for the discharge of an employee in the type of sensitive job held by Mr. Shafer.

It comments:

"The employment clearly should end when there is good reason to believe that the employee lacks the requisite judgment and discretion. Nor should the result be any different merely because the employee's past job performance has been unexceptional. In other words, if despite a satisfactory job performance, there nevertheless exist good and sufficient grounds for losing confidence in the employee, there is good and sufficient cause for discharge."

The guild retorts:

"Shafer's dismissal by the Times was not for 'good and sufficient cause,' since the stated cause of 'loss of confidence' related exclusively to anticipated guilt rather than actual misconduct and was wholly subjective and unreviewable and a total negation of the contract right not to be dismissed summarily."

Further

"The basic vice of the phrase 'loss of confidence' as the Times uses it, is that it is put forth as a conclusion which is meant to stand unaided by supporting evidence. But clearly such an approach is not sufficient to justify a discharge. The times must also prove that its conclusions are reasonable ones."

In other words, "loss of confidence," according to the guild, cannot be a subjective conclusion beyond evidentiary proof; on the contrary, it must be a conclusion arrived at on the basis of specific instances of misbehavior themselves

justifying the loss of confidence.

These and other forceful arguments, ably presented by counsel for the parties, have had very serious consideration by the arbitrator, particularly the argument of the guild with reference to "loss of confidence" as a mere subjective reaction.

In any ordinary case of dismissal involving this element of "loss of confidence," the arbitrator should have no difficulty in finding for the dismissed employee if the loss of confidence were based on nothing more than an unreasonable anticipation of future malperformance or nonperformance.

Labor has every right to guard itself against the whims of employers whose decisions rest on mere subjective fears not grounded in objective reality.

But this is not the case here.

The Times' loss of confidence in Mr. Shafer is not a loss of confidence in a vacuum. It is not unreasonable and arbitrary. It is not the mere whim of an unconscionable employer callous to the rights of his employees. On the contrary, the Times' loss of confidence in Mr. Shafer rests on a "reviewable fact"—Mr. Shafer's identification with the Communist cause, his membership in the

party and the reactivation of that membership at a critical stage of our national life-which is not denied by the testimony of the guild and which bears directly and in a most telling manner on the sensitive job held by Mr. Shafer in the

handling of Communist news.

The arbitrator has been influenced greatly in his decision by the repeated affirmations of the Times, at the arbitrator's hearing and in the brief submitted to him by counsel for the Times, that Mr. Shafer was not dismissed simply because he had been a member of the Communist Party, although the Times made much of the repeated membership in the party, but because, having been a Communist, he was not the proper person to handle the particularly sensitive position of dealing with foreign news generally and news from the Communist world specifically.

According to the Times, if I interpret its testimony correctly, Mr. Shafer was not the proper person to handle the specific sensitive job on the foreign-news desk because he did not inspire the adequate and required confidence that the

Times expects of the men on that job.

To the arbitrator's direct question: "Would you have dismissed Mr. Shafer had his job been on the sports desk rather than the foreign-news desk," Mr.

Loeb answered without hesitation, "No."

Times' counsel has emphasized over and over again that loss of confidence in Mr. Shafer was related directly to and indissolubly to the specific job Mr. Shafer was doing and not merely to the fact that he had once been a Communist.

To assume that in the face of Mr. Shafer's own admissions to Mr. Loeb, the Times should have continued to employ Mr. Shafer on his sensitive job, regardless of its doubts and lack of confidence in Mr. Shafer's ability to do the kind of job the Times wanted done is to deny to the Times' management and those responsible for its policies that exercise of reasonable administrative judgment which of necessity must be the prerogative of newspaper management.

For a newspaper of the character of the Times, the success of which rests not alone on the objectivity of its world news coverage but on the conviction of its readers that the coverage is objective and fair, is in itself as a leading organ of public information and opinion a sensitive operation to be handled on the basis

of a maximum confidence in the men who run it.

The Times' management has the right to be certain that the men who read, edit, and headline the news will do the kind of job expected of them not alone by the Times itself but by the public which reads and supports the Times.

It is unfair to assume that this particular kind of a public enterprise take chances on the kind of a job an employee will or will not do in whom it and its readers have not the required confidence.

Mr. Catledge, in the arbitrator's opinion, expressed succinctly and convincingly the ingredients of the Times' loss of confidence in Mr. Shafer when he said:

"Not only must we be sure that the person who handles our (Communist) news is not pro-Communist. We must be equally sure that he will not lean backward to prove that he is not a Communist or no longer a Communist.

Mr. Shafer could give the Times no such assurance, his record on the job notwithstanding. The Times was justified in dismissing him for "just and reasonable cause" in accordance with the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement.

EDWARD P. CORSI, Arbitrator.

Dated: June -, 1956.

(Following is the medical report on John Steuben, referred to on p. 1635:)

STATE OF NEW JERSEY.

County of Hunterdon, ss:

Robert R. Henderson, of full age, being duly sworn according to law, on his deposes and says:

During Mr. John Steuben's revisit to our diagnostic center on March 26, 1956, he asked if I would again write with information concerning his present condition, and whether he would be in danger if he were to stand trial. Please see

my previous letter to you dated September 15, 1955, for past details.

Since that time I have seen him at intervals of approximately 3 weeks and I believe that he has had some symptomatic relief during this time. However, he is continuing to take the digitalis, serpasil, paritrate, nitroglycerin, and evening sedation in the form of barbiturates. Several months following the radioactive iodine therapy he noted decreasing anginal pain but continuing

dyspnea with any physical exertion; i. e., with each meal. He told me during February 1956 that he felt able to do 1 or 2 hours of work (I believe writing) each day. However, he found this was not the case, and he continued to complain of increasing mental sluggishness, fatigue, and lethargy. From time to time he has had other symptoms indicating increasing congestive heart failure which require injections of mercurial diuretic. During his visit Monday and on the previous visit he complained of increasing pain concomitant with a slight decrease in his mental sluggishness. Therefore, we are considering repeating his radioactive iodine uptake with the view of evaluating the necessity for further radioactive iodine therapy.

Essentially, then, it appears to me that we have succeeded in making him more comfortable if he leads a sedentary life and does not leave the confines of his home. However, I do not feel that his prognosis or life expectancy have altered nor do I feel that he is medically able to stand trial without endangering his life. I do not expect his underlying cardiac status to improve, but rather to gradually deteriorate, and therefore, I doubt very much if my medical opinion in regard to a trial would alter. On 2 occasions in the past 6 months he has traveled to New York City and on both occasions has had considerable difficulty with chest

pain, etc.

ROBERT R. HENDERSON, M. D.

Sworn and subscribed to before me a notary public at Flemington, N. J., on April 11, 1956.

[SEAL]

MILDRED E. SINCLAIR.

My commission expires December 11, 1957.

HUNTERDON MEDICAL CENTER, Flemington, N. J., May 26, 1955.

To Whom It May Concern:

Mr. John Steuben, rural delivery 2, box 58A, Flemington, N. J., was first admitted to this hospital in April 1955. He has remained hospitalized since that time but for a 2-day interval, May 21 to May 23, 1955.

His diagnosis is that of-

Cardiac: hypertensive and arteriosclerotic heart disease;

Enlarged heart, coronary sclerosis, myocardial fibrosis, old myocardial infarction:

RSR; II-C to III-D.

Severe and recurrent angina pectoris.

Essential hypertension.

Mr. Steuben has a long history of difficulty with hypertensive and arterio-sclerotic cardiovascular disease. He has had recurrent, severe, and disabling precordial pain so that he has been completely and totally disabled in the past. He was treated for his hypertension with apresoline, with successful control of his blood pressure. However, during this therapy he was noted to run a low-grade fever which has persisted in spite of cutting the above medication. At the present time, we are attempting to discover the etiology of this febrile His prognosis is quite guarded, and I am certain that he will have to be considered completely and totally disabled upon discharge from this hospital. He should also have special care at home since he is very limited in his activities and notes distress with mild to moderate exertion.

ROBERT R. HENDERSON, M. D. Assistant Director of Internal Medicine.

NEW YORK, N. Y., February 4, 1955.

To Whom It May Concern:

In regard to the present condition of Mr. John Steuben, reference is made to the report and consultation of Dr. Arthur C. DeGraff of July 14, 1954.

Examination today reveals no great change since July 1954 with the following exceptions: The left ventricle which previously was moderately enlarged is now markedly enlarged. Right posterior tibial artery which previously was open is now no longer palpable. The hypertensive hemorrhagic retinitis has been

severely aggravated, particularly in the right eye where many hemorrhages have

occurred.

The above findings indicate unfavorable progression of the hypertensive arteriosclerotic cardiovascular disease which is accompanied by severe angina pectoris. It is still apparent that it would be both unwise and dangerous for Mr. Steuben to undertake a trip to Chicago or to be subjected to giving testimony and being cross-examined.

Yours truly,

ROBERT V. SAGER, M. D.

NEW YORK, N. Y., July 14, 1954.

Re Mr. John Steuben, 40-50 Denman Street, Elmhurst, Long Island. Dr. ROBERT V. SAGER,

New York, N. Y.

Dear Dr. Sager: Mr. Steuben came to my office this morning, as suggested by you, for a complete heart examination. He was accompanied by his wife. You were present later for the discussion. The following is my report of this examination:

Family history: Mr. Steuben's father died at the age of 73. His mother died of hypertension at the age of 63. He has 1 brother and 3 sisters living and well. A half-brother is not in good health, but the exact cause of his illness is not

known. Mr. Steuben has two children living and well.

Habits: Coffee—formerly drank a great deal of coffee. He now limits himself to 2 or 3 cups of coffee in the morning and 1 cup at night. Alcohol—only an occasional drink. Tobacco—he was formerly a heavy smoker, smoking up to 3 packages of cigarettes a day. He now smokes about 1½ packages of cigarettes a day. He sleeps rather poorly at night. He is awakened by shortness of breath.

Occupation: is editor of magazine.

History: Mr. Steuben had his appendix removed in 1949 and an operation on the left kidney for removal of stones in 1951. For some time, Mr. Steuben has noticed some difficulty in breathing, particularly on walking up hills. he was smoking heavily, he thought this was due to his heavy cigarette smoking. He also thought the pains in his chest might be on a muscular basis or might also be secondary to his kidney difficulties. On the weekend of June 19, 1953, he was particularly short of breath and had a great deal of chest pain on and off. On June 20, 1953, during dinner, he got very short of breath and had severe pressure across his chest. He was living in Chicago at that time. He called in Dr. Quentin Young of 1525 East 53d Street, Chicago, Ill. Dr. Young called an ambulance immediately and sent Mr. Steuben to the Woodlawn Hospital, where he remained for about a week. A diagnosis of left ventricular failure was made at that time. The blood pressure was considerably clayed. failure was made at that time. The blood pressure was considerably elevated, 220 mm. Hg. Mr. Steuben was advised to rest and to avoid physical effort as much as possible. This was rather difficult because he lived in an apartment on the third floor of a walkup apartment building. Therefore, he was mostly house confined. He was put on digitoxin, 0.1 milligram a day, and also given peritrate every 4 hours. Sometime in late October or early November 1953, he got very much worse and was put back in the hospital again. At that time, an attempt was made to give him hexamethonium for his hypertension, but after 3 days this drug was stopped because of severe reactions. At the end of November 1953, Mr. Steuben moved to Elmhurst where he is living at the present time. He had previously seen you on a visit to New York in June 1953, so he put himself under your care. His condition, instead of improving, got gradually worse, so in January 1954 you advised him not to travel to and from his office. Since January 1954 Mr. Steuben has remained mostly at home. On 3 or 4 occasions, he tried to go out to a neighborhood restaurant for a meal but had so much shortness of breath when he returned home that he has given that up. Recently, he has begun to cough quite a bit and vomits after nearly every meal. He has many attacks of chest pain of a gnawing type with radiation to the left arm, for which he takes nitroglycerin frequently. The pain in his chest radiating to the left arm occurs on walking even at a slow pace, after eating, when he has company at his home, and also on emotional stress even though the emotional stress is not very marked. He has been on a low-sodium, almost salt-free diet for some months. Over the weekend of July 4, 1954, he woke up one morning with a sense of cloudiness in the right eye. He saw Dr. B. Kimmelman, an

ophthalmologist, of 10 Downing Street, New York, N. Y., who found that there were hemorrhages in the right eye. The condition has cleared up to some extent, but Mr. Steuben is still bothered by cloudiness of vision in the right eye. At night, Mr. Steuben has difficulty in sleeping because he gets quite short of breath. He sleeps on several pillows and even then finds it necessary at times to get up out of bed and sit in a chair. In addition to the medication which was prescribed originally by Dr. Young and which he is still taking, you have put him on Raudixin and sedatives. On June 16, 1954, his sedimentation rate was found to be quite elevated. The hemoglobin is normal. The Wassermann test was negative. Urine examinations have shown the presence of albumin from time to time.

Physical examination: Age 47. Weight, 124 pounds. Height, 61 inches. Temperature by mouth, 98.4° F. His general condition is fair. His face is flushed. There is no dyspnea at rest. He is able to lie fairly flat on the examining table The retinal examination shows the presence of exudate without discomfort. in the right fundus on the temporal side of the disc. The retinal arteries are narrow and fragmented. There are no fresh hemorrhages. The pupils are equal and react to light and accommodation. There is no exophthalmos. Many teeth are missing; the remaining teeth are in poor condition. The pharynx is negative. No lymph nodes are palpable in the neck. The thyroid gland is not felt. The lungs are clear. The vital capacity is 2,400 cubic centimeters. The liver and spleen are not felt. There is no edema of the lower extremities.

Heart: The apex beat is palpable in the fifth space, 9 centimeters to the left of the midline. The rhythm is regular. The rate is 76 per minute. The first heart sound at the apex is somewhat valvular in quality. A2 is louder than P2. A systolic murmur can be heard over the entire precordial area. This murmur is quite loud and is rough in character at the apex. There is no diastolic murmur. The radial and brachial arteries are palpable and thickened. The blood pressure is 212/126. The fluoroscopic examination shows a moderate enlargement of the left ventricle. This is particularly noted when the heart is viewed in the left oblique position. The width of the aorta is within normal limits. The electrocardiogram shows an inverted T wave in Lead I, a diphasic T wave in Lead II, some elevation of the S-T segment at VR, an inverted T wave at VL, and inverted T waves at V_2 , V_3 , V_4 , V_5 , and V_6 . There is also some depression of the S-T segment at V_4 , V_5 , and V_6 . In addition to my own electrocardiogram, I reviewed two electrocardiograms which you brought to the office with you. one dated December 4, 1953, shows an inverted T wave in Lead I and inverted T waves at all the chest points. There is an isoelectric T wave in Lead II. electrocardiogram taken on June 15, 1954, shows the T wave inversions in various leads to be greater and there is now an inverted T wave in Lead II. These changes would indicate some progression in the cardiac condition between December 4, 1953, and June 15, 1954.

Discussion: Mr. Steuben has advanced hypertensive and arteriosclerotic heart

disease with enlargement of the left ventricle and evidence of left ventricular strain and also coronary artery insufficiency. The fact that he has had only recently hemorrhages in the right eye would indicate that his condition is rather precarious. Mr. Steuben complained to me of some numbness in his left thumb and also numbness of his lips. This may suggest that he has some vascular spasm in the region of the internal capsule and might easily, if subjected to any emotional strain which would increase the level of his blood pressure, have a cerebral hemorrhage. Mr. Steuben in my opinion should be kept at home spending his time resting in a chair or in hed. He is certainly not able to travel to Washington nor should he be subjected to any emotional strain at this time. In view of the fact that the electrocardiograms have shown progressive changes since December, there is a definite possibility that Mr. Steuben will not be able to improve sufficiently to increase his activities beyond what I have advised. should, of course, remain on a salt-free diet. I would advise continuance of the Raudixin, digitalis, and Peritrate. He should take nitroglycerin whenever he has the slightest bit of chest pain. He should also stop smoking.

In view of the findings in my examination today, I am of the opinion that it would not only be unwise but dangerous for Mr. Steuben to be subjected to the strain of giving testimony or being cross-examined at this time.

I appreciate very much your referring Mr. Steuben to me for examination.

Sincerely yours,

Two copies of this report: Standard and unipolar leads of electrocardiogram. Orthodiagram.

(The following press release of the Department of State was ordered into the record at a meeting of the subcommittee on June 18, 1956:)

UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY, WASHINGTON, D. C.

ADVANCE RELEASE: FOR MONDAY MORNING PAPERS, JUNE 18, 1956

The Soviet Union is aiming a sharply stepped-up propaganda drive at the movie audiences of the world, the United States Information Agency said today.

According to Turner B. Shelton, Chief of the Information Agency's Motion Picture Service, there has been a steep rise in Soviet film production, with the emphasis on films of the highest quality, pictures designed to win international

acclaim for Communist "cultural achievements."

In a report to Agency Director Theodore C. Streibert, Shelton said that the Soviet Union has indicated it will produce 120 feature films a year by 1960, as compared with an announced quota of 75 this year, 65 in 1955, and 38 in 1954. In addition, he said, the Soviet satellites and Communist China also are expanding their film production along the Moscow-dictated lines. Soviet films, he noted, currently are being shown in 59 countries.

"Communist countries are out to win worldwide recognition through the production of box-office hits," Shelton said. "They are sparing no effort—and no expense—to turn out lavish color extravaganzas that contain no blatant propaganda but that are, actually, subtle devices to sell the Soviet Union as the

cultural center of the world."

According to his report, the U. S. S. R. is spending millions of dollars a year

on feature films and documentaries.

Two distinct types of films are being produced by the Communists, Shelton said. One is the "sweetness and light" variety for export to the countries that ban the showing of outright propaganda films, and the other is the obvious propaganda film for countries where such showings can be obtained.

Among "sweetness and light" films Shelton listed the Soviet's "Othello," "Romeo and Juliet," "The Circus," Communist China's "Loves of Ling Shan Pao," and Czechoslovakia's puppet shows and special effects films which display

unusual artistry.

The Communist bloc, Shelton said, also is stepping up production of documentary films. Communist China, for example, has announced it will produce

220 newsreels and documentaries this year.

"Soviet propagandists take advantage of every opportunity to turn out expensive documentaries that will attract foreign audiences," Shelton said. prize example is the \$750,000, 14-reel color documentary which the Soviets made during India's Prime Minister Nehru's visit to the Soviet Union last year.

film promptly was shipped to India for countrywide showings."

According to Shelton, the Communist film campaign is "just beginning." Soviet Union, Communist China, and Soviet satellite countries, he said, are constructing huge film studios with Hollywood-type sets. Communist China, he declared, plans to turn out 40 feature films this year, as compared with 20 in 1955. In addition, the Communist Chinese plan construction of a new film studio in 1957.

"Communist countries," Shelton said, "have little difficulty peddling their films, even in free countries. Where distribution presents a problem, they subsidize box offices, lease theaters, and enlist the help of 'front' organizations, such as film societies, 'friendship' groups, and social clubs."

Senator Jenner. There being no further witnesses, the committee will stand adjourned.

(Whereupon, at 12:30 p. m., the subcommittee adjourned.)

(The following opinion and award of an arbitration board in the case of Daniel Mahoney, discharged employee of the New York Daily

Mirror, was ordered into the record at a meeting of the subcommittee on November 21, 1956:)

IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION BETWEEN AMERICAN NEWSPAPER GUILD, AFL-CIO, AND NEW YORK MIRROR DIVISION-THE HEARST CORPORATION

(L-16193-NY-L-37-56)

OPINION AND AWARD

There is here presented for determination and award the question whether there was good and sufficient cause for the dismissal of Daniel Mahoney by the Daily Mirror as required by the collective bargaining agreement between the parties which provides:

"Section 6-Job Security

"(a) there shall be no dismissal except for good and sufficient cause."

THE FACTS

Daniel Mahoney was employed by the New York Daily Mirror in 1934. Except for a period of service in the Armed Forces during World War II, he was continuously employed by the Mirror. He was a rewrite man in January 1956.

On January 5, 1956, he was summoned before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee. He stated, under oath, that he was not then a Communist. Queried about past membership, he refused to answer, exercising his constitutional privilege against possible self-incrimination. He was summarily discharged by the Mirror because, "Your course of conduct has terminated your usefulness to the New York Mirror."

A portion of Mahoney's testimony before said subcommittee follows verbatim:

"Mr. Sourwine. How long have you worked for the New York Mirror? "Mr. MAHONEY, I can cover this, if the committee will allow me. I have a

very brief statement here, sir.

"Chairman Eastland. No, no, sir. No, sir. No, sir; we don't-you will have to answer questions. You will have to answer questions. We are trying to accommodate you.

"Mr. Mahoney. I will answer the questions, sir.

"Chairman Eastland, All right; we are trying to accommodate your lawyer and we are trying to get through.
"Mr. Mahoney. Yes, sir. I say-

"Chairman Eastland. Answer the questions.

"Mr. MAHONEY. Sir?

"Chairman Eastland. Proceed again.

"Mr. Mahoney. May I appeal again? I have a brief statement. I would appreciate it if the committee would allow me to read it.

"Chairman Eastland. No, sir; I will not permit the statement. We want certain information from you, and counsel will ask the questions. Now proceed.

"Mr. MAHONEY. May I enter the statement into the record? "Chairman Eastland. We will receive it."

(The statement referred to will be found in the files of the subcommittee.)

"Mr. Sourwine. How long have you been employed by the Mirror? "Mr. Mahoney. For almost 22 years.

"Mr. Sourwine. In what capacity, sir?
"Mr. Mahoney. Various—currently I am a newswriter.

"Mr. Sourwine. You mean a reporter?
"Mr. Mahoney. I have been a reporter; yes, sir.

"Mr. Sourwine. You say you are a newswriter now. Are you on the desk? are vou a rewrite-

"Mr. Mahoney. I am a linotyper and I am a rewrite man.

"Mr. Sourwine. You are a rewrite?
"Mr. Mahoney. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Mahoney, are you presently a member of the Communist Party?

"Mr. Mahoney. No, sir; I am not.
"Mr. Sourwine. Have you ever been a member of the Communist Party?
"Mr. Mahoney. Sir, I'd like to answer it this way: Not only am I not a member of the Communist Party, but never in my life have I performed a disloyal or subversive act of treason, sabotage, espionage. I have broken no laws beyond the traffic violation. I have never advocated defiance-

"Chairman Eastland, Now, Mr. Mahoney-

"Mr. MAHONEY. Of the law of the Supreme Court of the United States.

"Chairman Eastland. You have not been accused-not been accused of any of those acts. Please make your answers responsive to the questions.

'Mr. MAHONEY. I am trying.

"Chairman Eastland. I think that your counsel will advise you, sir, that that is the proper thing to do.
"Mr. MAHONEY. Well, I am trying to do so, sir.

"Chairman Eastland. All right. Now the question was, Are you now or have

you ever been a member of the Communist Party?

"Mr. Mahoney. Well, sir, in view of the other remarks I made and in view of the fact that the committee has told me that there are no charges against me, I decline to answer the second half of that question.

"Mr. Sourwine. As to whether you ever were a member? "Mr. Маномех. Yes, sir; as being an invasion of my rights as a citizen, as a newspaperman, and I feel it is an abridgement of the freedom of the press, "Chairman Eastland. I overrule that and order and direct you to answer.

"Mr. Mahoney. Well, sir, I am sorry the committee does not choose to recognize the first amendment and, in view of that, I am forced to avail myself of the privileges of the fifth amendment, also.

"Chairman Eastland. All right.

THE POSITION OF THE PARTIES

The issue presented is one of "studied simplicity." The one hearing held in the matter was as brief as it was pointed. There were no allegations by the employer of employee unrest, impaired morale, etc., as a result of Mahoney's action. There were no allegations by the employer of loss of circulation, or advertisers. There were no allegations that Mahoney's writing had been biased,

slanted, or influenced in any manner.

The Mirror asserts that solely because of Mahoney's public testimony, it was afforded "good and sufficient" cause for his dismissal. The Mirror buttresses this contention by citing the ruling of the New York State Unemployment Insurance Commission that Mahoney's conduct (his public testimony) constituted misconduct, "detrimental to the employer's interest." This finding by a disinterested agency, the Mirror urges, supported and corroborated the Mirror's determination that its action was reasonable and just in dismissing Mahoney.

The guild contends that an employer is subject to a heavy burden of proof in any discharge case. That, indeed, the employer must set forth clear and convincing, factual, nonspeculative evidence that is capable of objective review. That in this particular case, there is but one fact or charge produced against Mahoney. The charge? That he exercised a privilege against possible self-incrimination; a right guaranteed to him by the Constitution of the United States. The guild states that, absent proof of any other facts relating to Mahoney's competency, or of damage to the Mirror, the action of the Mirror can only be considered unreasonable and arbitrary.

The issue presented, accordingly, could not be more simple nor, ironically, more complex.

THE FIFTH AMENDMENT

Written into the Bill of Rights over 150 years ago, and having roots in the law of England centuries ago, the fifth amendment has been especially subject to close scrutiny and debate in the last decade. Advanced methods of communication, such as television, have made the American public vitally conscious of the fifth amendment and its utilization by criminals and persons suspect of crime. Regrettably, a large segment of the public has concluded that a person, availing himself of the fifth amendment, is what he is accused of being, or did that which he is accused of doing. Thus was coined the presumptive appellation "fifth-amendment Communist," sorely troubling to many, and stirring up a storm of protest and condemnation in its wake.

The Supreme Court of the United States, obviously cognizant that a person exercising his constitutional privilege under the fifth amendment, raises a grave doubt as to his freedom from guilt, and that current popular opinion views the invocation of the fifth amendment as a certainty of guilt, met the issue with forthright resolution. In clear and ringing language our highest Court, in April of this year, reaffirmed the legal maxim that the fifth amendment is for the protection of the innocent as well as the guilty:

"The privilege against self-incrimination would be reduced to a hollow mockery if its exercise could be taken as equivalent either to a confession of guilt or a conclusive presumption of perjury." (Slochower v. Board of Education of New York, 100 L. Ed. 451, 454).

But we are not here concerned with the legal implications of a person's refusal to testify. The Constitution is concerned with criminal prosecution: "* * * nor shall (anyone) be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself * * * " (U. S. C. A. Const. Amend. V, p. 102) and not with all

the peripheral effects of pleading the fifth amendment.

The Constitution does not guarantee to a person, exercising the privilege against self-incrimination, his job, the respect of his neighbors, or an absence in the minds of his fellow workers and employer of a gnawing doubt as to his guiltlessness.

COMMUNISM IN AMERICA

There can be little doubt in the mind of any reasonable individual of the purpose of the Communist conspiracy today. It is ultimate world domination:

During the thirties, men of good faith, despairing of the economic chaos in our country, were easily deluded by the "golden apple" of communism. Fighting in the forties side by side with the Communists in an effort to suppress the international menace of nazism and fascism, it was easy to be confused as to the ultimate purposes of the Communists. But there comes a time where realization must arrive—perhaps in the late forties, but certainly no later than the Korean conflict. Anyone aiding, abetting, or partaking in the Communist conspiracy after that date cannot be a dupe, but rather a danger to the community.

In the year of Our Lord 1956, communism is a major menace to the free world,

to our democratic way of life, and to the private enterprise system. We cannot ignore these truths; we cannot romanticize or semanticize them away; we cannot wish them away; we can but accept them in their nakedness.

DISCUSSION

Ironically enough, our democratic way of life extends its protection even to those who have neither regard, belief, nor faith in its principles. Under collective-bargaining agreements requiring good cause for dismissal, persons in this category may have job security. As such, it may not be ignored that if the newspaper business cannot be termed "vital" and/or if Mahoney's position on the Mirror cannot be termed "sensitive," then the very foundation for "good and sufficient" cause, as urged by the Mirror, could crumble. In this age of "perpetual peril," the various mediums of mass communication are vital to our national security. The titans of the world are locked in a struggle cryptically described as a "cold war." It is a war of ideologies, of ideas, or propaganda. It is a battle for the approbation of the uncommitted nations of the world.

A metropolitan newspaper in America today is more than a "mirror" to the happenings of the day. It is a molder of public opinion; capable of leading crusades; capable of introducing new ideas; capable of propagating truth or propaganda as it wills. But its very nature, whether it would abdicate or not, a newspaper maintains a position of leadership and responsibility in this "cold war" that is vital to our national security. Other industries (atomic energy, defense, etc.) may be more vital, but this fact does not impair the "vital" role

of our press.

Each worker performs his task in life with tools, and these tools run the gamut from an axe to a zither. The "rewrite" man has his tools, too. They are words. Words but express ideas and so it follows that the "rewrite" man works all day with ideas. This is a war of ideas. Can his position be then deemed nonsensitive? A "rewrite" man can select the facts he considers important as relayed to him by the reporter in the field. His is the choice of the topic sentence and lead paragraph. His selection of words sets forth the tone of the article and influences, too, the choice of headline. The conclusion is irresistible that a "rewrite" man occupies a "sensitive" position on a newspaper.

The contention that the product of a "rewrite" man is subject to check by others before it reaches the public canont impair this conclusion. The "rewrite" man's skilled use of words and phrases; the background of constant deadline; the fact that his reviewers are at least thrice removed from the actual news event; the lulling effect of daily association coupled with a practical attitude to accept the product of an experienced hand without undue scrutiny-all these make ultimate detection and exposure far from simple, and, in all probability, long delayed. What difference does it make that a rewrite man may ultimately be caught? The undeniable fact is that he is in a position where he has the opportunity and capacity to do incalculable harm if he is so inclined. What more is needed to define his job as truly "sensitive"?

CONCLUSION

As stated, the issue here presented is simply—Was the public testimony of

Mahoney "good and sufficient cause for his discharge?"

The impact of Mahoney's testimony before the Senate committee was to raise a grave and gnawing doubt in the mind of his employer as to his association and connection with the Communist conspiracy. Was it during the understandable and, perhaps, forgiveable, period of the thirties and early forties? Or was it during the subsequent period of necessary universal awakening to and realization of the menacing and heinous designs of communism? Did it end when Mahoney received his subpena? Did it last until his actual appearance before the committee? Must the Mirror accept the travail of "watchfully wondering"?

Mahoney had no illusion about the impact of his public refuge behind the fifth amendment insofar as the Mirror was concerned. Witness the following excerpt

of his statement:

"If the committee possesses no such evidence (showing story slant or distortion), then it should clearly state so in the interest of being fair so that doubt or suspicion of my honesty and objectivity as a newspaperman may be removed

and that the confidence of my employer in me may not be impaired."

If Mahoney felt that his mere call to appear before a subcommittee would cause doubt in his employer's mind, then a fortiori his attitude and demeanor toward the subcommittee, his refusal to answer pertinent questions about his relationship with the conspiracy called Communist must shatter his employer's

confidence irreparably.

Yet Mahoney remained mute and this adamant attitude continued through the hearing of this arbitration when he knew that his very livelihood was "on the line." His eloquent silence before the subcommittee poses these unanswerable questions for his employer: What were Mahoney's allegiances, a decade, a year, a month, a day before January 5, 1956? A newspaper is entitled to know the answer to these questions with respect to communism in relation to a "rewrite" man, especially when publicly posed. It was reasonable for the Mirror to dismiss an employee who refused to supply the answers to these questions.

AWARD

The dismissal of Daniel Mahoney was for "good and sufficient cause," as required by the collective bargaining agreement between the parties hereto.

BURTON B. TURKUS, Arbitrator.

Dated: New York, N. Y., November 6, 1956. W. N. Thomson, Arbitrator, Concurring. John J. Green, Arbitrator, Concurring.

M. MICHAEL POTOKER,
Arbitrator, Dissenting.

JAMES WHITTAKER,
Arbitrator, Dissenting.



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